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

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
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

A DOCUMENTARY ACCOUNT
REVEALING THE CAUSES OF HER
STRENGTH, WEALTH, AND EFFICIENCY

BY J. ELLIS BARKER
AUTHOR OF "MODERN GERMANY" ETC.

ENLARGED EDITION

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PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION

THE second edition of 'The Foundations of Germany' is, as the title-page states, a very greatly enlarged one. The present volume would perhaps be described more correctly as a new book. Three chapters contained in the first edition which dealt with the causes of the World War, with the relations between Germany and Turkey, and with the German Colonial Empire, matters which have been treated by many writers, have been omitted. On the other hand nine new chapters, numbered VI to XIII and XIX, have been added. There are more than two hundred pages of new matter in the present edition.

Machiavelli, who at the same time was an eminent writer and an eminent statesman, pointed out in 'The Prince' that, according to historical experience, two able rulers succeeding one another may create a new State and firmly establish it. Modern Germany, which, after all, is merely an enlarged Prussia, has been created by four men possessed of rare statesmanlike genius, boundless ambition, singular strength of will, and unlimited daring. It has been created by Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick William I, King Frederick the Great, and Prince Bismarck. Each of these four men directed the State during an unusually long number of years. The Great

Elector governed Brandenburg-Prussia during forty-eight years, from 1640 to 1688. King Frederick William I and King Frederick the Great ruled Prussia during seventy-three consecutive years, from 1713 to 1786. Prince Bismarck conducted Prusso-Germany's foreign and domestic policy with almost regal authority from 1862 to 1890. During no less than one hundred and forty-nine years the State of the Hohenzollerns has been directed by men of the greatest administrative and executive capacity, whose brilliant successes have astonished the world, by men who autocratically wielded the entire power of the State, whose word was law, whose only aim was success, greatness, and glory. These four men have not only fashioned a new State, but have at the same time firmly impressed their extraordinary character upon the subjects. They have thus created both a new State and a new nation, and they have supplied State and nation, rulers and ruled, army and people with great traditions, with great precedents to follow, with a new rule of life.

The most eminent and the most influential among the four makers of Prusso-Germany was not Prince Bismarck, as is widely believed, but Frederick the Great. That singularly successful monarch was in truth the creator of modern Germany. His multitudinous activities inspired the generations which succeeded him. Both Bismarck and William II were his pupils. Determined upon increasing the power of the State at any cost, he introduced that non-moral policy which Prusso-Germany has followed ever since. Germany's political and military philosophers, from Von Bielfeld to Treitschke, and from Clausewitz to Bernhardi, were not originators. The advocates of 'Machtpolitik' merely built up a theoretical system upon Frederick's practice, and furnished Prussia's traditional policy with a pseudo-scientific cloak and justification.

Frederick was equally great as a general and as a diplomat, as an organiser and as a law-giver. Germany's

administrative, educational, financial, industrial, agricultural, and juridical policy is based upon Frederick's practice. A very full account of Frederick's policy and that of his great predecessors will be found in the first two chapters of this book. The fact that it is given as far as possible in the words of Prussia's rulers, and especially in those of Frederick the Great, should increase its value.

Incidentally this book reveals the failings of democracy, the defects of democratic organisation and administration. It is no doubt possible to combine the advantages of democratic with those of autocratic government, liberty with efficiency, order, and economy. Democracy need not, and should not, be synonymous with disorganisation, instability, amateurishness, drift, muddle, waste, improvidence, and unpreparedness for war. The present war has revealed the weakness of democracy. The views of the greatest German rulers and statesmen collected in this volume may indicate the cure. The experience of the present war may cause Germany to become more democratic and may cause the Anglo-Saxon democracies to become better prepared and better organised. The views of Frederick the Great on the defects of democracy and of cabinet government, which are given at length on pages 28 to 34 and 38 to 42, should be particularly interesting at the present moment.

The present volume on Germany bears the sub-title 'A Documentary Account revealing the Causes of her Strength, Wealth, and Efficiency.' Frederick the Great is one of the few statesmen who laid down his guiding principles and views in a number of secret State papers, political testaments, &c., for the use of his successors. Owing to the indiscretion of his worthless nephew, King Frederick William II, these were published shortly after his death. They are practically unknown to the general public. The most important of these invaluable documents will be found in the original French in Chapters XIV to XVIII. I would draw particular attention to them.

Prince Bismarck was Frederick's pupil. He endeavoured to carry out the idea of the Fürstenbund, Frederick's plan of unifying Germany under Prussia's leadership. The great characteristic of his foreign policy was that in it daring was blended with wise caution. In Chapter VII the secret story of the Ems telegram is fully told, and in Chapter VIII it is shown by means of little-known documents how he tricked Napoleon III in 1866, and how in that year he doubled the number of the subjects of the Hohenzollerns by concluding the most audacious, and the most profitable, peace of all time. I have endeavoured to show that Germany followed Bismarck's precedent of 1870 in going to war in 1914, and that she is endeavouring now to conclude a peace doubling her territory by following Bismarck's action in 1866.

Germany's war aims have been put forth in a petition which was drawn up by the six greatest business associations of the country. It was signed by the League of Agriculturists, the German Peasants League, the Westphalian Peasants Society, the Central Association of German Industrialists, the League of Industrialists, and the German Middle-class Association. These powerful societies represent the bulk of the German business-men in town and country. That most remarkable and important document, which frankly advocates the confiscation of private property in the conquered districts, the expulsion of the property-owners, and the enslaving of the resident working population, is given in full in Chapter XIX.

Bismarck desired that the new Germany should follow a cautious and conservative policy. He attached the greatest value to maintaining Germany's friendship with Russia and England. He foresaw and foretold that the rash and provocative policy of William II might bring about a world coalition against Germany and the downfall of the Empire. He tried in vain to oppose the Emperor's 'new course.' The contrast between his policy and that of William II, rendered chiefly in Bismarck's own words,

will be found in the lengthy Chapter III—'The Policy of Bismarck and of William II.'

The efficiency of the German people is due to their education, while that of the German army is due to the activity and excellence of the General Staff, which was reorganised by Von Moltke. Germany's educational policy is based upon that of Frederick the Great. It is described, largely in Frederick's own words, in Chapter IV, while the organisation of the General Staff and the cause of its efficiency are explained in Chapter V.

Education in Germany, from the elementary schools to the universities, is nominally free. In reality it is directed by the Government, by the military machine. The teachers at the schools and the universities, and the Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy as well, are well-drilled, State-appointed, and State-paid State officials, whose true character is disguised by their not being clothed in State uniforms. Secular education and spiritual education have been made subservient to the State, to militarism. How the German educational system has warped and distorted the national mind is shown at length in Chapter VI—'How Education has Degraded the German People.'

Germany's political propaganda in foreign countries is described in Chapter IX in the words of one of her agents at Washington. His revelations throw a good deal of light upon Germany's subterranean activities in the United States previous to the Great War.

In his book 'Politics,' Treitschke significantly placed Machiavelli, Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck side by side as the creators of the modern State, of modern Germany. While Machiavelli was undoubtedly the father of German statecraft, Luther had a far-reaching influence in shaping the character of the German rulers and of their subjects. Owing to his action, the German Reformation, which was originally a democratic movement, became an instrument for increasing the absolute power of the German

princes and for enslaving the people. Besides, Luther's coarseness and brutality affected German manners unfavourably. The influence of Machiavelli on German statecraft and of Luther on the German national character has been documentarily depicted in Chapters X and XI.

Whether one-man government is a blessing or a curse depends entirely upon the personal character of the monarch. Hohenzollern absolutism, which created Prusso-Germany's greatness and prosperity, caused the downfall of the country in 1806. At that time the Prussian people did not hold responsible the weak and incapable King Frederick William III. He was considered an innocent victim of Napoleon I. But will the German people remain similarly silent if the present war, which was caused by the recklessness and ambition of William II, should end in defeat and general ruin? Chapter XII describes Prussia's downfall in 1806, its causes and its lessons, and Chapter XIII deals with the consequences which Germany's defeat may have upon the German monarchy and people. In the latter chapter it is shown that the Germans were a democratic nation in the past, that their democratic spirit is not dead, that their democratic character has been suppressed, but not entirely been destroyed, by the Hohenzollerns, that the Germans possess considerable aptitude for self-government. A German defeat may discredit the Hohenzollern autocracy and may make Germany once more a democracy, and possibly a republic.

The bulk of this volume has appeared in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, *The Fortnightly Review*, and *The Contemporary Review*. The original articles have been considerably expanded and have been interconnected. I would cordially thank the editors of these three monthlies for permitting me to reprint them.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

LONDON, *March* 1918.

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THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY

CHAPTER I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S STRENGTH, WEALTH AND EFFICIENCY[1]

BEFORE the outbreak of the present war many very eminent, but very ill-informed, people publicly expressed the belief that Germany would not dare to go to war because the Powers ranged against her were too strong, because she was too poor, because her finances were in disorder. Immediately after its outbreak they proclaimed equally loudly that Germany would rapidly be defeated, that the combination of Franco-British wealth and of Russian numbers, of the greatest industrial and the greatest agricultural nation, of the largest army and the strongest fleet, would inevitably prove fatal to Germany, that before long the armies of the Allies would sweep all over Germany and enter Berlin. Since then many months have elapsed. The Allies have not yet succeeded in seizing firmly upon German soil. On the other hand, the Germans are still in possession of nearly all Belgium, and of Serbia, and they hold besides large and exceedingly valuable districts of North-eastern France and of Western Russia which contain some of the most important manufacturing centres.

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1915.

Belgium, Poland, and North-eastern France have become German strongholds and German arsenals. Germany controls territories filled with fortresses and with machinery of every kind. Nor is this all. She has not only successfully defended her own country and invaded her neighbour States ; she has in addition carefully organised the vast territories occupied by her troops and has thoroughly organised the defence of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey as well. Lastly, she is providing Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey not only with an abundance of officers and soldiers, but also with money, arms, ammunition, and supplies of every kind. She is governing and administering three great States. Without Germany's help Turkey and Austria-Hungary would probably have been lost. Germany's great military achievements, her vast industrial and financial strength, the foresight and ability of her military and industrial leaders and of her administrators, and the unity and the unflinching devotion of her people in field and factory have amazed even the best informed.

At the moment the cry of national organisation is on everybody's lips. We are told that the British nation, that the whole British Empire, must be organised for war, that a perfectly organised nation such as Germany can be overcome only if all the human and material resources of the Empire are brought to bear upon the struggle. Unfortunately, most Englishmen have only a vague idea what national organisation means and involves. Since statesmanship, the science of the vital interests of the State, as Prince Metternich described it, is absolutely ignored by the British and American universities, Germany's national organisation and administration are practically unknown to the English-speaking peoples. Industrious investigators have described to us in detail the outside of certain German institutions and organisations, but they have failed to show us their mainsprings and spirit, and to reveal to us the true sources of Germany's strength,

wealth, and efficiency. In the following pages I will endeavour to describe the causes of Germany's marvellous military and economic achievements, and will show that the chief cause of Germany's strength is discipline. In doing this I shall give a large number of most important documents, nearly all of which have not previously been published in the English language.

German efficiency and thoroughness have been plants of slow growth. Germany's administrative policy was not created by Bismarck, nor was her military policy initiated by Moltke. If we wish to discover the sources of Germany's power, we must acquaint ourselves with the views and teachings of those great men who created Germany's administrative, military, financial, and economic policy, who created her traditions, who made modern Germany. We must look into the past to understand the present.

Three centuries ago Brandenburg-Prussia, which became a kingdom only in 1701, occupied probably a far lower position in Europe than that held by one of the Balkan States at present. The country had neither a national organisation nor an army. The people were poor, rude, uncultured, ignorant, and were devoid of a sense of unity and of patriotism. The Germans, as a race, are not particularly gifted. Man for man, Englishmen and Frenchmen are probably their superiors. However, a Government can make or unmake the character of a nation. The Germans have been made what they are by their masterful rulers, especially by Frederick William, the Great Elector, by King Frederick William the First, and by Frederick the Great. Pliable materials are most easily moulded. The success of the three greatest rulers of Prusso-Germany is perhaps largely attributable to the fact that they set to work on the most unpromising raw material, upon poor, ignorant, and submissive boors.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, was born in 1620,

and he came to the throne in 1640, at a time when the Thirty Years' War of 1618–48 was still raging. As a youth he had spent three years in Holland, which was then the wealthiest, the most advanced, and the most warlike country in the world. As Brandenburg-Prussia had been terribly devastated by the warring troops, he wished before all to create an army for its defence. However, he found it very difficult to raise the necessary money. Self-government prevailed in his scattered dominions. As the nobility and the Estates jealously defended their privileges and refused to vote the necessary funds, the Elector resolved to break their power and to place taxation on a compulsory basis.

He gradually destroyed popular representation, such as it was, and made the Estates a mere tool. At last they were called together exclusively for the purpose of voting money. They were allowed to sit only for a fortnight, and to discuss nothing except the proposals which the Elector put before them. At the same time, they were informed that any funds which they failed to vote would be collected from them by force, by 'military execution.' The written remonstrances and protests of his Parliament were usually returned unanswered. At last the Estates of Prussia declared in 1674 that they did not care to attend the Diet any longer because their gathering led to nothing except an increase in taxation. The Great Elector replied that he also did not see the necessity of a Diet which did nothing but complain and produce nothing but unnecessary expense and delay. Frederick William, like Bismarck, preferred governing without a parliament.

Soon after his advent the Great Elector raised a force of 3000 men. This was the first standing army of the Hohenzollerns, and it grew apace. In 1651, after eleven years of government, the Great Elector had an army of 16,000, and in the war of 1665 he was at the head of 26,000 men supplied with seventy-two guns. His soldiers were

highly trained and disciplined. By enormous exertions he had made Brandenburg-Prussia an important military Power.

The Great Elector ruthlessly and tyrannously suppressed existing self-government in his possessions, and gave to his scattered and parochially minded subjects a strong sense of unity. Relying upon his powerful army, he enforced his will upon the nobility, the Estates, and the citizens, and made himself the absolute master of the country. He ruled the State with savage energy and with great ability. To enable the people to bear the cost of a large army, he strove to increase their wealth by promoting agriculture, commerce, and the manufacturing industries. He imported from Holland skilled engineers who reclaimed swamps, and able farmers and gardeners who improved cultivation. Every peasant had to lay out a garden, and none might marry unless he had planted at least six oak trees, and had planted and grafted at least six fruit trees. To improve industry and commerce, he constructed the Frederick William Canal, connecting the Oder with the Spree and the Elbe, and numerous high roads, and introduced a modern system of posts and mails.

As his country had been depopulated by the Thirty Years' War, he wished to attract to it new inhabitants. By an Edict of October 29, 1685, he promised to the Huguenots who fled from France owing to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes assistance for defraying their travelling expenses, permission to settle where they liked, freedom to bring in their goods and chattels free of all charges. The needy were to receive empty houses which the Elector would buy from their owners. They were to be given building material of every kind for repairing these houses, and to be freed from all imposts for six years. The well-to-do who wished to build houses for themselves were to be given land and building materials, and to be free from all imposts for ten years. The rights of citizenship were to be given gratis.

Manufacturers and artisans were to receive machines, raw material, and monetary subsidies. Agriculturists were to obtain ground suitable for cultivation. The refugees were to be allowed to settle differences among themselves by voluntary courts of their own, and in every town a preacher was to be maintained for them at the Elector's cost. French noblemen were to enjoy equality with Prussian noblemen, &c.

As the French refugees might be deterred by the rigorous climate and the poverty of Brandenburg and migrate to Switzerland, England, and Holland instead, the Elector wisely tried to induce them to come to his country and remain there by granting them far more valuable facilities and privileges than they were offered elsewhere. The result of his policy was that many French refugees who had gone to Switzerland and Holland went later on to Brandenburg. According to Ancillon's 'Histoire de l'établissement des François Réfugiés,' there were, in 1697, 12,297 French refugees in Brandenburg, not counting the military.

Numerous French people settled in Berlin, brought to that town their industries, and raised the intelligence of the population by their culture, energy, and vivacity. The French immigrants and their descendants became most valuable citizens. They founded industries, entered the professions, and many of the most eminent Germans are direct descendants of the French refugees. Some maintained their French names, like De la Motte Fouqué, Michelet, Lestocq, Ancillon, De la Courbière. Others Germanised them. Among the descendants of the French refugees were the brothers Humboldt. At the end of the Great Elector's reign no less than one-fourth of the inhabitants of Prussia were foreign immigrants and descendants of foreign immigrants.

By the policy outlined the Great Elector greatly increased the population, the wealth, and the military power

of his country. By a skilful and daring diplomacy, and by the energetic use of his excellent army, which he had been able to create only by destroying the power of the Estates and by greatly increasing the wealth of the people, he vastly enlarged his territories and gave to the State a great prestige throughout Europe. Among his victories, that over the dreaded Swedes at Fehrbellin was the most glorious. During the forty-eight years of his wise, energetic, but ruthless, reign, the territory of Brandenburg-Prussia was increased by nearly 50 per cent. Its population rose from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000, notwithstanding wars, famine, and pestilence. The success of the civil administration of a country can be gauged largely by the revenue returns. During the rule of the Great Elector the State revenue of Brandenburg-Prussia increased, incredible as it may seem, nearly five-fold, from 500,000 to 2,500,000 thalers. He had found a poor, devastated country without order and without an army. He left a greatly enlarged State, a comparatively wealthy and much larger population, and a large and excellent army to his successor.

In 1688 the Great Elector died. His place was taken by Frederick the Third, who in 1701 assumed the royal crown and the title of King Frederick the First. Frederick was a vain and worthless monarch. Under his rule the country declined and decayed. Maladministration became general. However, he maintained and even increased the Prussian army. That was his only merit.

Under the inept rule of this Frederick, who tried to ape Louis the Fourteenth, and who wasted the national resources in vain ostentation, luxury, and debauchery, the lifework of the Great Elector was largely destroyed. The unification, concentration, and organisation of the Prussian administration and of the whole national life which that great ruler had effected and the efficiency which he had created were temporarily lost. Favourites and mistresses ruled and robbed the country, and the worthless King went

so far in the neglect of his duties that he handed to his Minister-favourites signed blanks to be filled with orders and instructions at their pleasure, thus saving himself the trouble of reading documents requiring his signature.

His son, Frederick William the First, was one of the most remarkable and one of the greatest rulers the world has seen. He is unknown to the English-speaking peoples, for Carlyle and Macaulay have made a caricature of him. His eminence as a ruler may be seen from the fact that Frederick the Great, in writing an account of his life, closed it with the words: 'As all the strength of the spreading oak has sprung from a little acorn, so the greatness of Prussia has sprung from the industrious life and the wise measures of Frederick William the First.' Frederick William was neither brilliant, nor had he winning ways. He was the organiser, the disciplinarian, the schoolmaster, the true maker of modern Germany. History which has named his son 'the Great' should call Frederick William the First 'the Thorough.'

The Great Elector had, as we have seen, destroyed the power of self-government and of obstruction in Prussia, and had thus cleared the way for his successors. Frederick William the First made use of the opportunity which his grandfather had thus provided, and founded in Prussia a perfectly organised modern State, a model administration, and created a perfectly equipped and ever ready army.

Frederick William was in every respect totally different from his father. He was uneducated, boorish, coarse, gluttonous, harsh, brutal, suspicious, domineering, grasping, impetuous, and filled with energy and determination. While he lacked nearly all the finer qualities, Nature had given him cunning, unlimited common sense, a passionate love of industry and orderliness, and a strong sense of acquisitiveness, qualities which are often found in illiterate

peasants who succeed in accumulating great wealth in a life of unceasing labour, strife, and penurious thrift.

Frederick William the First had watched life at the Prussian Court in his father's time with horror and disgust. He came to the government in 1713. Although he was only twenty-five years old and quite unacquainted with affairs of State, he immediately set to work in his rough and impulsive way to clear the Augean stable of Prussia, being determined to save it from bankruptcy and to introduce in it a regime of frugality, thrift, morality, and efficiency. His first action consisted in dismissing the great majority of the courtiers, reducing the royal expenditure to one-fifth, and applying the amount saved to increasing the army. He sold the bulk of the useless jewellery, plate, valuable furniture, horses, carriages, and wine which his spendthrift father had accumulated, and forced those who had robbed the State in his father's lifetime to disgorge. He sold or let all unnecessary royal edifices, and converted vast royal parks and pleasure gardens into ploughed fields and drill grounds. While, according to Beheim-Schwarzbach, the coronation of King Frederick the First had cost 6,000,000 thalers, his own cost only 2547 thalers and 9 pfennigs.

King Frederick William had seen the advantage of conscientious one-man rule in the case of the Great Elector. He resolved to administer Prussia autocratically, treating the whole country like a huge private estate, and to improve it in every direction to the utmost of his ability. He wrote on one of the first days of his government, according to Droysen, that he would be his own field-marshal and his own minister of finance. He might have added that he would be his own minister of war, agriculture, commerce, education, justice, religion, and home affairs as well. He ordered the affairs of the Church, and prescribed the nature of the services and of the sermons. In every sermon the duties of the subject, and especially the duty of paying the taxes punctually, had to be mentioned. Other creeds

were not to be attacked by the clergy. Sermons were to be short. If a sermon lasted longer than an hour the clergyman was to be fined two thalers. Frederick William despised those citizens who lived without productive work, especially lawyers, artists, scientists, actors, dancing-masters, and money-lenders, and he prosecuted usurers with the greatest energy. Usurers advancing money to minors could, by his edict of 1730, be punished with the confiscation of their entire capital, with a whipping, and even with death. He thought newspapers superfluous and wholly mischievous. He prosecuted them, and in 1713 and 1714 he prohibited their appearance in Berlin altogether.

Frederick William the First desired to strengthen Prussia and to increase its territories. Clearly recognising that wealth is power, and that only a disciplined, well-governed, and prosperous nation can provide a powerful army, he concentrated his boundless energy upon improving the national administration, increasing the wealth of the people, and strengthening the army. When Frederick William came to the throne the army was in a bad state and was 30,000 men strong. He rapidly increased it. In 1725 it came to 64,263 and in 1740, the year of his death, to 89,099 men. At that time Prussia had only 2,240,000 inhabitants. How enormous Prussia's army was may be seen by the fact that at the same proportion of armed men to the civil population, England would now have in peace time a standing army of nearly 2,000,000 men, and Germany one of nearly 3,000,000 men. By sleepless vigilance he made his army the most perfectly drilled and equipped and the most ready force in the world. Frederick the Great himself acknowledged in his writings that he owed his wonderful victories to the excellence of the army which his father had created by twenty-seven years of unceasing labour.

Frederick William worked unremittingly for the country from dawn till deep into the night. Field-Marshal Count von Seckendorf, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, a

most reliable observer, admiringly wrote on April 25, 1723, according to Arneth's 'Life of Prince Eugene':

> It is certain that nowhere in the world one can see troops comparable with the Prussians for beauty, cleanliness, and order. Although in drill, training, and marching much is forced and affected, nearly everything is useful and efficient. Besides, it must be admitted that the army and the troops lack nothing that is needed. The soldiers number 70,000, and every regiment has at least a hundred more men than the normal figure. The Arsenal is superabundantly provided with field artillery and siege artillery, and only the teams are missing. Moreover, there is such an enormous store of powder, shot, and shells as if a great war was threatening. In Berlin and all about Brandenburg one sees as many troops moving as one saw in Vienna during the last war against the Turks. All this activity is directed by the King in person, and only by him. Besides, he looks after the whole public administration in all its branches with such care and thoroughness that not a thaler is spent unless he has given his signature. Those who do not see it cannot believe that there is any man in the world, however intelligent and able he may be, who can settle so many things personally in a single day as Frederick William the First, who works from 3 o'clock in the morning till 10, and spends the rest of the day in looking after and drilling his army. . . .

Frederick William the First created not only the German army, but also the German administration and the Civil Service. He made the German bureaucracy the ablest, the most hard-working, the most thorough and the most conscientious body of Government servants in the world. He created its traditions, and gave it that ability, zeal, and integrity which it has shown ever since.

Having punished severely those officials who had taken advantage of his father's neglect of public affairs, having dismissed the incompetent, and having reduced the salaries of the over-paid, he endeavoured to force thoroughness and good order upon the bureaucracy by his personal

example and supervision, and by the severe punishment of all who failed in their duty. However, the existing organisation could not be made to work smoothly and with despatch. When the King found that the departments could not be made to work in harmony, and when all the attempts of his ministers at reforming the service had failed, he retired to one of his country houses and drafted there in seclusion in his almost illegible hand and in very ungrammatical German the most comprehensive regulations for the reform of the Prussian administration. They may be found in Foerster's 'Life of Frederick William the First,' in which they fill more than a hundred pages. All the departments were to be harmonised by being united in a single body. The King gave the most minute orders regulating the proceedings of the 'General Directorate,' the supreme administrative authority of Prussia, and of the individual departments. The nature, thoroughness, and minuteness of his instructions will be seen from the following characteristic and amusing extract from the instructions to the General Directorate:

In summer the Ministers shall meet at 7 o'clock in the morning, and in winter at 8 o'clock.

The meeting shall not break up until all the matters which are to be discussed and decided upon have been disposed of. Not a single document must be left over for another day.

If the business in hand can be finished in an hour, the Ministers are free to go. If it cannot be settled in the forenoon, they must continue sitting without interruption until 6 o'clock in the evening or until all the business is completed.

We herewith order Our Minister von Printz that, if the Ministers are working later than 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he shall have fetched for them four good dishes of food from the royal kitchens, together with an adequate quantity of wine and beer. Half of the Ministers shall dine while the other half shall continue working, and those who are working shall dine as a second shift when those who were

dining have finished and are again at their work. In that way the work will be diligently and faithfully done. . . .

If one of the Ministers or one of their Councillors should arrive an hour later than we have ordered, and if he has not Our written permission for being late, one hundred ducats shall be deducted from his salary. If one of the Ministers or Councillors should miss an entire sitting without being prevented by illness or without having Our permission, he shall be fined by the deduction of six months' pay. If anyone should miss a second sitting without Our permission or without being ill he shall be dismissed from his office with disgrace, for as we pay our Ministers and Councillors they must work.

With regard to the dinner of the Cabinet and the Councillors, Minister von Printz received further instructions:

The head cook must at every sitting inquire at eleven o'clock through a servant whether he should provide dinner or not. Now we order herewith that in case dinner should be required by the Ministers and high officials there shall always be four good dishes, namely a good soup, a good piece of boiled beef with vegetables, a good dish of fish, and a good piece of roast beef, mutton, or veal.

In addition there should be a quart bottle of good Rhine wine for every person. However, the bill of fare should not always be the same. There should always be a change of dishes. The food should always be the same as that which is put before their Majesties themselves. It shall be served only by a single servant, for otherwise the room will be crowded with servants. To reduce the number of servants, every one of the Ministers shall receive together four plates and a glass, and a large basket shall be provided into which the soiled plates can be put.

Frederick William had the highest conception of duty. He lived not for himself or for his family, but for his country. He worked most conscientiously and like a strenuous business man. Thoughts of his duties constantly disturbed his sleep. Not unnaturally he demanded that all his officials

should be as hard-working and as thorough as he was himself. He treated his ministers as unceremoniously as he did his non-commissioned officers if they neglected their duty. In speaking of the Prussian Administration he habitually called it 'my machine.' It became indeed a machine absolutely controlled by the King. It acted with precision and speed, like clockwork. His officials had to work unceasingly and rapidly, but they were not allowed to become mere mechanical tools, for intelligence was as much demanded of them as was industry. Isaacsohn in his excellent three-volume work, 'Geschichte des preussischen Beamtenthums,' described the reforms introduced by Frederick William the First as follows:

The Prussian Civil Service was organised and developed on military lines. In the Prussian Civil Service, as in the army, skill, obedience, punctuality, cleanliness, and determination became the first and most indispensable qualifications. Official positions were given only to those who possessed a thorough practical knowledge of their office, and whose appointment was an obvious advantage to their superiors and to the State. The military spirit which permeated Prussia since the time of Frederick William the First filled the whole body of officialdom to the highest degree, and caused Prussia to be called a military State. Already as Crown Prince, Frederick William wore chiefly a military uniform, and after 1725 he appeared exclusively in military dress. . . .

The great characteristic of the new Prussian bureaucracy was the absolute responsibility of every official. None could hide behind another's back or behind a piece of paper, or plead that he had misunderstood his orders, that others were responsible. If a mistake had been made the culprit could invariably be found and punished. Isaacsohn tells us:

Never before had the officials so urgently and so unceasingly had impressed upon them the fact that they were personally responsible, and never before had personal responsibility so sternly been enforced. . . . The principle of personal responsibility was the great characteristic feature of the instructions given by the King to his Ministers. Every document put by the higher officials before the General Directorate had to be signed by one of the Councillors who, by giving his signature, assumed responsibility for its contents, and every document put before the King bore in addition the signatures of the five departmental Ministers. . . .

No Councillor was to be employed in the province to which he belonged, in order to abolish favouritism and personal considerations of every kind. Officials were to act with absolute impartiality. . . . That was particularly necessary because the nobility and the prosperous citizens, from whose ranks the higher officials were recruited, were not in sympathy with the administrative and financial reforms introduced by the King. . . .

The absolute subordination of the Civil Service from the highest to the lowest, their unquestioning obedience to the King, together with their absolute responsibility not only for their own actions, but also for those of their colleagues and their inferiors, created among them an extremely strong sense of professional honour, solidarity, and of professional pride. The influence of the nobility and of Society diminished unceasingly. The service of the King required undivided attention. The King's uniform, which every Civil Servant had to wear when on duty, kept the feeling alive among them that they were the King's servants and had to represent the King's interests. The power of the officials and their independence, in case they were opposed by strong social influences, was increased by the fact that the officials were strangers in the districts in which they were employed, for Frederick William continued the policy of appointing only strangers to the district to official positions, a policy which the Great Elector had introduced in order to overcome the opposition of the Estates in his policy of centralisation and of unlimited personal Government. . . .

Every official document had to be signed, and every signature involved the responsibility of the man who gave

it. The members of the Ministry were jointly responsible for one another. Every mistake, every error, every delay was visited on the guilty. The greatest exertions were demanded from all officials. Remonstrances and protests were useless. The King enforced discipline absolutely, and his servants had either to obey or to go under. The discipline enforced had the most marvellous results. He taught the officials to work with exactitude, rapidity, conscientiousness, and care, and thus Prussian officialdom became a model throughout Germany.

Ministers of State, like generals and colonels, obeyed unquestioningly and carried out their orders with military precision and punctuality. Only if the King had clearly acted in error they ventured upon a respectful protest. Every Minister, even if he were personally easy-going and soft-hearted, was compelled in his own interest to maintain in his department the same rigid spirit of order, punctuality, and rapidity which the King enforced upon his Ministers, and from the Minister's room the spirit of order and efficiency spread through the departments and through all ranks down to the humblest officials.

Frederick William hated flattery, and demanded from all his officials brevity and the naked truth. An official who had deceived him was lost. In his instructions to the General Directorate he stated emphatically in specially large print :

We do not wish in any way to be treated with flattery. We wish always to hear the clear truth. Nothing must be hidden from Us, and no falsehood must be put before Us, for We are the Lord and King and can do what We like.

In order to ensure the integrity and efficiency of the Prussian Administration and of the whole body of officials, Frederick William created a special authority, the ' Fiskalat,' which, by means of agents, was to supervise and watch all the officials and to bring every irregularity directly before the King. In his instructions to the chief of the

Fiskalat, von Kattsch, the King wrote with his own hand : ' Von Kattsch shall not spare anyone, whoever it may be, even if it be my own brother. He must, of course, carefully look out for thieves of every kind. He must watch all and spare none, and he may be assured that I shall support him with energy against all as long as I live.' The monthly and quarterly reports of the Fiskalat enabled the King to deal rapidly with every abuse, trace it to its very source, and punish the guilty.

A government which governs can easily form the character and the habits of the people. The German people are often praised for their thoroughness, industry, frugality, and thrift. These qualities are not natural to them. They received them from their rulers, and especially from Frederick William the First. He was an example to his people, and his son carried on the paternal tradition. Both Kings acted not only with thoroughness, industry, frugality, and economy, but they enforced these qualities upon their subjects. Both punished idlers of every rank of society, even of the most exalted. The regime of Thorough prevailed under these Kings, who together ruled during seventy-three years. These seventy-three years of hard training gave to the Prussian people those sterling qualities which are particularly their own, and by which they can easily be distinguished from the easy-going South Germans and Austrians who have not similarly been disciplined.

Frederick William the First was a stern disciplinarian, not only to his people, but even to his family. When his son and heir tried to flee the country in order to escape the bodily violence which he had to suffer from his father, Frederick William wished to have him shot by a court-martial as a deserter, although he loved his children, for duty, as he conceived it, was with him a stronger sentiment than affection. The harshness of Prussian education and the absolute discipline enforced in the Prussian families

and the Prussian schools are due to the example of the man who not only created the Prussian State but moulded the character of the German people upon his own.

Following the example of the Great Elector, King Frederick William strove to increase the wealth of the people, by improving communications and agriculture, by encouraging commerce and industry, and by settling numerous foreigners on the waste lands in his dominions. He drained swamps, constructed canals and roads, and on June 3, 1713, three months after he had come to the throne, he demanded that all the supplies for the army should be bought in Prussia. Only then it was discovered how low the Prussian industries had sunk. To raise them, Frederick William protected the manufacturing industries, especially the woollen industry, and forbade in his instructions to the General Directorate the investment of Prussian capital abroad.

How lavishly the thrifty King spent money for the improvement of the country may be seen by the fact that, although the whole income of the State amounted only to 7,400,000 thalers per year, he spent in the course of six years 6,000,000 thalers for improving the Province of Lithauen alone. He created there a number of towns, 332 villages, twenty-four water-mills, eleven churches, hundreds of schools, &c.

The Germans are perhaps the best educated people, and they have Frederick William to thank for it, for he was the first monarch who introduced compulsory education. It aimed at making the people useful and patriotic citizens. On September 28, 1717, Frederick William published an edict, which stated :

We regret that we have noticed that parents, particularly in the country, omit to send their children to the schools, and allow them to grow up in ignorance not only of reading, writing, and reckoning, but also in the knowledge of those things which are necessary for their soul and their salvation.

In order to abolish this most pernicious evil we have resolved to publish this edict and to order most earnestly that in those places where there are schools parents shall be compelled by severe punishment to send their children to school daily in winter and at least once or twice a week in summer, when they are not wanted at home, so that they shall not forget entirely in the summer what they have learned in winter. The children shall pay 2 dreiers per week to the schools, and if the parents cannot afford it, the school money shall be paid by the Local Authorities.

While Frederick William promoted elementary education, recognising its practical utility, his peasant-like ignorance prevented him understanding the use of the sciences and arts. He despised higher education, learning, and the arts of civilisation, to the despair and dismay of his son and heir, who loved them. He made learned professors court fools, and made his court fools university professors. Hence, Prussia remained a land of boors and soldiers, and Frederick the Great believed to his death that Germany was an unsuitable soil for the sciences and arts, that German was and always would remain a barbarous tongue, that the arts and sciences could not flourish in Prussia, and he surrounded himself with Frenchmen.

King Frederick William was a great organiser and administrator. He created the framework of the Prussian State and its traditions, and impressed his own character upon the nation. However, he did not possess the gifts of a great commander, and still less those of a diplomat. His boorish roughness, his impetuousness, and his choleric temperament prevented him securing any success in the field of diplomacy. Therefore, he obtained only an insignificant accession of territory. However, owing to his excellent administration and his thrift, he built for the future. He enormously increased the strength and the efficiency of the country. He trebled the national revenues. He greatly increased the wealth and the number of the

people. He vastly improved the land. He nearly trebled the army, made it the most efficient force in the world, and accumulated a vast store of war material and a large War Fund, with the help of which his son acquired Silesia and successfully resisted nearly all Europe during the Seven Years' War.

The Great Elector prepared the ground, King Frederick William the First firmly laid the foundations, and Frederick the Great erected thereon the edifice of modern Germany.

The strength of Germany lies in her form of government, as shaped by her rulers. She owes her power to her great sovereigns. The Great Elector and Frederick William the First were not men of many words. They were men of action. They practised an enlightened absolutism, but did not preach it. While sovereigns like Louis the Fourteenth of France and Frederick the First of Prussia used their absolute power chiefly for gratifying their vanity, their greed, and their lust, men like the Great Elector and Frederick William the First saw in their power a trust. They worked with all their might for the greatness and glory of their country and for posterity, and they crushed all opposition, and made themselves absolute masters of the State in order to increase the efficiency of their action.

Frederick the Great's character widely differed from that of his father. He was a man both of action and of words. He possessed eloquence, imagination, and a fluent pen—he would have made an excellent journalist—and he both practised and preached an enlightened absolutism. He gave eloquent expression to the faith within him, and he tried to make the people understand the policy of their rulers and to make them partners in their Sovereign's glory.

Frederick the Great was the most gifted and the most successful Prussian monarch. He was a great strategist, a great tactician, a great diplomat, a great economist and financier, a great organiser, and a great administrator.

As he had been most successful in all his undertakings,

it is only natural that his views and teachings have always enjoyed the greatest prestige in the highest Prusso-German circles, and that they have deeply influenced the action of his successors and of their statesmen. Among the numerous writings which he left, his confidential memoirs written for the guidance of future generations and his 'Political and Military Testaments' are of course most authoritative. Among the many pupils of Frederick the Great was Bismarck. It is no exaggeration to say that the writings which Frederick the Great addressed to posterity are the *arcana imperii* of modern Germany. Those who desire to learn the secret of Germany's strength, wealth, and efficiency, should therefore most carefully study the teachings of Frederick the Great.

Frederick's 'Political Testament' of 1752, addressed to his successors, begins with the significant words:

> The first duty of a citizen consists in serving his country. I have tried to fulfil that duty in all the different phases of my life.

The idea that the King is merely the first citizen, and that his duty consists in serving his country with all his strength and all his ability runs through the writings of Frederick the Great. In his later memoirs he elaborated that idea. For instance, in his 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernment,' written in 1777, twenty-five years after his first 'Political Testament,' he stated:

> The citizens have accorded pre-eminence to one of their number only because of the services which he can render them. These services consist in maintaining the laws, in meting out justice, in opposing with all his strength the deterioration of morals, in defending the State against its enemies.
>
> The ruler should carefully watch the cultivation of the soil. He should provide an abundance of food for the people, encourage industry, and further commerce. He ought to

be like a sentinel who watches unceasingly the neighbours of the State and the activities of its enemies.

It is necessary that the sovereign should act with foresight and prudence and conclude alliances in good time, and he ought to choose his Allies among those who are most likely to promote the interests of his country.

Each of the functions named requires a wealth of knowledge from the sovereign. He must study profoundly the physical conditions of his country, and should thoroughly know the spirit and character of the people, for an ignorant sovereign is as guilty as an ill-disposed one. Ignorance in the ruler is due to his laziness, while malice springs from an evil mind. However, the sufferings caused by his mistakes are as great in the one case as in the other.

Princes, sovereigns, and kings have not been given supreme authority in order to live in luxurious self-indulgence and debauchery. They have not been elevated by their fellow-men to enable them to strut about and to insult with their pride the simple-mannered, the poor, and the suffering. They have not been placed at the head of the State to keep around themselves a crowd of idle loafers whose uselessness drives them towards vice. The bad administration which may be found in monarchies springs from many different causes, but their principal cause lies in the character of the sovereign. A ruler addicted to women will become a tool of his mistresses and favourites, and these will abuse their power and commit wrongs of every kind, will protect vice, sell offices, and perpetrate every infamy. . . .

The sovereign is the representative of his State. He and his people form a single body. Ruler and ruled can be happy only if they are firmly united. The sovereign stands to his people in the same relation in which the head stands to the body. He must use his eyes and his brain for the whole community, and act on its behalf to the common advantage. If we wish to elevate monarchical above republican government, the duty of sovereigns is clear. They must be active, hard-working, upright and honest, and concentrate all their strength upon filling their office worthily. That is my idea of the duties of sovereigns.

A sovereign must possess an exact and detailed knowledge of the strong and of the weak points of his country. He must be thoroughly acquainted with its resources, the character of the people, and the national commerce. . . .

Rulers should always remind themselves that they are men like the least of their subjects. The sovereign is the foremost judge, general, financier, and minister of his country, not merely for the sake of his prestige. Therefore, he should perform with care the duties connected with these offices. He is merely the principal servant of the State. Hence, he must act with honesty, wisdom, and complete disinterestedness in such a way that he can render an account of his stewardship to the citizens at any moment. Consequently, he is guilty if he wastes the money of the people, the taxes which they have paid, in luxury, pomp, and debauchery. He who should improve the morals of the people, be the guardian of the law, and improve their education should not pervert them by his bad example.

Frederick took his regal duties very seriously. Like his father he worked indefatigably and unceasingly for his country. He rose in summer at three o'clock, and in winter at four o'clock, and a quarter of an hour later he was at his desk. Like his father he worked much and slept little, and set an example of industry and thoroughness to his subjects.

His capacity for work was prodigious. Like Frederick William the First he supervised the army and the Civil Service in all its branches. In addition, he conducted personally the enormous business of his very active diplomacy, and as chief of the staff he planned his campaigns.

He was ready to practise that absolute devotion to the State which he preached in his writings. That may be seen by his unceasing activity. It may also be seen by the fact that he was prepared to lay down his life for his country not only in the heat of battle but in cold deliberation. He repeatedly gave instruction that, if made a prisoner, he should be sacrificed for Prussia. On January 10,

1757, for instance, during the second year of the Seven Years' War, when Prussia's position was critical, he sent the following instructions to his Minister and confidential friend and adviser, Count Fink von Finkenstein:

In the critical position of Prussia's affairs, I must give you my orders. These will empower you to take all the necessary measures in case of a great misfortune.

(1) If, which Heaven forbid, one of my armies should be completely defeated in Saxony, or if the French should drive the Hanoverians out of the country, occupy Hanover, and threaten to invade Brandenburg itself, or if the Russians should penetrate into Brandenburg, the royal family, the Highest Courts of Justice, and the Departments of State must be brought into a place of security. If we are defeated in Saxony about Leipzig, the most suitable place for the royal family and the treasure is Küstrin. If the Russians should advance into Brandenburg, or if a disaster should overwhelm us in Lusatia, everything must be brought to Magdeburg. The last place of refuge is Stettin, but it must be resorted to only in case of the utmost necessity. The garrison, the royal family, and the treasure are inseparable. They always go together. To the treasure must be added the crown diamonds and the royal table silver. In case of need the royal silver and the gold plate must be melted down without delay.

(2) If I should be killed in action, the national business must be carried on without the slightest change. Nobody must notice that the government has changed hands. The rendering of the oath and the act of homage to the new ruler should take place as quickly as possible throughout Prussia, and especially in Silesia.

(3) I might have the misfortune of being made prisoner by the enemy. In that case, I absolutely prohibit that the slightest consideration be paid to my person and that any notice whatever be taken of the letters which I may write from my place of confinement. In case of such a misfortune I will sacrifice myself to the State. Everyone must obey my brother, and he and all my ministers and generals are

responsible to me with their heads that neither territory nor money is offered to the enemy in exchange for my liberty, that the war will be continued, that all advantages for defeating the enemy will be made use of, that matters will be treated as if I had never existed.

I hope and believe that you, Count Fink, will not find it necessary to make use of the orders contained in this letter. However, in case of misfortune I empower you herewith to carry out these instructions, and as a token that they embody my firm and constant will, and that they have been given after thorough and careful deliberation, I sign this letter with my own hand and append to it my own seal.

Frederick concentrated his whole energy and ability upon the government and the advancement of his country, and he desired that his successors also should manage themselves the entire business of the State. In order to enable them to fulfil this heavy task, he considered that a special education was required.

In a State such as Prusso-Germany the education of the future ruler is of course a matter of supreme importance, for the fate of the country depends upon the character and ability of the monarch. Therefore, the instructions which Frederick the Great wrote for the education of his nephew and successor, and sent to Major Borcke on September 24, 1751, when the heir-presumptive was seven years old, are of the highest interest and importance to all who wish to understand the policy and character of modern Germany and the causes of its success, for it may be said that Frederick's instructions have guided all his successors in the education of their heirs. The following are the most interesting passages from that most important document:

I entrust to you the education of my nephew, the Heir-Presumptive of Prussia. As there is a great difference between the education of the child of a private citizen and of a child that will be called upon to rule the State, I herewith give you my instructions for your guidance. . . .

The boy should learn history, but not like a parrot. The great utility of history consists in enabling us to compare the present with the past. The intelligent study of history shows the causes which have brought about vast changes in the world. It shows besides that, generally speaking, vice is punished and virtue rewarded. Attention must be drawn to the fact that the ancient writers are not always reliable, and that one must critically examine their statements before believing them. . . .

The greatest and most important part of education consists in shaping the character. Neither you nor all the powers of the world can change the character of a child. Education can only moderate its passions and instincts.

You should treat my nephew like an ordinary child that will be called upon to succeed by its own exertions. Reproach the boy for his faults, and tell him that he will be despised by all if he will not learn. He must not be allowed to become conceited. He should be brought up quite simply. He must be courteous towards all, and must be made to apologise immediately if he has been rude to anybody. He must be taught that all men are equal, and that exalted birth without exalted merit is worthless. Let him talk freely to all. That will make him self-possessed. It does not matter if he talks nonsense, for he is only a child. His whole education should be directed with the aim of making him self-reliant. He should not be guided by others. Whether he speaks foolishly or wisely, his ideas should only be his own.

It is very important that he should love the army. Therefore he must be told at all occasions and by all whom he meets that men of birth who are not soldiers are pitiful wretches. He must be taken to see the troops drilling as often as he likes. He ought to be shown the Cadets, and be given five or six of them to drill. That should be an amusement for him, not a duty. The great point is that he should become fond of military affairs, and the worst that could happen would be if he should become bored with them. He should be allowed to talk to all, to cadets, soldiers, citizens, and officers, to increase his self-reliance.

It is particularly important that he should learn to love his country, and that all people whom he meets should utter only patriotic sentiments. With all questions discussed some moral ideas might be connected. He should learn to love humanity and kindness, sentiments which grace all honourable men, and particularly princes.

My nephew will, when he becomes older, begin to do service as a lieutenant. He must pass gradually through all the ranks. That will prevent him becoming conceited. The officers who dine with him should contradict and tease him freely to make him self-possessed and bright. He should see as much of the world as possible. . . . At every opportunity you should inculcate in him love and respect for his father and mother and for his relatives. You will find out his passions, but you must try to moderate, but not to destroy them. He should never do anything without good reason, except during his hours of recreation. For minor transgressions he should be scolded. For greater ones he should be punished by being deprived of his sword, by being placed under arrest, and by other punishments likely to appeal to his sense of honour.

Report to me about him every month, and more often if necessary. Do not make him timid by showing too much anxiety about his health and safety. Great care must of course be taken of him, but he must not notice it. Otherwise he will become soft, timid, and nervous. These instructions are valid only till the child is ten or twelve years old.

Prussia has been a military State since its beginning. The country has grown great by successful wars and by conquest. Frederick William the First not only created a powerful army but militarised the administration and the civil institutions as well. He made the entire civil life of the country subservient to his military requirements and ambitions. Frederick the Great clearly recognised that the future of Prussia would depend upon its army, and upon the military strength of the country as a whole, that it needed a form of government which was most likely to

increase the power of the State. The activity of the Great Elector, of Frederick William the First, and his own achievements had shown him how greatly an able monarch, who is entirely unhampered by popular interference and control, can advance a naturally poor and weak country.

Frederick was deeply convinced of the superiority of monarchical over democratic government in administrative matters in general, and especially in matters of foreign policy and of war. A military State, like an army, should, in his opinion, be governed not by an Administration, not by statesmen and generals, but by a commander-in-chief, by the Sovereign himself. He showed an unlimited contempt for feeble sovereigns, for the weakness and inefficiency of the then existing republics, such as Holland, and for those States which under monarchical forms were democratically governed, such as England. He repeatedly described England as a republic in disguise and sneered at its army. He frequently expressed his opinion that monarchy was a far more efficient form of government, especially in war, than democracy. He wrote, for instance, in his 'Lettre sur l'Amour de la Patrie':

A monarch is not a despot, whose only rule of conduct is his caprice. He must be the centre of the State where all the lines from the circumference unite. A monarchical government can maintain in its deliberations that secrecy which is absent in republics, and the various branches of the administration can act together like a well-trained team of horses. Besides in monarchies party spirit is far less rampant than in republics, which are often plagued by party strife and by party intrigue.

In his 'Histoire de mon Temps,' Frederick wrote:

Sweden which, under Gustavus Adolphus, had been a land of heroes became the home of cowardice and infamy under a republican government. Thus kingdoms and

empires may decline and fall after having risen to the greatest glory. The cause of Sweden's decline may probably be found in the change in the form of its government. While Sweden was a monarchy, the army was honoured. It was efficient for the defence of the State, and could never become a public danger.

In republics the government must, by its very nature, be peaceful, and the military must be kept down, for the politicians in power are afraid of generals who are worshipped by their troops and who may bring about a revolution. In republics men of ambition can obtain power only by intrigue. Thus corruption arises and destroys public morality. The true sense of honour is lost. All try to succeed by intrigue. Besides, in republics secrecy is never observed in matters of State. The enemy knows their plans beforehand and can foil them. . . .

When Sweden was turned into a republic it became weak. The love of glory was replaced by the spirit of intrigue. Disinterestedness was replaced by cupidity. The public welfare was sacrificed to individual advantage. Corruption went so far that in the Swedish Parliament sometimes the French and sometimes the Russian party was supreme, but never the Swedish.

The views expressed by Frederick regarding the republic of Sweden should give food for thought to Englishmen and Americans. Democracy, both in the monarchical and in the republican form, provides undoubtedly a less efficient government than a monarchy. In democracies party spirit proves only too often more powerful than patriotism. While party interests are promoted those of the nation are disregarded and suffer neglect. Besides, democracies are administered not by men of action but by men of words, by amateurs whose position depends on the popular will and upon the popular whim. Consequently, nearly every Government measure brought forward in a democratic State is determined not on its merits, not by its national utility or necessity, but by the question: Will it be

popular or unpopular? Will it gain or lose votes? Will it strengthen or weaken the politicians in power or the Opposition? Besides, every measure, however secret, must be discussed in public although public discussion may imperil the existence of the State. While a monarch in a well-organised monarchy such as Germany can, in a time of danger, command and thus employ the whole national resources to the best advantage without delay, the head of a democratic Government can hope to unite the citizens and impel them to action only by begging and imploring, by exhorting and beseeching them to do their duty.

A modern democracy, like an old-fashioned charity, is run on voluntary contributions. A democracy has not one master, but many masters. Every democratic citizen claims for himself the right to decide whether he will obey or not, for he is one of the sovereigns. In the words of the judicious Bagehot: 'The natural instinct of Englishmen is to resist authority.' Politicians pander to the electors, and thus the people in democracies are taught that they have rights, but not that they had duties. Many months after the beginning of a war in which Great Britain's existence is at stake, the politicians who had prevented and opposed the tuition of patriotism in the schools began teaching the citizens by posters, by the methods of patent medicine vendors, the duty of defending their country.

Organisation in time of a crisis can be efficient only if the men in power can command, and if those over whom they have authority are certain to obey. Democracy is government by argument. It does not organise, but it disorganises, and the men in authority are afraid to order men to fight or to work because every democrat claims for himself the right to do what he likes, the right to resist authority. The German Government has opposed parliamentary institutions to the utmost, and has given to the Parliament which it has granted to the people merely the

power of a suburban debating society, not so much because the rulers and the aristocracy were jealous of their privileges, but because they feared, and rightly feared, that the democratisation of Germany would destroy its power, and would prove fatal to the country in case of war.

Circumstances have made Prussia a military State. The country has grown great by its military strength. Frederick clearly recognised that the existence and the future of Prussia depended upon the army. Therefore the army was his principal care. It was to be an army not for show and for parade, but exclusively for use in war. In his 'Political Testament' of 1752 he wrote: 'The army must be managed in peace in such a manner as to make it as efficient as possible in case of war.' Nothing was to be left to chance. Preparation down to the smallest details was unceasingly recommended by Frederick. Prussia was to rely in war not on her Allies, but entirely on her own unaided strength. The King wrote in his 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement':

> The size of the national army must depend on the strength of possible enemies. A ruler cannot safely reckon upon his Allies, for these do not always fulfil their obligations, or they fulfil them only in part. Those who count upon the strength of their Allies as upon their own are sure to be deceived.

Frederick thought it of the highest importance that the Sovereign himself should direct and command the army. He wrote in his 'Political Testament' of 1776:

> If the sovereign himself does not manage the army and does not set an example to his people in military matters all is lost. If the ruler shows by his actions that he prefers the loafing courtiers to his officers, all men will prefer idling at court to working hard in the army.

In his 'Political Testament' of 1752 he wrote:

> That ruler rules best who has carefully laid down his

policy and who rules himself. He will not be hampered at the moment when a decision must promptly be made, for he holds all the threads in his own hands. It is particularly important for him that he should possess as much knowledge as possible of all military details.

Men who are not soldiers are ill-fitted for devising a plan of campaign, especially if they are unacquainted with all the military technicalities, the knowledge of which is indispensable. He who does not know the need of an army, who is not acquainted with its thousand and one requirements, who does not know how an army is mobilised, and who is unacquainted with the art of war, who neither knows how to keep discipline among troops in peace time, nor how to lead them in time of war, will never succeed in conducting a war even if he should be a most able man and statesman, economist, and financier.

I wish to convince my successors that it is necessary for every King of Prussia to make war his particular study and to encourage those who wish to take up the noble and dangerous profession of arms.

As Prussia is surrounded by powerful States my successors must be prepared for frequent wars. The soldiers must be given the highest positions in Prussia for the same reason for which they received them in ancient Rome when that State conquered the world. Honours and rewards stimulate and encourage talent, and praise arouses men to a generous emulation. It encourages men to enter the army. It is paradoxical to treat officers contemptuously and call theirs an honoured profession. The men who are the principal supports of the State must be encouraged and be preferred to the soft and insipid society men who can only grace an ante-chamber.

Only the sovereign can create and maintain perfect discipline, for only he can act with authority, and blame and punish severely according to desert without respect to birth and rank. Only he can liberally reward the deserving, can constantly review the troops and keep them efficient. Therefore the King of Prussia should be a soldier and should be himself the Commander-in-Chief. . . .

Monarchies are disgraced by soft and idle rulers who leave the command of their troops to their generals, and thus tacitly avow their pusillanimity and their incapacity.

Those who have asserted in the past that civilian politicians are fit to manage the army and navy, and that a Cabinet, a number of politicians, can make plans of war, will do well to ponder on Frederick the Great's testamentary views.

Frederick was of opinion that the quality of the army depends in the first instance upon the ability and character of the commander. He was exceedingly careful in selecting men for high command, and he wrote in his 'Guerre de Sept Ans':

The ability and determination of a general are more decisive in war than the number of soldiers. . . .

Generally speaking, towns are defended neither by their fortifications nor by the strength of their garrison, for all depends on the ability, courage, and determination of their commander.

The perfect discipline of the German army has surprised many observers. At the word of command German soldiers will act like automata, perform the greatest deeds of valour, or commit the most shocking crimes. That perfect discipline which makes men machines in time of war was created by Frederick William the First and was recommended as indispensable by Frederick the Great. The latter wrote in his 'Political Testament' of 1752:

Military discipline makes the troops absolutely obedient. It makes blindly obedient the soldier to his officer, the officer to his colonel, the colonel to his general, and the generals to the commander-in-chief. A soldier who murmurs against a non-commissioned officer, or who draws his weapon against him, and an officer who draws his weapon against his commander, must be punished with death, for no clemency is possible towards those who violate the rules of discipline.

Insubordination supplies a dangerous example. The slightest loosening of the bonds of discipline would create a spirit of lawlessness and of mutiny, and would force the commanders to obey their men. Therefore the generals and colonels are given a despotic power over their regiments.

The commanders must be responsible to the sovereign with their lives for the obedience of their men. Hence a ruler is certain that his orders will be carried out. Strict discipline makes the troops so accustomed to absolute obedience that they no longer know how to disobey. They will neither grumble, nor argue, nor complain. They will do what they are told, act according to orders, expose themselves to the greatest dangers, and go to their death at the word of command. They will follow their officers and perform deeds of marvellous valour.

Discipline fills and regulates the lives of the soldiers, prevents them using violence, stealing, drinking, and gambling, and causes them to return to their quarters at the appointed time. Thus discipline will be better observed among soldiers in the army than among monks in a monastery. Absolute subordination through all grades makes the whole army dependent upon the will of a single man, the ruler, and if he is a skilful general he need only give his orders, for he can be certain that they will be carried out with exactitude.

In a democracy in which indiscipline is general, where men in authority can request, but not command, where the army is controlled by civilian politicians, the maintenance of perfect military discipline is of course impossible. Moreover, the English soldier has two masters: his officer and the law. If he shoots at the word of command he may be hanged for murder. That conception alone suffices to destroy a perfect sense of discipline in the army.

Frederick kept the greatest secrecy with regard to Prussian affairs. His opponents were rarely able to anticipate the King's plans. On the other hand, Frederick was determined to become acquainted with the intentions

of his possible enemies. With this object in view he developed a most perfect system of espionage in all the countries in which Prussia was chiefly interested. The King wrote in his memoirs:

If one wishes to oppose the plans of one's enemies one must know their plans.

Natural allies are those States the interests of which are identical with our own. Nevertheless alliances may be concluded among nations the interests of which differ, although they will be only short-lived.

In the present position of Europe all States are strongly armed, and as a Power of superior strength can destroy the weaker ones, it is necessary to conclude alliances either for mutual defence or for foiling the plans of one's enemies. However, alliances by themselves do not suffice. It is necessary to have in one's neighbour States, and especially among one's enemies, agents who report faithfully all they see and hear. Men are bad. It is most necessary to protect oneself against being surprised.

Germany's financial strength and her financial preparedness for war have surprised all observers, except those who are acquainted with Prusso-Germany's financial policy, and with her financial preparedness for war in the past. Here also Frederick William the First, and especially Frederick the Great, have created a tradition by which Germany continues to be guided.

Finance is a most powerful weapon in war, and none understood its importance better than Frederick the Great. He wrote in his 'Political Testament' of 1752:

If a country wishes to be happy and respected it is necessary that good order in the national finances should be maintained. . . .

Prussia has not the riches of Peru, nor wealthy merchants and banks, nor all the numerous resources possessed by France, Spain, and England. However, by means of industry and thrift, Prussia may succeed in occupying a

worthy place by their side. The most important thing is that carefulness and good order should be observed in both income and expenditure.

In his 'Political Testament' of 1776 Frederick stated his views on financial preparation for war more fully. He wrote:

Since the Seven Years' War Prussia's State revenues have prodigiously increased. . . . The national revenue amounts at present to 21,700,000 thalers. With that sum the whole of the national expenditure is provided and 187,000 soldiers are maintained. After all the necessary expenditure has been provided for, there remains every year a surplus balance of 5,700,000 thalers. Of that sum 2,000,000 thalers are deposited every year in the Treasury, while the remaining 3,700,000 thalers are spent on fortifications, on land improvements, on compensation for disasters, &c. These 5,700,000 thalers are used in war time for paying the war expenditure, which comes to 11,000,000 thalers per annum. Hence, 5,300,000 thalers are required as extraordinary expenditure for every year of war.

That sum may be drawn from the Treasury, which contains at present 19,300,000 thalers. Besides that sum Prussia has another War Fund of 4,500,000 thalers, the so-called Small War Fund, from which the cost of mobilisation will be defrayed. In addition, there exists a War Fund of 4,200,000 thalers at Breslau for purchasing forage for an army of 60,000 men, and there is a Fund of 900,000 thalers in the Bank at Magdeburg with which forage for six weeks can be bought.

Besides, the War Chest should contain 11,000,000 thalers for paying the regiments in advance in war time. Of that sum 4,000,000 thalers are there, and the remaining 7,000,000 will be added within three years. It should be noted that if the whole war expenditure is to come out of the war treasure, the money in hand suffices only for a campaign of four years. Hence Prussia must act with the greatest circumspection and economy so as to have money in hand at the time when peace comes again in sight.

It will be noticed that in 1776, thirteen years after the ruinous Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had accumulated financial resources sufficient to pay for a war lasting four years. Yet he deplored that the money in hand sufficed 'only for a four years' campaign.' Foresight in financial affairs, the necessity of the most ample financial preparation for war, was taught by Frederick the Great; and subsequent rulers have acted in accordance with his teachings.

Frederick the Great attached the highest value to well-ordered finances, to the possession of large funds which might be used in time of national emergency. Hence he valued a good system of taxation which would inconvenience the citizens as little as possible and which would be strictly just. In his 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement' we read:

Foreign policy cannot prosper, and the army cannot be strong, unless the national finances are in perfect order, and unless the ruler himself is economical and prudent. Money is like a sorcerer's wand. Miracles may be performed with it. Great political undertakings, the maintenance of an army, and a wise social policy require money.

No Government can exist without taxation. The great art of raising taxes consists in doing it without oppressing the citizens. To ensure that taxation should be fair, careful Government surveys and valuations of land are made. These are carefully classified, and thus taxation is imposed in accordance with the capacity of the individuals. It would be unpardonable if through a clumsy taxation the tillers of the soil should be made to abandon the land. Having acquired their property, they ought to be able to live on it with their families in comfort.

Frederick the Great provided in peace not only all the money required for a protracted war, but the food as well. He wrote in his 'Political Testament' of 1776:

We have in Berlin a magazine of corn of 36,000 wispels,

sufficient to feed an army of 60,000 men during a whole year. There is an equally large magazine in Silesia for another 60,000 men. Besides there is a fund of 2,000,000 thalers reserved for purchasing grain in Poland. That sum can furnish 120,000 wispels. Thus Prussia is protected against the possibility of famine in time of peace, and in time of war she has sufficient corn in hand for a campaign of three years.

Those who, at the beginning of the war, believed that Germany could be starved into surrender were not acquainted with the providence of the German Government, and with the food policy which Frederick William the First and Frederick the Great had introduced, and which is still pursued by the Prusso-German Government. That Government not unnaturally follows the tradition created by the greatest Prussian rulers.

Frederick William the First had, as we have seen, created in the General Directorate a Supreme Administrative Authority, in which all the Departments of State were co-ordinated so that all should work in harmony and unison instead of hampering and obstructing one another as they had done hitherto. That co-ordination was still further developed by Frederick the Great, who thought it indispensable for the efficiency of the national administration that all the great departments of Prussia should work like a single body. He wrote in his 'Political Testament' of 1752:

All the branches of government should be closely interconnected. The management of the national finances, the national policy, and the army are inseparable. It does not suffice that one of these branches is well managed. All three must be efficiently conducted and must advance in the same direction, like a well-trained team, pulling the car of State.

In his 'Political Testament' of 1776 Frederick once more exhorted his successors:

Foreign policy, the army, and the finances are the three great branches of statesmanship, and they are so closely interwoven that they cannot be separated. All three must be cultivated simultaneously. If all three are promoted simultaneously in accordance with the rules of sound policy the State will reap the greatest advantage. . . . In France there is no real union among these three branches. They do not co-operate. Each Minister is occupied only with the care of his own department. If a similar state of affairs should arise in Prussia the State would be lost.

In the following extract from his 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement' of 1777, Frederick the Great seems almost to describe Cabinet government on a democratic basis, such as exists in England, where men govern without system and without a plan, and where government naturally and inevitably results in waste, confusion, muddle, and inefficiency; if not in disaster. The King wrote:

If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and places it into the hands of paid men, of the Ministers appointed by him, one will steer to the right and another to the left. A general plan is no longer followed.

Every Minister disapproves of the actions of his predecessor, and makes changes even if they are quite unnecessary, wishing to originate a new policy which often is harmful. He is succeeded by Ministers who also hasten to overthrow the existing institutions in order to show their ability. In consequence of the numerous innovations made none can take root. Confusion, disorder, and all the other vices of a bad administration arise, and incapable or worthless officials blame the multitude of changes for their shortcomings.

Men are attached to their own. As the State does not belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest in its welfare. Hence the government is carried on with careless indifference, and the result is that the administration, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic

administration disappears. Everyone follows his own notions. No link is left which connects the directing factors.

As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together the single object of measuring time, all the springs and wheels of a Government should be so arranged and co-ordinated that all the departments of the national administration work together with the single aim of promoting the greatest good of the State. That aim should not be lost sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual interests of ministers and generals usually cause them to oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent the carrying through of the most necessary measure.

These wise words of Frederick the Great should be placed in golden letters in all the public offices, and be learned by heart by every school child.

In modern times Great Britain has experienced the efficiency of one-man rule in the time of Cromwell and of the elder Pitt. Under these two men the British Government worked like a single body, animated by a single will, with the most gratifying success. A Prime Minister can preserve the unity in the Cabinet, and the unity of governmental action, only if he possesses the supreme direction of all departments, if Cabinet Ministers are not his equals, but his subordinates, if the curious fiction of joint responsibility of the Cabinet is abandoned, if the Prime Minister alone is responsible. A Prime Minister cannot unify the great departments and services by acting merely the part of an amiable chairman at a suburban temperance meeting.

Unfortunately, Democracy, after having destroyed the power of the King, has gradually undermined that of the Ministers as well. Thus the nation is left without a guide. It has become a gigantic business with a large body of squabbling amateur directors, but without a general manager. No one is there to command. Amateurs, men without knowledge, without practical experience, without authority, without power, without initiative, nominally

govern the country, but in reality they merely occupy office, pose as administrators, and allow things to drift. And what is worst, they have suppressed the expert. Amateur politicians have muzzled the military and naval experts, and the ' sovereign ' nation is not allowed to know the truth.

The Ministers in power practise on the nation the confidence trick on a gigantic scale. They attribute all the achievements of the experts to themselves, but make the experts scapegoats for their mistakes. Custom, tradition, the system is to blame for this state of affairs rather than the men who occupy ministerial positions. That practice prevails not only in England, but in all democracies, Switzerland alone excepted. France was almost as unprepared for war as was Great Britain, owing to the inefficiency of her political system.

Germany owes her efficiency not to the greater ability of the Germans themselves, but to the political system which Frederick William the First and Frederick the Great have created, to the fact that a single will animates the whole administration of the State, that the whole nation acts like a single man, and every other consideration is subordinated to the national interest, while in democracies parties and people are squabbling, and the Departments of State are aimlessly pulling some in one direction and some in another.

Administrative efficiency requires not only a good system but also good men. Frederick the Great knew no favourites. In his own words, ' Nature has not distributed talents according to rank and lineage.' Frederick, like Napoleon, gave rank and position only to merit. For obtaining good public servants and increasing their zeal, he attached the greatest value to two factors—to rewards and to punishments. He wrote in his ' Political Testament ' of 1752 :

Men are ruled by two motives : by the fear of punishment and the hope of reward. . . .

A ruler should search for unknown merit and reward men for worthy deeds performed in secret. He should always pay attention to this and keep agents everywhere so as to be informed of meritorious deeds. He should watch for good actions as carefully as tyrants do for conspiracies.

In his 'Political Testament' of 1776 we read:

It is particularly necessary for the preservation of morals that distinctions should be bestowed only for merit and not for wealth. That principle has been disregarded in France, and the consequence has been that public morals have declined. Formerly Frenchmen could obtain honours only by worthy deeds, but now they believe that wealth alone suffices to bring them honours.

In his 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement' of 1777 he stated:

The promotion of morality in the widest sense is one of the most important duties of the sovereign. He can do much by distinguishing and rewarding the worthy and by showing his contempt for the worthless. A ruler should loudly disapprove of every dishonourable act and refuse distinction to those who will not mend their ways.

A sovereign may do irremediable injury to the State by distinguishing people of wealth but without merit, for honours bestowed on the worthless rich strengthen the widely held idea that wealth alone suffices to give distinction. If that belief should gain ground, greed and cupidity will break all bounds. A scramble for wealth will ensue, and the most reprehensible means for acquiring riches will be employed. Corruption will spread apace, become general, and take deep root. Men of talent and of character will be disregarded, and the people will honour only those who by ostentatious expenditure advertise their wealth.

To prevent the corruption of the national character the sovereign must distinguish only men of true merit and treat with contempt men of wealth without virtue.

The way in which Frederick practised what he preached may be seen by the methods by which he forced the nobility to act worthily towards their country. In the Prussian Code, compiled under the inspiration of Frederick the Great, we read in the chapter on the nobility:

Men of nobility are particularly entitled to honourable employment in the service of the State according to their abilities. . . .

Loss of nobility is the consequence if a person of noble birth leads a dishonourable life, or a life by which he lowers himself to the level of the common people.

For committing a common crime people of noble birth may be deprived of their nobility by judicial decision.

Unfortunately, England has been corrupted by politicians who have bestowed rewards on the worthless and neglected and discouraged the deserving. Distinctions and honours are rarely given for services rendered to the nation. Hence the saying, 'Patriotism does not pay,' is generally heard. Titles and honours are frequently bestowed by party men upon other party men. They are sold for cash or are given for party services, and often for unavowable ones, to people who sometimes have done the greatest injury to the State and nation by preying upon the people, drugging them with patent medicines, plying them with bad drink, or deceiving them in the interest of the governing party. On the other hand, patriots who have laboured all their life for their country die in poverty and obscurity. Thus intrigue is rewarded and patriotism discouraged.

People who have travelled in Germany have been surprised by the efficiency of the Government services, by the punctuality of the trains, by the cheapness and promptness of justice, the excellence of the post and telephone, the efficiency of national education, the conscientiousness and the honesty of all officials, and the absence of muddle, delay, and waste. The excellence of the German officials

is due to their training. Frederick the Great considerably increased the efficiency of the wonderful civil service which his father had created by applying to it his principle of rewards and punishments, and by appropriate laws such as the following. They form part of the Prussian code, which breathes in every chapter the Frederician spirit. We read:

Nobody may be given official employment unless he is sufficiently qualified for his post and has given proof of his ability to fill it.

He who by bribery or by other improper means has obtained official employment must immediately be dismissed.

All agreements and promises by which private advantages are promised for obtaining official employment are null and void.

He who knowingly entrusts an official position to an unfit person must make good the damage which may arise to the State or to private individuals through the ignorance or the incompetence of the person appointed.

Officials in authority who have neglected to prevent mistakes and misdemeanours on the part of their subordinates which they might have prevented by acting in accordance with the official regulations are liable for the damage which their neglect has caused to the State and to private citizens.

These laws and their watchful observance have naturally increased greatly the efficiency of the Prussian bureaucracy.

Before the advent of Frederick the Great, important positions in the State were given rather according to favour than according to merit. Frederick abolished this abuse. He was determined to give official positions only to men of ability, regardless of their birth and descent. He wrote in his 'Histoire de mon Temps': 'Nature has distributed gifts amongst men without considering their ancestors.' He anticipated Napoleon's principle, 'La carrière ouverte aux talents.'

Frederick believed that the strength of a State consists

not in its wealth, but in its power—that men are more important than commodities. He attached particular value to agriculture, recognising that the peasantry would supply him with excellent soldiers, and that the development of the national agriculture would enable the soil to nourish a very large population. The King wrote in his 'Anti-Machievel':

The strength of the State consists not in the extent of its territory, not in the possession of a large solitude, but in the wealth and in the number of inhabitants. Therefore it is to the interest of a prince to people his country and to make the inhabitants prosperous.

In his 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement' we read:

The agriculturists are truly the bread-winners of the State. They should be encouraged to cultivate the land carefully, for the true wealth of the country consists in the productivity of the soil. It is true that Holland flourishes, although she produces scarcely one-hundredth of the food consumed by the people. However, Holland is a small State, where commerce has replaced agriculture. It is clear that the greater the territory of the State is, the more necessary is it to promote its rural industries. . . .

The King stated in his 'Political Testament':

War is a bottomless pit, which swallows up men. Therefore attention must be paid to people the country as much as possible. Consequently it is necessary that the land should be well cultivated and that the cultivators should be prosperous.

In Frederick's 'Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement we read:

Steps must be taken to provide at all times an abundance of food for the people. To do this the first requirement is to have the soil carefully cultivated, to drain all the wet land which can be drained, and to increase the number of cattle

and thereby increase also the production of milk, butter, cheese, and manure. Besides, an exact account must be made of the quantity of grain of every kind produced in good, medium, and bad years. When allowance is made for the quantity of grain consumed, we know how much surplus there is for exportation in good years, or how much shortage there is likely to be in bad ones.

Every provident sovereign should establish magazines to protect the people against scarcity and famine. In the bad years 1771–1772, Saxony and the provinces of the Empire suffered terribly because they had neglected that precaution. The people were forced to eat the bark of trees. Entire districts became depopulated. Thousands of people. pale and emaciated, like spectres, left the country in order to find sustenance abroad. How their rulers must have reproached themselves when they saw the calamities which they had caused !

Frederick the Great, like the Great Elector and Frederick William the First, strove to enrich the people by wise governmental action. He settled large numbers of immigrants in his thinly peopled provinces, and promoted the national industries by protection and by importing skilled workers from abroad who created new industries in Prussia. According to his Minister Hertzberg, Frederick founded more than 1200 villages, and in 1786, the year of his death, between one-fifth and one-sixth of the inhabitants of Prussia, or more than a million, were immigrants, or descendants of immigrants. During Frederick's rule about 350,000 foreigners were induced to settle in Prussia. In 1785 Prussia had 165,000 industrial workers who produced manufactures to the value of 30,000,000 thalers per year, an enormous sum at the time.

The productivity of Prussia's agriculture was stimulated by wise laws. The code drafted in Frederick's lifetime laid down :

Every agriculturist is obliged to cultivate his property

thoroughly and economically for his own good and for that of the community in general. Therefore he may be forced by the State to cultivate his land adequately, and if he nevertheless continues to neglect it he may be compelled to cede it to others.

No peasant is permitted to sell crops before they are gathered.

The number of peasant holdings must not be diminished, either by incorporating them in landed estates or by combining several of them in one hand. On the contrary, landed proprietors are obliged to see that the holdings in their villages are duly occupied. Peasants' properties where teams are kept must not be converted into holdings where no teams are kept except by special permission of the State.

Desiring to increase the strength of Prussia, Frederick the Great was as much interested in matters economic as in war. As soon as a war was ended, the King endeavoured to repair its ravages and to increase the wealth of the people as much as possible. Immediately after the end of the first and second Silesian wars, Frederick concentrated all his energy upon raising the economic strength of the nation. In the first chapter of his ' Guerre de Sept Ans,' the King tells us :

Although the late King Frederick William I had taken care to bring order into the finances of Prussia, he had not been able to do everything that was needed. He had neither the time nor the means to accomplish so great a work, and the things which had to be done were numerous. Waste lands had to be cleared and cultivated, factories to be established, commerce to be extended, and industry to be encouraged.

As the first years of the King's reign were devoted to war, he could turn his attention to internal affairs only after the establishment of peace. Along the River Oder there were vast swamps, which had probably been uncultivated since the beginning of time. Plans were made for draining

the country. This was done by a canal from Küstrin to Wrietzen, and 2000 families were established on the reclaimed land. Farther on, about Stettin, 1200 families were planted. Thus a small province was conquered by industry from ignorance and sloth. The manufacture of woollens was hampered by the lack of weavers. These were imported from abroad, and a number of weaving villages, comprising two hundred families each, were created.

In the district of Magdeburg it had been a custom since time immemorial that foreigners should come in for the harvest and return to their homes when it had been gathered. King Frederick permanently established these immigrants about Magdeburg, and thus settled a large number of strangers on the land. Through the various measures taken, two hundred and eighty new villages were created; but the towns were not neglected. The King built a new town on the river Swine near the mouth of the Oder. It was called Swinemünde.

Everywhere new industries were called into being. In Berlin the manufacture of rich stuffs and velvets was established. Factories producing light velvets and mixed stuffs were erected at Potsdam. A sugar refinery was established in Berlin. A factory for making curtain stuffs was made to enrich the town of Brandenburg. At Frankfort-on-the-Oder the making of Russian leather was introduced, and in Berlin, Magdeburg, and Potsdam was introduced the manufacturing of silk stockings and silk handkerchiefs. The planting of mulberry trees was established all over Germany. The clergy were made to serve as leaders to the cultivators, and they taught them how to raise silkworms. In out-of-the-way places where wood was superabundant but unsaleable through lack of rivers ironworks were established which furnished the army with guns and shells. About Minden and in the Mark, saltworks were created and those at Halle were improved. In a word, industry was encouraged in the capital and in the provinces. The Emden Trading Company established an important branch in China. By reducing the export duties of the

harbours of Stettin, Königsberg, and Kolberg, the customs receipts were doubled.

Through all these enterprises the revenues of the Crown, excluding those of Silesia and East Frisia, were increased in 1756 by 1,200,000 thalers although the King had not introduced any additional imposts whatever. A census showed that the number of the inhabitants amounted to 5,000,000. As it is certain that the wealth of the State consists in the number of their inhabitants, Prussia could consider herself to be twice as powerful as she had been during the last years of the reign of Frederick William I, the father of King Frederick.

The national finances and the administration of justice did not monopolise the king's attention. The army, that powerful instrument for the glory and preservation of States, was not neglected. Eighty pieces of heavy artillery were cast, and twenty mortars. The store of gunpowder which had been accumulated amounted to 56,000 quintals. In the magazines there were 36,000 wispels of oats. Thus everything was prepared for a war which was to be foreseen. . . . The ants gather in summer the food they consume during the winter, and a ruler must save in time of peace the funds which he has got to spend in time of war.

Prussia had been devastated by the Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763. It had largely been fought on Prussian territory. The condition of the country resembled its condition after the Thirty Years' War. Frederick has told us in his ' Memoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg ':

Prussia's population had diminished by 500,000 during the Seven Years' War. On a population of 4,500,000 that decrease was considerable. The nobility and the peasants had been pillaged and ransomed by so many armies that they had nothing left except the miserable rags which covered their nudity. They had not credit enough to satisfy their daily needs. The towns possessed no longer a police. The spirit of fairness and order had been replaced by anarchism and self-interest. The judges and the revenue

authorities had given up their work owing to the frequency of invasions. In the absence of laws, a spirit of recklessness and of rapacity arose. The nobility and the merchants, the farmers, the working-men, and the manufacturers had raised the price of their labour and productions to the utmost. All seemed intent upon ruining each other by their exactions. That was the terrible spectacle which the formerly so flourishing provinces of Prussia offered after the conclusion of the war. The appearance of the provinces resembled that of Brandenburg after the end of the Thirty Years' War.

However, Prussia rapidly recovered owing to the King's wise and energetic policy. Referring to himself in the third person, as he habitually did in his writings, he stated in his 'Mémoires depuis la Paix':

There is no way to increase the wealth of a country except by increasing its manufacturing industries. That is clear and evident. Hence the King, after the peace, concentrated all his energy upon this object. Within ten years, by 1773, 264 new factories had been established in the Prussian provinces. Among them was the porcelain factory in Berlin which gave work to 500 people, and its produce soon exceeded in quality the famous Saxon china. A tobacco factory with branches in all the provinces was created, and it developed an export trade in manufactured goods.

The war had disastrously influenced the Prussian Exchange, and had thus harmed Prussia's foreign commerce. Immediately after the peace the inferior coinage was withdrawn and the exchange was improved by a State Bank founded with this object in view. It had a capital of 800,000 thalers, which was found by the King. It had at first some bad experiences, but later on proved a great success.

Sovereigns, like private people, must make economies so as to have money when it is wanted. Wise agriculturists regulate watercourses and use them for increasing the fertility of the soil. Acting on the same principle, the Prussian Government increased its revenue and used the surplus for promoting the public good. It not only restored what the war had destroyed, but improved all that could be

improved. It drained swamps, improved the land, increased the number of animals in the country, and utilised the sandy soil for afforestation.

The draining of the swamps along the rivers Netze and Warthe cost 750,000 thalers, and 3500 families were settled on the land thus regained to agriculture. The work was finished in 1773, and 15,000 people were settled where formerly had been a wilderness. The marshes about Friedberg were similarly treated and 400 foreign families were settled there. In Pomerania similar works were undertaken. In Brandenburg the marshes of the Havel, of the Rhine, and many others were drained. About Magdeburg 2000 new families were planted. Since the death of his father, Frederick William the First, the King had settled 13,000 new families.

Silesia was not neglected. The ravages which the war had inflicted were made good and improvements begun. The rich abbeys were compelled to establish manufacturing industries, and soon linen, copper, and iron industries, tanneries, and oil mills arose, and 4000 new families were planted in the agricultural district of Lower Silesia.

Large landowners had incorporated numerous peasant properties in their land. Recognising that the possession of property attaches the citizens to their country, and that they can care little for a State where they have nothing to lose, the landowners were compelled to re-establish the peasants. In compensation the King helped them and improved their credit by means of loan banks. Also he took pleasure in spending 300,000 thalers in repaying some of their most pressing debts.

All these expenses were necessary. Money had to be lavishly spent in the provinces to accelerate their recovery, which otherwise would have required a century. By acting generously and lavishly prosperity quickly returned, and 100,000 people who had fled from the war-stricken country returned.

In 1773 the population was by 200,000 larger than it was in 1756, when the Seven Years' War began. In Upper Silesia 213 new villages were created. They had 23,000 in-

habitants, and plans were made for increasing the Pomeranian agriculturists by 50,000 and those of the Mark by 12,000. That project was carried out toward 1780. Between the years 1740, when King Frederick came to the throne, and 1779 the population of the provinces increased as follows: That of Prussia from 370,000 to 780,000; that of the Mark from 480,000 to 710,000; that of Magdeburg and Halberstadt from 220,000 to 280,000; that of Silesia from 1,100,000 to 1,520,000.

Although enormous sums were spent on improving the country, vast amounts were devoted to military purposes as well. On the other hand, King Frederick did not indulge in ostentatious expenditure, usually found at Courts, but lived like a private man. With rigid economy the Treasuries were filled.

In 1770 all Northern Europe was stricken by famine. The infliction required vigorous action. The poor received gifts of corn. The King had accumulated large magazines in all parts of the country. He had 76,000 wispels of grain, enough to feed the army during a whole year, and 9000 wispels for the capital alone. His providence protected the people from starvation. The army was fed from the magazines, and the people were given grain for food and seed. Next year the harvest was bad again, and the neighbour States suffered much more than Prussia because they had neglected establishing magazines in time of abundance.

While barley cost two thalers per measure in Prussia, it cost five thalers in Saxony and Bohemia. Saxony lost more than 100,000 inhabitants through starvation and flight, and Bohemia at least 180,000. On the other hand, more than 20,000 Bohemian peasants and as many from Saxony fled to Prussia, where they were welcomed, and they were made to people the territories which had been reclaimed to agriculture.

In economic matters, as in matters concerning the national defence, the public administration, and the national finances, Frederick the Great acted with foresight and providence, and his successors continued his policy. He wrote prophetically in his 'Mémoires depuis la Paix':

A wise economic policy constantly improved upon from father to son can change the character of the State and convert it from a poor into a wealthy country. A wise economic policy can make a State so wealthy that it can exercise in Europe as great an influence as any one of the leading States.

By pursuing the wise fostering policy which Frederick the Great had initiated, the Hohenzollerns have indeed converted poor agricultural Prussia into a wealthy Great Power, possessed of highly developed industries and a vast international trade.

During the last four decades, while British agriculture has utterly declined and decayed, Germany's agricultural production has fully doubled in weight, and has more than doubled in value. Hence, Germany is agriculturally almost self-supporting. On a territory which is only 75 per cent. larger than that of the United Kingdom, Germany grows bread-corn for 45,000,000 people, while the United Kingdom grows bread-corn only for 5,000,000. Besides, Germany produces, on her 75 per cent. larger area, three times as much meat, about nine times as much potatoes, and twenty times as much timber as the United Kingdom, and enormous quantities of sugar and tobacco, of which none are produced in this country, although it is suitable for their production. Hence food is far cheaper in blockaded Germany than in Great Britain.

The wise policy of encouragement initiated by Frederick William the First and Frederick the Great, and reintroduced by Bismarck, has not only enormously increased Germany's agricultural production and rural wealth, but has had a still more marvellous effect upon her manufacturing industries. During the last thirty-five years the engine power of Prussia has increased more than seven-fold. While the British manufacturing industries as a whole, comparatively speaking, have remained stagnant, the German manufacturing industries have marvellously in-

creased, and her formerly insignificant iron and steel industry is now far greater than that of this country.

In the manufacturing industries, as in commerce, Germany has successfully challenged the formerly unchallengeable supremacy of this country. The policy of action, of wise governmentalism, has triumphed in agriculture, in industry and in commerce over that of *laissez-faire* and non-interference. Unfortunately, those who during the last two decades have unceasingly pointed out the danger of allowing Great Britain's agriculture to decay and her manufacturing industries to decline and to be outstripped by German competition, as the writer of this book has frequently done in the pages of *The Nineteenth Century*, *The Fortnightly Review*, and elsewhere, preached to ears deliberately deaf. The politicians in power did not ask whether the national safety was endangered by allowing the manufacturing industries, and even the iron and steel industry, which provides weapons for war, to stagnate or to decline, or whether the decay of agriculture would do irremediable harm to this country and perhaps cripple it in the hour of peril; they simply asked whether Protection was politically a 'profitable' policy, whether it would gain or lose votes, and, believing that it was an unpopular policy, that it might lose votes, the politicians in power preached Free Trade.

Those who are acquainted with the causes of Germany's efficiency and success must look towards the future with concern. Germany makes war cheaply but efficiently. Great Britain makes war wastefully. She has spent colossal amounts with lamentably inadequate results. In view of the comparatively small war expenditure of Germany and the enormous expenditure of Great Britain, and in view of the wonderful revival which the Prussian industries have experienced after the greatest national disasters, even after 1763 and 1806, in consequence of the energetic action of her Government, and of nation-

wide co-operation, Germany may conceivably be able to bear the costs of the present war better than Great Britain, and Great Britain may emerge from the war more crippled than Germany. Unpreparedness and muddle are very expensive luxuries in war, in administration, and in matters economic as well.

A hundred and fifty years ago Prussia was a land peopled by boors. Now it is a land peopled by professors, scientists, and artists. Frederick the Great was the first Prussian monarch to realise that science and art increase the strength and prestige of nations. Hence, he began cultivating the sciences and arts, and his successors followed his example. As science and art were found to be sources of national power, they were as thoroughly promoted as was the army itself, while in this country education remained amateurish. Men toyed with science, and the universities rather taught manners than efficiency.

Frederick the Great vastly improved the Prussian law. He desired that people should be able to obtain, not law, but justice speedily and cheaply. With this end in view he caused legal procedure to be shortened by wise regulations, and, in order to simplify the law, he had it codified. Herein lies the reason that justice may be obtained quickly and cheaply in Germany, and that the laws are simple and plain; whereas in this country the laws are a maze, and justice is sometimes unobtainable because of the intricacies of the law, its uncertainty, and its ruinous cost.

The details given in these pages show clearly that Germany's strength, wealth, and efficiency are due to the governmental system of the country. Germany's power has been created by her most eminent rulers, the Great Elector, King Frederick William the First, and Frederick the Great. They abolished self-government of every form, and made the whole nation a gigantic machine for carrying out the sovereign's will in war and in peace. Individually, the Germans are very ordinary men. Collectively

they have been amazingly successful because the whole power of the nation is organised, and can be employed against other nations in peace and war by an absolute sovereign. The secret of Germany's strength, wealth efficiency, may be summed up in a single word: Discipline. Apparently Germany is a constitutionally governed State possessing a Parliament, manhood franchise, &c. In reality Germany is more absolutely governed than ever before, for with the introduction of universal military service resistance on the part of the people has become impossible.

At first sight it may seem that it is hopeless for a democracy to compete with a highly organised monarchy such as Germany, that Great Britain is now suffering for the execution of Charles the First, that in the conflict between absolutism and democracy, democracy is bound to be defeated, that democracy is doomed. The conclusion is scarcely justified. A democracy may be efficient, business-like, provident, and ready for war. That can be seen by the example of Switzerland. It would be more correct to say that a Government which governs is likely to defeat, in peace and in war, a Government which drifts.

Nations are made by their leaders. Unfortunately the characteristic of British democracy is self-indulgence, while the characteristic of the German people, and of the Swiss people, too, is duty, patriotism, and work. British politicians have pursued the policy of pander which German statesmen and Swiss politicians have wisely disdained. The advocates of democracy, and especially of British democracy, may point to the successes of the English race in every clime, and to the fact that it owns one half of the habitable globe; the English race, however, has expanded so successfully, not because of democratic government, but in spite of it. It has flourished so greatly because of its capacity for colonising, because it was first in the field, because it was favoured by chance, because the great nations were fighting among themselves while Englishmen were conquering the

globe, because it never had to fight an organised absolutism such as the German.

Will the British and American democracy hold its own against Germany, or will it go under? That is the question which the war will settle.

It is too late to discuss principles of government when existence is at stake. The problem is to defend the liberty of Great Britain, of the British Empire, of the Anglo-Saxon race, and of its Allies in the life and death struggle in which they are engaged. The resources of the British Empire and of its Allies are boundless. They dispose of 700,000,000 men as compared with only 150,000,000 Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians, and Turks. The German combination has no chance against the Entente Powers if the gigantic resources of the British Empire are at last organised for war.

Analysis of Germany's organisation shows that nation-wide and Empire-wide organisation cannot be effected by voluntary methods, by persuasion, and by entreaty. By persuasion one can organise a team of athletes, not an Empire. Effort is merely wasted if those who ought to work in the factory fight, and those who ought to fight continue working, or idling. Organisation must be met by organisation, absolutism by absolutism. The nation and Empire want real leading, a system which can compel those who ought to fight to join the army, and those who ought to work to labour to the best of their ability. It seems that only a system conferring absolute power for the duration of the war can organise the forces of the United Kingdom and of the Empire as a whole.

Democracy is on its trial. The Anglo-Saxon race is fighting for its existence. There is danger in delay. War is a one-man business. Every other consideration should be subordinated to that of achieving victory. When the United States fought for their life, they made President Lincoln virtually a Dictator. The freest and most unruly

democracy allowed Habeas Corpus to be suspended and conscription to be introduced, to save itself. Great emergencies call for great measures. The war demands great sacrifices in every direction. However, if it leads to England's modernisation, to the elimination of the weaknesses and vices of Anglo-Saxon democracy, if it leads to the unification and organisation of the Empire, the purification of its institutions, and the recreation of the race, the gain may be greater than the loss, the colossal cost of the war notwithstanding. The British Empire and the United States, the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, have apparently arrived at the turning-point in their history.

CHAPTER II

THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY'S DIPLOMACY [1]

MANY British historians, statesmen, and publicists have endeavoured to explain to us the hidden causes of the present war. They have dwelt on the warlike and bombastic utterances which William the Second has made ever since he came to the throne, and have traced the conflagration to two powerful influences: to the boundless ambition and conceit of the German Emperor and to the support which he received by the teachings of German jingoes of the military and of the professorial variety, from Treitschke to Bernhardi. They have compared the Emperor to Bismarck, Louis the Fourteenth, and Napoleon the First. However, nothing is easier than to establish superficial but entirely misleading historical parallels.

Unfortunately, the British Universities, while devoting much time to abstract economic theory, miscalled political economy, and to the dust and dry bones of history, have completely neglected statesmanship, that most important of all sciences, in its practical and historical aspects. Before the war mediæval Germany was assiduously studied by the professors, but modern Germany was disregarded and was scarcely known. Militarily and intellectually Great Britain was equally unprepared for Germany's attack, and those who unceasingly tried to warn the nation, as the writer of these pages has done in *The Nineteenth*

[1] From *The Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1915.

Century, *The Fortnightly Review*, and elsewhere during fifteen years, were treated as alarmists, cranks, and anti-Germans.

After the outbreak of the war, British soldiers and statesmen hastily began to organise a national army, and British professors endeavoured to explain to the public modern German history and German statesmanship, two subjects with which they are deplorably ill acquainted. When it was too late, scraps from the political writings of Treitschke and his disciples were published in translation for the information of the public, and now everyone who has read some extracts from Treitschke and Bernhardi believes that he fully understands Germany's character and policy.

The rash policy of William the Second in no way resembles that of Prince Bismarck, nor is it comparable with that of Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon the First. In another part of this book I shall show that William the Second, soon after his advent, threw Bismarck's policy and teaching to the winds, and that the Iron Chancellor spent the last eight years of his life in strenuous opposition to the Emperor's reckless policy, and foretold that it would lead to Germany's ruin. William the Second has certainly not acted in accordance with Bismarck's views and methods. His world-embracing ambitions may resemble those of Napoleon the First, and his attitude and his absolutist pronouncements no doubt remind us of Louis the Fourteenth's celebrated *L'état c'est moi*. He has not, however, taken Frenchmen for his model, but one of his predecessors, Frederick the Great.

The Emperor bears in many respects a most remarkable resemblance to his great ancestor. Modern German statesmanship is not Bismarckian but Frederickian. Treitschke and Bernhardi are not innovators, but imitators. They are merely expounders of the methods of Frederick the Great. A study of Frederick's policy is not only interesting

at the moment, but it should prove of very considerable practical value to the statesmen of the nations allied against Germany. Such a study will reveal to us the hidden causes of the war and of Germany's conduct before and during the struggle, and it will give us an excellent insight into the traditional methods of Prussian statesmanship. It will show us how Prusso-Germany rose from insignificance and poverty to greatness and affluence, and it will at the same time teach us the way by which alone the Entente Powers can bring the war to a successful conclusion.

The British Universities, while publishing at great expense editions and translations of the writings of remote antiquity, which are entirely useless for all practical purposes, have paid no attention to the most important foreign political writings with which every well-educated Englishman ought to be acquainted. For Bismarck's statesmanship those who do not read German have to rely mainly upon his badly translated 'Memoirs,' which contain chiefly personal matters, and upon Busch's chatter; while for that of Frederick the Great they have to turn to the romancings of Carlyle and Macaulay. Frederick the Great's most valuable political writings are as unknown in this country as are Bismarck's. Frederick wielded a most prolific pen. His general writings fill thirty moderate-sized volumes, and his political correspondence, of which so far only part has been published, forty very large ones. He wrote only in French, and the large majority of the extracts from his writings and letters given in the following pages have not previously been published in English.

The Germans are stolid and one-sided people. William the Second strikingly resembles his great ancestor by his un-German vivacity, his restlessness, and his great versatility. The Emperor poses as an authority on all things human and divine, and endeavours not only to direct in person the Army, the Navy, the Church, and all the Departments of State, but all the arts and sciences and the economic activities

of Germany as well. Similarly, Frederick the Great was the Government. He was his own Commander-in-Chief, Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, of Commerce, and of Justice, &c. His assistants were mere clerks. In addition he was an excellent economist, historian, and musician. He wrote a good deal of indifferent French poetry and philosophy, and he patronised and endeavoured to direct all the sciences and arts and the entire business of Prussia.

William the Second, like Frederick the Great, is a consummate actor. Frederick the Great posed before the world as a philosopher, a friend of man, and a free-thinker. William the Second poses as a devout and deeply religious man. Both Frederick the Great and William the Second have acted with the greatest hypocrisy, unscrupulousness, and heartless brutality. Both have successfully deceived the world in the early part of their career by their frequently made fervent protestations that they loved peace and public morality, and condemned injustice, tyranny, and war, and both have attacked their unsuspecting and unprepared neighbours after having lulled them to sleep by their pacific and generous utterances.

Before studying the views and policy of Frederick the Great we should cast a glance at his immediate predecessors, for thus we shall be able to follow the progress of Prussia since the time when it became a kingdom.

Frederick's grandfather, the first King of Prussia, who was crowned a king in 1701, was despicable as a man and a monarch. Frederick the Great has drawn a terrible picture of him in his ' Mémoires de Brandebourg,' published in 1751. He wrote :

Frederick the First was attracted by the pomp surrounding royalty. He was actuated by vanity and self-love. He liked to exalt himself above others. His acquisition of the royal crown was caused by a common and childish vanity. In the end it proved a political master-stroke, for the royal

dignity delivered the House of Brandenburg from the yoke of the House of Austria. The crown became a spur and a challenge to his posterity, and he seemed to urge his heirs : ' I have acquired for you a great title. Make yourselves worthy of it. I have laid the foundation of your greatness. It is your duty to accomplish the work which I have begun. . . .'

The armies marching through Prussia, in the time of Frederick the First, had spread disease throughout the country, and famine had increased the effect of the pestilence. The King abandoned his people in their misfortune, and, while his revenues did not suffice for the magnificence of his expenditure on vain pomp, he saw in cold blood more than 200,000 of his subjects perish whose lives he could have saved by timely action. . . .

To obtain the royal crown he sacrificed the lives of 30,000 of his subjects in wars made on behalf of the Emperor. The royal dignity appealed only to his vanity and his love of dissipation. He was open-handed and generous, but bought his pleasures at a terrible cost. He sold his subjects as soldiers to England and Holland like cattle to the butcher.

He wasted the wealth of the nation in prodigal and vain dissipation. His Court was one of the most magnificent in Europe. His favourites received large pensions. Nothing could equal the magnificence of his palaces. His fêtes were superb. His stables were filled with horses, his kitchens with cooks, and his cellars with wine. He gave an estate worth 40,000 thalers to a servant for shooting a large stag. He intended to pawn his domains at Halberstadt in order to buy the Pitt diamond which ultimately was bought by Louis the Fifteenth. . . . His favourites were overwhelmed with gifts ; and while his eastern provinces perished through famine and pestilence he did not lift a finger to help them.

Frederick the First died for the good of his country in 1713, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick William the First, the father of Frederick the Great. Frederick William the First reduced the expenditure of the Court to a minimum, introduced the most rigid economy in the

country, and employed the national resources exclusively for creating a large army and a great war chest. He converted Prussia into an armed camp and militarised the whole nation. His character is drawn as follows by Frederick the Great in the 'Histoire de mon Temps':

The late King Frederick William the First strove to make his country happy, to create a well-disciplined army, and to administer his finances with order and wise economy. He avoided war in order not to be diverted from this worthy aim, and thus he advanced his country unostentatiously on the way to greatness without awakening the envy of other States.

In Frederick's essay 'Des Mœurs, des Coutumes, de l'Industrie,' we read:

Under Frederick the First Berlin had been the Athens of the North. Under Frederick William the First it became its Sparta. Its entire government was militarised. The capital became the stronghold of Mars. All the industries which serve the needs of armies prospered. In Berlin were established powder mills and cannon foundries, rifle factories, &c. . . .

Frederick William the First strove less to create new industries than to abolish useless expenditure. Formerly, mourning had been ruinously expensive. Funerals were accompanied by extremely costly festivities. These abuses were abolished. Houses and carriages were no longer allowed to be draped in black, nor were black liveries to be given to servants. Henceforward people died cheaply. The military character of the Government affected both customs and fashions. Society took a military tone. No one used more than three ells of cloth for a coat. The age of gallantry passed away. Ladies fled the society of men, and these compensated themselves with carousals, tobacco, and buffoonery.

Frederick William the First died on May 17, 1740, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick the Second, the Great.

As Frederick loved the French language and French elegance, was devoted to poetry, music, and art, and hated the army, he was despised by his coarse and brutal father. He seemed to him a fop and a degenerate, another Frederick the First. Men in Prussia and abroad who had suffered under the harsh and parsimonious government of Frederick William the First hailed Frederick's advent with joy. They thought that the rule of the martinet had come to an end, that life in Prussia under the new sovereign would be pleasant and peaceful.

Frederick was twenty-eight years old when he came to the throne, and he had done his best to deceive the world as to his real character. He was believed to be witty, genial, and peaceful, if not unmilitary. In 1737, three years before he ascended the throne, he published a book called 'Considérations sur l'état du corps politique de l'Europe,' which concluded with the words: 'It is a disgrace for a ruler to ruin his State; and to attempt to obtain territories to which one has no justified claim must be branded as criminal injustice and rapacity.'

Two years later, in 1739, Frederick the Great wrote his celebrated book 'The Anti-Machiavel.' It was published in 1740, the year when he came to the throne. In it he stated with the greatest emphasis that policy should be based upon morality, and laid down the remarkable doctrine that ruler and subjects were equals, and that the sovereign was the first servant of the State. In the first chapter of the 'Anti-Machiavel' we read: 'A sovereign, far from being the absolute master of the people, should only be the highest official (*le premier magistrat*).' In another edition of the same book that expression was replaced by 'le premier domestique.' In the 'Mémoires de Brandebourg' he stated that a ruler should be 'le premier serviteur de l'Etat.' Frederick the Great, in his 'Anti-Machiavel,' laid down the duties of kingship as follows:

Rulers ought to be exclusively occupied with the duties

of study and of government in order to be able to act with intelligence and in the fullness of knowledge. Their business consists in thinking correctly and in acting in accordance with their intelligence and convictions.

In the 'Anti-Machiavel' Frederick utterly condemned the policy advocated by the great Florentine statesman. He castigated the boundless ambitions of rulers, and urged that the action of sovereigns should be animated by philosophy, by a lofty idealism, by love of mankind, by virtue, and by love of peace. We read in the Preface and in Chapter VI:

While Spinoza undermined the foundations of faith, Machiavelli undermined those of statesmanship. . . . I venture to take up the defence of humanity against that monster which strives to destroy humanity, and would oppose reason and justice to sophistry and crime. . . . Floods which overwhelm the land, the fire of lightning which reduces towns to ashes, and pestilences which depopulate entire provinces are not as terrible to the world as the dangerous morals and the unbridled passions of kings. The celestial inflictions last only for a time. They rage only over a limited space, and Nature makes good the destruction they have caused, but for the crimes of kings entire nations suffer for a very long time. . . .

I would tell the kings that their true political interest consists in outshining their subjects in virtue. I would tell them that it is not enough for them to establish for themselves a great reputation by means of brilliant and glorious actions, but that on their part actions are required which will promote the happiness of the human race.

Of all the sentiments which exercise a tyrannic influence over our minds, none is more fatal, more contrary to humanity, and more pernicious to the peace of the world than unrestrained ambition, an unquenchable desire for false glory.

No terms were strong enough for Frederick with which to brand a conquering prince, who to him was merely a crowned villain. He told the world in his 'Anti-Machiavel':

Heroes and highwaymen possess the same courage and the same skill. The only difference between them is, that a conqueror is an illustrious thief and that a highwayman is an obscure one. The former is rewarded for his deeds with a laurel wreath, and the latter with the rope.

The 'Anti-Machiavel' is a pæan of peace. Peace is described as the greatest blessing and war as the greatest crime. The book significantly ends with the following powerful sentences:

I feel convinced that if monarchs would fully realise the miseries which a declaration of war inflicts upon their peoples I should not appeal in vain to their better feelings. But their imagination is not sufficiently strong. They do not appreciate the evils of war; they do not know them, and they are protected against war's horrors by their exalted position. They do not feel the taxes and imposts which crush the people, the loss of the youth of the nation enrolled in the army, the infectious diseases which decimate the troops, the horrors of battles and sieges, the sufferings of the wounded and of the mutilated, the sorrows of the orphans who have lost in their father their only support, the loss of so many useful men who have been cut off before their time.

Sovereigns who see in their subjects merely their slaves will sacrifice them without pity and see them perish without regret, but princes who see in other men their equals and consider themselves as the soul of the body politic, of the people, will carefully preserve the precious blood of their subjects.

As government should be based on virtue and on the love of mankind, it should be carried on with scrupulous honesty, the more so as honesty is not only a virtue but an advantage to those who possess it. Treaties should be observed most religiously and be broken only in case of direst need. We read in the 'Anti-Machiavel':

Both honesty and worldly wisdom demand that sovereigns should religiously observe the treaties which they

have concluded, and that they should scrupulously fulfil all their stipulations. . . .

A ruler is sometimes compelled by disagreeable necessity to break his treaties and alliances. However, he should part with his obligations like an honest man. He should advise his Allies in time of his intention, and he should before all never take such an extreme step unless the welfare of the people and absolute necessity make it inevitable. . . .

Looking solely at the interest of rulers, I assert that it is very bad policy on their part to act like rascals and to deceive the world. They deceive only once, and then lose credit everywhere.

According to the ' Anti-Machiavel,' Frederick's ideal form of government was a limited monarchy on the English model :

It seems to me that if we look for a model among the Governments of the present time we find it in England. In England, Parliament stands between the King and the people. The English King has the greatest power for doing good, but none for doing evil.

The ' Anti-Machiavel ' is not merely an expression of the purest and most praiseworthy sentiments, for it contains at the same time many exceedingly shrewd and practical political observations. Frederick the Great utterly condemned entrusting the forces of the country to ministers or generals, to underlings. In his opinion, the ruler should command the army in person, and should be supported by an able general if he did not possess the necessary military gifts :

A ruler should command his troops in person. His army is his home, his interest, his duty, his glory. Being the defender of justice, he ought to be the defender of his subjects, and as this is one of the most important objects of his office, he ought not to entrust it to anyone else. Besides, his presence with the army abolishes misunderstanding among his generals and differences between them which are

harmful to his interests and to those of the army. His presence creates order in the matter of magazines, ammunition and warlike provisions, without which even a Julius Caesar would be helpless. As the ruler orders battles to be fought, he should also command in battle, and should by his presence increase the courage and confidence of his troops and animate them by his example.

Although Frederick censured in the strongest terms war in the abstract, he very sensibly recognised the necessity of war against oppression and against the overweening ambitions of another nation. He justified only wars of defence, and he laid down the theory of the balance of power in the following sentences :

Sometimes sovereigns are wise in undertaking wars of precaution. Such wars are technically wars of attack. Nevertheless, they are just. When the excessive strength of a State threatens to overflow its boundaries and to engulf the world, wisdom commands us to oppose dykes and to arrest thereby the torrent while it can still be controlled. When we see clouds arise on the horizon and when lightning announces to us the coming storm, the threatened sovereign who cannot weather it alone will, if he is wise, combine with those who are threatened with the same danger, and who have therefore the same interests.

If the kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had allied themselves in time against the power of Rome, Rome would never have been able to overthrow them. A carefully devised alliance and an energetically conducted war would have prevented Rome from achieving its aims and enslaving the world. It follows that a ruler will act more wisely if he embarks upon a war of aggression while he is still master of his destiny, while he can still choose between war and peace, than if he should sit still and wait until times have become desperate, for then a declaration of war on his part would serve no purpose except to delay his enslavement and ruin for a little while.

It is an excellent maxim that it is better to surprise than

to be surprised in war, and all great men have taken advantage of it.

The 'Anti-Machiavel' was an act of self-revelation on the part of Frederick. At the end of the sixth chapter we read the remarkable words: 'Let Caesar Borgia be the model of those who admire Machiavelli. My model is Marcus Aurelius.'

We have listened to Frederick's profession of faith publicly made in the year 1740, when he came to the throne. His book created an immense sensation throughout Europe, and impressed rulers and peoples with the idea that a mild, generous, and peace-loving Sovereign had ascended the Prussian throne. However, the world was deceived. While Frederick seemed to be devoted to peace, art, beauty, and all the virtues, he was devoured by an insatiable thirst for glory. He was determined to win renown either by fair means or by foul, and was prepared to use the worst methods described by Machiavelli to fulfil his ambitions. He was ready to bring about a war which would cost countless lives, and which might end in the utter destruction of his country and of his dynasty.

The Emperor Charles the Sixth had no son. He desired that his hereditary rights, after his death, should fall to his daughter Maria Theresa, and had endeavoured to guarantee her peaceful succession by treaties with nearly all the Powers, the so-called Pragmatic Sanction, to which Prussia also had adhered. Although Prussia had signed that solemn act which guaranteed Austria's integrity, Frederick resolved to claim under the flimsiest of pretexts from Austria four duchies of Silesia which had been in Austria's undisputed possession ever since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We shall learn Frederick's motives for attacking Austria partly from his correspondence, partly from his 'Histoire de mon Temps.' The latter is an historical document of the very greatest importance. It is true

its style is occasionally flippant. However, it was written by Frederick for the guidance of the future rulers of Prussia, and is therefore an invaluable supplement to his political and military testaments. Its author told us in the Preface:

> I wish to transmit to posterity the principal events in which I have taken a part, or of which I have been witness, for the guidance of those who will rule Prussia after me. Thus they may learn the reasons of my actions, the means which I employed, the enterprises of Prussia's enemies, the course of diplomatic negotiations, &c.

While in his 'Anti-Machiavel' Frederick described love of peace and morality as the greatest virtues of a ruler, and condemned ambition, love of glory, and love of conquest in unmeasured terms, he revealed his true character in the Preface of the 'Histoire de mon Temps.' There he revealed the fact that love of glory and conquest was after all a virtue and his principal motive. He stated:

> The true merit of a good prince consists in being sincerely attached to the public welfare—to love his country and to love glory. I mention glory because that happy instinct which arouses in men a strong desire to acquire a good reputation is the mainspring which incites them to heroic actions. The love of glory is the power which awakens the mind from its lethargy and causes us to embark upon useful, necessary, and praiseworthy enterprises.

The Emperor Charles the Sixth, a naturally strong and healthy man, died suddenly and rather unexpectedly on October 20, 1740, at the early age of fifty-five. Frederick was at the time in the country, at Rheinsberg, and he immediately wrote to Jordan and other friends of his that he would make use of the opportunity and attack Austria in order to acquire glory, that he wished to employ the powerful army which Frederick William the First had created and the war treasure which he had accumulated

by his thrift. On November 1, 1740, Frederick wrote to his principal Minister, von Podewils:

. . . I give you a question to solve. When one has the advantage, should one make use of it or not? I am ready with my troops and with everything else. If I do not use them now I keep in my hands a powerful but useless instrument. If I use my army it will be said that I have had the skill of taking advantage of the superiority which I have over my neighbours.

Frederick made war upon Austria in 1740, not because Prussia had any serious and valid claims to Silesia, but merely because the young King was eager to acquire glory and had a strong and ready army, while Austria was disorganised, was totally unprepared for war, and was likely to prove an easy prey. The Austrian Government had fallen into the hands of a young and inexperienced woman, who lacked good advisers and generals; and other Powers were likely to follow Frederick's example, dispute the Austrian succession, and endeavour to seize part of the Austrian heritage. The King has told us with great candour—or should one call it cynicism?—in his 'Histoire de mon Temps':

After the conclusion of the Turco-Austrian War [in which Austria was badly defeated] the Austrian army was completedly ruined. . . . The larger part of the Austrian troops remained in Hungary, but they numbered only 43,000 combatants. No one thought of reorganising and completing the army. Besides these, the Austrians had only 16,000 men in Italy, at most 12,000 in Flanders, while five or six regiments were distributed in the Hereditary Lands. Instead of being 175,000 men strong, the Austrian effectives did not reach 82,000. . . .

Notwithstanding her disorganisation and hidden weakness, Austria was, in 1740, still reckoned among the most formidable of European Powers. People thought of Austria's vast resources, and believed that a man of genius might put everything right. Meanwhile, Austria replaced strength with pride, and she sought comfort for her recent humiliation by thinking of her glorious past. . . .

Prussia had a national income of only seven million thalers. The provinces were poor and backward owing to the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, and were unable to furnish adequate resources to the sovereign. Hence the ruler had to rely for financing a war on the economies made in the past. The late King Frederick William the First had accumulated a war treasure. Although it was not very large it sufficed. One could make use of one's opportunities. However, matters had to be managed with prudent care. One had to avoid a long-drawn-out war, and to hasten a decision.

It was most awkward that Prussia had no regular shape. The provinces of the country were small in size, and were spread all about Central Germany from Poland to Brabant. Her geographical position gave Prussia many neighbours, more than she would have had if her territory had been rounded off and formed a solid block.

As matters stood, Prussia could go to war only if she was supported either by France or by England. One could march hand in hand with France, for that country thirsted for glory and desired to humble the House of Austria. From the English one could have obtained nothing except subsidies, which they would pay only for the promotion of a policy favourable to British interests, while Russia had as yet not sufficient weight in the balance of European power.

After the death of the Emperor, Austria was in a most difficult position. The national finances were in confusion. The army had fallen to pieces and was disheartened by its failure in the War with the Turks. The Ministers were disunited. At the head of the Government was a young woman without experience [Maria Theresa, who was only twenty-three years old] who had to defend a disputed succession. Hence the Austrian Government did not appear redoubtable.

The King of Prussia was certain that he was able to obtain allies. Frederick's determination to make war upon Austria was confirmed by the death of the Empress Anna of

Russia. Through her demise the Russian crown fell to the youthful Grand Duke Ivan, a son of a Princess of Mecklenburg and of Prince Anton Ulrich of Brunswick, and the latter was Frederick's brother-in-law. To all appearances, Russia would, therefore, during the minority of the young Czar, be more interested in maintaining order in the interior of the Empire than in defending the Pragmatic Sanction in Austria. . . .

Marshal Münnich, who had caused the elevation of the Prince of Brunswick and of his Mecklenburg consort, was the most eminent personage in Russia. He wielded for all practical purposes the sovereign power during the Grand Duke's minority. The Prince of Brunswick was weak and unintelligent. His wife was capricious, and she possessed all the faults of an ill-educated woman. Under the pretext of congratulating the Prince of Brunswick and his wife, the King sent Baron Winterfeld on a mission to Russia. His real reason for sending Winterfeld was to gain over Marshal Münnich, who was Winterfeld's father-in-law. He wished to induce the Field-Marshal to favour the designs which Prussia was on the point of carrying out. The success of Winterfeld's mission was as great as could be desired.

Although every precaution was taken to disguise the intended expedition against Austria, it was impossible to accumulate perishable provisions, to establish magazines, to assemble artillery, and to move large bodies of troops without attracting attention. The public began to suspect that some enterprise was about to be undertaken. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Damrath, advised his Court that a storm was brewing which might sweep over Silesia. The Council in Vienna replied: 'We will not and cannot believe your news.' Nevertheless, the Austrian Court sent the Marquis Botta to Berlin nominally with the mission of congratulating King Frederick on his succession, but really in order to find out whether the Austrian Ambassador was right or whether he had given a false alarm. . . .

Although King Frederick was firmly determined upon his policy, he thought it useful to make an attempt at arriving at an agreement with Vienna. With this object

in view, Count Gotter was dispatched to Vienna. He was to declare to Maria Theresa that King Frederick would assist her against all her enemies if she would cede Silesia to him. As that offer was likely to be rejected, Count Gotter was authorised to declare war on Prussia's behalf. However, the Prussian army travelled more quickly than the Prussian Ambassador. It entered Silesia two days before Count Gotter arrived in Vienna.

Twenty battalions and thirty-six squadrons were directed towards Silesia, and these were followed by six battalions who were to besiege the fortress of Glogau. Although that number was quite small it seemed sufficient to seize an undefended country. . . .

On December 23, 1740, the Prussian army entered Silesia. On their march the troops distributed everywhere proclamations in which were shown the rights which the House of Brandenburg had to Silesia. At the same time manifestoes were distributed in which it was stated that the Prussians took possession of Silesia in order to defend that country against attacks from a third Power. Thus it was hinted with sufficient clearness that Prussia would not abandon Silesia without fighting. At the same time, in consequence of these proclamations, the nobility and people of Silesia did not look upon the Prussians who entered their province as hostile invaders, but considered their arrival as an endeavour on the part of a neighbour and ally to assist in the defence of that province against third parties.

Frederick the Great has told us in his 'Guerre de Sept Ans':

If sovereigns wish to make war they are not restrained by arguments suitable for a public proclamation. They determine the course upon which they wish to embark, make war and leave to some industrious jurist the trouble of justifying their action.

Frederick's intention to attack Austria without cause surprised and scandalised even his best friends. His

intimate friend Jordan wrote to the King from Berlin on December 14, 1740:

Les critiques croient la démarche présente directement opposée aux maximes renfermées dans le dernier chapitre de l'Antimachiavel.

To this the King replied:

Laisse parler les envieux et les ignorants; ce ne seront jamais eux qui serviront de boussole à mes desseins, mais bien la gloire. J'en suis pénétré plus que jamais, mes troupes en ont le cœur enflé, et je reponds du succès.

On November 1, 1740, Frederick had expressed to his Minister, von Podewils, as we have seen, his determination to attack Austria. Five days later, on November 6, he requested Professor von Ludewig, who during forty years had collected material showing Prussia's claims to four Silesian duchies, to send him a memoir for his justification.

Although Frederick had in his 'Anti-Machiavel' recommended honesty and straightforwardness in diplomatic negotiations, he acted with incredible unscrupulousness. Writing on November 15 to his Ambassador in Vienna, he stated that the position in Europe had become so critical, and that the balance of power in Europe, the preservation of the German Empire and German liberty were so much endangered, that he was forced to employ violent remedies. Hence he had resolved to invade Silesia, partly in order to prevent that province being seized by another State; partly in order to be able to support and save Austria from the ruin with which she was threatened. He dwelt on the purity of his motives, and stated that he was ready to guarantee the Austrian possessions against all comers and to conclude an alliance with Austria if that country would cede Silesia to Prussia.

Very naturally, his 'offer' was declined.

Frederick invaded Silesia before Count Gotter, the bearer of his ultimatum, had arrived in Vienna. The province

stood open to the Prussian troops, and was entirely undefended. In order to disarm resistance on the part of the inhabitants, Frederick informed them by a Proclamation, dated December 1, that, as the Emperor had died without leaving an heir male, the Austrian succession had been challenged, that there was a danger that other Powers might seize Silesia, and that he occupied that province with his troops, 'not at all in the intention of insulting Her Majesty, Maria Theresa, but, on the contrary, in order to manifest his friendship with the house of Austria, to promote its true interests, and to contribute to its preservation; that no hostility was to be expected from the Prussian troops, and that he hoped that the inhabitants would act like good neighbours.'

That Proclamation singularly resembles the one addressed to the inhabitants of Belgium at the beginning of the present war.

Wishing to deceive the other European Powers as to his intentions as long as possible, Frederick sent, on December 6, 1740, a declaration to the principal embassies, according to which the invasion of Silesia was not intended to be a hostile attack, for it was worded as follows:

Le Roi, en faisant entrer ses troupes en Silésie, ne s'est porté à cette démarche par aucune mauvaise intention contre la cour de Vienne et moins encore dans celle de vouloir troubler le repos de l'Empire. Sa Majesté s'est cru indispensablement obligé d'avoir sans délai recours à ce moyen pour revendiquer les droits incontestables de sa maison sur ce duché, fondés sur des anciens pactes de famille et de confraternité entre les électeurs de Brandebourg et les princes de Silésie, aussi bien que sur d'autres titres respectables.

Les circonstances présentes et la juste crainte de se voir prévenir par ceux qui forment des prétentions sur la succession de feu l'Empereur ont demandé de la promptitude dans cette entreprise, et de la vigueur dans son exécution. Mais

si ces raisons n'ont pas voulu permettre au Roi de s'eclaircir préalablement là-dessus avec la reine de Hongrie et de Bohême, elles n'empêcheront jamais S.M. de prendre toujours les intérêts de la maison d'Autriche fortement à cœur, et d'en être le plus ferme appui et soutien, dans toutes les occasions qui se présenteront.

In a letter sent to the King of England on December 4, he stated that he had invaded Silesia in order to guarantee Germany's liberty and to protect Austria, and that he was acting in Austria's true interests. He wrote:

Monsieur mon Frère: La grande confiance que j'ai dans l'amitié de Votre Majesté, et nos intérêts communs dans les conjonctures critiques d'à présent, m'obligent à Lui communiquer sans réserve mes sentiments sur les mesures à prendre dans la situation épineuse des affaires où l'Europe se trouve maintenant, et à Lui faire part en même temps de la démarche à laquelle j'ai été obligé de recourir, pour remédier promptement au danger dont l'Europe entière, la liberté de l'Allemagne, et le système de l'Empire sont menacés également.

La maison d'Autriche, en butte à tous ses ennemis, depuis la perte de son chef et le délabrement total de ses affaires, est sur le point de succomber sous les efforts de ceux qui font ouvertement des prétentions sur la succession, ou qui méditent en secret d'en arracher une partie; et comme par la situation de mes États je me trouve le plus intéressé à en empêcher les suites et à prévenir surtout ceux qui pourraient avoir formé le dessein de s'emparer de la Silésie, qui fait la sûreté et la barrière de mes provinces limitrophes, je n'ai pu me dispenser de faire entrer mes troupes dans ce duché, pour empêcher que d'autres, dans les conjonctures présentes, ne s'en emparent à mon grand préjudice et à celui des droits incontestables que ma maison a eus de tout temps sur la plus grande partie de ce pays-là, comme je ne manquerai pas de le manifester en temps et lieu.

Mon intention en cela n'a d'autre but que la conservation et le véritable bien de la maison d'Autriche.

Je me suis même expliqué sur cela par mon ministre à la cour de Vienne d'une manière que, si elle entend ses véritables intérêts, elle ne balancera pas un moment à y donner les mains. . . .

In striking at unprepared Austria Frederick had well calculated his chances. Austria and all the other Powers were unready for war. The King tells us in his 'Histoire de mon Temps,' in tones of satisfaction:

Towards the end of 1740 all the Powers discussed, negotiated, intrigued, and strove to come to some arrangement, to form alliances. However, none of the European Powers disposed of troops ready for immediate action. None had had the time to accumulate magazines and stores. So King Frederick made use of this state of affairs in order to carry out his great plan.

Frederick no longer considered his subjects as his equals whose lives should be cherished, as he had done in the 'Anti-Machiavel.' He wrote callously in this 'Histoire de mon Temps': 'When Kings play for provinces, men are merely gambling counters.' Summing up the events of the first Silesian war, the King stated:

The acquisition of Silesia increased Prussia's revenues by 3,600,000 thalers. The greater part of that sum was used to increase the army. In 1741 it consisted of 106 battalions and 191 squadrons, and we shall presently see the use which Frederick made of these troops. . . .

Silesia was united to Prussia. A campaign of two years had sufficed for conquering that important province. The War Fund which the late King had collected was nearly exhausted. Still, it is very cheap to acquire States when they cost only seven or eight millions. Chance helped in carrying through the enterprise successfully. It was necessary that France should allow herself to be dragged into the war with Austria. . . .

The principal cause of the successful conquest of Silesia was the army which had been formed in the course of twenty-

two years by an admirable discipline and which was superior to the troops of all the other States of Europe. Besides, the Prussian generals were true citizens. The ministers were wise and incorruptible, and the whole enterprise was accompanied by that good fortune which often favours youth but shuns old age. If that great undertaking had failed, King Frederick would have been called a foolish prince. He would have been reproached for having begun an enterprise that was beyond his strength. Owing to his success he was declared to be lucky. Indeed, Fortune makes one's reputation. Fortunate men are praised and unfortunate men are blamed.

Silesia was to be merely a stepping-stone towards further conquests. Describing the events of the year 1744, Frederick the Great significantly wrote in his 'Histoire de mon Temps': 'The acquisition of Silesia had given new strength to Prussia. Hence Prussia was now able to carry out with energy the plans of the ruler.'

Frederick's calculations had proved correct. His excellent and well-led army defeated the slowly gathering Austrian troops. Other States desired to take advantage of Austria's weakness and to share in the plunder. France was made to play the same part by Frederick the Second which Austria-Hungary has been made to play by William the Second. In May 1741 Frederick concluded at Nymphenburg with France and Bavaria an alliance against Austria. In June 1742 a separate peace was made between Prussia and Austria at Breslau which gave to Prussia all Silesia. Its possession increased Prussia's population by no less than one half.

France and Bavaria, Prussia's Allies, continued the war against Austria. Gradually Austria gathered strength and defeated her two opponents. Fearing that Austria, having defeated France and Bavaria, might retake Silesia, Frederick resolved to recommence the war and to attack her before she had become too strong. He concluded some alliances, and in 1744 once more acted as the aggressor.

Again he strove to deceive the world as to his motives, and endeavoured to justify his conduct in an 'Exposé des motifs qui ont obligé le Roi de donner des troupes auxiliaires à l'Empereur,'[1] which concluded with the words: 'En un mot, le Roi ne demande rien, et il ne s'agit point de ses intérêts personnels; mais Sa Majesté n'a recours aux armes que pour rendre la liberté à l'Empire, la dignité à l'Empereur, et le repos à l'Europe.'

Once more Frederick the Great was victorious, but as his position had become precarious he made peace with Austria at Dresden. That peace merely confirmed the peace previously made. No territorial gain rewarded Frederick for the second war. He was no doubt disappointed, for his ambitions were by no means satisfied by the conquest of Silesia. In 1752, four years before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, he wrote a political testament in which he urged upon his successors that they should conquer Polish Prussia, Swedish Pomerania, and especially Saxony, which country he considered a particularly valuable and desirable possession. In his political testament of 1776, the 'Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien,' Frederick wrote:

De nécessité il faut s'emparer de la Saxe. . . . S'il s'agit des vues politiques d'acquisition qui conviennent à cette monarchie, les États de la Saxe sont sans contredit ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en l'arrondissant et lui formant une barrière par les montagnes qui séparent la Saxe de la Bohême. . . . Cette acquisition est d'une nécessité indispensable pour donner à cet État la consistance dont il manque. Car, dès qu'on est en guerre, l'ennemi peut avancer de plain pied jusqu'à Berlin sans trouver la moindre opposition dans son chemin.

Meanwhile the world had no longer any illusions as to the character of Frederick the Second. It had recognised

[1] This Emperor, who disputed Maria Theresa's succession, was Charles the Seventh, Elector of Bavaria. He was set up by Frederick the Great.

that the King was not merely a poet, a philosopher, and a champion of all the virtues, but that in him were combined unscrupulousness with craft, and craft with power. The nations around saw in Frederick a danger to the peace of Europe, and their alarm was increased by the fact that Frederick's diplomacy was feverishly active in every quarter, and that his army was constantly increasing in strength.

Very naturally his neighbours wished to protect themselves in time. Austria and Saxony concluded an alliance in 1745, and Russia joined it. Through the bribery of some officials, Frederick had become acquainted with these arrangements which were to restrain his aggression. He was annoyed, and in 1756 he resolved to embark upon a third war of attack, and he began it by invading coveted Saxony in August of that year. As usual he made a surprise attack. When, in July, the Saxon Court became seriously concerned at Prussia's military preparations, the King wrote on the 10th of that month to his Ambassador at Dresden :

I find it somewhat extraordinary that Saxony has become alarmed at my so-called military preparations, and that I should be believed to be organising three armies for war. You must positively assure those who speak to you on the subject that no army is being formed, that only some regiments are being moved according to the ordinary routine as they are in other countries, such as Austria.

The following month Frederick invaded Saxony with a large army, ostensibly on the ground that necessity compelled him to attack Austria by way of Saxony, because Austria intended to strike at Prussia. Saxony was thus made another Belgium. On August 26 the King wrote to his representative at Dresden in tones of unctuous rectitude :

The unjust proceedings and dangerous plans of Austria are forcing me to violent measures, which I should like to

have avoided out of love of peace and of public tranquillity. Circumstances compel me to march my army into Saxony in order to reach Bohemia. . . . In making this declaration in a most polite and tactful manner to the King, you should impress upon him the fact that necessity compels me, and that the Vienna Court is solely responsible for these hard and disagreeable consequences.

The British Ambassador Mitchell reported on August 27 to his Government a conversation with Frederick the Great in which the King had stated that he was compelled to forestall the Austrians, and that ' nothing but the absolute necessity of his affiairs made him take that step.' We are reminded of the German declaration made at the beginning of the present war that France's intention to attack Germany by way of Belgium compelled her to invade that country in self-defence.

Having occupied Dresden, Frederick had the archives searched. The defensive treaties between Saxony, Austria, and Russia and much correspondence were discovered, and these were published and described to the world as a vile conspiracy against Prussia. William the Second merely repeated at Brussels the performance of his ancestor at Dresden.

Having invaded Saxony, Frederick explained his conduct to the world in the usual way. The war had been forced upon him. Once more he was the innocent victim. In his celebrated ' Mémoire Raisonné,' justifying the invasion, which was distributed in thousands of copies in all countries, and which may be found in Hertzberg's ' Recueil,' we read :

Les raisons, qui ont mis le Roi dans la nécessité de prendre les armes contre la Cour de Vienne et de s'assurer pendant cette guerre des États héréditaires [1] du Roi de Pologne, sont fondées sur les règles les plus exactes de l'équité et de la justice. Ce ne sont pas motifs d'ambition ni des

[1] That is to say, Saxony. Frederick Augustus the Second, Elector of Saxony by inheritance, was, like his father, the elected King of Poland.

vues d'aggrandissement. C'est une suite de projets, de complots et de trahisons de la part de ces deux Cours qui ont obligé Sa Majesté de songer à sa défense et à sa sûreté. Les découvertes qu'Elle a faites sur cette importante matière mettent cette vérité dans tout son jour et forment une éspèce de démonstration de la justice de sa cause et des mauvais procédés de ceux qui l'ont forcée d'en venir à ces tristes extrémités. . . .

In German and even in English histories may be read the fable that a European Coalition had been formed with the object of despoiling Prussia, that Prussia was forced into the Seven Years' War. Yet Count Hertzberg, who wrote the 'Mémoire Raisonné' at Frederick's orders, and who conducted the Prussian Foreign Office in Frederick's time during more than two decades, admitted himself in a paper read before the Berlin Academy in 1787, the year after Frederick's death, that in 1756 there had been no conspiracy against Prussia and no plan to attack her; that combined action had been planned by Austria, Saxony, and Russia only if Prussia should be the aggressor. A full account of his lecture may be found in Schoell's 'Histoire Abrégée des Traités de Paix.' The Prussian historian von Raumer more recently stated that 'Frederick had not proved, and could not prove, that a formal offensive alliance against him had been concluded between Austria, Russia, and Saxony.'

Frederick the Great, like Napoleon the First, kept his own counsel. We do not know for certain why he invaded Saxony in 1756. As he was not threatened by a hostile coalition as he alleged, as the second Silesian War had not brought him the hoped-for territorial increment, and as in 1752 [1] he had, in his political testament, urged his successors to acquire Saxony, one may safely conclude that he went to war in the hope of acquiring that country.

Germany's assertions that a conspiracy was formed

[1] As we have seen, he also urged the acquisition of Saxony in his later 'Political Testament' of 1776.

against her by King Edward and Sir Edward Grey finds its exact counterpart in Frederick's assertions made in 1756.

The peculiar attitude of modern Germany towards treaties, which are treated as scraps of paper if they are inconvenient to her and as sacred undertakings if she can benefit by them, is based on the precedents set by Frederick the Great and upon his teachings. In his 'Anti-Machiavel' the King urged that honesty was the best policy, that faith should be kept by rulers, that treaties should be religiously observed, as will be seen by reference to the extracts given at the beginning of this chapter. These views soon changed when a change was deemed advantageous. In the Preface of the 'Histoire de mon Temps' we read:

Posterity will perhaps see with surprise in these Memoirs accounts of treaties which have been concluded and broken. Although examples of broken treaties are common, the author of these Memoirs would require better reasons than precedent for explaining his conduct in breaking treaties. A sovereign must be guided by the interest of the State. In the following cases alliances may be broken:

(1) When one's ally does not fulfil his engagements;
(2) When one's ally wishes to deceive one, and when one cannot by any other means prevent him;
(3) When necessity (*force majeure*) compels one;
(4) When one lacks means to continue the war.

By the will of Fate wealth influences everything. Rulers are slaves of their means. To promote the interest of their State is a law to them, a law which is inviolable. If a ruler must be ready to sacrifice his life for the welfare of his subjects, he must be still more ready to sacrifice, for the benefit of his subjects, solemn engagements which he has undertaken if their observance would be harmful to his people. Cases of broken treaties may be encountered everywhere. It is not our intention to justify all breaches of treaty. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that there are cases when necessity or wisdom, prudence or consideration of the welfare of the people, oblige sovereigns to transgress

because the violation of a treaty is often the only means whereby complete ruin can be avoided.

To me it seems clear and obvious that a private person must scrupulously observe the given word, even if he should have bound himself without sufficient thought. If a private person breaks his contract the damaged person can have recourse to the protection of the law, and however the decision may go, only an individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another sovereign breaks his treaty? The word of a private person involves in misfortune only a single human being, while that of sovereigns can create calamities for entire nations. The question may therefore be summed up thus: Is it better that a nation should perish, or that a sovereign should break his treaty? Who can be stupid enough to hesitate in answering this question?

In other words, advantage was to decide whether a treaty was to be kept or broken. Frederick broke his treaties shamelessly. He abandoned his ally, France, because it suited him, as he frankly admitted in his 'Histoire de mon Temps.' The King wrote:

We must now touch the reasons which led to an armistice between Prussia and Austria. This is a delicate question. The policy of the King was wrongful and shady (*scabreuse*).

The object of the war, as far as King Frederick was concerned, was to conquer Silesia. He concluded alliances with Bavaria and France only with that object in view. However, France and her Allies looked upon the object of the alliance in a different way. The Cabinet at Versailles was convinced that Austria had arrived at the hour of her destiny, and that her power would be destroyed for all time. The downfall of Austria was incompatible with the liberty of Germany, and did in no way suit the King of Prussia, who worked for the elevation of his dynasty, and who did not intend to sacrifice his troops in order to create new rivals to himself. . . .

Had King Frederick too strenuously supported the

operations of the French troops, their success would have been dangerous to himself. From an Ally he would have become a subject of France. . . .

Queen Maria Theresa stood at the edge of a precipice. An armistice gave her breathing time, and the King could break the armistice at any moment convenient to himself.

France learned the meaning of the saying, 'travailler pour le Roi de Prusse.'

In deserting France, Frederick explained his conduct in a letter written June 10, 1742, to Cardinal de Fleury, the principal Minister of France, in which he stated:

L'avenir ne m'offre que des perspectives funestes, et dans une situation aussi critique (quoique dans l'amertume de mon cœur) je me suis vu dans la nécessité de me sauver du naufrage et de gagner un asile. Si des conjonctures fâcheuses m'ont obligé de prendre un parti que la nécessité justifie, vous me trouverez toujours fidèle à remplir les engagements dont l'exécution ne dépend que de moi.

These mendacious professions of impotence to continue the war glaringly contrast with the real reasons for abandoning France given by the King in his posthumously published history.

Although Frederick readily broke treaties which were not advantageous to himself, he condemned in the strongest terms those nations which failed to fulfil their engagements towards Prussia. To the end of his days he expressed hatred and contempt for England because she had broken her treaty with Prussia towards the end of the Seven Years' War. Modern Germany tells us that she was justified in breaking her treaty regarding Belgium, but that Italy acted criminally in refusing to participate in the Belgian crime.

Bismarck induced Italy to join the Austro-German Alliance, as he repeatedly stated, not so much in the hope of obtaining her support in time of need, but in order to

keep her neutral in case of a great war. Herein he followed Frederick's teachings, for the King wrote in his 'Anti-Machiavel':

It is frequently asserted that treaties are useless because their stipulations are hardly ever fulfilled, and that men are no more scrupulous now than they were in former ages. To those who argue thus I would reply that although both in ancient and in modern times rulers have failed to fulfil their treaty obligations, it is always advantageous to conclude treaties. An ally is an enemy the less, and if your ally does not come to your aid, you induce him by means of an alliance to remain neutral—at least for some time.

Sham alliances were highly valued by Frederick. He wrote to his Minister von Podewils on June 1, 1742:

For the future security of Prussia's new possessions I rely upon a good and numerous army, a large war treasure, strong fortresses, and sham alliances—that is, upon alliances which at least will make some impression upon outsiders. . . .

The easiest way to neutralise a powerful country and a possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance with that very State. Therefore we read in his 'Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien,' his 'Political Testament' of 1776:

One of the first political principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free as long as the alliance lasts.

During the last two centuries all the Russian Czars except one married German princesses. German princesses—the supply is very large—have sat upon many foreign thrones and often influenced the policy of nations in Germany's favour. Prusso-Germany's matrimonial policy was established on a broad basis and most highly developed

by Frederick the Great. In order to influence Russia's policy in Prussia's favour he strove in 1744 to direct Russia's policy through German influence in the ruling family as he had done in 1740. The King has told us in his 'Histoire de mon Temps':

Nothing would have been more opposed to Prussia's interests than to allow the formation of a matrimonial alliance between Russia and a Saxony hostile to Prussia. At the same time, nothing would have seemed more unnatural than to sacrifice a Prussian princess of the blood royal in order to dislodge the Saxon princess whom the Saxon Court wished to give to the Grand Duke to wife. Another expedient was necessary. Of all the German princesses of marriageable age none seemed more suitable for Russia and none seemed more likely to serve the interests of Prussia at the Russian Court than the Princess of Zerbst.

With the object of supplanting the Saxon princess by the Princess of Zerbst, complicated intrigues were entered upon, and they proved completely successful. The Russian Czarina was prevailed upon to consent, and the Princess of Zerbst, known to history as Catherine the Second, the Great, went to Russia and influenced Russian policy in Prussia's favour. By making similar use of family influences, Frederick the Great strove to direct, in Prussia's favour, the policy of Sweden, which then was still a very important State. Frederick has told us in his 'Histoire de mon Temps':

When the Russian Czarina had agreed to it that the Princess of Zerbst should marry the Grand Duke, her son, matters were made easy for marrying Princess Ulrike of Prussia to the new Crown Prince of Sweden. Prussia founded her security upon these two family alliances with Russia and Sweden. A Prussian Princess close to the Swedish throne could not possibly be hostile to her brother King Frederick, and a German Princess married to a Russian Grand Duke, a Princess who had been brought up and

educated on Prussian territory and who owed her elevation to the action of the Prussian King, could not desert him without ingratitude.

Describing the events of the year 1773, King Frederick stated in his 'Mémoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg':

By careful management and intrigue the King succeeded in inducing the Russian Czarina to choose the Princess of Darmstadt, the sister of the Princess of Prussia, as a wife for her son the Grand Duke Paul. In order to have influence in Russia it was necessary for Prussia to place there persons who were likely to favour Prussia. It was to be hoped that the Prince of Prussia, when succeeding King Frederick, would be able to draw great advantage from the fact that his wife's sister had married the Russian heir to the throne.

Bribery, corruption, and spying have been among the most conspicuous characteristics of the policy of modern Germany. German money is lavishly spent abroad for influencing opinion and the action of foreign Governments, and according to apparently reliable reports the German Emperor himself has taken a strong and personal interest in the more seamy side of the German Secret Service. If these reports are true, he has acted as a faithful disciple of Frederick the Great. In his time spying, corruption, and bribery were brought to the highest perfection.

We have seen in the beginning of this chapter that Frederick, when intending to attack Austria for the first time in 1740, sent to Russia Baron Winterfeld. He was to influence his father-in-law, Field-Marshal Münnich, who at the time was all-powerful in Russia, and he was to resort freely to bribery. On December 6, 1740, Frederick wrote to his Ambassador at Petrograd:

You must use all your skill to gain Field-Marshal Münnich to my interests, and must spare neither compliments nor promises of gratitude. You can assure him that if, by employing his authority and credit, he induces the Regent

to support me, I will give him and his posterity in perpetuity the estate of Biegen, which has a yearly income of more than 5000 thalers, and I shall give him as well the County of Wartenberg in Silesia. . . .

As both the properties mentioned were in Silesia, which Frederick was about to overrun and conquer, Münnich was directly interested in the success of Frederick's piratical expedition.

Two days later he wrote in the instructions for Count Gotter, who was sent to Vienna with that celebrated ultimatum to Maria Theresa which arrived two days after the Prussian army had invaded Silesia:

If the Cabinet in Vienna can be gained to Prussia's interests by bribery, my Ambassador, von Borcke, had instructions given him on the 7th of this month to offer up to 200,000 thalers to the Grand Chancellor, Count Zinzendorff, and 100,000 thalers to the Secretary of State, Toussaint. If others have to be bribed, Count Gotter should let me know, and I will give my orders.

On January 11, 1741, Frederick wrote to his Ambassador in Petrograd, von Mardefeld, that if the estates which were to be offered to Field-Marshal Münnich by his son-in-law, Count Winterfeld, Prussia's special envoy, should not suffice to gain him over to Prussia's interests, Winterfeld could dispose of 100,000 thalers as well. In 1745 Herr von Mardefeld was ordered to offer 40,000 thalers to Count Bestucheff if Russia would remain neutral during the second Silesian War.

When, in the beginning of the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great became hard pressed by his enemies, it occurred to him that he might possibly detach France by bribing Madame de Pompadour, the all-powerful mistress of King Louis the Fifteenth. The political correspondence of the King, published on behalf of the German Government in a large number of volumes, contains a number of references

to that interesting transaction. For instance, on July 7, 1757, Frederick wrote to his sister:

My dear Sister,—It is too kind of you to take so much trouble with my affairs. I am ashamed to abuse your kindness. Still, as you are willing to promote the conclusion of peace, I would ask you to send M. de Mirabeau to France. I will gladly bear the expenses of his journey, and he may offer to the King's favourite a sum up to 500,000 thalers for the conclusion of a peace. He may even increase his offer far above the sum named, if Madame de Pompadour should bind herself to procure to Prussia not only peace, but also some advantages. You understand, of course, that this business must be treated with the greatest delicacy, and that my name must not be connected with it. If the people in England should get wind of this transaction, all would be lost. . . .

Soon Frederick increased the bribe which he was willing to offer to Madame de Pompadour. On September 26, 1767, he wrote to Colonel von Balbi:

. . . I sincerely hope that the secret negotiations which I have opened will substantiate, unless cessions of territory should be required. As I have been informed that the transaction might be soon concluded if I could make up my mind to cede to Madame de Pompadour the principality of Neuchatel and Valangin for life, I have much pleasure in telling you that I shall raise no difficulties, and I authorise you expressly by the present letter to mention this offer to your friends so that they can boldly insinuate and promise to Madame de Pompadour on my behalf that I shall cede to her the principality named for life as soon as peace is concluded between France and Prussia. The revenues of the principality will be hers, and I trust that she will use her whole influence so that the conditions of peace will be advantageous, or at least little onerous, to Prussia. . . .

Frederick the Great achieved his master stroke in corruption during the period of peace which preceded the

Seven Years' War, when men in the Austrian and Saxon Diplomatic Services whom he had bribed delivered to him the most important secrets of State. The King tells us in his 'Guerre de Sept Ans':

A man named Weingarten, who was secretary to La Puebla, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, allowed himself to be used by King Frederick, and furnished the King with the most secret correspondence which passed between the Austrian Ambassador and the Court of Vienna and the Court of Petersburg.

This man, whose services were exceedingly important at last became suspected by his master. He was lucky enough to notice it in time. He escaped from the Embassy and claimed the King's protection. He was withdrawn with difficulty from the prosecution which the Austrian Ambassador set on foot, was hidden and sent to Kolberg, where he changed his name.

Although that source of information was thus cut off, there was another channel by which the King received reliable information regarding the plans of his enemies. He was well served by an employee of the Secret Chancellery of Saxony at Dresden. That man handed every week to the Prussian Minister to Saxony the despatches which the Dresden Court received from Petersburg and Vienna, and he also supplied him with copies of all the treaties deposited in the Dresden archives.

The employee of the Foreign Office at Dresden mentioned by the King was the notorious Friedrich Wilhelm Menzel. He was engaged, not by one of the King's underlings without his knowledge, but by the direct orders of Frederick himself, and the King settled all the details regarding this man in a letter sent on April 8, 1752, to von Maltzahn, his Ambassador in Dresden. We read in it:

Quant à celui que le sieur Rehnitz vous a amené [Menzel] je vois, par les échantillons que vous m'avez marqués de son savoir-faire, que ce sera un sujet bien utile et dont nous

saurions tirer des connaissances très utiles. C'est aussi pourquoi vous devez vous arranger et prendre les concerts qu'il faut avec lui.

J'ai résolu de lui faire payer une pension jusqu'à 2000 écus par an, selon que vous conviendrez avec lui, et mon conseiller privé Eichel a mes ordres de vous faire parvenir cet argent en tels termes que vous le désirerez, soit par des exprès ou par des remises en argent, tout comme vous le jugerez convenable.

Pour vous mettre aussi en état de faire d'abord des largesses à cet homme, j'ai fait ordonner par le conseiller privé Eichel au banquier Splitberger de vous remettre la somme de 500 écus sous le prétexte d'un argent qui lui avait été remis par vos parents, afin de vous le faire payer à Dresde.

Au surplus, vous vous garderez bien de ne rien communiquer au département des affaires étrangères des avis que vous tirerez de ce canal, sans mes ordres exprès, parceque je veux, pour être d'autant mieux assuré du secret, que tout ceci ne passe que par mes mains seules. C'est aussi pourquoi vous ne me ferez autrement vos rapports à ce sujet que par le chiffre immédiat dont vous êtes en possession.

Quant au sieur Rehnitz, comme je crains tout comme vous qu'il ne gâte par sa conduite imprudente et inconsidérée toute cette affaire vous tâcherez à le disposer de partir le plus tôt possible de Dresde en l'assurant que ses affaires particulières qu'il a là, n'en souffriraient pas, et que je lui saurais gré, s'il voulait faire un tour dans le pays de Saxe pour engager et m'amener ici quelques *Parchentmacher* [skilled artizans] que je voudrais bien établir dans ce pays-ci.

Je remets tout à votre dextérité et prudence et attendrai votre rapport sur la manière que vous aurez tout arrangé.

FREDERIC.

Between 1752 and 1756 Menzel betrayed the diplomatic secrets of Saxony and of her Allies to Frederick. How greatly the King was interested in Menzel's activity will be seen by the fact that he is mentioned or alluded to in no less than thirty-six of the King's published letters.

Frederick cherished him like the apple of his eye, and frequently had enjoined care upon him, sent him on holidays, &c.

Frederick was the most thrifty of monarchs in all matters except bribery and corruption. Professor von Ludewig, mentioned in an earlier part of this chapter, when set to work to prove Prussia's historic claims to Silesia, was paid three thalers (9*s*.) a day for his labour, and he was remunerated for his forty years' activity in collecting the necessary material to support the King's claim 'with a little wind that costs nothing,' in the shape of a title, as von Podewils put it.

Frederick attached the highest importance to the possession of a large fund of ready money to be used for political purposes at the right moment. He wrote in his 'Anti-Machiavel':

Cardinal de Retz stated rightly that in important affairs money should be regarded as of no consequence. A sovereign should therefore always be in the position of controlling large funds usable in case of necessity.

In his 'Political Testament' of 1776 Frederick stated:

Statesmanship ought to look as far as possible into the future and calculate the chances and the constellations of Europe, and make use of them either for concluding alliances or for foiling the plans of Prussia's enemies.

It must be remembered that it is not possible to shape the course of history. However, opportunities must be seized when they occur. Hence the finances of the country must always be in order. Herein lies the reason that there should always be kept a large reserve of ready money, for then only can the Government strike immediately when the right moment for action has arrived. War itself should be conducted in accordance with the true principles of statesmanship. One must strike the most sanguinary blows at one's enemies.

Frederick the Great, like William the Second, endeavoured to produce dissension within the Governments of countries the activities of which he desired to cripple. Immediately after his first attack upon Silesia, on January 6, 1741, he wrote to his Ambassador at Petrograd :

You will skilfully throw an apple of discord among the Russian ministers so that we can carry out the principal aim which we have in view. I leave you full liberty to employ not only flatteries and promises, but as much money as you think necessary, and Major von Winterfeld can draw on the offices of the Company.

Frederick the Great was absolutely unscrupulous. He deliberately brought about three wars, and he employed unhesitatingly the worst methods of Machiavelli. Nevertheless, like Shakespeare's Richard the Third, he posed habitually as an injured innocent. In his ' Guerre de Sept Ans ' he described his great and good opponent as follows :

King Frederick had, in the person of the Empress Maria Theresa, an ambitious and vindictive enemy, and she was all the more dangerous as she was a woman who stuck obstinately to her opinions and was implacable. Devoured by ambition, Maria Theresa wished to pursue glory in every way.

When, soon after the beginning of the Seven Years' War, France and Sweden joined Austria, Russia, and Saxony against Prussia, and when Frederick began to experience serious defeats, he cried to Heaven about the wickedness of his opponents. On July 13, 1756, he wrote despairingly to his sister Wilhelmine :

I am in the position of a traveller who is surrounded by a number of rascals and on the point of being murdered because these robbers wish to divide his goods among themselves. Since the League of Cambrai there has never been an example of a conspiracy similar to that which that criminal

triumvirate has engineered against me. It is infamous, a disgrace for mankind, and a crime against morality. Has the world ever seen three powerful princes forming a plot to destroy a fourth who had done nothing to them ?

I have never had any differences with France or with Russia, and still less with Sweden. Three men acting thus against a neighbour would be condemned by the law. Nevertheless, we see three monarchs giving such a horrible example to their subjects. I am a king, and believe that I should think like a king.

It has always been my principle that to a Sovereign his good name should be more precious than his life. A conspiracy has been hatched against me. The Court at Vienna has insulted me, and I should have considered myself dishonoured had I borne the insult. Thus the war was begun, and a band of rogues attacked me from all sides. That is my story.

In the introduction to his ' Mémoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg,' the arch-deceiver among kings protested : ' During my whole life I have never deceived anyone. Still less shall I deceive posterity.'

Modern Germany, like Frederician Prussia, loudly protests her innocence. Her alliances were legitimate, and were purely defensive. Those of her opponents were meant for aggression, were a conspiracy against Germany. According to her protestations, Germany has never deceived or attacked any Power. She is a peaceful State, and the other nations have fallen on her without any cause, desiring to destroy Germany and German civilisation.

Modern Germany is guided by the principles of *Machtpolitik*. It is frequently assumed that the policy of using power ruthlessly has been invented by Bismarck, Treitschke, Bernhardi, &c. In reality, the policy of using power ruthlessly was evolved and brought to the highest perfection by Frederick the Great. He wrote in his ' Histoire de mon Temps ' : ' Royal crowns are won only by means of big guns.' Believing that all policy was founded in the

last resort upon power, upon force, life in peace was for Frederick the Great a constant preparation for war. He wrote in his 'Mémoires depuis la Paix de Hubertusbourg': 'Peace was to the Prussian armies a school, and war was the practice.'

Although Frederick was of opinion that States were founded not upon right but upon force, and although he believed that States could be established, enlarged, and maintained only by force, he absolutely disapproved of the wanton abuse of force. Like Cardinal Richelieu and Prince Bismarck, he was absolutely opposed to wars of aggression, to wars of precaution, to wars of prestige, to rash interference in international affairs. We read in his preface to the 'Histoire de mon Temps':

All who have bowels of compassion and look at things as they are must be deeply moved by the evils which statesmen inflict upon the people, either through thoughtlessness or through their passions.

Reason prescribes for us a rule of conduct which, in my opinion, every statesman should observe. It is, to make use of one's opportunities, and to embark upon a dangerous enterprise only when circumstances are favourable, but not to force the pace and to leave all to chance. There are moments which one should seize, when one should act with the utmost energy, and there are others when prudence compels us to remain inactive. This question requires our most profound thought, and we must examine not only the present position of affairs, but also study all the consequences to which our enterprise may give rise, and weigh the means possessed by ourselves against those of our enemies, in order to be able to gauge which side is likely to prevail. If the decision should not be left to cold calculation, but should be influenced or dictated by passion, a happy issue of a great enterprise is impossible.

Statesmanship requires patience, and the masterpiece of the skilled statesman consists in doing the right thing at the right moment and in the right way.

History is the school of princes. They should strive to learn from the mistakes made in past centuries, so as to avoid them. Thus they may learn how to map out a wise policy, and how to carry it out step by step. Only he who has best calculated his chances and who has most carefully laid down his line of action, can hope to overcome men who act less logically.

It will be noticed that Frederick the Great recommended coupling energy with moderation.

When, in 1740–41, he had succeeded in wresting Silesia from Austria, he desired that Prussia should remain at peace, and should, by a policy of moderation, reconcile Europe to the great increase of Prussia's power. On June 21, 1742, he wrote to his Minister Podewils:

At the present moment our task consists in making the capitals of Europe accustomed to see Prussia occupy the great position which she has obtained by her war with Austria, and I believe that great moderation and a conciliatory attitude towards our neighbours will help us in this.

The policy recommended in the foregoing letter singularly resembles that urged by Bismarck in the thirtieth chapter of his posthumous memoirs, in which we read:

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power by honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partizan, and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would be that of France, Russia, or England.

Frederick the Great and Bismarck would undoubtedly have loudly disapproved of the war which William the Second so rashly began in 1914.

Frederick the Great, like Bismarck, spent the later years of his life in laying down the principles of statesmanship

for the benefit of future generations, and Frederick, like Bismarck, looked with anxiety and pessimism towards the future. In the concluding passages of his history of the Seven Years' War he stated :

Time, which heals everything, will no doubt give back to Prussia her old prosperity and splendour. The other Powers also will recover. However, in future other ambitious men will bring about new wars and new disasters to mankind, for it is a peculiarity of men that they will not learn by experience. The follies committed by the fathers are not heeded by the sons. Every generation must make its own experiences. . . .

May Heaven—supposing Providence looks down upon our human miseries—protect Prussia and the Kings who will govern the State in future against the calamities from which the country has suffered in the troublous times which I have described, and may they never be compelled to have recourse to those terrible and violent measures which had to be employed to protect the State against the ambitious hatred of all Europe, which wished to destroy the House of Brandenburg and to exterminate for all time the very name of Prussia.

In many passages of Frederick's writing we find a free expression of his pessimistic forebodings, which were only natural in view of the worthlessness of his nephew and successor, Frederick William the Second. In his ' Histoire de mon Temps ' we read : ' La fortune est souvent plus funeste aux princes que l'adversité. La première les enivre de presomption ; le seconde les rend circonspects et modestes.' Good fortune was indeed fatal to Frederick William the Second and Frederick William the Third. It made them presumptuous. They neglected the State, and allowed the army to decline. The rule of these two princes led to Prussia's downfall in 1806.

Frederick recommended that Prussia should follow a cautious, conservative, and moderate policy. He desired

that the country should not lightly engage in war, that Prussia's sovereigns should only rarely engage in hostilities. The great King thought it particularly important that Prussia should go to war only if the campaign was likely to be highly profitable to the State. He wrote in his ' Political Testament ' of 1776 :

As Prussia is not rich, care must be taken not to enter into a war where nothing can be gained. In such a war one exhausts one's strength, one can only lose, and if later on some good opportunity should arise, one cannot take advantage of it.

All territories lying at a distance from the State are a burden. A village on the frontier is more valuable than a principality sixty miles away.

It is necessary to hide with care, and as much as possible, one's ambitious plans, and it is advisable to awaken envy among the European Powers, for their division enables Prussia to strike. . . . Secrecy is a most important virtue both in statecraft and in war.

During the Seven Years' War, Prussia, supported by England, successfully resisted the united forces of Austria, Russia, France, Saxony, and Sweden. More than once she suffered serious defeats. Yet she was not overwhelmed. The causes of her successful resistance to nearly all Europe should be of particular interest at the present moment when Germany is engaged in a similar and apparently hopeless struggle. In the Seven Years' War Prussia fought against three Great Powers. Now, Germany fights against three races, the Latin, the Slavonic, and the Anglo-Saxon race. The highest authority on the causes of Prussia's successful resistance is undoubtedly Frederick the Great himself. In 1759 Prussia suffered a number of most disastrous defeats, and the King's position seemed to be desperate. In commenting on the campaign of that year the King wrote :

That campaign was perhaps the most disastrous of all,

and Prussia would have been lost if her enemies, who knew how to defeat her, had known equally well how to take advantage of their victories.

How Prussia weathered her greatest defeat may be seen from the Battle of Kunersdorf. At that battle the Prussians lost a large number of guns to the Russians, and an enormous number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the end of the day scarcely 10,000 men of Frederick's army remained, and these were a flying mob. Commenting on that disastrous battle the King wrote:

Had the Russians known how to take advantage of their victory, had they pursued the discouraged Prussian troops, Prussia would have been lost. Owing to their inaction, they gave King Frederick time to make good his losses. Nearly all the Prussian generals were wounded. Prussia's enemies had it in their power to end the war. They need only have given their defeated enemy the *coup de grâce*. But they stood still and, instead of acting with vigour and energy, as the occasion demanded, congratulated each other on their success and praised their good fortune.

Prince Soltikoff explained the reason of his inactivity. When Marshal Daun, the Austrian general, urged him to continue his operation with vigour he replied: 'I have done enough during this year. I have won two battles which have cost Russia 27,000 men, and before going into action once more I wish to wait for a couple of Austrian victories. It is not right that the Russian troops should bear the brunt and do all the fighting.' Only with difficulty could the Austrians induce the victorious Russians to cross the river Oder.

Commenting on the campaign of 1761–62, Frederick the Great told us:

At the end of the last campaign in the opinion of all statesmen Prussia was lost. She was saved by the death of a woman, and was supported and saved by the help of that

Power which had been most eager to destroy her. In a similar manner Madame Masham saved France in the War of Succession by her intrigues against Lady Marlborough. How vain are all our calculations! The smallest accident influences and changes the fate of empires. Chance makes a plaything of us, laughs at the vain wisdom of us mortals: elevates some and overthrows others.

Frederick the Great was saved from annihilation, as he himself admitted, through the mistakes of his opponents, and especially through their lack of unity. When all seemed lost Fate saved the King by the death of the Empress Elizabeth of Russia. Her son, Peter the Third, a blind admirer of Frederick, not only made peace with Prussia, but concluded an alliance with her.

When matters were desperate with Prussia, Frederick tried to divide the Allies against themselves. Writing of the year 1760, he told us in his 'Guerre de Sept Ans':

From day to day the war became more difficult, and the risks and dangers constantly increased. Although the Prussians were fortunate, Fortune betrayed them several times. Nothing could be hoped for from Italy, and Turkey had so far not seemed inclined to let it come to a breach with Austria. Therefore the only resource left consisted in dividing or separating the Powers which had formed the anti-Prussian Alliance. With this object in view negotiations were entered upon both in France and in Russia.

As we have seen, the negotiations with Russia proved successful in the end through the death of the Czarina.

In the 'Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans,' Frederick summed up the causes of Prussia's successful resistance as follows:

In 1757, during the second year of the Seven Years' War, it seemed impossible that Prussia would be able to resist the attack of the Powers arrayed against her. If we

carefully examine the causes which led to so unexpected an issue, we find that the following reasons prevented Prussia's downfall :

(1) The lack of agreement and harmony among the Powers which formed the Anti-Prussian Alliance ; their different interests, which prevented them agreeing with regard to the military operations which were undertaken ; the lack of unity among the Russian and Austrian generals, which made them over-cautious when opportunity demanded that they should act with energy and destroy Prussia, as they might easily have done.

(2) The over-artful policy of the Court at Vienna. That Court made it a principle to ask Austria's allies to undertake the most difficult and the most dangerous operations, so that at the end of the war Austria should possess a better and stronger army than that of any of the other Powers. The pursuit of this policy caused the Austrian generals to act with over-great caution. Hence they abstained from giving the *coup de grâce* to Prussia when Prussia's position was absolutely desperate.

(3) The death of the Russian Czarina, with whose demise the Russo-Austrian Alliance died as well ; Russia's desertion of the anti-Prussian Alliance, and her alliance with King Frederick, which was concluded by the Czarina's successor, Peter the Third.

Frederick the Great summed up the losses caused by the Seven Years' War as follows :

Prussia had lost by the war 180,000 men, and in addition 33,000 people had died owing to the ravages of the Russians. According to estimates, the Russian troops lost 120,000 men. The Austrians estimated their loss at 140,000 men, the French theirs at 200,000 combatants, the English and their Allies lost 160,000 men, the Swedes and the troops of the German Circles 23,000 men. The French Government had lost all credit, and the French commerce with both Indias had been destroyed by the English. Sweden was on the point of becoming bankrupt. Prussia had suffered most, for the Austrians, French, Russians, Swedes, and the troops

of the Circles under the Duke of Wurtemberg had ravaged the country.

Before his advent to power, Frederick the Great had posed as a philanthropist, a lover of peace, and a friend of virtue. Animated by insatiable ambition and recognising that he could easily conquer Silesia, he attacked Austria in 1740, little heeding the consequences. That reckless and criminal attack led to two further wars, and Prussia would have been lost had not chance saved her at the most critical moment.

The Seven Years' War alone cost more than a million lives ; and according to Frederick's own statement, 'the state of Brandenburg, after the Seven Years' War, resembled that caused by the Thirty Years' War.' Frederick the Great had declared in his 'Anti-Machiavel' that his model was Marcus Aurelius, while that of the admirers of Machiavelli was Caesar Borgia. Frederick himself, like his imitator William the Second, was in many respects another Borgia ; but William the Second has improved upon his ancestor by using weapons which Frederick disdained and condemned.

The Seven Years' War inflicted terrible sufferings upon Prussia and all Europe, but it laid the foundation of Prussia's greatness, of modern Germany. By his conquests Frederick nearly doubled the national territory, increased Prussia's population from 2,250,000 to 5,500,000 inhabitants, and made her one of the Great Powers. Besides, Prussia's successful resistance to nearly all Europe enormously increased her prestige. It enabled Prussia to weather her defeats of 1806, and the remembrance of the Seven Years' War is now encouraging Germany and inspiring her with a firm hope of a final victory.

The history of the Seven Years' War suffices to show that it will not be an easy matter for a great European Coalition to triumph over the Germanic combination of

Powers. The experience of the Seven Years' War and of many other wars proves that coalitions suffer from serious disadvantages, that disunion is liable to appear in their ranks, and that a dictatorship, such as that which exists permanently in Germany, has enormous advantages over Governments less well organised for war. In the time of Frederick the Great lack of energy and of initiative in warfare lamed the power of the Coalition.

After all, it is only natural that amateurs who co-operate with difficulty are at a disadvantage in contending against perfectly drilled and organised professionals, that a military State which absolutely obeys a single will enjoys enormous advantage over several non-military States. Modern war is conducted by armed nations. Exactly as the command of an army cannot safely be entrusted to a committee, but only to a single commander-in-chief, the guidance of a nation at war is best entrusted to a single man, to a dictator. That was clearly recognised by the ancient Romans, the most fervent republicans the world has seen, and the modern democracies that are fighting for their liberty may do well to learn from Rome's example.

Austria suffered grievously at Prussia's hands in the time of Frederick the Great and of Prince Bismarck. Is she willing to be ruined completely by William the Second, who has dragged her into the present war, or will she remember her sufferings and turn at the most critical moment against her ancient enemy, as Bismarck foreshadowed? He wrote in his 'Memoirs':

If in Austria anti-German tendencies, whether national or religious, were to gain strength, and Austria leagued herself with Germany's enemies for the purpose of making a clean sweep of the results of 1866, no words are needed to show how greatly aggravated would then be the peril of Germany. This idea is pessimistic, but no means chimerical.

If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-German policy

appear *salus publica* for Austria-Hungary, public faith could not be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice.

In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error to exclude the possibility of a hostile policy such as was pursued by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust. May not the policy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Russia, be again pursued towards another Power? . . .

We cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose sight of the possibility that the policy of Vienna may willy-nilly abandon us.

In disclosing the existence of the Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia, and foretelling the present war, and the break-down of the Triple Alliance, in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on January 24, 1892 (the full text will be found in another chapter of this book), Bismarck wrote:

No one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment will not reawaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidelity to treaty, Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire.

Germany's defeat would mean Austria's annihilation. Germany's victory would make her a German vassal State. It seems not impossible that at the critical moment the allied Powers might approach Austria and offer her compensation for the losses which she is bound to suffer in the east and south, by giving Silesia back to her and joining the chiefly Roman Catholic South German States once more to the Dual Monarchy. Austria might recover the great position which she held in Germany and revenge herself upon Frederick the Great at the cost of William the Second. The present Emperor may have rashly destroyed not only the lifework of Bismarck but that of his great ancestor as well.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICY OF BISMARCK AND OF WILLIAM II [1]

PRINCE OTTO EDUARD LEOPOLD VON BISMARCK, Germany's greatest son, was born on April 1, 1815, at Schönhausen. He died on July 30, 1898, at Friedrichsruh. Fate has its ironies. Apparently William the Second took the terrible decision which brought about the present war at a Council held at the Neues Palais in Potsdam on July 30, 1914, the anniversary of Bismarck's death; and the celebration of the centenary of Bismarck's birth has taken place in the turmoil of a war which seems likely to end in the destruction of Bismarck's life-work and of the Empire which he had laboriously created.

To the broad masses of the English-speaking people, and even to most well-informed men in this country, Prince Bismarck is an unknown and a sinister figure, a mysterious and terrible character, a man of blood and iron, Germany's evil genius, a statesman devoid of human feeling; who by diabolical cunning, unscrupulousness and violence, by the medieval methods of Machiavelli, united Germany; who imprinted his character deeply, and fatally, upon the new Empire, and forced it into a path which inevitably led to the present catastrophe. Those, however, who see in Bismarck a bloodthirsty and unscrupulous schemer of boundless ambition, who believe that the Iron Chancellor is responsible for the present war, and that William the

[1] From *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1915.

Second and his supporters have merely acted in accordance with Bismarck's teachings, are in error. The principal characteristic of Bismarck's foreign policy was not its daring and unscrupulousness, but its perfect sanity, one might almost say its wise moderation and its cautious restraint.

The present war is solely the work of William the Second and of his entourage. Had not the Emperor and his counsellors deliberately thrown to the winds Bismarck's pleadings for a sane policy and his unceasing admonitions, Germany would still be prosperous and at peace. Unfortunately, statesmanship is little studied in Great Britain. Bismarck, the statesman, is almost unknown even to those who are keenly interested in politics and who have adopted politics or diplomacy as a profession. This is the more to be regretted as Bismarck was probably not only the greatest diplomat but the greatest statesman, in the fullest sense of the word, of whom we know. In his social policy, economic policy, parliamentary policy, and in matters of organisation and administration he was a pioneer, and in all these he was probably as great as he was in the sphere of foreign policy. Unfortunately statesmanship, the greatest of all human sciences, is completely neglected at the Anglo-Saxon Universities in both hemispheres. If it were taught, as it ought to be, there would be chairs of Bismarckian statesmanship at every university.

The greatness of a statesman may be seen not by his eloquence and his parliamentary and electoral successes, but by his national achievements. Bismarck created an empire and made a nation. Measured by the positive success of his activity Bismarck was undoubtedly one of the greatest statesmen known to history. In 1862, when Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia, Germany was merely a geographical expression, and Prussia was a weak, poor, small, torn, and disunited State. It consisted of two disjointed halves, which were separated from one

another by the independent States of Hanover and Hesse. It had only 18,491,220 inhabitants. It had practically no merchant marine, no manufacturing industries, and very little wealth. The nation and its Government were in conflict. Austria dominated and domineered over Prussia. The country had been shaken to its foundations by the revolution of 1848. Another revolution seemed not impossible.

Civil strife was so acute, and the internal difficulties of Prussia were so great when William the First ascended the Prussian throne, that he had actually written out in his own hand his act of resignation. With difficulty Bismarck induced the despairing monarch to tear up that fatal document.

King and Parliament were in deadly conflict. Kingship had fallen so low in public esteem that, as Bismarck has told us, scarcely anyone raised his hat to the King in Berlin except a couple of Court hairdressers. Such was the position when Bismarck took office. He resolved to break the power of the pugnacious Prussian Parliament, to strengthen to the utmost the authority and power of the Crown, to deprive Austria of her leadership, to conquer for weak and despised Prussia the supremacy in Germany and in Europe.

Bismarck is unique among statesmen. Gifted with marvellous foresight, he formed the full programme of his entire life-work as a comparatively young and quite inexperienced man, and was able to carry it out in every particular in the course of a long and laborious life. In manuscript notes written down in March 1854, and in a long memorandum sent to Otto von Manteuffel, the then Prime Minister of Prussia, on July 25, 1854, both of which are reprinted in vol. ii. of the 'Anhang zu den Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck,' we find laid down the complete policy which Bismarck pursued unswervingly to the day of his death. He then advocated, for instance, that Prussia should follow not a German

but a purely Prussian policy; that she should make herself supreme in Germany, following, if necessary, an anti-Austrian policy; that she should cut herself off from Austria, and should not support that country if the pursuit of her Balkan ambitions should involve the realm of the Hapsburgs in trouble with Russia.

As a young student, Bismarck, like many men of his time, dreamed of a United Germany. However, while the vast majority of Germans wished to unite all the German States and the States of Austria-Hungary in some loose form of federation, Bismarck aimed at creating a compact and purely German Germany, a great national and homogeneous State, under Prussia's leadership, expelling Austria out of Germany and leaving to the House of Hapsburg the rule of the alien nations, of the Slavs, Magyars, Roumanians, and Italians.

In the beginning of his official career Bismarck advocated the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein with Kiel, desiring to make Prussia a seafaring and naval Power. He recommended the construction of the Baltic and North Sea Canal, and looked hopefully forward to a war with Napoleon the Third, who then dominated Europe, trusting that his overthrow would unite Germany and give to Prussia the hegemony in Germany and Europe.

Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862. Supported by the King, he immediately set to work to strengthen the Prussian Army immensely, for he wished to make Prussia independent and powerful with its help. As the Prussian Parliament absolutely refused to vote the large funds required, he governed for years without a Parliament and without a budget, collecting the taxes by force. Two years after, in 1864, supported by Austria, he made war upon Denmark, and took from that country Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel. At that time, Austro-Prussian co-operation was indispensable for achieving Bismarck's aims. As the two Germanic Powers seemed firmly united,

and as Russia and France were not ready for war, the States of Europe only protested against the seizure of the Danish territories, but did not intervene.

Austria had served Prussia well by enabling her to acquire the coveted Danish territories, but the defeat of the Dual Monarchy was required to make Prussia supreme in Germany and to give her the leadership of the other German States, the adherence of which would immensely strengthen her military power. The Austro-Prussian condominium in Schleswig-Holstein lent itself admirably to the production of the necessary *casus belli*. War was duly brought about in 1866. The Prussian people and their parliamentary representatives, who had dreamt of a Greater Germany, embracing Prussia, Austria, and all the smaller States, and who detested Bismarck as an enemy of liberalism and of representative government, protested passionately, but in vain, against the *Bruderkrieg*, the fratricidal war. Owing to the great increase of the Army, made against the will of the representatives of the people, Prussia had become exceedingly strong. She defeated Austria, and that country lost her supremacy both in Germany and in Italy. By arms Prussia had established her paramountcy in Germany.

Austria's defeat had freed Prussia from Austria's leadership, had made her independent, had greatly increased her power and prestige, and had loosely attached to Prussia the Central and South German States, who naturally inclined towards the victor. To weld Prussia and the South German States into a firmly united body, to give Prussia for all time the leadership in Germany, and to reconquer the formerly German Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck required a successful war with France, the hereditary enemy. He clearly recognised that only a victory over France could arouse among all the German States and peoples an enthusiasm sufficiently strong to overcome the petty jealousies which had divided Germany since the dawn of her history.

In six years, from 1864 to 1870, Prussia had, under Bismarck's leadership, fought three most successful wars. She had acquired free access to the sea. She had created an organic connection between the detached eastern and western halves of the Monarchy by incorporating Hanover and Hesse as a result of the war of 1866. She had acquired vast German territories, and had firmly joined to herself the purely German South German States. She had reconquered Alsace-Lorraine, and had won for the King of Prussia the Imperial Crown. Thus, Bismarck had at the same time made Prussia great, had united Germany, and had firmly established the authority of the King. He had achieved all this against the will of the people and against that of the most influential circles. Even the King himself had always to be persuaded and convinced, cajoled and threatened, to follow Bismarck's lead.

Government against the will of the people, as carried on by Bismarck, had proved marvellously successful. The King-Emperor was given the full credit of Bismarck's achievements. Hence, Bismarck's successes had steadily increased the authority of the monarch. The people had been taught to trust their rulers blindly and unquestioningly, and to treat their shortsighted parliamentary representatives almost with contempt. The belief in authority among the people was greatly strengthened by a patriotic education in the elementary schools, and by making the formerly free universities of Germany and the Press instruments of the Government and of the Imperial will. Thus, the liberal and democratic Germany of former times was destroyed.

Having created Prusso-Germany's greatness, Bismarck wished to establish the country's security for all time. By an economic policy which at the same time was wise and daring, he created a wonderful system of State railways, and a powerful and efficient merchant marine. He converted Germany from a poor and almost purely agricultural

State into a wealthy industrial country. He introduced a system of State Insurance which has been copied by many countries, and secured Germany's position among the Powers by the most wonderful system of alliances which the world has seen.

By sparing Austria after her defeat of 1866, Bismarck made possible her reconciliation with Germany. By placing the Dual Monarchy into opposition with Russia at the time of the Russo-Turkish War, he raised the spectre of a Russo-Austrian War. It alarmed Vienna very greatly, and made an Austro-German Alliance not only possible but necessary.

Fearing the abiding resentment and hostility of defeated and humiliated France, Bismarck wished to isolate that country. The German-Austrian Alliance did not seem to afford a sufficient guarantee against the formation of an anti-German coalition, in which France would, of course, be the moving spirit.

To alienate France and Italy, Bismarck gave to France at the Congress of Berlin Tunis, to which Italy had by far the stronger claim, and thus he involved these two countries in bitter hostility, and a ten years' Customs war. He prompted France to acquire colonies in opposition to England, and at the same time encouraged England to occupy Egypt, to the possession of which France considered herself entitled. Thus, he estranged France and England. Furthermore, England and Russia were made to quarrel over Constantinople and Asia.

France's hostility, combined with Austro-German pressure, forced Italy to join the German-Austrian Alliance. The Triple Alliance was created. Germany could rely on the support of two Great Powers, while France, Russia, and England were isolated. Germany's security seemed throughly established. Nevertheless, Bismarck still feared the formation of a coalition hostile to Germany. It is true the Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument.

Still, Russia might conceivably feel threatened by that combination and endeavour to protect herself by a counter-alliance with France, Germany's natural enemy.

To prevent Russia and France combining, Bismarck not only demonstrated to Russia Germany's sincere friendship whenever an opportunity offered, but he concluded with that country a secret but purely defensive alliance which assured Russia that Germany would not aid Austria-Hungary if that country should attack Russia, but, on the contrary, observe towards Russia an attitude of benevolent neutrality. The two treaties completely shackled Austria's freedom of action, and tied that country to the German car of State. They made Austria-Hungary a junior partner in the Alliance. With the two alternative Alliances Bismarck could always play off Austria-Hungary against Russia, or Russia against Austria-Hungary. The initiative in the Triple Alliance was reserved to Germany.

As England was hard pressed by France in Africa, and by Russia in Asia, she naturally inclined towards Germany, and would probably have assisted that country in a war with France and Russia. She was considered to be an unofficial, a semi-detached, member of the Triple Alliance. In addition, Roumania, ruled by a Hohenzollern Prince, was attached to the Triple Alliance by a secret treaty, and Turkey could be relied upon to support Germany against Russia in time of need. As Russia and England were friendly to Germany, France was isolated and unable to find an ally. By this wonderful system of alliances, concluded with all the important European nations, which were encouraged to quarrel among themselves, Bismarck dominated and directed all Europe. An anti-German coalition was unthinkable. Germany ruled Europe.

Bismarck pursued not an ambitious policy of domination, but a purely nationalist and a conservative policy. He did not aim at ruling the world. The wars which he had brought about were in truth wars of nationality. They were under-

taken solely for the purpose of uniting the divided German nation. They were means to an end, and they were necessary for Germany's unification. Ever since his youth, Bismarck had wished to see all Germans, except the Roman Catholic Austro-Germans, united in a single State, ruled by the Hohenzollerns. In 1871 he had achieved his ideal. When, by three successful wars, he had accomplished his aim, he considered his work completed. He had created a great German Empire, and he desired the new Empire to keep the peace and to remain a purely German State. Ever since 1871 Bismarck strove to avoid war. It has often been asserted, but it has not been sufficiently proved, that Bismarck intended to attack France in 1875. He denied that intention to the day of his death, unceasingly condemning wars of ambition or precaution, such as that brought about by William the Second.

The future historians of Germany may tell their readers that Bismarck created the German Empire and that William the Second destroyed it. It seems exceedingly strange that Bismarck's successors proved unable to continue Bismarck's work, for their task was simple and easy. At the time when the Iron Chancellor was dismissed the position of the German Empire was impregnable. The Triple Alliance was a rock of strength, and as Austria was kept in check by the German-Russian secret treaty of alliance Berlin retained the initiative. England, Russia, Turkey, and Roumania were firm friends of Germany, and were likely to support that country in case of need. Isolated France was Germany's only enemy.

It is true Bismarck had no great successor. He has often been reproached for not having trained a statesman to take his place. However, great statesmen, like great poets, are born, not made. Besides, Germany no longer required a great statesman to continue Bismarck's work, for that far-seeing statesman had left to his successors the fullest and the most detailed instructions for their guidance.

His policy, like that of every truly great statesman, was distinguished by its simplicity and by its absence of secrecy. No statesman has ever taken his contemporaries more freely and more fully into his confidence than has Prince Bismarck. He laid his policy open to all Germany, and the Germans showed their gratitude and admiration for the founder of the Empire by publishing in full Bismarck's innumerable speeches and addresses, despatches, State papers, newspaper articles, confidential and private correspondence, and his conversations and table-talk in many hundreds of volumes. Modern Germany gave itself over to a veritable Bismarck cult. The Bismarck literature of Germany is about as copious as is the Napoleonic literature of France. Bismarck's views on every subject and on every question were studied, not merely by the elect, but by the masses. His 'Memoirs,' his political testament, were and are probably as widely read and as frequently quoted in Germany as the Bible and Goethe's 'Faust.'

Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's unity and firmly established the State, Bismarck desired to establish its permanence and security by pursuing a peaceful, prudent, moderate and conciliatory foreign policy, rightly fearing that a policy of dash and adventure, of interference, provocation and bluster, would raise dangerous enemies to the new State. In one of the concluding chapters of his 'Memoirs,' his political testament, that great statesman laid down on large lines the policy which Germany ought to pursue in the future, in the following phrases:—

> In the future not only sufficient military equipment, but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the German ship of State through the currents of coalition to which, in consequence of our geographical position and our previous history, we are exposed. . . .
>
> We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling among the nations, which has been called forth through our

growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partizan, and also less harmful to the freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia or England. . . .

In order to produce this confidence, it is above everything necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events.

William the Second came to the throne on June 15, 1888. He disagreed with Bismarck on important questions of domestic and foreign policy. He dismissed the founder of Modern Germany on March 22, 1890. After his dismissal, Bismarck watched with concern and anxiety the unceasing, reckless, and neurotic activity of the young Emperor. He feared that the youthful monarch, encouraged by Court flatterers, place-hunters, and adventurers, might endanger, or even destroy, the newly created Empire, and deep pessimism took hold of him. Hoping to save his country, Bismarck devoted the remaining eight years of his life entirely to political teaching. He laid down the principles of his foreign and domestic policy in a large number of newspaper articles and speeches, he criticised freely and fearlessly the mistakes of his successors, and he gave to his country the essence of his statesmanship, the *arcana imperii*, in his 'Gedanken und Erinnerungen,' his 'Memoirs,' which may be found in every German house.

Bismarck's pessimism as to Germany's future, which impressed numerous Germans who paid him homage in his retirement, was chiefly caused by the unstable, rash, overweening and domineering character of William the Second, by his vanity and by his susceptibility to flattery. I have already quoted in this book the following two paragraphs from Bismarck's 'Memoirs,' obviously comparing William the Second with his grandfather, but they will bear repetition :

The Emperor William I was completely free from vanity of this kind ; on the other hand, he had in a high degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries and of posterity. . . . No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity, he would have thought : If anyone has the right of praising me to my face, he has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would not admit either. . . .

What I fear is that by following the road in which we are walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is the qualification, then demands will be made on the general ability of the monarch which even a Frederick the Great could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day.

Referring to the misrule of former Prussian kings, Bismarck significantly wrote in his 'Memoirs' :

In an absolute monarchy no one except the sovereign can be proved to have any definite share of responsibility for its policy. If the King comes to any unfortunate decisions, no one can judge whether they are due to his own will or to the influence which various personalities of male and female gender—aides-de-camp, courtiers and political intriguers, flatterers, chatterboxes, and tell-tales—may have upon the monarch. In the last resort the royal signature covers everything ; how it has been obtained no one ever knows.

William the Second dismissed Bismarck because he thought his own policy wiser than that of his experienced Chancellor. Believing himself a genius, he wished to be his own Chancellor. He had no use for statesmen, for men of genius and of character such as Bismarck, but only for time-serving nonentities, for men without backbone, who were ready to execute without question the Imperial will

and every Imperial whim, regardless of the consequences to the country. On July 1, 1897, Bismarck commented on the impending retirement of Herr Marschall von Bieberstein from the German Foreign Office. He discreetly pointed out that not Herr von Marschall, but the Emperor himself was to blame for the mistakes of Germany's foreign policy made since Bismarck's dismissal. He wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten :*

A number of papers, especially the *Kölnische Zeitung*, give a good character to Herr von Marschall at the occasion of his impending resignation. . . .

We have not noticed that Herr von Marschall has been guided by any political views and principles of his own in carrying out the Imperial orders. We are convinced that he possessed certain principles when he entered the Foreign Office, but we do not believe that he had any opportunity to apply them during his seven years of office. We believe that he has merely done his official duties by carrying out the instructions which he received from the Imperial Chancellor on behalf of the Emperor. . . .

We do not intend to criticise Germany's policy during the last seven years, but we should be acting unjustly in holding him responsible for that policy. We consider that he had no part in shaping it, that he merely did what he was told.

William the Second has made numerous absolute pronouncements, such as 'You Germans have only one will, and that is My will; there is only one law, and that is My law.' '*Sic volo, sic jubeo.*' 'Only one master in this country. That is I, and who opposes Me I shall crush to pieces.' Like another Louis the Fourteenth, William the Second taught the people '*L'état c'est moi.*' Bismarck dreaded the Emperor's inclination towards absolutism. He considered his recklessness to be doubly dangerous in view of the great power possessed by the monarch, and the abject flattery and servility prevailing in German Court

circles, on the one hand, and in view of the extreme docility of the well-drilled German nation on the other. Hence, Bismarck strove with all his might to create a counterpoise to the Emperor in an enlightened public opinion, in an independent Parliament, and in frank public criticism of the Emperor's policy. He wrote in his 'Memoirs':

Absolutism would be the ideal form of Government for a European State were not the King and his officials as other men to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman wisdom, insight, and justice. The most experienced and well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imperfections, such as an over-estimation of their own wisdom, the influence and eloquence of favourites, not to mention petticoat influences, both legitimate and illegitimate. Monarchy and the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism; the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk of losing his way.

Criticism can only be exercised through the medium of a free Press and of Parliaments in the modern sense of the term.

After his dismissal, Bismarck settled in Friedrichsruh, his country seat, close to Hamburg, and the *Hamburger Nachrichten* became the principal organ in which he stated his views, in numerous anonymous articles which betray his authorship by their style. They will be found collected in the seven-volume work of Penzler, and in the two-volume work of Hermann Hofmann, two journalists who edited them, and in the publications of Poschinger, Horst Kohl, Liman, Blum, and other writers on Bismarck. It should be added that the vast majority of the extracts given in this chapter have not been published in the English language. Their authenticity may be seen by the fact that Bismarck did not repudiate their authorship when, during his lifetime, they were collected and published by Penzler and described as articles emanating from the great Chancellor.

In the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of November 24, 1891, Bismarck commented severely on the Emperor's pronouncement '*Suprema lex regis voluntas.*' He contrasted it with his first speech from the throne, on June 27, 1888, in which the Emperor had promised that he would maintain the existing constitution, and had stated that he was satisfied with his position as established by it.

On December 11, 1891, Bismarck received the editor of the *Eisenbahn Zeitung.* Referring to the Emperor's pronouncement '*Sic volo, sic jubeo,*' he told the journalist that he saw Germany's salvation in the possession of a strong monarchy and of a Parliament which defended the rights of the people. On the following day, December 12, 1891, receiving a deputation of the town of Siegen, Bismarck said:

The most disquieting feature for me is that the Reichstag has abdicated its position. We suffer everywhere from the bureaucracy. . . . The Reichstag is the indispensable cement of Germany's national unity. If its authority declines, the bonds which hold Germany together are weakened.

On July 24, 1892, Bismarck, addressing a South German deputation at Kissingen, said:

I would have gladly continued my work, but our young Emperor will do everything himself. . . . The German Reichstag is the focus of our national life. To strengthen the Reichstag, the responsibility of Ministers should be increased. Anyone can become Imperial Chancellor, whether he is fitted for the office or not, and the Chancellor's post may be abused to such an extent that he becomes a mere secretary, and that his responsibility is limited to executing the orders he receives. . . . If ministerial responsibility were established by law, a man who does not possess the necessary qualifications would not take office. . . .

When I became Minister, the Crown was threatened by the people. The King was discouraged because he could no

longer rely on his Ministers, and he wished to abdicate. Hence I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Perhaps I have gone too far in that direction. We now require a balance of power within Germany, and I believe that free criticism is indispensable to the monarchy. Otherwise we fall a prey to official absolutism. We require the bracing air of public criticism. Our entire constitution is based on it. If Parliament becomes powerless, becomes a mere tool in the hands of the Government, we return to the régime of absolutism.

Bismarck was particularly dismayed at the Emperor's unceasing and exasperating interference in foreign politics which threatened to create everywhere enemies to Germany. On July 30, 1892, he stated in his speech at Jena that in foreign policy the most important thing was not activity but patience, and he attributed much of his success to the fact that he had learned patience when stalking deer or fishing. Continuing, he said:

The basis of a constitutional monarchy is the co-operation of the monarchical will with the convictions of the governed people. . . .

It is a dangerous experiment nowadays to strive after absolutism in the centre of Europe. Henceforward we must aim at strengthening independent political thought and political conviction in our Parliament and among the German people. . . .

The wars which united Germany were necessary, but there is no need for further wars. Our wishes are fulfilled. We should be frivolous or clumsy if we allowed ourselves to be involved in further wars without need. If we follow a conservative policy we shall be able to hold our own against all comers, although we are in the centre of Europe. Germany cannot conduct aggressive cabinet wars. Besides, a nation which can be forced into such wars does not possess the right constitution. . . .

Since 1870 we have avoided further wars and have striven to strengthen Germany. In building up the empire some

kind of dictatorship was necessary, but that cannot be considered as a permanent feature. Our task can be completed only when Germany possesses a powerful Parliament which embodies our sense of unity.

As Bismarck's appeals to the German Parliament and to the German people to assert themselves proved fruitless, he endeavoured to find a counterpoise to the Emperor in the minor States of Germany, which are represented in the Federal Council. He wrote, on June 11, 1897, in the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten:*

According to Article 8 of the German Constitution, there exists within the Federal Council a committee on foreign affairs, formed by representatives of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg, and by two representatives elected by the other Federal States. That Committee is entitled to demand information from the Government regarding diplomatic affairs. Formerly, a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council was of the greatest rarity. Prince Bismarck guided Germany's foreign policy, and no one felt the necessity of controlling him. Now matters are different.

Although we do not wish to criticise the achievements of Prince Hohenlohe or Herr Marschall von Bieberstein, we feel that it is necessary to remind the country of the existence of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council. We are of opinion that the German people are entitled to know the character of the 'changes' which have taken place in the relations between Vienna and Berlin, about which inspired Austrian papers have been writing, and we hope that these 'changes' have not taken place at Germany's cost, that they will neither lead to Germany's isolation nor to Germany's dependence upon Austria and Russia.

The watchword of modern Germany is 'Machtpolitik.' Unrestrained violence is advocated as a policy. During recent years, and especially since Bismarck's death, many leading Germans have advocated a ruthless policy devoid

of morality and based exclusively on brute force. Modern Germany has paid lip-worship to Bismarck, but has disregarded his teachings, for that great statesman endeavoured, in the main, to follow an honest, moderate, and straightforward policy, and he attached the greatest value to political morality. On July 21, 1893, addressing a thousand people from Brunswick, Bismarck said:

The possession of moral authority is a very important factor in political life. To avoid wars, something more is needed than the possession of a powerful army. I attach value to the respect and the prestige which Germany enjoys among the non-German nations. Respect and prestige are desirable not merely to satisfy national vanity and ambition. They are valuable and extremely useful assets which carry with them great advantages, and we suffer when Germany's prestige and respect are diminished.

Contemplating with concern the Chauvinistic tendencies which had become noticeable in Germany under the government of William the Second, Bismarck, after his retirement, unceasingly urged that Germany should follow a policy of peace, of moderation, of good faith, and of good fellowship towards other nations. He wrote in his 'Memoirs':

We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power by the honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of others, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, or England.

It has always been my ideal aim, after we had established our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence not only of the smaller European States, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful now that it has repaired the *injuria temporum*, the disintegration of the nation. In order to produce this confidence it is above everything necessary

that we should be honourable, open, and easily reconciled in case of friction or *untoward events*.

In most cases an open and honourable policy succeeds better than the subtlety of earlier ages.

Advocating a peaceful, honourable, and straightforward policy, Bismarck was absolutely opposed to unnecessary wars, and especially to preventive wars. Hence, he would not allow the military men, who easily incline towards war, to exercise any influence upon statesmanship. He wrote in his 'Memoirs':

Even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one. Besides, one cannot read the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development and make one's own calculations accordingly. It is natural that in the staff of the army not only young, active officers, but experienced strategists also should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of their troops and their own capacity to lead, and should wish to make themselves renowned in history. It would be a matter of regret if that feeling did not exist in the army. However, the task of keeping that feeling within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the State.

That feeling becomes dangerous only under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences.

How peaceful Bismarck's views were may be seen from the following New Year article which appeared in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* on January 4, 1892. We read:

The indisputable predominance of Germany in European policy from the end of the Franco-German War to the end of the 'eighties was due, before all, to the superiority of the German army and to the great personal prestige and influence enjoyed by the Emperor William I and Prince Bismarck. Since then other nations have increased their readiness for

war, and since the disappearance of the old Emperor and of his Chancellor, Germany's authoritative position has naturally diminished, for only fresh successes can give Germany that prestige and influence which she acquired in the times of these men. However, successes similar to those achieved in the time of William I do not often recur.

The German Empire, as left by its founders, does not require new foreign wars, for nothing can be gained by them. On the contrary, Germany's principal aim must be to increase its internal strength, so that the Empire may be able to weather future storms. In the time of William I it was necessary to bring about appeals to arms, because the foundations of Germany's national life had to be laid. Now it is Germany's task to avoid these decisions as far as possible, for by war nothing can be gained, and only that which has been won can be lost. That has been Prince Bismarck's leading political idea ever since the Peace of Frankfort in 1871. . . .

In entering upon the New Year we express the wish that German statesmanship may not abandon the fundamental directions which have been laid down for its guidance, that Germany may, at least in the domain of foreign policy, continue to pursue the old course.

After dismissing Bismarck, William the Second announced to the world that he would henceforth steer the ship of State over a new course, and that he would lead Germany towards a great and glorious future. Filled with anxiety lest the reckless ambition of the Emperor would involve the young Empire in unnecessary and perilous wars, Bismarck wrote, in a series of articles published in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* between May 12 and 18, 1892:

Prince Bismarck had created Germany on a broad national basis. When that task had been fulfilled he and his successors had only to preserve Germany's position, the creation of which had demanded such heavy sacrifices. This being his fundamental maxim, it was necessary for

Germany to be as strong as possible. At the same time, it was necessary to avoid, as long as possible, all appeals to arms in which Germany could win nothing, but could only lose. His leading view was that every extension of territory beyond the limits of 1871 would be a misfortune. . . .

Bismarck's entire foreign policy culminated in the idea of isolating France and of placing the new frontiers which he had given to Europe under the protection of all the other Powers. . . .

Germany's position and activity will always largely depend upon her Allies. On the day when the leading German statesmen have to decide on peace or war they should inquire conscientiously whether the prize is worthy the sacrifice, and whether the desired result cannot be equally well obtained without a war, the issue of which no one can guarantee. War is made only for the sake of peace. It is made only in order to obtain those conditions in which we wish to live with our opponent when the war is over. . . .

Is it really necessary to pursue a new course? The new pilot is, perhaps, not able to steer the German ship of State with the knowledge and determination of his predecessor, but is it therefore necessary to abandon altogether the course that had been steered in the past?

Wishing to avoid unnecessary and ruinous wars, Bismarck desired before all to avoid a war with Russia, Germany's traditional ally, who had saved Prussia from extinction in the time of Napoleon, and who had supported her in the wars of 1866 and 1870, and had thus enabled Germany to achieve her national unity. Besides, Germany and Russia had no conflicting interests, and neither Power had reason to covet any territory possessed by the other.

Desiring that Germany should develop in peace, and fearing the possibility of a hostile attack, Bismarck had concluded a purely defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. It seemed, therefore, not likely that Russia would attack either Germany or Austria. Hence a war with Russia seemed to be possible only if an Austro-

Russian quarrel should break out about the Balkan Peninsula and if Austria was the aggressor.

Bismarck was determined that Germany should not be drawn unnecessarily into a purely Austrian quarrel. Hence he had concluded with Russia a secret defensive Treaty which, as has previously been stated, assured that country of Germany's benevolent neutrality in the event of an Austrian attack.

As long as Russia felt sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality if attacked by Austria, she had no cause to ally herself with France. Thus France remained isolated, and Austria could not venture to attack Russia unless with Berlin's approval. Hence she was compelled to be guided in her Balkan policy by Germany. If, on the other hand, Russo-German relations should become bad, it was clear that Russia would turn to France for support, and that Austria would be able to drag Germany into her Balkan adventures. Bismarck wrote in his 'Memoirs':

After the conclusion of our defensive alliance with Austria I considered it as necessary to cultivate neighbourly relations with Russia as before. . . .

If, however, Germany should quarrel with Russia, if an irremediable estrangement should take place between the two countries, Austria would certainly begin to enlarge her claims to the services of her German ally, first by insisting on an extension of the *casus foederis*, which so far, according to the published text, provides only for the measures necessary to repel a Russian attack upon Austria; then by requiring the *casus foederis* to be replaced by some provision safeguarding the Austrian interests in the Balkans and the East, an idea to which the Press has already succeeded in giving practical shape.

The wants and the plans of the inhabitants of the basin of the Danube naturally reach far beyond the present limits of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The German Imperial Constitution points out the way by which Austria may advance and reconcile her political and material interests, so

far as they lie between the eastern frontier of the Roumanian population and the Gulf of Cattaro. It is, however, no part of the policy of the German Empire to lend its subjects, and to expend their blood and treasure, for the purpose of realising the designs of a neighbouring Power.

In the interest of the European political equilibrium the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might, in case of need, stake her own peace with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from going outside this security, and should not deduce from the alliance claims which it was not concluded to support. . . .

After Bismarck's dismissal the defensive Russo-German Treaty, the so-called Re-Insurance Treaty, was not renewed. Prince Hohenlohe wrote in his diary on March 31, 1890:

It seems more and more clear that differences regarding Russia between the Emperor and Bismarck have brought about the breach. Bismarck intended to leave Austria in the lurch, while the Emperor wished to support Austria, even if his policy should involve him in war with Russia and France. That is made plain by Bismarck's words that the Emperor carried on his policy like Frederick William the Fourth. Herein lies the danger of the future.

In another part of his 'Memoirs,' Prince Hohenlohe wrote that the Emperor's refusal to renew the Russo-German Treaty was the principal cause of Bismarck's dismissal.

The old Emperor was so strongly convinced of the necessity of Germany keeping peace with Russia that on his death-bed, addressing William the Second, he said, according to Bismarck: 'Thou must always keep in touch with the Russian Emperor; there no conflict is necessary.' These were some of his last words.

Bismarck had been dismissed largely because the Emperor wished to reverse Bismarck's policy towards Russia and Austria-Hungary. Foreseeing that a discontinuance of the Russo-German Treaty would ultimately,

and almost inevitably, involve Germany in an Austro-Russian war about the Balkans, where Germany had no direct interests, Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on April 26, 1890, only five weeks after his dismissal:

Austria cannot hope to obtain Germany's support for promoting her ambitious plans in the Balkan Peninsula. These Austrian plans have never been encouraged by Germany as long as Germany's foreign policy was directed by Prince Bismarck. On the contrary, the Prince has, at every opportunity, particularly at the time of the Bulgarian incident, shown with the utmost clearness that he is very far from wishing to promote Austria's special interests in the Balkans in antagonism to Russia. Such a policy would not be in harmony with the stipulations of the Triple Alliance. That Alliance views only the *damnum emergens*, not the *lucrum cessans*, of the signatory Powers.

Least of all is it Germany's business to support Austria's ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. If such ambitions exist, and are to be promoted with the assistance of other nations, Austria-Hungary will have to address herself not to Germany, but to the nations interested in Balkan politics. These are all the Great Powers except Germany. They are (apart from Russia) England, France, and Italy. Austria can always arrive at an understanding with these Powers if she wishes to further her interests in the Balkans, and Germany need not concern herself about them. Germany's point of view is this: that she has no interests in Balkan affairs.

Five months later, on September 29, 1890, Bismarck renewed his warning in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

In the past, when the relations between Germany and Austria and between Germany and Russia were discussed, there were two points of danger: Firstly, that German policy—or, what would be worse, the German Army—should be placed at the disposal of purely Austrian interests in the Balkans against Russia; secondly, that Germany's

relations with Russia should be endangered and brought to the breaking-point by unnecessary Press attacks.

We have always warned against this twofold danger, but we have never advised a breach of treaty faith towards Austria. The Austro-German alliance does not demand that Germany should support Austria's Balkan interests against Russia. It only demands that Germany should assist Austria if her territories should be attacked by Russia. . . .

We attach the greatest value to the preservation of good and cordial relations between Germany and Russia. If Austria and Russia should differ, Germany can mediate most successfully if she is trusted in St. Petersburg. Besides, a breach with Russia would, according to our inmost conviction, make Germany dependent upon Austria. . . .

No one can object if Austria succeeds in her Balkan policy without a war with Russia which would demand enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure. The Balkans do not concern Germany. We are interested in the maintenance of peace, and we do not care how Austria and Russia arrange their spheres of interest in the Balkans. . . .

Being anxious that good relations should exist between Germany and Austria, and that Austria's power and position should be preserved, we have opposed mistaken views as to the scope of the Austro-German Treaty, and have endeavoured to show that that Treaty does not oblige Germany to support Austria in the Balkans.

Hinting at the so-called Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia which William the Second had refused to renew, under the provisions of which Germany was to support Russia in case of an unprovoked attack upon her by Austria, Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of January 24, 1892:

The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879 contemplated, as far as Russia was concerned, only mutual defence against a possible attack. Hence Germany always pointed out in Vienna that the Austro-German Alliance protected only the Dual Monarchy itself, but not its Balkan policy,

against Russia. With regard to the Balkans, Germany had unceasingly advised Austria to find protection by means of a separate Treaty with the States interested in the Balkans, such as England and Italy. Relying on the unaggressive character of the Austro-German Treaty, Germany was always able to go hand in hand with Russia, and to influence Austria if the Eastern policy of that country seemed likely to take an undesirable turn.

This advantageous position, the maintenance of which made considerable claims upon the skill of Germany's diplomacy, was later on believed to be too complicated. Besides, personal misunderstandings [between the Emperor and the Czar] impaired the good relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, and led to the Russo-French rapprochement. Thus the position has changed to Germany's disadvantage. Formerly it was in Germany's power to arrive at any moment at an understanding with Russia, in consequence of treaty arrangements which existed side by side with the Austro-German Treaty, but which exist no longer. In consequence of the estrangement between Germany and Russia, Austria has been enabled to exercise considerable pressure upon Germany.

Foretelling the present war and the breakdown of the Triple Alliance, Bismarck continued:

Apparently German statesmanship no longer observes a disinterested attitude in Eastern affairs. By following the path upon which she has entered, Germany is in danger of gradually becoming dependent upon Austria, and in the end she may have to pay with her blood and treasure for the Balkan policy of Vienna. In view of that possibility, it will be readily understood that Prince Bismarck again and ever again gave warning that Germany should not break with Russia. . . .

The change in the European situation to Germany's disadvantage cannot be excused by extolling the power of the Triple Alliance. Formerly the Triple Alliance existed as it does now, and its importance was increased by the fact that Germany had a free hand, directed it, and dominated

Europe. We fear that since then the strength of the Alliance has not increased. . . .

A crisis in Italy, a change of sovereign in Austria or the like may shake its foundations so greatly that in spite of all written engagements it will be impossible to maintain it. In that case Germany's position would become extremely serious, for in order not to become entirely isolated she would be compelled to follow Austria's policy in the Balkans without reserve. Germany might get into the leading-strings of another Power which, it is true, has accepted the new position of Germany. However, no one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment will not reawaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany's cost if the fortune of war should no longer favour Germany or if the pressure of European events should weigh upon us. Notwithstanding her fidelity to treaty, Austria may be disinclined to bear the supremacy of the new German Empire.

Considering good relations between Russia and Germany absolutely essential for Germany's security, and desiring to bring about a renewal of the Russo-German Re-Insurance Treaty, Bismarck at last embarked upon a great Press campaign. He revealed to Germany and the world the fact that there had formerly existed a secret treaty with Russia in the plainest language in his celebrated article which appeared on October 24, 1896, in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*. We read in it:

Russo-German relations remained good until 1890. Up to that date both States were fully agreed that if one of them were attacked the other would observe a benevolent neutrality. For instance, if Germany were attacked by France she would be sure of Russia's benevolent neutrality, and Russia would be sure of Germany's benevolent neutrality if she was attacked without cause. That agreement has not been renewed since the time when Prince Bismarck left office, and if we are rightly informed about the occurrences which have taken place in Berlin it appears that the failure to renew the treaty was not due to Russia being dissatisfied at the

change of Chancellors. It was Count Caprivi who refused to renew the mutual insurance of Russia and Germany, although Russia was ready to renew it. As at the same time Germany pursued a philo-Polish policy, it was only natural that the Russian Government should ask itself: What can be the object of Prussia's Polish policy, which stands in flagrant opposition to the friendly relations established at the time of the Emperor William the First?

We need not mention other anti-Russian indications at the German Foreign Office. Caprivi's attitude in the general European policy and in Germany's Polish policy was such that Russia, notwithstanding her great power, had seriously to consider the future. During the Crimean War all Europe, Prussia excepted, had been hostile to Russia. We do not intend to assert that a similar position will return. Still, it is only natural if a powerful State like the Russian Empire says to itself: 'We must have at least one reliable Ally in Europe. Formerly we could reckon with the three Emperors Alliance. Afterwards we could depend upon the House of Hohenzollern. If, however, in times of difficulty, we should meet with an anti-Russian policy, we must endeavour to arrange for support elsewhere.' The Kronstadt meeting and the first rapprochement between Absolute Russia and Republican France was solely brought about by Caprivi's political mistakes. Hence, Russia was forced to find in France that security which of course her statesmen desired to obtain.

This article created an immense sensation not only in the entire German Press but in the Press of the world.

The Government-inspired Press accused Bismarck of high treason in divulging secrets of State, and threatened him with the public prosecutor and with imprisonment. The disclosure led to a prolonged Press campaign in the course of which Bismarck defended the Re-Insurance Treaty with great vigour in numerous articles. With wonderful energy Bismarck, who was then eighty-two years old, endeavoured once more to direct the policy of Europe with

his indefatigable pen. He not merely criticised Germany's foreign policy and pointed out the dangerous mistake which had been made in destroying the intimate relations which existed formerly between Russia and Germany; he endeavoured at the same time to bring about a re-grouping of the Powers and to create differences between Russia and France likely to destroy their recent intimacy. This may be seen from many articles of Bismarck's, published at the time in various journals.

In his 'Memoirs' Bismarck summarised his views as to the attitude of Russia and France in this blunt phrase: 'With France we shall never have peace; with Russia never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation.'

'Dynastic blunders' have done what Liberal stupidities failed to achieve.

In his articles and in his 'Memoirs' Bismarck repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary might not only abandon Germany in the hour of need, but, remembering the loss of Silesia to Prussia and the Battle of Königgrätz, turn against Germany.

Unceasingly Bismarck pointed out in the clearest language that Germany was under no obligation whatever to support Austria in the Balkans, and that, in case of serious Austro-Russian differences, such as those which arose in July 1914 about Serbia, Germany should not act as Austria's unconditional supporter but as a mediator between the two States. Bismarck wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on January 15, 1893:

> The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance provides only against an attack on Austrian and German territory on the part of Russia. Being thus limited, the possibility is excluded that the Treaty may serve Austria's special interests in the Balkans. The purpose of the Alliance is exclusively to prevent a Russian war of aggression. Its purpose is in no way to strengthen Austria in the pursuit of a purely Austrian policy in the East. Germany has no interests in the East. Besides, if she supported Austria's Balkan policy she would defeat the purpose of the Treaty, which is to preserve the peace.
>
> If Austria was entitled to the support of Germany's bayonets if engaged in the East, a collision with Russia would become probable. Hence the *casus foederis* is limited to the possibility of a Russian attack upon one of the two Allies. The task of Germany, as Austria's Ally, consists in acting as a mediator between the two Powers in case of differences in the Balkans. If Austria wishes to further her individual interests in the Balkans she must seek support not in Germany, but among those countries which are interested in the East—England, France, and Italy.

Bismarck spoke and wrote in vain. His shallow successors treated his advice with contempt. The great German statesman not only pointed out the mistake which the Emperor had made in breaking with Russia but he tried to recreate the intimate relations which formerly existed between Germany and Russia. His exertions proved unavailing, and he wrote despairingly in the *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in June 1892:

> The worst that has happened under the Chancellorship of Caprivi is that all the threads connecting Germany with Russia were suddenly broken. The German Emperor tried to win over the Russians with amiable advances. However, busy intermediaries reported to him expressions from the Czar's entourage which proved that his intended visit to Russia would be politically unsuccessful. Then William the Second immediately went to England and concluded with England the Treaty relating to Zanzibar and Heligoland, and that anti-Russian demonstration was followed by his philo-Polish policy, which was hurtful to Russia. Germany's foreign policy could not have taken a more fatal step than to threaten Russia with the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland in case of a Russian defeat. That

was bound to lead to the Franco-Russian rapprochement and to Kronstadt.

Bismarck clearly recognised that the alliance between Italy and Austria was an unnatural one, and that Italy's fidelity to her two partners would depend partly on the character of Germany's policy, partly on England's relations with Germany. In view of Italy's long and exposed sea-border and of her vulnerability in case of an attack from the sea, Italy could obviously not be expected to support Germany and Austria if such support would involve her in hostilities with the strongest naval Power. For this reason, among others, Bismarck was anxious that Germany and England should be firm friends. He wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on June 13, 1890:

The co-operation of Germany, Austria, and Italy threatens no one. The Triple Alliance does not involve dangers which would become fatal to the co-operation of these three States. On the contrary, the Alliance is designed to strengthen the peace of Europe. The *casus foederis* towards Russia arises only if Russia attacks the territory of one of the two Allies. This limitation deprives the Alliance of all aggressive tendencies, and excludes the possibility that it may serve the special interests of Austria in the Balkan Peninsula and thus threaten the preservation of peace. . . .

The Austro-Italian Alliance is not equally favourable. Between Austria and Italy there are unadjusted differences, which are to be found particularly on the side of Italy, such as the anti-Austrian aspirations of the Irredentists. Besides, the Italian Radicals are opposed to the Triple Alliance, and sympathise with France. . . .

In view of France's aspirations, Italy must be able to rely on the assistance of the English fleet, for the Triple Alliance cannot protect the Italian coasts. Hence, Italy has to think of England, and consideration of England may conceivably limit Italy's freedom of action. The maintenance of the present relations between Austria and Italy must be the principal care of the diplomats, especially as,

if Italy for some reason or other should abandon the Triple Alliance, the Austrian Army would be compelled to protect the Dual Monarchy against Italy. Hence it would no longer be able to fulfil Article 1 of its Alliance with Germany, according to which it should assist Germany 'with its entire armed power.' By the detachment of Italy, the Austro-German Alliance would militarily lose so much that its value would become very problematical. . . .

If we sum up the considerations developed we find that the present position is quite satisfactory. As long as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are united in the Triple Alliance, and as long as these three States may reckon on the assistance of the English sea-power, the peace of Europe will not be broken. We must take care that friendly relations between Austria and Italy and between Italy and England shall be maintained. Besides, we must see that the Triple Alliance is restricted to its original scope, and that it is not allowed to serve those special interests which have nothing to do with it. We therefore firmly trust that, as far as Germany is concerned, the 'old course' will be preserved with particular care.

Bismarck died on July 30, 1898. We know from his speeches that he attached the greatest value to good relations between England and Germany, that he saw in England 'Germany's natural and traditional ally.'

The greater part of the German colonies was acquired by Bismarck. His principal care was to ensure Germany's security on the Continent of Europe, and he attached the greatest value to Great Britain's good will and support in view of the possibility of Continental complications. Considering Germany's Continental interests infinitely more important than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused to pursue a transmaritime and colonial policy in opposition to England, fearing that an anti-British policy would drive England into the arms of France and Russia. Even when diplomatic differences had arisen between the two countries, Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great

Britain. On March 2, 1884, for instance, he stated in the Reichstag with reference to an Anglo-German dispute:

I shall do everything in my power in order, *sine irâ et studio*, and in the most conciliatory manner, to settle this matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly intercourse which has at all times existed between England and Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse, which is most natural because neither Power possesses vital interests which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power. I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies us our modest attempts at colonising.

He laid down at greater length his guiding principles in his intercourse with Great Britain on January 10, 1885, when he stated in the Reichstag:

The last speaker has told us that we must either abandon our colonial policy or increase our naval strength to such an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or to speak more clearly, that our navy should rival that of England herself. However, even if we should succeed in building up a navy as strong as that of England, we should still have to fear an alliance of England and France. These Powers are stronger than any single Power in Europe is or ever can be. It follows that the policy indicated by the last speaker is one which should never be striven after.

I would also ask the last speaker not to make any attempts to disturb the peace between England and Germany or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I absolutely deny that possibility. It does not exist, and all the questions which are at present being discussed between England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really do not know what disputes could arise between England and Germany. There never have been disputes between the two countries. From my diplomatic experience, I cannot see any reasons which can make

hostilities possible between them, unless a cabinet of inconceivable character should be in power in England, a cabinet which neither exists nor which is ever likely to exist, and which criminally attacks us.

Four years later, on January 26, 1889, only a short time before his dismissal, he stated with reference to the Anglo-German Zanzibar dispute in the Reichstag:

I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived at an understanding with England, we shall take the necessary measures in Zanzibar in agreement with that country. I do not intend either actively to oppose England or even to take note of those steps which subordinate British individuals have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa we act in perfect harmony with the British Government. We are marching hand in hand, and I am firmly resolved that our relations shall preserve their present character.

English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous places, and subordinate colonial officials are occasionally hostile to German interests. Nevertheless, we are acting in perfect unison with the British Government. We are absolutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve Anglo-German harmony and to continue working in co-operation with that country.

The preservation of Anglo-German good-will is, after all, the most important thing. I see in England an old and traditional ally. No differences exist between England and Germany. I am not using a diplomatic term, if I speak of England as our ally. We have no alliance with England. However, I wish to remain in close contact with England also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched side by side during at least a hundred and fifty years, and if I should discover that we might lose touch with England I should act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing England's good-will.

Modern Germany has erected to Bismarck countless statues. Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and

Bismarck's memoirs have been printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, and they are found on the book-shelves of the German people by the side of Schiller and Goethe. But Modern Germany has forgotten, or she deliberately has disregarded, Bismarck's policy, and Bismarck's warnings.

Bismarck saw in England 'an old and traditional ally.' Hence he never thought an Anglo-German war possible. To him such a war was, as he said, unthinkable.

As long as the great Chancellor lived William the Second did not venture upon pursuing a violently anti-British policy which was bound to drive this country into the arms of France and Russia. Although William the Second was hostile to England, he was probably restrained by the fear of Bismarck's criticism during the Chancellor's lifetime. Soon after Bismarck's death William the Second began his naval campaign.

When Bismarck had closed his eyes a violent anti-British agitation, financed by Krupp and carried on by hundreds of generals and professors, was started throughout Germany, and in 1900 was published the great German Navy Bill, in the introduction of which we read the ominous and oft-quoted words: 'Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would jeopardise the supremacy of that Power.'

Bismarck had observed the Emperor's Anglophobia in its more modified form with alarm, fearing its effect upon Italy. He had written in a series of articles on the European situation, published in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* from May 12 to 18, 1892:

> In discussing Anglophobia in Germany we must remember that the principal Anglophobe is supposed to be the Emperor William the Second, who was hostile to England not only as Crown Prince, but even during the first years of his rule.
>
> England's attitude towards the Triple Alliance depends not upon the Heligoland Treaty, but on Italy. If England is opposed to Germany we can never reckon upon Italy's help. . . .
>
> The Austro-Hungarian Army is at Germany's disposal only if the Dual Monarchy does not require its use against Italy. Otherwise, one-half of the Austrian army would be lost to Germany. . . . Italy is therefore a very important factor in the Triple Alliance, even if she limits her action to abstaining from attacking Austria. . . .
>
> The idea that Russia may make a surprise attack upon Germany is Utopian. Only moderate diplomatic skill on Germany's part is required to avoid a war with Russia for generations. The tension among the nations would be greatly diminished if we should succeed in recreating in leading Russian circles the faith in Germany's neighbourly honesty which has disappeared since Bismarck's resignation.
>
> A Russian war is a calamity which must not be brought upon the population of the Eastern Provinces of Germany without pressing necessity. The seriousness of a Russo-German war is particularly great, because it would immediately lead to a Franco-German war, while, on the other hand, a Franco-German war need not lead to Russian intervention. Besides, the impossibility of obtaining adequate compensation for such a war must be borne in mind. What can Germany obtain from Russia? . . . At best she would obtain a second neighbour-State thirsting for revenge. Germany would be in an uncomfortable position created by her own rashness.

Bismarck did not consider England's support as a matter admitting of doubt. He reckoned upon it as a matter of course. Commenting upon an important colonial debate in the Reichstag, he wrote in the *Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung* on February 8, 1891:

> The value of England's friendship consists in this: that in case of a war she protects the Italian coasts or, which is perhaps more uncertain, helps in protecting the German shores. By doing this, England would largely act in her own interest. . . .

Three days later he wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

In decisive moments our co-operation with Italy would be influenced by England's attitude. The greater or lesser measure of good relations between England and Germany is not without influence upon Italy's policy, and it is certainly questionable how Germany's relations with Italy would shape themselves if Italy should no longer be in the position of being attached by an equal friendship to England and to Germany.

On May 19, 1892, he wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that Italy's faithfulness to the Triple Alliance depends largely upon the relations existing between England and that country. Italy cannot run the risk of being isolated in the Mediterranean, and of being defeated by France. Hence she must be certain of the protection of the English fleet in case of need.

The agitation for strengthening the German navy began in a mild way soon after William the Second came to the throne. Bismarck, observing that dangerous development with concern, warned Germany against frittering away her strength and competing on the sea with the French or English fleets. Addressing 3000 people from Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck said on May 26, 1895:

I wished to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, because unless we had that province we could not hope to have a German fleet. It was a question of national dignity that in case of need Germany should be able to hold her own against a second-rate navy. Formerly we had no fleet. I should consider it an exaggeration for Germany to compete with the French or the English navy. However, we must be strong enough on the sea to be able to deal with those second-rate Powers which we cannot get at by land.

Two years later Bismarck warned Germany more emphatically against creating a fleet strong enough to challenge England. On September 4, 1897, Mr. Maximilian Harden published in the *Zukunft* the following pronouncement of Prince Bismarck:

The papers are discussing unceasingly whether the German fleet should be increased. Of course, all that is required in the opinion of sober-minded experts should be voted. I have never been in favour of a colonial policy of conquest similar to that pursued by France. As far as one can see, the most important thing for Germany is a strong and reliable army provided with the best weapons. I am of Moltke's opinion—that we shall have to fight on the Continent of Europe for the possession of colonies. We must beware of undue economy in naval matters, but we must also guard ourselves against fantastical plans which might cause us to quarrel with people who are important for our position in Europe. *Qui trop embrasse. . . .*

In December 1897 Bismarck stated his views on Germany's transmaritime policy as follows in the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*:

The German Government should not embark on undertakings unless they are absolutely required, or at least justified, by the material interests of the State. . . . Nothing would be more strongly opposed to Germany's interests than to enter upon more or less daring and adventurous enterprises guided merely by the desire to have a finger in every pie, to flatter the vanity of the nation or to please the ambitions of those who rule it. To carry on a policy of prestige would be more in accordance with the French than the German character. In order to acquire prestige, France has gone to Algiers, Tunis, Mexico, and Madagascar. If Germany should ever follow a similar policy, she would not promote any German interests, but would endanger the welfare of the Empire and its position in Europe.

Bismarck clearly foresaw that by embarking recklessly

upon a policy of adventure in the colonial sphere, Germany might endanger her relations with Great Britain. Besides, he foresaw that by wresting Port Arthur from victorious Japan in company with Russia and France, and occupying Kiaochow, she might later on be exposed to Japan's hostility. He did not understand why Germany should have gone out of her way to drive Japan out of Port Arthur with the help of France and Russia. Therefore he wrote on May 7, 1895, in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

It appears that Japan, following the friendly advice of Germany, Russia, and France, has abandoned the Liao-tung Peninsula. Germany has no interest whether the district in question remains in China's possession or not. If she has nevertheless exerted pressure upon Japan she might have had reasons with which we are not acquainted. Possibly the policy made in Berlin may have been due to the persuasiveness of people who were in favour of a policy of prestige similar to that pursued in the time of Napoleon the Third.

If Germany's action at Tokio was intended to do a service to Russia, it might perhaps be approved of. However, Russia might have been supported by an attitude of benevolent neutrality without active interference. . . .

For the present we believe that Germany's initiative in East Asia was not timely, and we doubt whether that policy and the extraordinary change of attitude towards England can be justified. We cannot help fearing that Germany's initiative in East Asia is merely a symptom of a defect from which our foreign policy suffers: that it springs from the inability to sit still and wait. We do not see why it was necessary to run any risks. . . .

Germany's action has diminished the sympathies for Germany which hitherto existed in Japan. That loss was perhaps unnecessary. The loss incurred on the one side may perhaps be balanced by gains, but only the future can show whether there are any gains.

Reverting to Germany's East Asiatic policy, Bismarck

wrote in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* on May 23, 1895:

Germany's action against Japan can only be explained by a desire to regain good relations with Russia, which have lately been lost. If that is the case, the Government should be careful not to fall between two stools. Russia desires to obtain ice-free harbours in the East, and Germany has no reason either to support or to oppose her. During decades we have endeavoured to encourage France to develop and expand in every direction—except in that of Alsace-Lorraine. We have encouraged her to expand in Tunis, in India, and in Africa, and we have a similar interest as regards Russia in the East. Germany has little interest in the Black Sea, but still less in the Sea of Japan. . . .

As we said before, we do not know the intentions of the Government, but we can only recommend that Germany, after having once more grasped Russia's hand, should hold it firmly and stand by Russia as long as Germany's own interests are not hurt thereby. If the contrary policy is followed, the result would be that we should offend Russia as much as we have already offended Japan by our interference.

Bismarck gave two most impressive warnings regarding mistakes in foreign policy in general and regarding a German attack on France, such as that which took place in 1914, in particular. In chapter xxviii of his 'Memoirs' the great statesman wrote:

Errors in the policy of the cabinets of the Great Powers bring no immediate punishment, either in St. Petersburg or in Berlin, but they are never harmless. The logic of history is even more exact in its revisions than the chief Audit Office of Prussia.

In chapter xxix, entitled 'The Triple Alliance,' Bismarck wrote regarding a German attack upon France:

It is explicable that for Russian policy there is a limit beyond which the importance of France must not be diminished. That limit was reached, I believe, at the Peace of

Frankfort, a fact which, in 1870 and 1871, was not so completely realised at St. Petersburg as five years later. I hardly think that during the Franco-German War the Russian Cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over, Russia would have for neighbour so strong and so united a Germany.

Bismarck was a most loyal citizen. He never endeavoured to revenge himself on the Emperor for the disgraceful way in which he was dismissed, and for the persecution which, after his dismissal, he suffered at the hands of the bureaucracy, no doubt by the Emperor's orders. Although he distrusted the Emperor's reckless and adventurous personal policy, he never attacked him or reproached him personally. He merely criticised his advisers and their action, and laid down the broad principles of Germany's policy in his posthumous 'Memoirs' and in numerous speeches and articles.

Bismarck's worst fears have been realised. The German nation, as I stated before, has paid lip-service to Bismarck, but has utterly disregarded his warnings and advice. William the Second and his courtier-statesmen have apparently destroyed Bismarck's creation. They cannot plead that they were not warned, for Bismarck foretold unceasingly that the Emperor's rash interference would lead to the break-up of the Triple Alliance, make Germany subservient to Austria-Hungary, involve her in war with Russia about the Balkan Peninsula where Germany possesses no interests, detach Italy, bring about Japan's hostility, and end in Germany's isolation in Europe.

The official and non-official spokesmen of Germany have asserted unceasingly that a world conspiracy had been formed against their country, that Russia, or England, is to blame for the present war. Those who are acquainted with Bismarck's writings know that the present war has not been caused by England's jealousy or Russia's ambitions, or France's thirst for revenge, but only by

Germany's own folly, and especially by the action of her Emperor, who dismissed Bismarck, disregarded his warnings, and plunged the nation into a war which may end in Germany's destruction.

Bismarck died at the ripe age of eighty-two. During no less than thirty-nine years he was in the service of the Government, first as Ambassador and then as Prime Minister and Chancellor. As Prime Minister of Prussia and Chancellor of Germany he was uninterruptedly in office during twenty-eight years, and during the whole of that long period he laboured and fought unceasingly with the single object of establishing the German Empire and of consolidating it. Bismarck scarcely knew the meaning of pleasure or of relaxation. He laboured day and night. Frequently in the course of the night he called one of his secretaries to his bedside and dictated to him. The great Chancellor gave all his time, in fact his whole life, to his country. After his dismissal in 1890 he spent the last eight years, not in resting from his labours, but in fighting for his country. He fought not against the Emperor, as his enemies and enviers have often asserted, but against the pernicious policy, the incompetent statesmen, and the dangerous influences which, he feared, would cause Germany's downfall. Bismarck laboured and fought in vain. A century after his birth the wonderful edifice which he erected almost single-handed seems to be crumbling. One man created the German Empire, and another one is apparently destroying it.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN EDUCATION AND OF THE NATIONAL CHARACTER[1]

THERE is a vast literature on German Education. Innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles give us the fullest details of the German school system in all its branches. Enthusiastic British and American educationalists have explored the great education machine of Germany in every aspect, and have bidden the Anglo-Saxon countries to copy it. However, most writers on German Education have considered only its outward aspects and its present state. They have failed to explain to us the secret of Germany's education. An educational system, like a national constitution, cannot be copied. It is a thing that has been evolved in the course of centuries. We can understand German education and the German character only if we go back to the foundations, if we consider the way by which the German educational system has been created.

The Germans, and particularly the North Germans, the Prussians, were until comparatively recent times a nation of ignorant boors. To-day they are the best educated, or at least the most educated, people in the world. They have been made what they are by their great rulers, especially by Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick William the First, and King Frederick the Great.

It would, perhaps, lead too far to study the government

[1] From *The Contemporary Review*, January 1916.

and the influence of the Great Elector. He ruled from 1640 to 1688. It requires some mental effort to appreciate his educational activities at the present day. It will perhaps suffice to say that he introduced in Prussia the *régime* of enlightened absolutism as has been shown in the beginning of this book. He destroyed the independence of the nobility, of the towns, and of the estates, and made the whole people a willing instrument in the hands of their ruler.

The Great Elector died, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick, who became the first King of Prussia. The son was a worthless monarch. He sacrificed the welfare of his country to his vanity and his lust. Under his rule Prussia declined and decayed. He was succeeded by his son, King Frederick William the First, a coarse-mannered, ignorant brute. Frederick William was as uncultured as was President Kruger. At the same time he possessed, like Kruger, great natural abilities. He allowed himself to be guided by his instincts. He ruled Prussia absolutely in accordance with his will, in accordance with the precedent which the Great Elector had created. Frederick William loved the army. He was fond of order and cleanliness, and he was extremely thrifty and parsimonious. He founded in Prussia a model administration and a model army, and he moulded the character of the people upon his own.

Frederick the First had tried to imitate Louis the Fourteenth of France. He spent the money of the citizens lavishly and almost ruined the country. His son was outraged by the outlandish elegance and luxury, the waste and immorality, which his father had introduced in Prussia. His instinct rebelled against his surroundings in his early childhood. When, as a small boy, he was given a dress of the most precious brocade, he refused to wear it. At great trouble he was prevailed upon to put it on. However, before joining the company he crept into a chimney, covered

himself with soot, and entered the royal presence looking like a sweep. He hated the full-bottomed powdered wigs with enormous flowing curls which Louis the Fourteenth had made popular. One day the little prince was sitting among a number of pompous old courtiers ornamented with the largest and costliest French wigs. He himself wore only a little one. Suddenly, the Crown Prince exclaimed that it was too hot for wearing wigs. The courtiers of course agreed. In a moment Frederick William threw his own wig into the blazing fire, exclaiming, 'He is a rascal who does not follow the Crown Prince's example!' All the courtiers regretfully, but obediently, followed suit.

When Frederick William the First came to the throne his first action consisted in inspecting the royal accounts and in reducing the royal expenditure to one-fifth. Without a moment's delay, all the superfluous courtiers and servants were dismissed or pensioned. All unduly high salaries were reduced. The superfluous royal buildings and grounds were sold or let to the best advantage. Royal parks and ornamental gardens were converted into ploughed fields and into drill grounds for the army. The unnecessary jewellery which his father had accumulated, vast quantities of costly wines, and many horses and carriages were sold. Innumerable objects of silver and gold were sent to the Mint and turned into coin. While in his father's time the characteristic of the Prussian Court had been elegance and luxury, its characteristic feature under Frederick William the First became simplicity and thrift. The King lived like a simple private citizen. Upholstered furniture, carpets, and rich hangings were banished from the royal rooms. The new King preferred plain wooden floors and plain wooden tables and chairs. Simplicity and cleanliness became the predominant note of the royal residence.

The impetuous King hated luxury. He would tolerate luxury neither in his own family nor among others. By legislative enactments, profusion in dress and wastefulness

of expenditure were checked. The King hated the French fashions, and tried to make them ridiculous. With this object in view he caused the most despised men in his army, the provosts, who acted as military police and as executioners, to be dressed at parade in the richest French fashions and in flowing wigs. The ladies at Court were not allowed to use paint or powder. Elaborate French cooking was banished from the royal kitchens. The royal table was supplied with the plainest viands. When the King on his walks noticed an attractive smell of cooking emanating from the house of a peasant or of a citizen of small means, he would not hesitate to enter and to invite himself to dinner. He would ask after the price of the food, and then insist that the royal cook should provide him with a meal of the same kind at the identical price.

In his personal expenditure the King was the thriftiest of men. For the sake of economy he always wore oversleeves and an apron when working at his desk. He checked the accounts of the royal household down to the smallest sums, and woe betide a dishonest servant or one who through ignorance or carelessness had spent too much in supplying the royal family. The same economy which the King practised in his person and his family he required from all the officials and from the private citizens as well. Every penny had to be carefully accounted for. Ministers of State were told that common paper, which was cheaper than white paper, was good enough for their use. In large matters the King was economical as in small ones. Every year considerable sums of money were saved. Officials who wished to acquire the King's favour had to produce large surpluses. Vast sums thus saved were employed for strengthening the army and for improving the country by building canals and high roads, by draining marshes and irrigating dry land, by settling large numbers of foreigners on reclaimed waste lands in Prussia, and by accumulating a fund in ready money in the cellars of the royal castle.

Frederick William the First educated the Prussians not only to habits of frugality, economy, and order, but to industry and thoroughness as well. In his father's time the Government business had been left to underlings, who had abused their position. Frederick William resolved to take the whole national business in his own hands and to become the principal official of the State. He fulfilled his duties most conscientiously. Thoughts of the national business disturbed his sleep. He rose at the break of dawn and worked indefatigably till far into the night. He was no doubt the most industrious man in his kingdom. On every walk and every ride he acted as general inspector to the nation, supervising, admonishing, helping or punishing the people on the spot. When he saw working-men idling at their work he accelerated their movements with his stick. Once on one of his early morning walks the King approached one of the Potsdam gates and noticed that a traveller who had arrived by the night mail from Hamburg was knocking in vain at the gate. The enraged King had the gate opened, rushed into the gatekeeper's house, and with his stick drove him out of bed and out of office. Then, returning to the astonished traveller he apologised to him, and expressed his deep regret that a Prussian official should have been so neglectful of his duties. Frederick William listened to all complaints, and investigated them in person if possible. While he insisted that all the citizens should be industrious and thrifty, he was always pleased when he saw hard-working men enjoying innocent amusements. Once he came, on one of his walks, to an inn where people were playing at ninepins. He watched their game and praised them for spending their leisure hours in such a healthy way. The players told their friends, and when the King happened to pass the ninepin-alley a few days later there was a crowd of loafers who waited for the King's applause. Immediately the King grew red in the face, rushed among them, and drove them to their business with his stick.

Frederick William the First died in 1740, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick the Great. Frederick the Great is known to the world chiefly as a soldier and as a diplomat. Like Napoleon the First, he was his own Commander-in-Chief, Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is not so much known that Frederick the Great, like his father, administered in person all the principal offices of State, that he was a great administrator and, before all, a great educator in the widest sense of the word. He was an indefatigable worker. He rose in summer at three o'clock in the morning, and in winter at four o'clock, and his servants had instructions to get him out of bed by force if he did not rise immediately when called. A quarter of an hour after having been awakened, Frederick was at his desk, reading his correspondence and dictating replies. He, like his father, became to the Prussian people a model of industry, thoroughness, and economy.

Frederick the Great left numerous hitherto unpublished writings for the guidance of his successors, as well as printed essays and books scarcely known to the English-speaking peoples, in which he explained the principles which guided his numerous activities. His enlightened views as to education in the narrower sense are extremely interesting and valuable, especially as they have had the greatest influence upon Prusso-German educational policy. He wrote in his 'Mémoires depuis la Paix':

> Custom, which rules the world, holds imperious sway over the narrow-minded. Still, a Government must not restrict its activities to a single aim. It must be prompted to action not only by the consideration whether action is profitable. The public welfare has numerous aspects, and the Government should interest itself in all. Among the objects which the Government should further with particular care, the education of youth is one of the most important. . . . Unfortunately teachers strive merely to fill the memory of

their pupils with facts and dates, and omit to strengthen their intelligence and their judgment.

Frederick the Great believed that by a wisely directed education a nation might be raised rivalling the ancient Greeks and Romans in bravery and general ability. He stated in his pamphlet, 'Lettre sur l'Éducation,' written in 1769:

The vast number of great men which Rome and Greece have produced have influenced me in favour of the education of the ancients. I am convinced that by following their methods one can create a nation superior in character and ability to the generality of modern nations.

The education given to the children of the nobility throughout Europe is extremely bad. In Prussia they are given their first education in the parental house, and an intermediate and higher education at the schools and the universities. In the house of the parents, blind parental love prevents them giving their children the necessary correction. Mothers particularly, even if they rule their husbands with despotic severity, have a boundless indulgence for their children. These are handed over to servants, who flatter and spoil them, who inspire them with pernicious ideas, and who thus fatally influence minds so tender. The educators who are generally chosen for the children when they are a little older are, as a rule, either clergymen or young lawyers who often themselves need educating. . . .

Children are trained to habits of idleness by being allowed to be idle. Men who wish to get on in the world require a hard and laborious education. Boys should be given work of composition, which should be corrected and recorrected. By forcing them to rewrite and to improve their work, they will be taught to think correctly and to express their ideas with facility. Instead of following this method, teachers cram the brains of the young with facts and allow the working intelligence of their pupils to remain inactive and undeveloped and to become atrophied. Children are forced to accumulate knowledge, but are prevented from acquiring that discriminating intelligence with which alone they can make good use of the knowledge which they have acquired.

The softness of their first education makes boys effeminate, comfort-loving, lazy, and cowardly. Thus, instead of rearing a hardy race resembling the ancients, a race of pleasure-loving sybarites is created. Hence young men lead lives of idleness and of self-indulgence. They believe that they have been born to enjoy comfort and pleasure, and that men of their position are under no obligation to be useful members of society. Consequently, they will commit follies of every kind, run into debt, drink and gamble, and ruin their families.

Young men cannot be too well educated. They cannot possess too much knowledge, whatever their calling may be. The profession of arms, for instance, requires very vast knowledge. Nevertheless, one often hears people say: 'My boy will not learn. I shall therefore make him a soldier.' He may become a private, but not an officer qualified to fill the highest posts.

In the administration of justice and of the national finances, in the diplomatic service and in the army, illustrious birth is an advantage. However, all would be lost if birth should become more potent than merit. A Government which would exalt birth above merit would no doubt experience fatal consequences. . . . It is an error to believe that the arts and sciences soften the national character. All that serves to enlighten the mind and to extend the range of knowledge, elevates the national spirit.

In Frederick's opinion, education should improve the character and increase the abilities of the people. It should be practical and useful rather than ornamental and showy. These principles should apply to the education of girls as well. He wrote in his 'Lettre sur l'Éducation':

I must confess that I am surprised to see that people of the highest position bring up their daughters like chorus girls. They chiefly wish that their daughters should be admired, that they should please by their appearance. Apparently it is considered unnecessary that they should be esteemed, and it is forgotten that their business in life consists in raising families. Their education should be

directed towards their principal object in life. They should be taught to detest everything that is dishonourable. They ought to learn wisdom and be made to acquire useful and lasting qualities. Instead of this, parents endeavour to cultivate their beauty and grace, attractions which are evanescent. Example is more precious than precept. How then can parents teach their daughters wisdom and virtue if they themselves lead idle and frivolous lives and devote themselves to luxury and to other scandalous practices?

Frederick the Great clearly recognised that the sciences and arts are apt to increase the prestige and the power of a nation. He regretted that the Prussians were a nation of boors, and he wished to create culture among them by a suitable education. He therefore encouraged all the sciences and arts, established learned institutions, and promoted study and investigation in every way. He wrote in his 'Discours de l'Utilité des Sciences':

The inborn gifts of men are small. Men possess tendencies which education may develop. Men's knowledge must be increased so as to widen their horizon. Their memories must be filled with facts, so that their imagination will have sufficient material with which it can work. The critical faculties of men must be sharpened so as to enable them to discriminate between the valuable and the worthless. The greatest genius among men, if devoid of knowledge, is like an uncut diamond. How many geniuses have been lost to society, and how many truly great men have lived and died in obscurity, because their great natural gifts remained undeveloped either through lack of education or through lack of opportunity! The welfare and the glory of the State require that the people should be as well educated and as enlightened as possible, for then only can the nation produce men of the highest ability in every walk of life for the good of the country. . . .

All enlightened rulers have patronised and encouraged those learned men whose labours are useful to society, and now matters have come to such a pitch that a State will

soon be a century behind its neighbours if it neglects to encourage the sciences. In this respect Poland furnishes us with a warning example.

Very interesting are Frederick's own instructions for the Académie des Nobles in Berlin, where sons of the nobility were to be educated. Frederick the Great wrote:

The professor of law should draw upon Hugo Grotius. The pupils should not be turned into juridical experts. Well-brought-up men should possess some sound general ideas about the law, but need not have profound legal knowledge. The law professor shall therefore limit himself to giving to his pupils some knowledge of the rights of the citizens, of the rights of the people, and of the rights of the monarch. They should have some idea of international law. At the same time they should be told that international law lacks that authority and compelling power which are possessed by the ordinary law, and that it is therefore a phantom to which sovereigns appeal even when they are violating it. The lessons will be wound up by the study of the Frederician code, which, being the body of the national laws, should be known by all the citizens.

If the pupils should do wrong, they must be punished. If they do not know their lessons, they should be made to wear a donkey's head. If they are lazy, they should be given only bread and water. If they are ignorant through ill-will, they should be locked up, deprived of food, scolded, served last at table, not be allowed to carry their sword in public, and be compelled to ask pardon in public. Obstinate pupils should be allowed to carry only an empty scabbard until they repent of their obstinacy. But under pain of imprisonment the governors of the academy are prohibited from beating their pupils. As they are young men of position, they should possess greatness of soul and a keen sense of honour. The punishments inflicted on them should awaken their ambitions but should not humiliate them.

Law is an important part of the national education. Frederick the Great was eminent not only as an educa-

directed towards their principal object in life. They should be taught to detest everything that is dishonourable. They ought to learn wisdom and be made to acquire useful and lasting qualities. Instead of this, parents endeavour to cultivate their beauty and grace, attractions which are evanescent. Example is more precious than precept. How then can parents teach their daughters wisdom and virtue if they themselves lead idle and frivolous lives and devote themselves to luxury and to other scandalous practices?

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Very interesting are Frederick's own instructions for the Académie des Nobles in Berlin, where sons of the nobility were to be educated. Frederick the Great wrote :

The professor of law should draw upon Hugo Grotius. The pupils should not be turned into juridical experts. Well-brought-up men should possess some sound general ideas about the law, but need not have profound legal knowledge. The law professor shall therefore limit himself to giving to his pupils some knowledge of the rights of the citizens, of the rights of the people, and of the rights of the monarch. They should have some idea of international law. At the same time they should be told that international law lacks that authority and compelling power which are possessed by the ordinary law, and that it is therefore a phantom to which sovereigns appeal even when they are violating it. The lessons will be wound up by the study of the Frederician code, which, being the body of the national laws, should be known by all the citizens.

If the pupils should do wrong, they must be punished. If they do not know their lessons, they should be made to wear a donkey's head. If they are lazy, they should be given only bread and water. If they are ignorant through ill-will, they should be locked up, deprived of food, scolded, served last at table, not be allowed to carry their sword in public, and be compelled to ask pardon in public. Obstinate pupils should be allowed to carry only an empty scabbard until they repent of their obstinacy. But under pain of imprisonment the governors of the academy are prohibited from beating their pupils. As they are young men of position, they should possess greatness of soul and a keen sense of honour. The punishments inflicted on them should awaken their ambitions but should not humiliate them.

Law is an important part of the national education. Frederick the Great was eminent not only as an educa-

tionalist, but also as a law-giver. He considered that the citizens were entitled to obtain justice quickly and cheaply, that the confusion and the multiplicity of laws prevented the poor obtaining justice, and enabled the rich and cunning to oppress the poor and the weak. He laid down his principles regarding the laws in various writings. In his ' Dissertation sur les Raisons d'Établir ou d'Abroger les Lois ' he wrote :

Few and wise laws make the people happy, while the multiplicity of laws embarrasses jurisprudence. A good doctor does not overdose his patients with medicines, nor does a skilful legislator overdose the public with superfluous laws. Too many medicines are harmful. They neutralise one another. Too many laws create a maze, in which the lawyers and justice itself become lost.

England has a law against bigamy. Once a man was accused of having married five wives. As the law had to be interpreted literally, he could not be punished for bigamy. To make the law clear it ought to have stated : ' Whoever marries more than one woman will be punished.' The vaguely worded laws of England, which are literally interpreted, have given rise to the most ridiculous abuses.

Carefully worded laws leave no room for chicanery. When they are vaguely and obscurely expressed, it becomes necessary to discuss and to determine the intention of the law-givers, and judges, instead of adjudicating on the facts, have to waste their time in expounding and interpreting the law.

One can limit the addresses of lawyers to the recital of facts which can be supported by proofs, and their addresses may be concluded with a short recapitulation. Nothing is more powerful and more moving than an appeal to the passions, to sentiment, made by a man gifted with eloquence. An eloquent advocate can move his hearers in any way he likes, and can thus obscure the truth. Lycurgus and Solon prohibited the use of eloquence in the law courts. . . . Prussia has followed that wise custom of Greece. Eloquence is banished from our pleadings.

When the laws of a State have not been collected in a

code it is only natural that the existing laws frequently contradict each other. As they have been made by different legislators at different times, they lack that unity which is essential in all important matters.

In his ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' Frederick wrote :

Good laws must be clearly expressed. Otherwise trickery can evade them, and cunning take advantage of them, and then the weak will become a prey to the powerful and the cunning. Legal procedure should be as short as possible. Otherwise the people will be ruined by protracted law suits. They should not have to spend vast sums in litigation, for they are entitled to justice. The Law Department of the Government cannot be too watchful in protecting the people against the grasping greed of the lawyers. The whole legal apparatus should be kept in order by periodical inspections, when those who believe that they have been wronged by the law can place their complaints before the visiting Commission.

Punishments should never be excessive. Violence should never displace the laws. It is better that a sovereign should be too mild than too severe. Laws must be devised in accordance with the national character. A docile people does not require severe laws.

More than 150 years ago Frederick the Great endeavoured to make the laws plain and clear to all by compiling a code. Great Britain is still devoid of a code. Contradictory laws and all the evils described by Frederick the Great abound. The law in England, and in America too, is a scandal, and the lawyers oppose the compilation of the laws in a code in their own interest.

The old Prussian Code, which was inspired by the ideas of Frederick the Great, is a model of clearness and brevity. It is interesting not only because it shows how plain and simple the law can be made by a government which has the will to simplify it, but also because it shows how powerful

an educational instrument legislation can become in the hands of a wise government. The old Prussian Code established clearly the rights and duties of ruler and ruled, of the State and of the citizen. While England and the United States are swayed by individualism, while in the Anglo-Saxon countries the interests of the individual are placed above those of the community as a whole, Frederick the Great impressed upon his people throughout his Code the fact that the whole is more important than the part, that the State is more important than the individual. In the Introduction to the Code we read, in the beautifully clear and brief language which makes it a model of style :

Every citizen is obliged to promote the welfare and security of the community in accordance with his position and means. If the rights and duties of the individual should come into collision with the promotion of the general welfare, the rights and advantages of the individual citizen must range after the interests of the community. On the other hand, the State is obliged to make good the damage which individuals may suffer by sacrificing their rights and interests to the general welfare.

It will be noticed that the State, the community, was given enormous powers over the individual, powers which might be abused. To prevent their abuse, the citizens were enabled to proceed at law against the State with the same ease with which they could proceed against one another. The Code stated :

Differences between the head of the State and his subjects will be settled before the ordinary law courts, in accordance with the law, and will be decided by them.

That was not an empty assertion. While in England and in the United States the popular representation is all-powerful, and can, with impunity, act unjustly towards the citizens, the Prussian people were enabled by law to place their differences with Government and ruler before

the law courts. When Frederick the Great had built the *château* of Sansouci he found that a windmill close by disturbed him at his work. He offered to buy the mill, but the miller refused to part with it at any price. Annoyed by his refusal, the King threatened to seize the mill, paying the miller compensation, whereupon the proprietor fearlessly replied that the King could not act against the law; that he would take the matter to the law courts if Frederick used violence, and the result was that the miller remained in undisturbed possession of his property.

By the action of the Great Elector, of Frederick William the First, and of Frederick the Great, the ruler and the Government of Prussia had been given the greatest powers. Frederick the Great was no doubt a despot, but he was an enlightened despot. He claimed for the State the most far-reaching rights, but he insisted that ruler and Government, being endowed with the greatest power, were obliged to fulfil their duty towards the citizens, that they should act towards them the part of Providence. The old Prussian Code lays down :

All rights and duties of the State towards the citizens are united in the sovereign.

The principal duty of the ruler of the State consists in maintaining peace and security towards other nations and in the interior of the country, and in protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his life and property against violence and against disturbance.

The duties before mentioned were generally recognised by conscientious sovereigns. However, Frederick the Great went farther. He was of opinion that the Government should not only protect the citizens, but should also promote their prosperity by wise interference, and come to their aid when in distress. The Code states :

It is the duty of the ruler to provide measures and create institutions whereby the citizens will obtain means

and opportunities for developing their abilities and powers, for using them and for increasing their prosperity.

Hence, the head of the State is possessed of all the privileges and powers which are required in order to obtain this object.

The State is obliged to maintain the security of the subjects and to defend their person, their honour, their rights, and their property.

Hence, the State is obliged to take the measures and to create the institutions necessary for providing justice, for taking care of those who cannot help themselves, and for preventing and punishing transgressions and crimes.

Germany was the first State to introduce a system of National Insurance. As Bismarck inaugurated the first national insurance laws, it is often believed that he originated Germany's social policy. In reality he merely carried out the duties which Frederick the Great had recommended, and which were laid down in the old Code. The old Prussian Code distinctly states that those citizens who are in need are entitled to employment, and that they are entitled to support if employment cannot be found for them, or if they are unable to work. On the other hand, citizens were not allowed to live in idleness by begging, and institutions which encouraged idleness and dissipation, even if they were charitable institutions, were not to be tolerated. The Code states :

It is the duty of the State to provide for the maintenance of those citizens who cannot provide for themselves, and who cannot obtain maintenance from those private persons who, according to the law, are obliged to provide for them.

Those who lack means and opportunities to earn a living for themselves and their dependents, are to be supplied with work suitable to their powers and capacities.

Those who will not work, owing to laziness, love of idleness, or other disorderly inclinations, shall be made to do useful work by compulsion and punishment.

Foreign beggars must neither be allowed to enter the country nor to remain in it if they have entered it, and if they should have succeeded in entering it by stealth, they must be sent back across the frontier.

The native poor must not beg. They must be sent back to the place to which they belong, and must there be provided for in accordance with the law. The State is entitled and obliged to create institutions and to take measures which prevent destitution among the citizens, and which prevent exaggerated expenditure and waste.

Arrangements and institutions which promote idleness, especially among the masses of the people, and which are harmful to diligence and industry, must not be tolerated within the State.

Charitable and other institutions which favour and promote inclination towards idleness, may be dissolved by the State, and their income may be used for the benefit of the poor.

Those who deliberately live by begging, such as tramps and idlers of every kind, must be made to work ; and when they are useless they must either be cheaply provided for or be expelled from the country as strangers.

Thieves and other criminals who, owing to their evil inclinations, may become dangerous to the community, shall not be allowed to leave prison after they have served their sentence unless they have shown that they are able to make an honest living.

Authorities and officials who neglect the preventive measures outlined will be held responsible for themselves and for their subordinates, according to the circumstances of the case.

Germany does not swarm with tramps, touts, and idlers of every kind who live by defrauding charitable organisations and kindly disposed private people, because the nation has been trained to habits of industry and thrift during the last two hundred years. The Prussian sovereigns themselves have given an example of industry and thrift to their people, and they have, in addition, endeavoured to make the people industrious and thrifty by wise legislation, for the principles

contained in the old Code still guide the German Government and the local authorities of the country.

On his journeys, Frederick the Great, like his father Frederick William the First, lent a willing ear to the complaints of all his citizens. Referring to his activity when travelling, he wrote to Voltaire:

I endeavour to prevent that in Prussia the strong oppress the weak, and I try to mitigate sentences which appear to me to be too severe. That is part of my occupation when travelling through my provinces. Every citizen can approach me without let or hindrance, and his complaints are investigated either by myself or by others. Hence I am able to help numerous people who were unknown to me until they handed to me their petitions or complaints. As I am apt to revise sentences the judges are careful and cautious, and are not likely to proceed with over-great harshness.

Frederick the Great endeavoured by law not only to promote industry and to discourage idleness among the lower classes, but among the middle and upper classes as well. Peasants and farmers who cultivated their land badly could be compelled to cede it to others unless they improved its cultivation. By careful Government regulation efficiency was enforced in every direction. Officials could only be appointed if they had given satisfactory proof of their ability, and people of the middle classes were allowed to engage in industrial and professional pursuits only if they had shown their capacity. Quacks, humbugs, and frauds of every kind, who flourish so greatly among Anglo-Saxon nations, were not allowed to make a living in Prussia. In all professions, in all callings, from the highest to the lowest, efficiency and competence, thoroughness and industry, were required and were enforced by appropriate regulations and laws. The nobility were given great privileges, but corresponding duties were required of them. Appointments were to be made only according to ability and merit, and noble-

men who had disgraced themselves or had not done their duty towards the State, could be deprived of their title and position either by the sovereign or by the law courts. Full religious liberty was granted, but no religious body was allowed to encourage hostility to the State or to promote immorality, for the Code stated:

Every citizen must be allowed complete freedom of religion and of conscience.

On the other hand, every religious body is obliged to teach its members fear of God, obedience to the laws, loyalty towards the State, and moral behaviour towards the citizens.

Two centuries ago the Germans were a nation of boors. They were poor, ignorant, backward, and undisciplined. They have become a cultivated and a powerful nation by the training which they received from their ruler-statesmen, who have been the most successful educators, in the widest sense of the word, which the world has seen. Great Britain and the United States may learn from their example.

CHAPTER V

THE GERMAN ARMY AND THE GENERAL STAFF

THE success of an army, like that of any individual, depends, in the first place, not upon its brute strength, but upon its brain. The General Staff is the brain of an army. A General Staff in some form or other has existed in armies since time immemorial. Cromwell had an excellent General Staff, although it bore a different name. However, the General Staff in its modern and most perfect form is a German invention. Count von Moltke's greatest merit consists in having created the German General Staff upon foundations which promised to ensure its permanent usefulness and value.

Unfortunately no English books on military affairs give a true inside view of the wonderful organisation of the German General Staff. The existing military literature deals exclusively with its outward activities. The most valuable account existing is contained in the confidential reports which Colonel Stoffel, who was the military attaché of France in Berlin from 1866 to 1870, sent to his Government. As that book has not been translated into English, I would herewith give some extracts from it which describe the organisation and activities of the German General Staff:

The Great General Staff in Berlin is perfectly organised for the training of officers and for serving as a brain to the army. At its headquarters may be found all the documents

necessary for studying the different European armies and the countries which may become theatres of war. All books, military journals, pamphlets, and other publications, maps, charts, &c., which appear anywhere in Europe are collected and classified. It possesses particularly the most complete investigations regarding the countries bordering upon Prussia. A special feature is a collection of the most detailed studies regarding the resources of the various countries, their geographical features, their roads, towns, and villages, their population, their revenues, their watercourses, the volume, depth, and width of streams, their points of passage, &c. Nothing similarly complete exists in France.

It must be proclaimed very loudly, and as an incontrovertible truth, that the Prussian General Staff is the first and foremost in Europe. The French Staff cannot be compared with it. I have unceasingly pointed this out, being convinced that if there should be an early war; the North German Federation would derive the very greatest advantages from its General Staff, while the French would terribly regret the inferiority of theirs. This question seems to me to be the gravest of all. I do not wish to disguise it, and my conviction is so strong that I raise a cry of alarm. Caveant consules! I should not do my duty did I act differently. . . .

General von Moltke is the chief of the staff, and he possesses almost absolute powers. He chooses the officers who are to be admitted and to be employed by the General Staff. He makes the promotions, which the War Minister merely ratifies, and he distributes staff officers throughout the army. His power is practically unlimited, and his position, which would appear incomprehensible in France, appears in Prussia only natural, because the integrity and merit of von Moltke are generally recognised in that country.

Any lieutenant in the army, after three years' service with his regiment, may enter the War Academy (Kriegs-Akademie) at Berlin. This is an important military high school. It is the foremost military school in Europe by the character of the teachers and by that of the tuition. It is not merely a staff school, for it has a larger aim. Its

object is to familiarise chosen and ambitious officers with the higher aspects of the art of war by giving them a training which will develop their intellectual faculties, and which will enable them to become good staff officers and prepare them for obtaining a high command. . . .

Of the 120 lieutenants who on an average wish to join the academy every year, only the 40 who show most ability are admitted. They are selected by severe examinations from the 120 who have come forward. The course of the study extends over three years; and it continues during nine months of every year. During the remaining three months the officers rejoin their regiments and take part in the autumn manœuvres. In the third year the pupils receive their training in actual staff duties and travel during a month through varied country under the guidance of their professors. During that month they occupy themselves with reconnaissances, practical studies of the ground, military map-making, placing camps for troops, and other practical military problems. . . .

When these three years of training have passed, all the lieutenants are sent back to their regiments, and the professors and the director of the academy point out to General von Moltke the most promising and the most zealous pupils. Now of the forty officers the twelve ablest are chosen, and these are transferred for six or nine months to a regiment belonging to another arm than that with which they have hitherto been acquainted. Those men who during that new stage have shown the necessary zeal and ability in their new surroundings are then called by General von Moltke to Berlin to serve their apprenticeship on the General Staff. However, they work there not in staff officer's uniform, but in their regimental uniform. The distinction of being allowed to wear a staff officer's uniform is not easily obtained. . . .

The one or two years which the officers chosen spend at the General Staff headquarters in Berlin, learning the practical staff business, are of the greatest importance to their future career, for they attend the highest military training school of the country, which is directed by General

von Moltke in person. By personally supervising the training of the young officers, von Moltke becomes acquainted with their character, and is able to judge of their abilities. He carefully introduces these young men to the work of each of the departments of the General Staff, and in addition he delivers lectures to them. He orders them to write essays on subjects which he chooses himself, and he reads and criticises these essays before the assembled officers. However, in doing so he never mentions the name of the author, in order neither to hurt the feelings of the unsuccessful nor to arouse a spirit of vanity among the successful. . . .

When this temporary service at the headquarters of the General Staff, which is a kind of apprenticeship, has been completed, General von Moltke chooses secretly those officers with whom he has been working who are to be appointed to the General Staff. He could, of course, immediately appoint those whom he considers to be the most competent. However, in order not to hurt the feelings of the unsuccessful men, all the officers who have served their apprenticeship are indiscriminately sent back to their regiments, where they resume their former duties. The less gifted are left there, but the most promising ones are, after several months' practical service, promoted captains over the heads of their fellows, and are given the distinguishing and much-coveted uniform of the General Staff. . . .

General von Moltke employs the captains who have thus been chosen according to his discretion. He gives them work for which they have shown particular aptitude, and he sends the majority of the men to the staffs of the different army corps in the provinces, where they become acquainted with the corps duties. The Prussian staff officers, unlike the French, are not permanently tied to their desks. They are not occupied all the time with clerical work, for all this is left to non-commissioned officers and privates.

In being chosen for the General Staff the officers gain not only prestige, but obtain at the same time substantial material advantage, for by being promoted captains, they

obtain that grade from six to eight years earlier than they would have obtained it in the ordinary way. . . .

Out of the 120 promising officers who on an average come forward every year, desiring to join the War Academy, only the forty ablest are admitted after severe examinations, as has been pointed out, and of these forty only the twelve most capable men are finally chosen, as has been shown. However, among the officers who have not come forward to study at the War Academy, and among those who have attended the War Academy and who have been rejected, there may of course be men of very great ability. In order that these should be discovered and employed on the General Staff, the regimental commanders are invited to propose every year, through the generals commanding, to von Moltke those officers who have shown the greatest professional knowledge, zeal, and aptitude. The commanders of regiments and corps are of course anxious to discover as many able officers as possible in their commands, and to recommend them to von Moltke. To the officers who have thus been recommended to him, General von Moltke sends problems to solve and questions to answer. If they show signs of talent and of ability in carrying out the tasks which von Moltke gives them, he calls them to the General Staff and employs them tentatively. If they give satisfaction, they receive permanent appointments. If they disappoint him, they are sent back to their regiments. . . .

All the mechanical staff work is left to underlings. The staff officers themselves are occupied solely with the study of important military questions, with brain work of the highest importance. Every year the chief of the staff of each army corps makes with all the staff officers a so-called staff journey in order to extend their knowledge. On that journey practical problems of war are treated. The officers of the Great General Staff of Berlin make every year a similar staff journey, which is conducted by General von Moltke himself and which lasts from two to three weeks. . . .

As shown by the details given in the foregoing, the superiority of the Prussian General Staff over the staffs of other nations is due firstly to the careful selection of the

staff officers from all the officers of the army, for all officers may compete for staff appointments, as has been shown. Its superiority is due, in the second place, to the fact that only ambitious, capable, and industrious officers will come forward, for they know that they can hope to succeed in obtaining a staff appointment only if they work earnestly and with the greatest concentration, for they are aware that only the ablest will be selected—that appointments are made exclusively by merit. By this most careful selection, and by the highest professional training of the staff officers, Prussia has secured for herself the foremost body of staff officers in the world. The more frequently I compare the German staff officers with the French staff officers, the more I am struck with the superiority of the former.

It has been said that genius is an infinite capacity of taking pains. Count von Moltke was a most painstaking and conscientious worker. By infinite application and by unremitting labour, he succeeded by the means described to select from the large body of the German officers practically all the best men and training them in their duties. The great successes which the German army has obtained in 1866, in 1870–71, in the present war, are chiefly attributable to the General Staff, which has been the brain of the army in the fullest sense of the term, which has trained the commanders. Other nations may learn from Germany's example. The methods practised by von Moltke are of course applicable not only to the army, but to every Government department and to every large commercial organisation.

CHAPTER VI

HOW EDUCATION HAS DEGRADED THE GERMAN PEOPLE[1]

In all the world's history no race has been so drilled, schooled, sermonised into a sort of inverted religion of hate, envy, jealousy, greed, cruelty, and arrogance. Man and woman, girl and boy, have been taught from childhood this inhuman vainglory and lust of power. It has grown to be their sole Gospel, Creed, Hymnal, and Prayer-book. Britons and Americans cannot comprehend how a great and intellectual people can have come to a cult so Satanic.

FREDERIC HARRISON in *The Times*, August 4, 1917.

NATIONS consist of individuals. Hence the character of a nation depends on that of the individuals composing it. Now although the influence of race, of heredity, is exceedingly powerful in man, as it is in animals, that of education in the widest sense of the term is at least equally potent. Surroundings and upbringing determine the character of individuals. An English baby, if adopted and brought up by Prussians, will probably become a typical Prussian, if brought up by Turks it will probably become an average Turk, if abandoned in China it will most likely become a Chinese. It will not only learn the German, Turkish, or Chinese language, but adopt the German Turkish, or Chinese habits, tastes, views, and standards of life and behaviour, although it may do so somewhat reluctantly. It cannot very well adopt English ways of thought and action, because it knows only those of the country of its upbringing. Only in very rare and

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1917.

exceptional cases would such a child possess enough strength of character and independence of mind to condemn the views held by all the people around, even by the best and the most exalted, and formulate views and principles of its own totally opposed to its surroundings. I shall show in the following pages that the character of the German nation, which originally was democratic, kindly, and human, has been warped, but probably not completely destroyed, by the educational policy which the Hohenzollerns have pursued for generations.

For many years English people contemplated German education with uncritical admiration. They saw in the German educational system merely a powerful instrument for developing the national abilities, but completely failed to observe the disastrous effect which German education had upon the national character. In an article significantly entitled 'Education and Miseducation in Germany,' which I contributed to the *Contemporary Review* in October 1906, and which forms chapter xx. of the fifth edition of my book 'Modern Germany,' I wrote:

England and America have been flooded with a constantly flowing stream of books in praise of German education, but I have failed to discover a single book on the failure of German education, although such a book seems to be very urgently required. It is to be hoped that a book pointing out the grave defects of German education from the English point of view will soon be written. . . .

The educational organisation of Germany was, and is still, an absolutist machine, though at first sight it bears a strongly democratic appearance. . . . The leading feature of the German elementary schools is militant patriotism and militarism, while moral and religious education is treated as a matter of secondary importance. The Chinese child learns spelling from the Confucian classics, the German child from tales illustrating German military valour. While the English schools strive to elevate the

child's character by instilling the civic virtues, the German schools strive almost exclusively to teach discipline and to arouse and to develop the military inclinations, or rather the spirit of Jingoism, giving little consideration to the training of character and practically none to the development of the civic virtues. The birthday of the Emperor and the anniversary of the battle of Sedan are the two great school festivals, not only in the elementary schools, but in the higher schools as well, and they are celebrated with patriotic songs, recitations, speeches, &c. The 'Hereditary Enemy' plays a very large part in the elementary history books of Germany. No wonder, then, that the principal and almost the only game of German school children consists in playing at soldiers or at Frenchmen and Germans, which lately has been superseded by playing at Boers and Englishmen. . . .

The chief practical value of the German schools consists, in my opinion, not in the knowledge disseminated, but in the discipline instilled. . . . German education teaches the young to work, to obey, and, before all, to obey the authorities. . . . It cannot too often and too loudly be asserted that Germany has become great and powerful not through her education, as synonymous with knowledge, but through her discipline.

In Prusso-Germany the State is all-powerful. It is highly centralised, although centralisation is disguised by the appearance of self-government. Most self-governing bodies are as dependent upon the Government at Berlin as are the nominally independent and self-governing minor German States with their kings, grand dukes, and dukes. Frederick William, the Great Elector, who ruled from 1640 to 1688, took advantage of the terrible position created by the Thirty Years' War. He destroyed the self-government of the impoverished and weakened towns and introduced governmental absolutism and a standing army in Brandenburg-Prussia. His successors have continued and developed that policy. Since the rule of the Great Elector, and

especially since that of King Frederick William the First, the father of Frederick the Great, who reigned from 1713 to 1740, Prussia has been a camp and a drill-ground. The army was the State, and social life, industry, commerce, education and science were made subservient to the military exigencies and ambitions of the Sovereign. Ever since 1640, and particularly since 1713, the people of Prussia have lived under a rigorous discipline, and have been taught that their principal duty consists in worshipping their ruler, in obeying implicitly his commands and those of his underlings, and in paying their taxes. Even now the German ruler is sacrosanct and stands high above the Deity. God takes merely the second place in the German scheme of State. That may be seen from the fact that, while there are many prosecutions for *lèse-majesté* in Germany, there are very few for blasphemy. Besides, while, according to the German Penal Code, blasphemy, a verbal insult offered to God, is punishable with imprisonment from one day to three years, simple *lèse-majesté*, a verbal insult offered to the ruler, is punishable with imprisonment from two months to five years. The difference is characteristic and highly significant.

In Germany educational policy is considered to be an extremely important part of statecraft. Educational policy is therefore not shaped by the educational specialists, but by the German rulers and their statesmen. Prusso-Germany is a military State. Its character and purpose are chiefly military. The nation is an appendage of the army. Hence it is only natural that Prusso-German education has been militarised since an early date, that the educational department is a branch of the military establishment, and that it is directed for military purposes under the influence of the high military dignitaries.

Education in the widest sense of the term is obviously not restricted to the schools. The formation of opinions, habits, tastes, etc., is a process which goes on continually

from the cradle to the grave. The principal educational factors which contribute in shaping the German character are the various schools, the churches, the army, and the Press. In addition there are numerous minor factors, such as the Court, society, etc. The principal four factors will be considered in the following pages, and it will be shown that not only the nominally free schools and universities, but also the nominally free churches and Press, have become instruments of government and have fallen under the control of the ruling military and aristocratic class.

The German schools strive not to enlarge and develop the mind of the German people, but to confine and control it, while developing the usefulness of the citizens to the State. They strive to confine and control the mind of the people in the interest of the Sovereign, and of the ruling and the privileged classes through which he governs. A German burgomaster, who disguised his identity under the pseudonym 'Lothar Engelbert Schücking,' wrote in 'Die Reaktion in der inneren Verwaltung Preussens' (Berlin, 1908):

As soon as the young citizens begin to go to school the State commences its endeavours in giving them a patriotic and religious education. The patriotic education is monarchical-national. However, it is very superficial, because the budding citizen is purposely given no clear idea of the political conditions of the State. No Prussian elementary school tells its pupils anything regarding the Prussian Constitution, its evolution, its history and constitutional practice.

Prussian administrative law and custom are a secret science of the Prussian bureaucracy. Prussian history is intended to create and increase affection for the dynasty. This tendency, scientifically considered, is harmful. But it is still more harmful that the pupils are constantly told of the deeds of the Prussian Sovereigns as if they were still living in an autocracy. A description of the circumstances which led to the proclamation of the Prussian Constitution is never given in the schools, although that

part of our history is most interesting and most important for the future citizens. The French Revolution is depicted in the schools as if it had been a senseless slaughter perpetrated by absolutely bestialised men. Other revolutions and constitutional struggles are never mentioned. The fact that Prussia's political organisation, and even the Prussian Constitution, have been founded on the achievements of the French Revolution is carefully disguised. Otherwise young Prussians might learn that political progress was possible, that many things in Prussia are unconstitutional, that the Constitution and the electoral arrangements require completion and improvement. Hand in hand with the suppression of all education with regard to political and administrative matters goes a truly disgraceful neglect of tuition with regard to our official organisation. Not a single pupil is acquainted with the functions and powers of a Landrat or a Regierungspräsident . . .

Matters are worse in the Prussian intermediate schools (Gymnasia). Formerly historical instruction went as far as the War of Liberation of 1813–1815. When it is no longer possible to avoid the events of the nineteenth century, it is inevitable to speak of the Prussian Revolution of 1848 and the Constitution created in consequence of it. And how this is done! Most of our young men begin to study the Prussian Constitution only when they have to do so on account of a legal examination. Pupils at secondary schools are told nothing of our bureaucratic organisation and the rights of the citizens. In learning about the French Revolution they are told a great deal about the guillotine, but nothing about the Rights of Man, and the Imperial Constitution remains to them a book with seven seals.

The description given by the burgomaster is perfectly true in every particular. German education deliberately endeavours to create obedient citizens, who are absolutely ignorant of political matters and of their rights, who know only their duties, and who live in dread of the bureaucracy, of the Government, whose powers appear to them vague, mysterious, and unlimited.

In consequence of the Revolution of 1848 Prussia was given a Constitution, which was proclaimed on January 31, 1850. Many of the promises made in that interesting document were simply not fulfilled. Others were artfully whittled away. With regard to education the Prussian Constitution states in paragraphs 20–24:

Science and its tuition are free.

The education of youth shall be provided for by a sufficiency of public schools. . . .

Everybody is at liberty to teach or to found or to direct educational establishments if he has proved to the proper authorities that he possesses the necessary moral, scientific, and technical qualifications. . . .

Public teachers have the rights and duties of State officials.

The local authorities are entitled to direct the outer affairs of elementary schools. The State appoints from those who are qualified the teachers, with the assistance of the local authorities, acting according to law.

At first sight it would appear that, according to the Constitution, Prussia had a most liberal system of education, that the founding and the direction of schools was left to enterprising qualified individuals and to the people themselves, represented by the local authorities, that the State aimed at educational decentralisation and individualisation, that private schools should be as flourishing in Prussia as they are in England. However, if we analyse the figures furnished by the German educational census of 1911 we find that German education is organised as shown in table, p. 181.

It will be noticed that the number of pupils in private schools is quite insignificant. If we take all the schools, excepting Girls' Gymnasia, there is only one pupil in private schools to 88 pupils in the public schools. If we consider the figures in greater detail we find the disproportion between private and public schools even larger. For every

single pupil in a private elementary school there are 394 pupils in the public elementary schools of Germany, and the disproportion between private and public schools is almost as large in the case of the Gymnasia, the Real-Gymnasia, and the Upper Real-Schools whence are drawn the professional men, the officers, judges, officials, etc.

—	Pupils.		Teachers.	
	Public.	Private.	Public.	Private.
In 1911 *in Germany.*				
Elementary Schools	10,309,949	26,151	187,485	?
Upper Schools	273,394	80,660	7,531	4,534
Gymnasia	167,186	2,451	9,612	157
Real-Gymnasia	70,053	304	3,677	31
Upper Real-Schools	75,682	150	3,440	33
Pro-Gymnasia	8,434	1,075	534	36
Pro-Real-Gymnasia	7,220	32	381	3
Real-Schools	78,414	11,554	3,611	654
Various	11,054	3,435	523	249
Preparatory Schools	49,234	466	1,206	33
	11,050,620	126,278	218,000	5,730
Girls' Gymnasia	134,044	78,280	6,824	4,535
In 1911 *in Prussia.*				
Elementary Schools	6,572,140	8,849	?	?
Gymnasia	103,849	147	?	?

In the remaining schools, which are chiefly intended for shopkeepers, the proportion of private schools is somewhat greater.

Since 1871 the Prussian policy of making education a State monopoly has been copied by the non-Prussian States of Germany. Still these have not yet gone so far as has Prussia. The table shows that in 1911 for every single pupil in a private elementary school in Prussia there were 743 pupils in public elementary schools, and for every single pupil in a private Gymnasium in Prussia there were

707 pupils in the public Gymnasia. Only in the case of Girls' Gymnasia private enterprise is comparatively important. There are almost as many teachers in the private Girls' Gymnasia as in all the remaining private German schools combined. The reason for this exception is obvious. The women are of no importance in Germany. Hitherto the State has not thought it worth while to control directly the intermediate schools for girls. After all, women have no votes and do not serve in the army.

The superficial have greatly admired the fact that Germany has no 'religious difficulty,' that education in the German schools is not purely secular, that Germany has known how to combine general instruction with the teaching of religion. That has been comparatively easy in Germany because, as will be shown farther on, the German churches, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic, have been made part of the governmental apparatus, and the Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy have become part of the German bureaucracy. Hence church and school, teacher and priest, work hand in hand and control and direct the schools jointly in perfect harmony. They act in the interest of their employer, the State, and in accordance with directions 'from above.' In the fifteenth edition of the standard 'Handbook on Prussian Constitutional Law and Administrative Practice,' by Count Hue de Grais, we read :

The Church participates in the management of the school because religion forms an important part of the tuition given in the elementary schools. In consequence of the comprehensiveness of tuition, religious instruction could not easily be separated. The direction of religious instruction by the various religious bodies, which has been promised in the Prussian Constitution, and in particular the co-operation of the local clergy, is not an absolute right, but is given by order and with the permission of the State.

It will be noticed that the local clergy co-operates in the work of education 'by order and with the permission of the State,' a condition which, of course, is incompatible with true religious freedom. But then the churches in Germany are not free, but have become servants of the State.

The teachers at the elementary schools are in the first place State officials, part of the great bureaucratic apparatus of Prussia. Only in the second place are they teachers. The Prussian Constitution states, according to the extracts previously given : 'Public teachers have the rights and duties of State officials.' Count Hue de Grais informs us in his valuable handbook :

The teachers at the elementary schools receive their training at seminaries. Formerly they prepared for the examination, which must be passed on entering, by private studies. Now preparatory institutions have been created. Instruction at the seminaries lasts three years. A special examination is required for the position of a teacher. The appointment, or the confirmation of an appointment, is in the hands of the Government. The Constitution promised that the local authorities should assist in the appointment of teachers. At present such co-operation on the part of the local authorities occurs only in a few cases. Particularly in the eastern provinces local authorities have the right to propose teachers. Elementary school teachers have the duties and rights of State officials.

In other words, the elementary teachers of Prussia are Government servants who are trained in Government institutions, who are appointed by the Government, and may be dismissed by the Government. They belong to the large body of un-uniformed officials.

The position of the teachers in the secondary schools is similar to that of the elementary school teachers. Count Hue de Grais states :

The teachers in the higher schools are appointed after passing an examination before a scientific commission.

The appointment in the case of schools which are under royal patronage, and the confirmation in case of those schools which are not under royal patronage, are made either by the provincial school boards or by the Minister of Education. The directors of the Gymnasia and of the Real-Schools are appointed by the King.

The teachers at the higher schools have the duties and rights of State officials.

Although according to the Prussian Constitution 'Science and its tuition are free,' the university professors also are carefully controlled by the State. Count Hue de Grais writes :

It is the duty of the universities to promote science and the scientific education of the servants of the State and of the Church. They were originally self-governing corporations, and they have known how to preserve some independence after they had become State institutions. . . . Control by the State is exercised through the curator, who acts as the representative of the Minister of Education.

The professors at the universities have the duties and rights of State officials.

The independence of the German universities resembles that of the minor German principalities. No scientist, however eminent, can hope to obtain a professorship in Prussia if he is *persona ingrata* with the Government, and a professor who opposes the Government, unless he acts with the greatest moderation and circumspection, is likely to lose his position and income. The German Government exercises practically unlimited influence over the universities rather by indirect than by direct means. The professors in their collegiate capacity will nearly always act in accordance with the wishes expressed by the all-powerful Minister of Education, for he disposes of vast powers and a great patronage. Moreover, professors who make themselves disliked by showing too much independence can be kept in order by social pressure and by professorial and by Press attacks, while those who please and support the Government

will be rewarded with promotions, appointments, valuable grants, decorations, titles, &c. The university professors also have become part of the un-uniformed Prussian bureaucracy.

In consequence of the influence which is unceasingly exercised over the professors by the State, German science is no longer free. The State interferes, of course, little with the teaching of medicine, chemistry, etc., but the Government has known how to destroy the independence of those sciences which may be made subservient to the State. Prominent among these are History and International Law, which have become official sciences. German historians boast frequently of their impartiality, of their objectivity, their *Sachlichkeit*. That virtue may be apparent in the treatment of ancient history and of the history of those States in which Germany has no special political interest ; but that boasted impartiality is totally absent in the treatment of German history and of the history of those States which are Germany's competitors. The great histories of Germany written by Ranke, Droysen, Sybel, Treitschke, Oncken, &c., are totally unreliable. Their writers and many other historians have merely endeavoured to write a panegyric of the Hohenzollerns, not German history, and as the great mass of minor historians have issued from the school of these men, German history, as taught in Germany, is a tissue of fables. Unfortunately many foreign historians, in writing the history of Germany or of Prussia, have drawn their information from these industrious but totally unreliable official historians. German historians have been equally mercenary in writing the history of France, Russia, England, etc. Lately a few German historians have begun to revolt against the deliberate prostitution of history. Herr Hans Prutz wrote in the introduction to his excellent 'History of Prussia' (Stuttgart, 1900) :

Even a patriotic Prussian must doubt occasionally whether German history is not written too much from the

Prussian point of view, whether Prussia really was just in all she has undertaken. After the disaster of 1870–1 the French historians ceased to flatter the national vanity, as Thiers and others had done with fatal consequences to the nation. That change was an advantage to France morally. Are we Germans not drifting at the present moment towards similar dangers in view of the fact that future officers are taught history in the way in which it is taught at the universities? Warnings have been heard against the manner in which history has been taught, and historical science has loudly protested against methods which are in conflict with the highest law of history, with truth. . . .

There must always be certain limitations to the statement of historical truth in the course of tuition, in the first place because we must respect our country, and in the second because we must respect the feelings of German youth. But with the methods which are now pursued it is to be feared that the German past will be peopled with ideal figures. That should particularly be the case with regard to Prussia's rulers. By depicting them as possessing more or less all human perfections, and by attributing to them wisdom and far-reaching intentions which they did not possess, it is impossible to understand their action. The panegyric way of writing German history must raise doubts among the German youth, whose simplicity is not as great as perhaps is imagined. They will form their own ideas if they are taught that from the first ruler of Brandenburg to the last all Hohenzollerns were equally great as Prussian and as German patriots, that they were equally eminent as diplomats, as administrators, and as soldiers.

In Germany history has indeed been prostituted and has been subordinated to the military aims of the State. The German citizens never learn that many of their rulers were vicious and incapable, *e.g.* that Frederick William the Second was a degenerate. Owing to the way in which history is written under official auspices, all Germans believe

that Frederick the Great was perfectly justified in seizing Silesia by a surprise attack made in profound peace, that the partition of Poland was necessary and requires no defence, that war was forced upon inoffensive Prussia in 1864 by Denmark, in 1866 by Austria, and in 1870 by France.

History is written in Germany from the conqueror's point of view under the direction of the military, and international law has been abased and prostituted in the same manner. As Germany's entire policy is based on the right of the stronger, on might, the justification of the right of the stronger had to be proved by those Germans who expound law, and especially international law. The law of necessity (*Notstand*) was expounded by numerous eminent professors and writers such as Janka, Stammler, Titze, Auer, and Kohler. According to the conception of *Notstand*, a German on a raft is entitled to push the others off in order to save himself, a hungry man who cannot obtain food is entitled to break into a baker's shop and help himself, a sick man is entitled to break into a chemist's shop, etc. The doctrine that necessity knows no law is of course most highly developed by the German teachers of international law. One of the most distinguished German teachers of international law, Professor Zorn, whose name is well known in this country, expressly states on the opening pages of his handbook of international law that international law is merely a fiction, that in war necessity, the right of the stronger, is the only law.

The details given in the preceding pages show that the German educational system, from the elementary schools to the universities, is a gigantic apparatus controlled by the Government, that it is an organisation which is as much part of the German Civil Service as is the staff of the Custom House. Meanwhile the fiction is maintained that the German schools are free and independent by not providing the teachers with a uniform.

Now let us consider the principles by which that huge instrument which has been devised for shaping the mind of the nation is directed.

Prince Bismarck stated on August 11, 1893, to a deputation of Bavarian schoolmasters :

The school is an important part of Germany's national institutions. The German school, like the German Corps of Officers, is a specifically German institution which no other nation can easily copy. In the course of the last few decades the seed sown by the schools among the youth has borne fruit and has given us a national political consciousness which fomerly we lacked.

The most potent influence which the body of the teachers brings to bear upon German national education consists in this, that when the German teacher receives the child its mind is like a white sheet of paper. What the teacher writes on it in the course of the elementary education is written with indelible ink. It remains for life. The youthful soul is soft and receptive, and we all know that we never forget what we have been taught between the ages of seven and fifteen. The lessons then impressed upon us guide us for ever. In this receptivity of youth, in the fact that the minds of people may at an early age be moulded for all time, lies the power which the German teachers have over Germany's future. As I have said on a former occasion, he who controls the schools controls the future.

Germany's recent educational policy was created by Bismarck. His general views as to the purpose of education may be seen from the extracts given. He left, of course, the details of educational organisation to the Minister of Education.

Particulars with regard to patriotic tuition may be found in numerous circulars sent to the teaching bodies by the Ministry of Education. In these the greatest stress is laid upon a form of tuition which will drill and militarise the growing generation by means of the schools. From

year to year attempts have increased to make the schools subservient to the military and political aims of the State. The tendency to use the schools as a political and military instrument has become accentuated since 1888, when the present Emperor came to the throne. After his accession the deification of the Hohenzollerns and the abuse of the schools for political aims became more and more notable. In an educational address delivered on December 4, 1890, the Emperor stated :

If the school had done what must be demanded of it—I am initiated in these things, because I have attended the Gymnasium and know how things are managed there—it should at once and on its own motion have undertaken the fight against Social Democracy. The teaching boards ought to have combined and ought with energy to have instructed the growing generation in such a manner as to furnish Me with material with which I can work within the State. Then it would have been easy to overmaster quickly the Socialist movement.

In another address on educational matters delivered on December 17, 1890, the Emperor said :

Men who support Radical Utopias can as little be employed in education as they can be employed in the Government offices. According to his rights and duties, the teacher is, in the first place, a State official—an official of the existing State. In this position of his a teacher should do what is demanded from him. He should teach the young and prepare them for resisting all revolutionary aims. . . . All who clearly understand the character of the State and its progress must recognise the danger of the Socialist theories and will consider it their duty to defend the State against all attacks from without and from within.

The German Government controls an army of about 250,000 teachers, who to the uninitiated citizens and to their pupils appear to be free and independent men who

teach according to their conscience. In reality they are Government servants whose identity is disguised by not clothing them in a uniform, and their principal duty consists in shaping the mind of the nation by order of the Government. Apart from the difference in organisation, the German teaching staff differs materially from the body of Anglo-Saxon school teachers in a point to which too much attention cannot be given by those who desire to understand German education. While in England and in the United States the great majority of the elementary school teachers are women, the vast majority of German elementary school teachers are men. Out of 187,485 German elementary teachers employed in 1911, 148,217 were men and only 39,268 were women. While in many cases little boys are taught by women in England and America, the majority of the German little girls are taught by men. This is a very significant difference. Women represent gentleness. Now the German Government does not want to raise gentle citizens, but ruthless soldiers. Therefore the children of the tenderest ages are handed over to men, not to women.

Brutal men are more likely to be ruthless soldiers than gentle ones. On the same principle on which professional criminals brutalise their dogs, the German Government deliberately brutalises its citizens. Crimes of brutality are therefore exceedingly frequent in Germany, and they are treated with great leniency. Brutality is deliberately confused with manliness. Duels are rather encouraged than discouraged among the educated, and so are fights with sticks and knives among the masses. For the same reason sexual outrages and drunkenness are treated with great leniency. Mr. Price Collier stated correctly in his book 'Germany and the Germans':

It has always been the avowed policy of autocracies to atone for the lack of political freedom by lax regulations in regard to moral matters. The citizen is imprisoned

for insulting the State, but he may insult his own person by dissipation up to any limit, this side of disorderliness, in public. Drinking, gambling, and other forms of vice are provided for the citizens of Berlin comfortably and, comparatively speaking, cheaply.

We have seen in the foregoing that the schools have become part of the German bureaucracy. In addition the State has succeeded in converting not only the Protestant State Church but the Roman Catholic Church as well into instruments of government. Both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic clergy have become part of the German bureaucracy. Prusso-Germany's ecclesiastical policy is based upon that of Frederick the Great. Frederick wrote in his 'Political Testament of 1751':

The Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, the Reformed, the Jews, and many other Christian sects live in Prussia, and live in peace. I strive to unite all these by making them conscious that they all are citizens of the same State, and that one may love just as much a man who wears a red coat as a man who wears a grey coat.

To Frederick religion was purely a matter of outward difference. He wished to give to the citizens full religious liberty, but at the same time he meant to subject the churches to the State. Therefore he wrote to Cardinal Sinzendorff:

In Church matters, except, of course, questions of faith, I am *summus episcopus* in Prussia. I recognise no other authority, not even the Pope. Let the Cardinal remember this, and let him remember that he is the subject of a Sovereign who possesses the means of maintaining his authority.

Many similar pronouncements of Frederick the Great might be given, and since his time the Prussian Government has treated the churches as subordinate to the State—as part of the bureaucracy. This may be seen from the celebrated Prussian Code, the *Landrecht*, which was begun

under Frederick the Great and was published in 1794, eight years after his death. That most important compilation of the fundamental laws of Prussia lays the greatest stress on the principle that the churches and other religious associations are subject to the State, that they exist and teach by permission of the Government, and that their clergy are State officials. We read in Part II, chapter 11, of the Prussian Code:

Every religious association is obliged to teach its members reverence towards God, obedience towards the law, fidelity towards the State, and good moral sentiments towards the citizens.

Religious principles opposed to these conditions must not be taught within the State either by word of mouth or in print.

Only the State is entitled to condemn religious principles after an examination and to prohibit their teaching . . .

The persons appointed by religious associations for celebrating divine service and for giving religious instruction enjoy equal rights with the other officials of the State . . .

Every religious association which desires to enjoy the right of toleration must give due notice to the State and must prove that the opinions taught by it are not opposed to the principles previously stated . . .

The private and the public exercise of religion of any and every religious association is subject to the control of the State.

The State is entitled to information with regard to all matters which are taught and discussed during meetings of religious associations . . .

The clergy of all religious associations which have been authorised by the State are State officials, and as a rule they are free from the burdens and duties [military service, &c.] of the ordinary citizens.

It will be noticed that the Prussian Code asserts twice that the clergy of all religious denominations tolerated in Prussia possess the character of State officials, that the various religions may be exercised, both publicly and privately, only under the supervision and control of the Government. It becomes therefore evident that the church, or rather the churches, of Prussia occupy a position similar to that held by the nominally independent schools. Indeed the churches are part of the great educational apparatus of the Government. The fact that the churches are considered to be part of the official organisation for forming the mind of the nation can most clearly be seen from the existing administrative arrangements. Both the churches and the schools stand under the supervision and direction of a single Minister, the *Kultusminister*, who looks after the promotion of culture—the *Kulturpflege*, as it is officially termed. The fact that education and religion are part of the same department which is devoted to the promotion of *Kultur* throws a great deal of light on that fearful and wonderful word. The State Department which deals simultaneously with education and religion is called 'the Ministry of Ecclesiastical and Educational Affairs.'

There are only two important churches in Germany, the Protestant State Church, in which the Lutheran and Reformed Churches have been united, and the Roman Catholic Church. The Protestant State Church stands under the absolute and direct control of the Emperor. The management of the State Church is in the hands of the Supreme Church Council, which was established by a Royal Proclamation issued on June 29, 1850, and it is composed of a number of members and a president who are nominated by the King of Prussia in person, who, in appointing them, acts as the *summus episcopus* of the Church. The Supreme Council, being appointed solely by the King, is responsible only to the King. Below the Supreme Council there are Provincial Consistories which examine and ordain candidates of theology, exercise supervision over the clergy, &c. The character of the organisation of the Prussian State Church shows that the King of

Prussia is as much the absolute commander of the Church as he is of the army.

The official view as to the relations between Church and State in Prussia is stated as follows in Count Hue de Grais' handbook:

While the influence of the Church upon secular affairs has been abolished almost completely, the State cannot abandon certain rights towards the Church owing to its very character. Supremacy over the Church is consequently a necessary part of the supremacy of the State. It comprises the right of tolerating religious associations, the right of protecting them, and the right of supervising them, and therefore of opposing all action on the part of religious associations which may violate and endanger its safety.

The same writer, who bases all his statements on the fundamental documents, to which he carefully refers in numerous footnotes, lays down that, according to the regulations in force, the necessary qualifications of clergy and priests are as follows:

The exercising of a spiritual office in the Christian Church presupposes that the person in question is a German, has passed a German Gymnasium, and succeeded in the final examination, and presupposes a three years' study at a German university. A candidate may be dispensed from these conditions by the Minister of Ecclesiastical and Educational Affairs. It is forbidden to create schools and seminaries which prepare for religious office. It is not permissible to appoint to religious office a person who either lacks the qualifications demanded by law or who is not suited for such office by reasons connected with his general qualifications and character as a citizen. Spiritual office may be given only to a candidate whose name has been placed before the Oberpräsident (a high Government official) and if no objection has been raised by the latter within thirty days because of the candidate lacking

the necessary qualifications. . . . Clergy and priests are threatened with punishment if by sermons or other publications they endanger the State. . . . The introduction of supervision by the State and of the management of its funds, as well as the partial prohibition of religious orders, views particularly the Roman Catholic Church.

It will be noticed that with Frederickian impartiality the Prussian State exercises equal supervision and control over the Protestant and the Roman Catholic establishments. A strict, and almost a military, discipline is maintained within the Church. Appointments depend upon the all-powerful representatives of the Government, and it will be noticed that they are given a considerable discretionary latitude. Appointments may be refused not only because the candidate in question has not the necessary qualifications as established by law, but also because he may lack 'the general qualifications and character as a citizen.' A candidate's history and record are carefully scanned. If he has all the necessary qualifications, but holds political opinions disliked by the Government, he may never obtain an appointment. Even the fact that his father or some other near relative is a Socialist may prevent him obtaining employment. With similar rigour candidates for educational employment are sifted. Promotion and preferment, both in the schools and in the Church, depend not only on professional qualifications, but also the political character of the individual. The Government wishes to make sure that the teaching officials and the ecclesiastical officials not only possess the desired orthodox views, but also that they continue acting in a manner pleasing to the Government during the whole course of their career.

With regard to clerical appointments Count Hue de Grais states:

As independence has been attributed to the Church, the clergy can no longer be considered as State officials.

Nevertheless, their position bears the character of a public office.

The independence of the churches and of the clergy is of course purely nominal, is a mere make-believe, for, continuing, Count Hue de Grais states :

The official income of the clergy can be confiscated in exactly the same manner as that of the State officials. The official income of the clergy must be granted by the Protestant and Roman Catholic parishes in accordance with the standards laid down by law. The minimum salary of Catholic priests is fixed at 1500 marks, and it rises every five years by an addition of 400 marks up to 3200 marks. For the Protestant clergy the minimum salary is 1800 marks per year, and it is increased every five years by an additional 600 marks until it reaches 4800 marks.

It will be noticed that the State has fixed the salary of the Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy exactly as it has fixed the salary of any other class of Government officials, and that the salary of the clergy may be confiscated by the State for the same reason for which the salary of ordinary State officials may be seized. Moreover, a large portion of the official salary of the clergy is paid by the State. In 1912 Prussia paid 25,480,000 marks to the Protestant Church and clergy and 9,430,000 marks to the Roman Catholic and priesthood. Both Churches are, proportionately, treated equally generously. Both are equally dependent upon State support. Hence approximately both are equally obedient to the Government.

The Roman Catholic Church in Germany is nominally controlled by Rome. Yet if we look a little more closely we find that, notwithstanding the semblance of independence, the Roman Church in Germany is a German State institution. Count Hue de Grais states in his authoritative book :

The Roman Catholic bishops must render to the King the oath of fidelity and of obedience. . . . They are elected by the Chapters, but candidates for election who are not pleasing to the Government are excluded. . . . The State possesses the right of supervision over the administration of the funds of the Roman Catholic dioceses.

He who approves appoints. The Government, by reserving to itself the approval of elected bishops, makes the election a sham. The Chapters can elect only a bishop approved of by the Government. In other words, the German Government appoints its own Roman Catholic bishops, and through the bishops the Government controls the teaching establishment and the Roman Catholic Church as a whole. Roman Catholic ecclesiastics who act in a manner displeasing to the Government may have part of their income withdrawn. On the other hand, Roman Catholic priests who please the Government may obtain advancement. Lastly, the Roman Catholic priests have been trained in Government-directed or controlled institutions up to the time of their ordination. It follows that the Roman Catholic Church in Germany is rather German than Roman Catholic, the Pope being merely the figure-head.

In directing the Protestant Church the King of Prussia and German Emperor acts through the supreme Church Council, through men who are appointed by himself and who are solely responsible to himself. In acting upon the Roman Catholic Church he makes use of the bishops whose election he has permitted and upon whose German loyalty he can as a rule absolutely rely. In matters of general administration, an order issued by the King of Prussia requires the ministerial counter-signature whereby the power of the monarch is limited ; but when he acts as the *summus episcopus* no such counter-signature is required. The monarch is absolute in Church matters, and in his eyes the high ecclesiastical dignitaries are merely the commanders of his spiritual bodyguard. The Emperor's

attitude towards the Church may be seen from numerous declarations of his. For instance, he stated on December 17, 1890:

I hear that you were surprised that I did not mention religion in opening the great School Conference. I was of opinion that My ideas about religion, about the relations between men and God, are so high and holy to Me that they would be known to every citizen. Both as King of Prussia and as *summus episcopus* of My Church I consider it My highest duty to take care that religious sentiment and the Christian spirit are cultivated within the school.

The authority of the German monarch over the Roman Catholic Church has been greatly increased in consequence of the struggle with Rome, the *Kulturkampf*, in the course of which recalcitrant Roman Catholic bishops and priests were persecuted and imprisoned, Roman Catholic training establishments were closed, and the official salaries estreated. In addition a pulpit law was passed at the time, whereby priests could be punished for sermons displeasing to the Government. In course of time the German Government gave way to Rome in the non-essentials, but it carefully preserved supervision over the Roman Catholic seminaries.

The nominal head of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany is the Pope, but he also has been brought to some extent under German Government control, partly because the Roman Catholic Church in Germany has become rather German than Roman Catholic, partly because Germany has known how to exert influence in Rome in co-operation with Austria. Their joint opposition no Pope can disregard. In fact, his election depends largely upon the good-will of the German and Austrian Governments. In view of the great influence which Germany and Austria exercise over the Pope, it is perhaps only natural that he apparently pursues a philo-German policy, that his recent peace proposals were highly favourable to Germany and

Austria, and that he refused to discriminate between the guilt of the Central Powers and that of their hapless victims.

As the Roman Catholic Church in Germany is rather German than Roman Catholic, it is only natural that German Catholics place the State high above the Church, that they are official patriots first and Churchmen after, that agnosticism and atheism are almost as prevalent among the German Catholics as among German Protestants.

The Prussian Ministry of Ecclesiastical and Educational Affairs controls not only the German churches and schools, but the arts and sciences as well. Artists and scientists depend therefore very largely upon official patronage, which not only takes the form of Government commands for statuary, architectural monuments, paintings, etc., but also finds expression in exceedingly lucrative appointments, titles, decorations, etc. Thus artists and scientists have become part of the great bureaucratic machine.

Not merely the churches and the schools, but the army and the Press, are great educational factors. The object of the army is not only to train soldiers in warfare, but also to train their mind, to develop patriotism and blind obedience. The Press has been gained over by the Government because the Government controls the sources of information, possesses vast secret funds, and can materially assist impecunious journals by inserting advertisements, subscribing to large numbers, etc. On the other hand, the Government can penalise opposition journals by withdrawing advertisements and information, and especially by withdrawing the privilege of cheap distribution through the post and at the Government railway stations. Representatives of a journal whose views are not approved of will call in vain for information at the Ministries, and their lives will be made a burden. By these methods indicated the Government exercises control over the bulk of the

non-Socialist Press and part of the Socialist Press, especially in war.

The details given in these pages show that in Germany the elementary schools, the intermediate schools, the universities, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Churches, art, science, and the Press have been made subservient to the Government, have become Government tools, have become part of the great military machine. We cannot therefore wonder if there are not only militant schools and universities but a militant science, a militant art, and a militant Church as well. The army has devoured the nation. Opinion in Germany, from the cradle to the grave, has been controlled and directed by the military. *Machtpolitik* and the policy of ruthlessness in warfare are therefore unanimously advocated by soldiers and citizens, scientists and clergymen, merchants and Roman Catholic priests. Most people in England have no conception how opinion in Germany has been warped and falsified by a military and all-powerful Government, how all the sources of information and enlightenment have been diverted. Montesquieu wrote nearly two centuries ago in his 'Esprit des Lois,' in a chapter superscribed 'De l'éducation dans le gouvernement despotique':

L'extrême obéissance suppose de l'ignorance dans celui qui obéit; elle en suppose même dans celui qui commande; il n'a point à délibérer, à douter, ni à raisonner, il n'a qu'à vouloir.

Education, far from enlightening the German nation, has blinded, debased, and dehumanised it.

CHAPTER VII

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR—THE SECRET HISTORY OF 1870

THE veil which has obscured the origin of the war is slowly beginning to lift. Lately various interesting revelations have been made. We have learned that the German Government, desiring to make it appear that Russia was the aggressor, caused that country to mobilise by having a false announcement of Germany's mobilisation printed in a special edition of the Government-inspired *Berlin Lokalanzeiger*. The Russian Embassy, of course, telegraphed the news to Petrograd as soon as it appeared. A few minutes later the German Government announced that a mistake had been made, that mobilisation had not been ordered. However, meanwhile the wires to Russia had been closed. Thus that country had begun mobilising before the official *dementi* was received. By a deliberate trick Russia was made to furnish the desired pretext for a 'war of defence' on Germany's part. The German White Book published on the outbreak of war bore the sub-title, 'How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's Confidence and thereby made the European War.' Very likely that sub-title was determined upon long before the crisis.

Since the beginning of the war Germany has protested that the ultimatum to Serbia was sent spontaneously by Austria-Hungary, that the German Government had had no previous knowledge of its contents, that it was therefore not responsible for the outbreak of the war. However,

lately we have been told by exceedingly well-informed people that various German diplomats had asserted long before the dispatch of the fatal ultimatum that Austria would send an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia. In *The Times* of July 28, 1917, it was stated that an Austro-German Council, attended by von Bethmann-Hollweg, Admiral von Tirpitz, General von Falkenhayn, Herr von Stumm, the Archduke Frederick, Count Berchtold, Count Tisza, and General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, was held at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, that it was presided over by the Emperor, and that at that meeting the policy was settled which was embodied in the ultimatum sent to Serbia eighteen days later. *Si fecisti nega.* Not unnaturally the German Government has denied that it had agreed to the Austrian ultimatum either on July 5 or at any other date. That denial is strictly in accordance with German practice. See October 1917.

Mr. Henry Morgenthau, former United States Ambassador to Turkey, published in the *New York World* some of his conversations with German and Austrian diplomats. He confirmed Germany's guilt. He stated, according to *The Times* of October 15, 1917:

Whenever the question of peace is raised the Kaiser solemnly asserts that he did not will this war, but that with the help of the good German God he will see it through to the end. He did will this war, and he brought it about when it suited his purposes and his preparations. The Serbian incident was more than an excuse; it was an opportunity. On August 18, 1914, as American Ambassador in Constantinople, I called on the Marquis Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to congratulate him on the Emperor's eighty-fourth birthday. After exchanging the usual diplomatic compliments suitable to such an occasion, he spoke of the condition of the Emperor's health and his great physical and mental activity in spite of the strain to which he was subjected. The conversation then

turned to the war, which was in its third week, and his Excellency told me that when he visited the Emperor in May his Imperial Majesty had said that war was inevitable.

Mr. Morgenthau is able to confirm the statement that the date of the war was fixed at a conference held in the early part of July 1914. The secret of this conference was confided to him by Baron Wangenheim, the German Ambassador in Constantinople, in an 'outburst of enthusiasm after the arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* in the Dardanelles, he having directed their movements by wireless while they were endeavouring to escape from the British Fleet.' Baron Wangenheim himself was present at the conference to report on conditions in Turkey. From him Mr. Morgenthau learned:

The Conference was presided over by the Kaiser. Count Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there; so was Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, and with them were the leaders of German finance, directors of railways, and captains of industry, whose aid was essential to the Kaiser in putting his vast military machine into operation. Each was asked if he was ready for war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers, who insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell foreign securities and arrange their loans.

At the time this Conference was held nobody outside the inner circles of the Berlin and Vienna Governments dreamed of war:

They took good care that no suspicions should be aroused. The Kaiser went straightway on his yacht to Norway. The Chancellor left Berlin for a rest. The Diplomatic Corps had no intimation of the impending calamity, and the British Ambassador went away, leaving the Embassy to the Chargé d'Affaires. The same drug was used in Vienna, and even when the blow fell the Russian Ambassador was absent from his post on leave. From the date of this conference German financiers were busy with their part, while the Army marked time.

Mr. Morgenthau's conversation with the German Ambassador took place on August 26, six weeks after the Potsdam Council.

Rulers and statesmen not unnaturally follow the example of their most successful predecessors. It has been the traditional policy of Prusso-Germany to attack its opponents unexpectedly and to defeat them by surprise. Frederick the Great taught in his 'History of Seven Years' War' that sovereigns make war when they consider the moment propitious, leaving to industrious jurists the trouble of justifying their action after the event. Prince Bismarck was a pupil of Frederick's, but he vastly improved upon his master's policy. He wished to have public opinion on his side by putting his opponents in the wrong. Every one of the three wars which he brought about was willed by Prussia, and was won by a surprise attack in overwhelming force. Yet in all three Prussia acted—at least nominally—on the defensive. The Franco-German War is a classical example of Bismarckian statecraft in bringing about war in such a manner as to put all responsibility upon the attacked Power. The Iron Chancellor acted with so much art and foresight that it was believed for decades, both in Germany and abroad, that France had recklessly attacked peaceful Prussia. Only lately the world has been made acquainted with Bismarck's manipulation of the Ems Dispatch. However, that was merely the finishing touch of Bismarck's campaign of provocation. There is too great a resemblance between Germany's action in 1914 and Prussia's proceeding in 1870 to be merely accidental. It stands to reason that, in embarking upon the great gamble and the great crime, Germany's rulers resolved to follow Bismarck's example as far as possible. Only the initiated few are acquainted with the events which brought about the Franco-German War of 1870. A short account, based on documents most of which are practically unknown in this country, is most interesting, and it is valuable because

it throws a great deal of light upon the genesis of the present war.

Since his student days Bismarck had seen his ideal in the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. At an early date he had come to the conviction that to succeed in this, it was necessary to expel Austria out of Germany, that Austria's defeat by Prussia was necessary, and that the minor German States could be induced to abandon Austria and to place themselves under Prussia's leadership only in consequence of a successful war with France. Before he came to office Bismarck's programme consisted in defeating Austria first and France afterwards.

In the war waged against Denmark by Prussia and Austria jointly in 1864, and especially in Prussia's war with Austria in 1866, Bismarck required France's goodwill and benevolent neutrality. France's ill-will and opposition would have inevitably led to Prussia's failure and defeat. To secure France's support Bismarck approached Napoleon III, flattered that vain and weak ruler to the utmost, expressed his greatest sympathy with Napoleon's policy of nationalities, and declared that the most natural alliance was one between France and Prussia. He told Napoleon and other eminent Frenchmen that the Belgians were French by race and language, that, in accordance with the principle of nationalities, Prussia should be allowed to unite to herself the North German States, and that France should compensate herself for Prussia's increase of power by acquiring Belgium and perhaps Luxemburg, and the German territories west of the Rhine as well. Napoleon III was a dreamer. He allowed himself to be persuaded by Bismarck. He encouraged Prussia to attack Austria in 1866, and urged Italy to support Prussia by attacking Austria in the rear. Under Napoleon's auspices the Prusso-Italian Alliance was concluded, and the war of 1866 begun. Bismarck had, before the war, been profuse in promising vast terri-

torial compensations to the Emperor, and Napoleon III had been short-sighted enough to trust Bismarck's words. Perhaps he had hoped that the war would be long-drawn-out and indecisive, that thus France would have an opportunity to put forth her claims in time. However, the overwhelmingly strong Prussian army utterly defeated Austria at Königgrätz. In a few days Austria was overwhelmed. When Benedetti, Napoleon's Ambassador, pressed Bismarck at headquarters for the territorial compensations which he had promised before the war, he received a refusal. When he renewed his demand Bismarck threatened to make peace with Austria, attack France with the united Prussian and Austrian armies, and to raise a revolution in that country. As the French army was utterly unready, the French Government had to desist. In consequence of the war Prussia acquired vast territories inhabited by more than four million people, and Italy received Venetia. France's eastern neighbours had been greatly strengthened to France's danger. Napoleon and all France felt that they had been deceived and defrauded by Prussia. Prussia owed her success in 1864, and especially in 1866, to Napoleon's support. In February 1867 Bismarck said frankly to General Turr, Napoleon's special envoy :

Je veux vivre en bonne harmonie avec la France et ne désire nullement avoir une guerre avec elle. C'est à l'empereur Napoléon que nous devons nos succès en 1866. . . . Je suis prêt à seconder en tout la France. Mais ici, à Berlin, il faut travailler lentement, car on ne peut pas attaquer notre roi de front. Si l'empereur voulait me formuler ses désirs par écrit, je me fais fort de les obtenir tous en quelques mois. S'il voulait, par exemple, annexer le Luxembourg à la France, il n'y a qu'à chercher à créer dans ce pays un parti français qui demande l'annexion. Je n'essaierai pas même de vérifier si ce parti représente la majorité de la population et je me bornerai à accepter tacitement le fait accompli. Quant à la Belgique, je l'ai déjà dit maintes fois et je le répète hautement : l'empereur n'a qu'à la prendre, et, s'il se trouve un gouvernement qui veuille s'y opposer, nous croiserons la baïonnette contre lui.

Many similar pronouncements of Bismarck's might easily be given.

Relying on the great superiority of the Prussian army, Bismarck pursued towards France a policy of deliberate deception, humiliation, and provocation, playing with that country in the most cynical manner. Having promised Napoleon vast territorial compensations, he induced the unsuspecting Benedetti to put before him in writing France's territorial desires in the form of draft treaties, which the Chancellor carefully put by for future use. When Napoleon recognised that he could not obtain in 1866 the vast compensations which he had been promised, he hoped to receive at least small compensations either by the acquisition of Luxemburg or by a correction of the Prusso-French frontier. In accordance with his settled policy, Bismarck encouraged the French Government to make one demand after the other, which invariably met a refusal. Prussia had, owing to France's support, not only succeeded in acquiring vast territories with four million inhabitants, but had furthermore attached to herself by treaty the powerful and populous South German States. The balance between Prussia and France had been most seriously disturbed to France's disadvantage. All France had become exasperated against Prussia, and, relying upon the superior strength of the Prussian army, Bismarck strove to increase France's exasperation not only by diplomatic action, but also by making use of those French politicians and of that part of the French Press which could be influenced with money or otherwise.

Bismarck was determined to make war upon France, believing that the South German States, which in 1866 had been attached to Prussia by treaty, would be willing to

merge themselves into Germany, and to subject themselves entirely to the King of Prussia only if their enthusiasm was raised to the highest pitch in a victorious war with France. A pretext for war could always be found. The problem was to begin it at the moment most favourable to Prussia, and to create at the same time a situation unfavourable to France. Immediately after the war of 1866 the South German States, which had been forced to conclude defensive and offensive alliances with Prussia, had been compelled to reorganise and to greatly strengthen their armies. During each of the first three years Prussia's striking force would be increased by 100,000 soldiers owing to the measures taken. For military reasons 1870 was the most favourable year for a war upon France. For political reasons also it seemed undesirable to adjourn the war beyond 1870. Dissatisfaction against Prussia was increasing in the South German States. They had been forced to submit themselves to Prussia after their defeat. They wished to reconquer their freedom. South German particularism was constantly increasing in strength. Possibly the South German States might secretly ally themselves with Prussia's opponents in order to be able to shake off the Prussian yoke. Besides, France was known to be negotiating with Austria and Italy for an alliance. The year 1870 was therefore most propitious for a Prussian attack upon France for political reasons as well.

France did not desire a war with Prussia. Napoleon's power and prestige were declining. Liberal opposition to Napoleon's absolutism became stronger and stronger. The Emperor resolved upon introducing constitutional government. On January 2, 1870, a Liberal Cabinet, presided over by Emile Ollivier, came into power. It was pledged to peace, international arbitration, and the reduction of armaments by international agreement. The new French Foreign Minister, Count Daru, declared in a note sent on February 13 to Lord Lyons:

Notre intention est, en effet, de diminuer notre contingent; nous l'aurions diminué beaucoup, si nous avions obtenu une réponse favorable du chancelier . . .; nous le diminuerons moins, puisque la réponse est négative, mais nous le diminuerons. La réduction sera, j'espère, de 10,000 hommes. . . .

Nous affirmerons de la sorte par les actes qui valent mieux que les paroles, nos intentions, notre politique. Neuf contingents, réduits de 10,000 hommes chacun, font une diminution totale de 90,000 hommes. C'est déjà quelque chose, c'est le dixième de l'armée existante, je regrette de ne pouvoir faire plus.

To the Liberal Left the army reduction proposed seemed insufficient. It demanded that twice as large a reduction should be made. In 1870 France had embarked upon the novel experiment of parliamentary government. Parliamentary orators unacquainted with practical statesmanship were conducting the government. The amateurishness of the French statesmen would be a vast advantage to Bismarck.

The year 1870 was obviously the most favourable one for a Prussian attack upon France. It remained to find a plausible pretext for war, a pretext which would put France ostensibly in the wrong, and to bring about a position which would damage her militarily as much as possible.

In attacking Austria in 1866 Prussia had been greatly benefited by her alliance with Italy, which country had attacked Austria in the rear. The Habsburg Monarchy had thus been compelled to divide its forces. France might be similarly weakened if Prussia should succeed in inducing Spain or England, or both countries, to attack the French. An English attack upon France was likely if France should lay hands upon Belgium. With the object of bringing about hostility between the two countries, Bismarck had unceasingly suggested to the French that they should acquire Belgium in some form or other, and

had secured from Benedetti draft treaties arranging for France's acquisition of Belgium. Accident gave Bismarck the chance of securing Spain's support against France, and the Chancellor resolved upon making the best use of his opportunities.

Between 1863 and 1868 numerous revolutionary outbreaks occurred in Spain. The Spanish people were disgusted with the Government of Queen Isabella II. On September 30, 1868, she was deposed. Temporarily the Government was in the hands of the military leaders, and these, being opposed to the establishment of a republic, sought a candidate for the vacant Spanish Throne. It occurred to Bismarck that France's feelings might be wounded to the utmost by placing, without her knowledge and by suprise, a Hohenzollern prince upon the Spanish Throne. A prince of the Roman Catholic Sigmaringen branch of the House of Hohenzollern might prove a suitable candidate. France had watched with alarm the rapid growth of Prussia's military power on her eastern frontier. Naturally she would not allow a Prussian prince to obtain the Spanish Throne. It had been an ancient maxim of French statecraft not to allow an enemy of France to control the policy of Spain. As France may be attacked on her eastern frontier by Germany and Italy, she would have security on her western frontier. France was as sensitive with regard to Spain's political position as is England with regard to the independence of Belgium. Furthermore, if Bismarck should be able to bring about a war with France regarding Spain's selection of a King, France's refusal to recognise the German candidate might be described as an insult to Spain. Thus the proud Spaniards might be induced to play the same part which Italy played in 1866, and attack Prussia's enemy in the rear.

Some of the most valuable information relating to the Spanish candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern may be found in the 'Memoirs' of his brother, King Charles

of Roumania, which were published in German between 1894 and 1900. Unfortunately there is no English translation of this important book. On September 17, 1869, that Prince wrote in his diary: 'As early as October 13, 1868, various newspapers have mentioned the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern as a candidate for the Spanish Throne, and on November 19, 1868, the *Neue Freie Presse* has stated that his candidature had produced terror at the Tuileries because it seemed likely to prove successful.' On December 9, 1868, Prince Anthony, the father of Prince Leopold, wrote to his son, Prince Charles of Roumania: 'So far the Spanish candidature has been discussed only in the papers. We have not heard a word of it. Owing to our relations with Prussia, France would never tolerate a Hohenzollern King in Spain.' Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was certainly not proposed by Spain. On July 2, 1870, when the Hohenzollern candidature had suddenly been sprung upon an astonished world, General Prim, the all-powerful Prime Minister of Spain, stated to the French Ambassador Mercier, according to the latter's dispatch:

Ma consolation, c'est que ce n'est pas moi qui ai inventé cette combinaison; je ne l'ai pas même cherchée, on est venu me la mettre dans la main. Seulement, dans l'état où nous sommes, je ne peux pas la repousser.

There is every reason to believe that General Prim did not seek the candidature of the Hohenzollern Prince. Prince Leopold accepted it very reluctantly and against his will, upon the persuasion and pressure of Prince Bismarck, as we shall see farther on. As neither General Prim nor the Hohenzollerns of the Sigmaringen line brought forward the candidature of Prince Leopold, there is every reason to believe that it was arranged by Prince Bismarck, to whom Prim obviously referred without actually naming him. There were, indeed, mysterious arrangements and negotia-

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tions between Bismarck and the temporary Spanish Government. We are not yet fully informed as to Bismarck's activity in Spain in bringing about the Hohenzollern candidature, but we know that he promoted it with the utmost energy at home. The late King, then Prince, Charles of Roumania wrote in his diary on March 2, referring to himself in the third person :

Prince Charles learns that his brother, Prince Leopold, has gone to Berlin, and that he will be followed in a few days by his father. The Spanish question is to be finally decided there and then. . . .

Count Bismarck pleads with great warmth that Prince Leopold should accept the Spanish Crown. He demonstrates in a memoir of his to King William of Prussia the great importance for Germany of having a Hohenzollern prince on the Spanish Throne ; that it would be politically invaluable to have in France's rear a country friendly to Germany.

We do not possess the final text of Bismarck's memorandum, but we possess the draft which the Chancellor dictated to Robert von Keudell, one of his collaborators, for Keudell reprinted it in his ' Reminiscences,' which were published in Germany in 1901. In that draft memoir, which is very carefully written, and which probably closely resembles the final document, we read :

For our relations with France it would be useful to have in the rear of that country a State upon the sympathy of which we could count. In the event of a war between Germany and France . . . that would make a difference of up to two army corps. . . . The prestige of the Hohenzollern dynasty would be greatly increased if that family would occupy a European position similar to that which the House of Habsburg possessed in the past.

The Spaniards would be wounded most severely if the Crown of that country, which has held so exalted a place in history, should be refused, if we should refuse to save

that country from anarchy. It would seem harsh to decline the Crown for personal reasons when the welfare of 16,000,000 people is at stake. Such a refusal would increase the chance of establishing a republic in Spain, and France might follow Spain's example, to Germany's danger. Public opinion in Germany would hold those responsible who, by a refusal, would have created Spain's discontent with Germany and who would have increased the dangers which we must fear from France.

I therefore consider the acceptance of the Spanish Crown to be in the interest of peace and of German general contentment. I consider such a solution as advantageous. This is the least dangerous solution of the Spanish problem.

The election by a three-quarter majority is assured. . . . If we remember how in a similar way the reigning dynasty of England was chosen in the place of the expelled Stuarts, and how the Romanoff dynasty was elected in Russia, the legitimacy of the Spanish Crown cannot be doubted. . . .

Bismarck described in his memoir the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern as militarily, politically, and economically advantageous to Germany. From his insistence upon the duty of Prince Leopold to accept the Spanish Crown for ideal and for German national reasons, we can gauge the reluctance of the Prince, which is apparent from many other documents which it would lead too far to quote in this place.

Since autumn, 1868, Bismarck had been busy baiting the Spanish trap for France. The question whether a Hohenzollern prince should or should not ascend the Throne of Spain was obviously considered to be not merely a private question which regarded solely the House of Hohenzollern, but it was considered to be a German national question which might, and probably would, have the most far-reaching consequences. This may be seen from a letter which Prince Anthony, the father of Prince Leopold, sent to his son, Prince Charles of Roumania. It may be found in the

King of Roumania's 'Memoirs,' and it was written in Berlin on March 20, 1870. That most important document ran as follows:

I have been in Berlin for a fortnight on most important family matters. No less is in question than the acceptance or refusal of the Spanish Crown for Leopold, which has officially been offered to him by the Spanish Government under the seal of secrecy, it being a European secret of State.

This question occupies people here very much. Bismarck desires acceptance for dynastic and political reasons, but the King only if Leopold accepts willingly. On March 15 there was here a very interesting and important Council (*Beratung*), presided over by the King. There were present the Crown Prince, Leopold and I, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile, and Delbrück. The unanimous resolution was in favour of acceptance, because this was a Prussian patriotic duty. Leopold has declined for many reasons after a great struggle. However, as Spain desires before all a Roman Catholic Hohenzollern prince, I have proposed your brother Fritz instead of Leopold. . . .

It will be noticed that the acceptance of the Spanish Crown was resolved upon by a Council of the highest Prussian dignitaries, presided over by King William himself. At this Council it was resolved to embark upon a policy which was bound to provoke France to the utmost, and which was likely to lead to a great war. Herein lay the reason that the Council was attended by Moltke, Roon, and the other leading Ministers. The secret of this Council was revealed to the world by the 'Memoirs' of King Charles of Roumania. It destroyed the fiction that the Spanish people had spontaneously offered the Spanish Crown to the Hohenzollern Prince and that Germany had been forced into war with France against her wish and will. Hence Prince Bismarck tried to deny the fact that the Council had taken place in chapter xxii. of his 'Memoirs,' in which he stated:

The 'Memoirs' of his Majesty, the King of Rumania, are not accurately informed as regards details of the ministerial co-operation in the question. The Ministerial Council in the Palace which he mentions did not take place. Prince Anthony was living as the King's guest in the Palace, and had invited him and some of the Ministers to dinner. I scarcely think that the Spanish question was discussed at the table.

In view of Prince Anthony's detailed statement in the letter written to his son five days after the event, Bismarck's denial of the War Council is very unconvincing, and his distinction between an official ministerial Council and an unofficial Council of Ministers who had been invited to dinner by the King, is ridiculous. In due course we may learn that the War Council which, according to *The Times*, took place at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, was also not an official Council presided over by the Emperor, but was merely an ordinary meeting of Ministers and other principal dignitaries of Germany and Austria who happened to be invited at the same time. The distinction between an official Council and an unofficial one is a distinction without a difference.

On May 26 Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern wrote to his son, Prince Charles of Roumania, that Bismarck was very dissatisfied with the failure of his Spanish policy, the Prince having refused the Crown. However, the Chancellor soon succeeded in persuading Prince Leopold to accept the Crown, according to Prince Charles's statement, 'in Germany's interest,' which will be found in his diary under the date of June 2. Two days later, on June 4, reverting to the Spanish question, Prince Charles wrote in his diary:

The hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern has declared his readiness to accept the Spanish Crown, as it has been represented to him in the most authoritative quarter that that step was required in the interest of the State! He is resolved

to waive all personal objections and to yield to a higher necessity. He has written a letter to the King of Prussia in which he has stated that he accepts the offered Crown, as he could hope thereby to render a great service to the Fatherland.

The Hohenzollern Princes were, as we have previously seen, convinced that 'France would never tolerate a Hohenzollern King of Spain.' Prince Leopold nevertheless accepted the Spanish Crown, having been informed by 'the most authoritative quarter,' that is, by Bismarck, and probably the King as well, that acceptance was required in Germany's interest. He accepted it, hoping thereby 'to render a great service to the Fatherland.' At the Council of March 15, at which Moltke and Roon attended, the military consequences of the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by a Hohenzollern Prince were no doubt discussed. The Chief of the Staff and the Minister of War had probably assured the King of Prussia and the two Hohenzollern Princes, father and son, that Prussia's victory was certain in the event of the acceptance of the Spanish Crown leading to a war between Prussia and France.

The Hohenzollern Princes of the Roman Catholic Sigmaringen line were on most excellent terms with the Emperor Napoleon III. They frequently visited him. Prince Charles of Roumania owed his throne to the Emperor. The Emperor would never have thought it possible that one of the Hohenzollern Princes, one of his personal friends, would accept the Spanish Crown behind his back and without his previous knowledge and consent. Prussia had deceived, provoked, and humiliated France ever since July 1866. When, at the beginning of July 1870, the news was published that a Prince of Hohenzollern was candidate for the Spanish Throne, and that the Cortes would elect him on the 20th of that month, the news was felt by all France like a blow in the face. The Empress Eugenie wrote to Ollivier that it was a bomb-shell, and the King of Prussia also wrote

of the 'Spanish bomb-shell' in a letter to his wife. The exasperation and indignation at the French Court and throughout France were indescribable. After years of humiliation Prussia had succeeded in striking France in the most sensitive spot.

A clever criminal, in laying his plans, makes beforehand careful arrangements to cover his tracks and to prove an *alibi*. In the beginning of July 1870, all the world was at peace. There seemed to be no possibility of diplomatic complications anywhere. The holiday season had begun, and everybody was away, exactly as at the end of July 1914. King William took the cure at Ems. Prince Bismarck was at his country seat of Varzin, nominally ill, and had left Herr von Thile in charge of the Prussian Foreign Office. The French Ambassador in Berlin, Benedetti, was taking the waters at Wildbad. In Paris Count Gramont had quite recently replaced Count Daru as head of the Foreign Office, and on July 6 he read in the French Parliament a declaration of protest which stated:

I am about to reply to the interpellation addressed to me yesterday by the Honourable M. Cochery.

It is true that Marshal Prim has offered the Crown of Spain to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that he has accepted it. But the Spanish people have not yet declared themselves, and we are not yet acquainted with the true details of a negotiation which was concealed from us. Accordingly, a discussion could not at present lead to any practical result. We beg you, gentlemen, to postpone it.

We have not ceased to show our sympathy for the Spanish nation, and to avoid everything that could have had the appearance of an interference of any kind in the internal affairs of a noble and great nation in the full exercise of its sovereignty; we have not, with regard to the various candidates for the Throne, departed from the strictest neutrality, and we have never shown any of them either preference or aversion.

We shall persist in this conduct. But we do not think

that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people compels us to suffer that a foreign Power, by placing one of its Princes on the Throne of Charles V, should disturb to our disadvantage the present balance of power in Europe and should endanger the interests and honour of France.

This eventuality we firmly hope will not be realised.

To prevent it, we count at once on the wisdom of the German people and the friendship of the Spanish people.

In July 1870 the Government at Berlin pursued the identical policy which it followed in July 1914. It pleaded complete ignorance of the Spanish question, and asserted that Prussia was in no way interested in it. Bismarck had instructed his underlings to answer in reply to questions that the Spanish candidature was a purely Spanish affair. In 1914 diplomats, anxious to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Austria and Serbia, were similarly told at Berlin that this was a purely Austrian matter. If France should ask for explanations in Berlin, the Foreign Secretary was to plead ignorance. If questions should be addressed to Bismarck in Varzin, the questioners would not be received because of Bismarck's illness, and be referred to Berlin. If the King of Prussia should be approached while taking the cure at Ems, he was apparently to refer questioners to his Chancellor and Foreign Office.

By direction of the French Foreign Office, M. Le Sourd, the French Chargé d'Affaires, went in Benedetti's absence to the Prussian Foreign Office, where von Thile was in charge. When asking for explanations of the Spanish candidature, von Thile, who, as we have seen, had attended the Cabinet Council of March 15, at which Prussia's Spanish policy had been decided, declared, though with visible embarrassment, that the Prussian Government completely ignored the Spanish question, which did not exist as far as Prussia was concerned. Bismarck's object was obviously to induce France to protest in Spain in the hope of creating bad blood between Spain and France. Lord Loftus,

the British Ambassador in Berlin, reported on July 6 the conversation between von Thile and Le Sourd as follows:

Being prevented by illness from leaving the house, I requested Mr. Petre to call on M. de Thile to inquire if his Excellency could give me any information on the subject of the reported offer of the Crown of Spain to the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern.

M. de Thile informed Mr. Petre that the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. le Sourd, had called upon him a few days ago and had stated that the intelligence which had reached the French Government of a deputation having been sent from Madrid to offer the Crown of Spain to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and of the offer having been accepted, had produced an unfavourable impression at Paris, and that the Imperial Government wished to know what course the Prussian Government intended to pursue with reference to this question (' quelle serait l'attitude du Gouvernement prussien ').

M. de Thile told the French Chargé d'Affaires that the selection of a Sovereign to fill the Throne of Spain was a question with which the Prussian Government had no concern whatever (' c'était une question qui n'existait pas pour le Gouvernement prussien '), and that consequently he was not in a position to give any explanations upon the subject to the French Government. The Prussian Government considered that the statesmen and people of Spain were entitled to offer the Crown to anyone whom they might think fit, and that it concerned the person alone to whom the offer was made to accept it or not. . . .

As the French Government could obtain no information at the Prussian Foreign Office, and as the Prussian Foreign Office disclaimed all knowledge of, and interest in, the affair, Gramont directed the Ambassador Benedetti to go to Ems to see King William and to apply to him as the ruler of Prussia and the head of the Hohenzollern family. The King had been carefully prepared by Bismarck for this eventuality, and he told M. Benedetti, according to the

Ambassador's dispatches, that the Prussian Government was quite unacquainted with the Hohenzollern candidature, that he had known of it only as head of the family, and not as King of Prussia, and that he had neither called together nor consulted the Prussian Cabinet. Exactly as Bismarck did in his 'Memoirs,' the King drew an untenable distinction between private and public action. Privately the King and his Cabinet knew and approved of the Hohenzollern candidature, but both King and Government pleaded to be officially ignorant of the event! Naturally this trickery irritated the French still further. Bismarck had not desired that the King should negotiate with Benedetti, but his protests had proved unavailing. To the dismay of the Chancellor, the old King, instead of referring Benedetti to Bismarck and the Foreign Office, discussed the Hohenzollern candidature repeatedly with Benedetti. He was willing to give way, because he desired to avoid the war which Bismarck wished to force upon France. The European Powers recognised that France was in the right in protesting against the arrangement devised by Bismarck. In consequence of the protests which arrived from all sides, the Prince of Hohenzollern withdrew his candidature. To Bismarck's despair it seemed that France had won a diplomatic victory. The Chancellor intended to resign. Unfortunately the hot-blooded amateur statesmen in Paris were not satisfied with their triumph over Prussia, but wished to accentuate it. They directed Benedetti to demand that King William should bind himself never again to consent to the Hohenzollern candidature in the event of it being renewed, and to induce the King to write a letter in that sense to the Emperor Napoleon. Not unnaturally King William refused this, kindly but firmly. He considered the matter settled, and, having received M. Benedetti three times with regard to the Spanish candidature, and being bombarded by Bismarck with telegraphic protests against his negotiating unconstitutionally with the

French Ambassador, the King wished to abstain from further negotiation, and declined a fourth audience which Benedetti had demanded.

While in Ems it was believed that the Spanish incident had been peacefully and permanently settled by the withdrawal of the candidate, Bismarck, who had come to Berlin, was in despair. We learn from the 22nd chapter of his 'Memoirs' that, while dining with the Generals Moltke and Roon, he received a telegram from Councillor Abeken, who was in the King's entourage, and who reported the King's final conversation with Benedetti as follows:

His Majesty writes to me:

'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from me finally, in a very importunate manner, that I should authorise him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind *à tout jamais*. Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself, he could clearly see that my Government once more had no hand in the matter.'

His Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince.

His Majesty, having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference to the above demand, upon the representation of Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to let him be informed through an aide-de-camp: That his Majesty had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say to the Ambassador.

His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at once communicated both to our Ambasadors and to the Press.

Bismarck described the receipt of the telegram by him and his guests as follows:

When the copy was handed to me it showed that Abeken had drawn up and signed the telegram at his Majesty's command, and I read it out to my guests, whose dejection was so great that they turned away from food and drink. On a repeated examination of the document I lingered upon the authorisation of his Majesty, which included a command, immediately to communicate Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection both to our Ambassadors and to the Press. I put a few questions to Moltke as to the extent of his confidence in the state of our preparations, especially as to the time they would still require in order to meet this sudden risk of war. He answered that if there was to be war he expected no advantage to us by deferring its outbreak, and even if we should not be strong enough at first to protect all the territories on the left bank of the Rhine against French invasion, our preparations would nevertheless soon overtake those of the French, while at a later period this advantage would be diminished; he regarded a rapid outbreak as, on the whole, more favourable to us than delay.

How firmly Moltke was convinced of a German victory may be seen from the fact that two days later he stated to King William, according to Oncken: 'We shall do magnificently with the South German States, without the South German States, and even against the South German States.'

Having once more been told that a German victory was certain, Bismarck sat down at a small table and condensed Abeken's telegram, which was perfectly innocuous in its original form, as follows:

After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to the Imperial French Government by the Royal Spanish Government, the French Ambassador at Ems further demanded of his Majesty the King to authorise him to telegraph to

Paris that his Majesty the King engages for all future time never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should again return to their candidature. His Majesty the King thereon declined to receive the French Ambassador again, and had him told by the Adjutant in attendance that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the Ambassador.

The abbreviated version of the Ems telegram, as given above, will be found in the third volume of the British Blue Book on the Franco-Prussian War (C.–210), where it is significantly headed: 'Telegram addressed by the Prussian Government to Foreign Governments.'

An ambassador is the direct representative of the monarch. According to the shortened version of Abeken's telegram it would appear that the King of Prussia had insultingly broken off communication with the French Ambassador, had unceremoniously shown him the door. The wounding and provocative character of the shortened telegram was immediately recognised by Bismarck's guests, for the Chancellor stated in his 'Memoirs':

After I read out the concentrated edition to my two guests, Moltke remarked: 'Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley, now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.' I went on to explain: 'If in execution of his Majesty's order I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our Embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull.'

Having failed in bringing about war by the elaborately staged and long-prepared Spanish candidature, Bismarck succeeded at the last moment in causing France to declare war upon Prussia by the manipulation of the Ems telegram. We learn from his 'Memoirs,' which were only published

after his death, that he deliberately manipulated Abeken's telegram with the object of bringing about a French attack upon Prussia. Up to Bismarck's death German diplomats and historians had strenuously maintained that France was the aggressor, that the war had been 'forced upon' Prussia by the warlike French. That legend was assiduously propounded by Bismarck immediately after the outbreak of war. On July 15 Gramont and Ollivier made before the French Chamber a declaration which was equivalent to a declaration of war. On July 18 Bismarck sent to the Prussian Ambassador in London a telegram which was to be communicated to the English Government, in which he stated, with scant regard for the truth, referring to the notorious Ems telegram and the Spanish candidature:

There exists no note or dispatch by which the Prussian Government notified to the Cabinets of Europe a refusal to receive the French Ambassador. There exists nothing but the newspaper telegram known to all the world, which was communicated to the German Governments and to some of our representatives with non-German Governments, according to the wording of the newspapers, in order to inform them of the nature of the French demands, and the impossibility of complying with them, and which, moreover, contains nothing injurious to France. . . .

The statement is also untrue that his Majesty the King communicated the candidature of Prince Leopold to me, the undersigned Chancellor of the Confederation. I was casually informed in confidence of the Spanish offer by a private person concerned in the negotiations.

It will be noticed that Bismarck and the Prussian Government described the abbreviated version of the Ems telegram which the Chancellor had written out with his own hand in Berlin as 'a newspaper telegram.' In all the official German documents this celebrated telegram

is called a 'Zeitungstelegramm,' as if it had been written by any ordinary journalist, and in the German 'Staatsarchiv' it is called 'a newspaper telegram from Ems,' as if some poor innocent journalist at Ems had drafted the celebrated message with which Bismarck deliberately provoked France into war.

In embarking upon his diplomatic campaign against France Bismarck had not only attempted to put France ostensibly in the wrong, but also to involve that country, if possible, simultaneously in a war with Spain or with England, or with both countries combined. In Bismarck's 'Memoirs' we read:

I waited for some days expecting that a Spanish declaration of war against France would follow that of the French against us. I was not prepared to see a self-assertive nation like Spain stand quiet behind the Pyrenees with folded arms, while the Germans were engaged in a deadly struggle against France on behalf of Spain's independence and Spain's freedom to choose her King.

We learn from Poschinger's 'Tischgespräche' and other sources that the day following the declaration of war Bismarck asked General Prim how large a force Spain would send against France.

Bismarck had unceasingly tempted Napoleon to attach Belgium to France in some form or other in the hope of involving France in a war with England. With this object in view he published, immediately on the outbreak of war, the various proposals and draft treaties which he had induced Benedetti to submit to him. He not only stated that France had unremittingly tempted Prussia to embark upon various adventures which would involve the absorption of Belgium into France, but he even asserted that France did not really intend to make war upon Prussia, that she merely wished the two countries to mobilise with the object of jointly seizing Belgium in a piratical expedition. In a

telegram of July 28 to the Prussian Ambassador in London, which will be found in the third volume of the British Blue Book, Bismarck stated:

. . . The final conviction that no territorial aggrandisement for France could be obtained *with* our co-operation has undoubtedly ripened the resolution to gain it by war *against* us.

I have even reason to believe that if this publication (of the Franco-Prussian draft treaty written out by Benedetti) had not taken place, France would have proposed to us, after the completion of her own and of our preparations for war, to enforce Count Benedetti's programme at the head of the two armies against unarmed Europe—that is to say, to conclude peace at the expense of Belgium. The draft of treaty which is in our hands, and which Lord Augustus Loftus has seen, is from beginning to end, including the corrections, in Count Benedetti's own handwriting, well known to the English Ambassador. If the French Cabinet now denies tendencies for which it has constantly tried to obtain our consent since 1864 by varying promises and demands, this seems very natural under the present political circumstances. . . .

On the following day Prince Bismarck sent to London another telegram, in which the accusation was repeated. He stated:

. . . I am under the impression that it was only the definitive conviction that no enlargement of the frontiers of France was to be obtained with us that has led the Emperor to the determination to strive to obtain it against us. I have even reason to believe that, if the publication in question had not taken place—after the completion of the French and our own preparations for war—propositions would have been made to us by France to carry out jointly, at the head of 1,000,000 armed men against unarmed Europe, the proposals formerly made to us; that is to say, before or after the first battle to conclude peace on the basis of the Benedetti proposals at the expense of Belgium.

At the same time Bismarck tried to involve England and France in war by working upon Lord Loftus in Berlin, but the British representative was shrewd enough to recognise Bismarck's aims. In reporting this conversation with Bismarck, he stated on July 30:

It is evident to me that Count Bismarck will use all his endeavours to obtain the co-operation of England, and he hopes, by representing the dangers by which Belgium is menaced, to work on public opinion in England, with a view to the eventual aid of Great Britain in the war against France.

Many historians have asserted that war between Prussia and France would have been avoided in 1870 had France been satisfied with her diplomatic success, with the abandonment of the candidature to the Spanish Throne by the Prince of Hohenzollern. That view is no doubt erroneous. Bismarck had clearly shown that he meant to have war with France in any case in 1870. On July 13, when it seemed that the Franco-Prussian differences had been permanently adjusted by the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern, Bismarck stated to Lord Loftus, according to the report of the Ambassador to the Earl of Granville:

After what has now occurred we must require some assurance, some guarantee, that we may not be subjected to a sudden attack; we must know that this Spanish difficulty once removed, there are no other lurking designs which may burst upon us like a thunderstorm. . . .

Count Bismarck further stated that unless some assurance, some declaration, were given by France to the European Powers . . . the Prussian Government would be obliged to seek explanations from France. It was impossible, added his Excellency, that Prussia could tamely and quietly sit under the affront offered to the King and to the nation by the menacing language of the French Government.

Bismarck's words make it perfectly obvious that the Chancellor was not willing that the Spanish question should find a peaceful settlement. Had the French been satisfied with the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern, Bismarck would have demanded 'guarantees' from France. He would no doubt have made unacceptable demands, such as the reduction of the French army, or an apology on the part of the French Emperor, which inevitably would have led to war.

CHAPTER VIII

HOW GERMANY MAKES PEACE—THE SECRET HISTORY OF 1866

GERMANY'S diplomatic action in bringing about war in 1914 closely resembled Prussia's action in 1870. In that year, having succeeded in placing upon France the reproach of aggression, she destroyed by a model campaign the unready French armies and forced France into a disastrous peace. The war was extremely profitable to Germany. She gained by it the possession of Alsace-Lorraine with 1,500,000 inhabitants and a war indemnity of £200,000,000, a sum which was four times as large as Germany's actual war expenditure had been. As the war of 1870-71 had been Prusso-Germany's most brilliant campaign, it is widely assumed that the Peace of Versailles and Frankfurt, by which it was concluded, was her most advantageous peace. Hence many believe that Germany, in making peace, would endeavour to follow the precedent of 1871 in the event of her proving victorious in the present war. However, it is an error to believe that the peace of 1871 was the most advantageous one ever concluded by the Hohenzollerns. By far the most profitable peace made by them was that of 1866 after the war with Austria. As Germany's present position curiously resembles Prussia's position in 1866, it may be assumed that Prusso-Germany will endeavour to follow the precedent which she created in that memorable year. Indeed everything points that way.

Hence it seems worth while studying Prussia's action at that time. Such study will help us to understand Germany's diplomatic activities and her numerous peace proposals.

In 1870 Prussia's risk in going to war with France was comparatively small. Her military superiority over France was absolutely overwhelming. The issue of the struggle could scarcely be in doubt. Moreover, in case of a defeat, Prussia could have lost to France only a comparatively unimportant stretch of territory west of the Rhine. In 1866 Prussia and her opponent were more evenly matched than in 1870. As in 1914, Prussia had to wage war on several fronts and against several opponents. As her enemies were German States, she risked losing to them vast stretches of purely German territory. A disastrous war would undoubtedly have led to Prussia's partition, to her disappearance as an independent State, and to the abdication of her King. Bismarck, according to his own confession, would have committed suicide in case of defeat. Before the outbreak of the war of 1866 Austria had expressed to Napoleon the Third her willingness to cede Venetia to Italy in exchange for Silesia, which she hoped to conquer from Prussia. Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hesse, which were Austria's allies, would undoubtedly have annexed vast Prussian territories, and Napoleon the Third would very likely have claimed the Rhine frontier, in return for the cession of which he would have protected Prussia against too far-reaching a spoliation. Prussia, which in 1866 had a little more than 19,000,000 inhabitants, might have been reduced to a State of 12,000,000 or 13,000,000 people. Austria would have become paramount in Germany and would have made Prussia her vassal unless that country had become a French Protectorate.

In 1866, as in the present war, the risk run by Prussia was very great, but then, as now, the stakes for which that country went to war were gigantic. Prussia was

determined to risk all for all. The short and successful campaign against Austria proved by far the most profitable one in the history of Europe, and probably in that of the world. The war lasted only a few weeks, and it was almost bloodless. According to the official account, Prussia lost in 1866 only 4450 killed in action, while 6427 officers and soldiers died of disease. At a cost of less than 11,000 lives the State of the Hohenzollerns doubled its territory and population and became from a second-rate Power the leading Great Power on the Continent

The fact that by the peace of 1866 Prussia doubled her territory and population is practically unknown in England, yet it is correct. In 1866 Prussia had 19,304,843 inhabitants. At the peace she annexed the following territories, which were directly incorporated in Prussia:

	Inhabitants
Hanover	1,923,492
Schleswig-Holstein	960,996
Electorate of Hesse	737,283
Nassau	466,014
Frankfort-on-the-Main	89,837
Hesse-Darmstadt Cessions	75,102
Bavarian Cessions	32,976
Total	4,285,700

The direct acquisitions made by Prussia at the peace of 1866 were by far the greatest she had ever experienced. The population acquired was practically three times as large as that gained by the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. However, her direct annexations were Prussia's smallest gain, for in addition to the territories enumerated in the table, Prussia firmly and quite openly attached to herself the North German States, such as the various Saxon States, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Lübeck, Bremen, Hamburg, and some minor States. These became her vassals in the North German Federation which Prussia constituted. In addition to the North German States mentioned, Prussia attached to herself in 1866 secretly the

great South German States, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, the independence of which was nominally maintained. The North German States and the South German States which thus lost their independence in 1866, which were permanently attached to Prussia, partly openly and partly by secret treaty, which were made Prussia's subordinates, and which were forced to place their entire armies unconditionally at Prussia's disposal, had together about 15,000,000 inhabitants. Thus by the single battle of Königgrätz the population subject to the Hohenzollerns was increased by 4,300,000 annexed Hanoverians, Hessians, &c., and by 15,000,000 Bavarians, Saxons, &c., who remained nominally subjects of the terrorised minor potentates of Germany. Thus the subjects of the Hohenzollerns were in 1866, by a single stroke, increased from 19,300,000 to 38,500,000.

Prussia's gigantic success was scarcely noticed at the time. The non-Prussian German States remained nominally independent. It was widely believed that the North German Federation would break up before long, and it was not known that the South German States also had been made subject to Prussia. Besides the Government-inspired Press and the Government-inspired historians of Prussia preserved a judicious silence with regard to their country's astounding expansion, which destroyed the balance of power in Europe. As the other European Powers, and especially France, Prussia's direct neighbour, would not have tolerated the doubling of Prussia's population and armed strength, the arrangements which were made by Bismarck with the great South German States, with a view to placing them completely under Prussian control, were kept most strictly secret for a time. Besides, Bismarck had succeeded in gaining France's goodwill and support before he embarked upon attacking Austria. Thus interference on the part of France with Prussia's expansion had become somewhat difficult.

Before attacking Austria, detaching from that country all the minor German States, and attaching them to Prussia in some form or other, Bismarck had to win the support of the European Great Powers, and especially that of France, Prussia's most dangerous neighbour. With this end in view Bismarck sought the friendship of Russia, France, and Italy, for England kept aloof from continental affairs at the time, and therefore did not count in his calculations. Napoleon the Third was a dreamer. The Prussian Chancellor succeeded in persuading that unfortunate monarch that Prussia's expansion at Austria's cost was not only not dangerous, but was beneficial to France; that it was in France's interest that Austria, which was dangerously strong, should be weakened; that France and Prussia were naturally friends and allies who ought to co-operate for their mutual advantage; that if Prussia should succeed in aggrandising herself, France should be compensated for Prussia's growth by the acquisition of Belgium, of Luxemburg, and of German territories on the Moselle and on the Rhine with Prussia's assistance.

Desiring to put France off her guard, Bismarck wished particularly to convince Napoleon the Third of Prussia's moderation in case she should be victorious in a war with Austria. The Chancellor meant to be sure as to Napoleon's attitude in case of war, and as action through his diplomatic subordinates had failed to give him the necessary security, Bismarck resolved to discuss matters with Napoleon in person. He took a holiday late in October in 1865, ostensibly for the sake of his health, and went with his wife first to Paris, where he stayed for a few days, showing her the sights, and then to Biarritz, where Napoleon was staying at the time. At Biarritz he had lengthy conversations with the Emperor, and in the course of his negotiations was given the certainty that Napoleon would observe a benevolent neutrality towards Prussia in case of a war with Austria as long as Prussia would limit her war aims

to the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein and to a reform of the German Federation which would give her the leadership in North Germany. However, Napoleon the Third insisted that South Germany should remain independent, and he pointed out to Bismarck that Prussia would have to reckon with France's hostility should she endeavour to bring under her influence the great German States south of the river Main.

Having made very satisfactory arrangements with Napoleon, Bismarck felt justified in working for a war with Austria. On February 28, 1866, a great Prussian Cabinet Council regarding a war with Austria was held. It was presided over by King William, and his son, the Crown Prince, also attended it. At that meeting Moltke declared that a Prussian victory could be counted upon for certain only if Italy attacked Austria in the rear and forced that country to divide its armies. He demanded that military co-operation with Italy should be arranged for. Bismarck had been negotiating with Italy for a long time with a view to forming an alliance directed against Austria. As a result of the Cabinet Council he accelerated matters. On April 8, 1866, a Prusso-Italian alliance of defence and offence, which was to be effective during three months from the date of its conclusion, was signed, and on the following day, April 9, Prussia brought forward in the Diet of the German Federation a motion designed to facilitate war with Austria. She proposed an electoral reform which she knew was unacceptable to her great opponent. Provocation followed provocation, and on June 10, Prussia proposed in the German Diet that Austria should be excluded from the then existing German Federation, which embraced Austria and all German States. On the following day Austria, which hitherto had been the leading Power in Germany, demanded not unnaturally the mobilisation of all the Federal armies against Prussia. On June 12 the

diplomatic relations between Austria and Prussia were broken off. On June 14 the fatal war vote took place in the Federal Diet, and on the following day Prussia opened hostilities simultaneously against Austria, Hanover, Saxony, and the other German States which had placed themselves at Austria's side. Being perfectly ready for war, Prussia invaded the countries of all her opponents, and on July 3, three weeks after relations had been broken off, the battle of Königgrätz took place. It decided the war, for Austria was utterly defeated.

Ever since November 1865, when Napoleon the Third had promised Bismarck his benevolent neutrality, and especially since April 8, 1866, when the Prusso-Italian war alliance was concluded, Bismarck had pointed out unceasingly the reasonableness and moderation of Prussia through the Press and through Prussia's political and diplomatic representatives. For instance, on March 5, 1866, the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, Von der Goltz, declared to Napoleon, according to the historian H. von Sybel, who was allowed to read the ambassadorial reports, that Prussia intended only to acquire Schleswig-Holstein and to obtain the leadership in North Germany—that she was determined to preserve carefully the autonomy of the minor States. On June 16, when the war began, Bismarck sent a circular note to all the diplomatic representatives of Prussia in which he stated that Austria had forced Prussia into the war, that Prussia fought reluctantly and that she would act with the greatest moderation. It contained the following assertions:

Nous avions prévu que les armements inopinés et injustifiables de l'Autriche auraient pour conséquence une crise fatale ; cette crise vient d'éclater. . . .

En présence de l'hostilité ouverte manifestée par la résolution de la Diète de mettre sur pied contre la Prusse les forces de la Confédération, Sa Majesté S'est vue dans la nécessité de prendre, Elle aussi, les mesures que le soin de

Sa propre défense et Ses devoirs envers Son peuple réclaimaient impérieusement. . . .

Le Gouvernement du Roi a la conscience qu'en formulant ces demandes il s'est renfermé dans des limites aussi étroites que le soin de sa propre défense le lui permettait. Si des conditions si modérées ne sont pas acceptées, il se verra obligé d'avoir recours aux propres forces et d'employer contre les Gouvernements qui se seront fait connaître comme ses adversaires déterminés tous les moyens dont il dispose. La responsabilité de ce qui en pourra résulter retombera tout entière sur ceux qui, par leurs menées hostiles, auront créé cette situation, et qui auront repoussé au dernier moment la main que la Prusse leur tendait.

Before the outbreak of the struggle Prussia had, as far as possible, concealed the high state of her preparedness for war in order to be able to strike down her enemies by surprise. Moreover, Bismarck had sedulously striven to convince Napoleon that Prussia was weak, that a war with Austria was very dangerous for her unless she possessed Italy's alliance and France's support. Firmly believing that Austria would be victorious over Prussia, Napoleon had urged Italy to help Prussia. Reckoning upon the probability of an Austrian victory, France had not mobilised her troops. Napoleon's army was quite unready for war, partly owing to the Mexican expedition, partly owing to internal disorganisation. The leading French authorities considered Austria to be far stronger than Prussia, and Prussia had done nothing to disabuse them.

Napoleon had promised Bismarck France's benevolent neutrality largely because he did not consider Prussia dangerous. On July 3, three weeks after diplomatic relations with Austria had been broken off, Austria was decisively defeated in the gigantic battle of Königgrätz. The news fell upon unprepared Paris like a thunderbolt. Napoleon's diplomatic plans, which were based upon a Prussian defeat or at best upon a long-drawn-out war, collapsed like a house of cards. France was unready for intervention. At best she could have raised a force of 40,000 soldiers. Still Bismarck wished France to be neutral. He desired to retain France's support up to the peace, in which he hoped to double King William's subjects and more than double Prussia's power and wealth. He was prepared to do a great deal in order to prevent France's interference. With this object in view he pressed negotiations with Austria to the utmost. At the same time he endeavoured to secure Napoleon's goodwill by promising him vaguely vast compensations, such as the possession of Belgium and of Luxemburg. He made these promises through the unfortunate Benedetti, the French Ambassador.

For a time he endeavoured to put Napoleon off his guard by talking moderation. On July 8, five days after the battle of Königgrätz, Bismarck telegraphed to the Prussian Ambassador, Von der Goltz, who had previously reported that Napoleon and his Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, were becoming impatient and anxious : ' Prussia's peace aims, as far as I know the wishes of King William, do not materially exceed the reform of the German Federation. However, Prussia's friends and Prussia's opponents will have to be treated somewhat differently.' At the same time Bismarck sent to Paris Prince Reuss, who was *persona gratissima* at the French Court, with a personal letter written by the King of Prussia to Napoleon which once more dwelt upon Prussia's moderation. Prince Reuss verbally assured Napoleon that King William would be very reasonable in his demands, which concerned mainly a reform of the German Federation, a step of which Napoleon himself had previously approved.

Ever since the beginning of the war the whole Prussian Press had, under official direction, preached reasonableness and moderation, while the Austrian Press had been allowed to indulge in the most extravagant language and demands. According to Rothan, the semi-official Press

of Prussia went so far as to protest against the annexation of Hanover and the Electorate of Hesse against the will of the Hanoverian and Hessian peoples. By making skilful use of Prussia's diplomatic representatives and of the Press, Bismarck succeeded in creating an atmosphere exceedingly favourable to Prussia throughout Europe. The whole world thought that Prussia would be exceedingly reasonable in her demands when concluding a peace.

While ostensibly Prussia's main war aim was a reform of the German Federation, the purpose and extent of which was obscure to most non-Germans, and while Prussian diplomats and the Prussian Press were creating a favourable peace atmosphere by displaying Prussia's self-restraint and generosity, Bismarck communicated part of his real war aims to Von der Goltz, his Ambassador in Paris. In a most important letter, which was written on July 9, and which is printed in part in Sybel's ' History,' Bismarck stated :

The French Cabinet has expressed the desire to know Prussia's peace requirements. Your Excellency will have the same impression which I have, that Prussian public opinion demands the incorporation of Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse in Prussia. That solution would certainly be the most useful for all concerned if it could be brought about without the cession of Prussian territories. I myself do not find the difference between a sufficiently favourable reform of the German Federation and the direct acquisition of the countries mentioned great enough to risk once more the fate of the monarchy. Our political requirements are limited to being able to dispose of the strength of North Germany in some form or another. We ought to treat the decision as to the details of form, as far as possible, as an internal affair to be arranged in Parliament.

It seems to me not permissible that those who on the 14th of June voted in favour of a Federal war against Prussia should be given the same conditions as those who voluntarily joined us, forming a new Federation. The former States are

the more powerful, and therefore they are the more dangerous to the newly created Federation in the future. This difficulty may be solved in two ways, either by imposing upon Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse more unfavourable conditions with regard to their military autonomy or by diminishing the territorial extent of these countries. . . .

As headquarters are about to move, I must finish my letter, and I send your Excellency for the present these pages and leave it to you to find out what impression will be created and what demands for compensation *outside Germany* will be raised by France if we should demand the full annexation of Saxony, Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, Upper Hesse, and Nassau. Before doing this, you should carefully sound the people as to the eventualities previously considered. Your Excellency should at the same time allow it to be understood, without using any threats, that we are firmly resolved not to accept a peace which would be dishonourable in view of Prussia's successes.

Should the hope of arriving at a direct understanding with Austria not materialise, and should France assume a threatening attitude towards Prussia, we should await developments, and then, basing ourselves on the planned Imperial Constitution of Germany of 1849, bring about a great rising of all Germany. We should unite the whole nation and employ every means in our power in order to strengthen the resistance of the nation. However, so far I feel convinced that the fears of the Berlin public are unfounded, and that we shall be able to come to an agreement with the Emperor Napoleon if I should succeed in limiting the demands made on this side to such an extent that they will appear reasonable and sufficient.

It will be noticed that in this most important dispatch Bismarck considered not only the incorporation of Hanover and Hesse in Prussia, but that of Saxony as well. However, he was wise enough to believe real power more important than outward form. The Chancellor plainly stated that he wished before all to obtain control of the forces of North Germany. It was immaterial to him whether the

non-Prussian States in North Germany should be incorporated in Prussia or whether they should be allowed to preserve a purely nominal independence. Furthermore, it will be noticed that Bismarck was quite willing to give to France territorial compensations outside Germany, which means in Belgium or Luxemburg, and that he threatened that he would raise all Germany against Napoleon, should Napoleon be hostile. The reference to the proposed Imperial Constitution of 1849 may be obscure to many readers. At that time the Frankfurt Parliament proposed the creation of a united Germany, comprising Austria and all the purely German States. In other words, Bismarck hinted that in case of need Prussia would reconcile herself with Austria, and that the united Prussian and Austrian armies would march against France and rapidly overwhelm that country.

Up to 1866 France was the dominant Power in Europe, and Napoleon the Third was the dominating figure in the political world. He liked to consider himself the master of the Continent. Foreign rulers and statesmen eagerly sought his friendship, his counsel, his favour, and his support, and he listened patronisingly to their wishes and proposals. He believed that he controlled the Continent, and all France shared his views. In a spirit of patronage he had received Bismarck at Biarritz in 1865, and had agreed to support Prussia against Austria.

Firmly believing that the war would be difficult and long drawn out, that Austria would probably be victorious, and that France would have ample time to arm to intervene in the struggle, Napoleon had neglected mobilising his army. The battle of Königgrätz opened his eyes. The sudden rise of Prussia filled him with dismay, if not with terror. On the evening of July 4, as soon as he had received the staggering news of the battle of Königgrätz, he telegraphed to King William of Prussia that the prompt and striking successes of Prussia compelled him to abandon his

passive attitude. He recommended moderation to the King and proposed an immediate armistice. Fearing Austria's collapse, and recognising the danger threatening from Prussia, Napoleon intended to interfere with energy, to mobilise the army, to advance into Rhenish Prussia, which was denuded of troops, and to prevent a great change in the European balance of power to France's disadvantage. The French Chambers were immediately to be convoked. When, however, the unready state of the army was described to him, he recognised the danger of his proceeding. He faltered, and could not make up his mind whether he should interfere energetically at the risk of war or whether he should abstain from action. The decision to assemble the Chambers was abandoned. He hesitated to choose a policy, and Bismarck, being fully acquainted with the deplorable state of the French army through the Prussian military attaché, Von Loe, who was at Headquarters, made the best use of the Emperor's perplexity and hesitation. Bismarck politely declined Napoleon's demand for an immediate armistice, pointing out to him that, owing to the terms of the Prusso-Italian Alliance, an armistice could only be jointly concluded by Italy and Prussia, and referred Napoleon to Italy. At the same time he urged Italy to refuse France's demand for an armistice. Italy acted in accordance with Bismarck's advice when Napoleon the Third suggested the cessation of hostilities. The arbiter of Europe discovered that overnight his power and prestige had slipped from his hands.

Desiring to stay Prussia's progress, Napoleon sent to the Prussian army headquarters Count Benedetti, the French Ambassador in Berlin. He was given only very vague instructions. Benedetti realised the danger to France of a vastly aggrandised Prussia. He endeavoured to oppose her expansionist ambitions and to claim for France territorial compensations which would maintain the established balance of power between France and Prussia.

He failed in both tasks. Bismarck employed towards the French Ambassador the arguments and threats suggested to Von der Goltz in the dispatch previously quoted. Von Sybel, who saw Bismarck's memoranda of his negotiations with Benedetti, has told us:

When Benedetti demanded for France Mayence, &c., with great energy, pointing out Prussia's injustice and ingratitude, Bismarck negatived his demand and stated that in case of need Prussia would go to war with France. The Chancellor gave this important declaration quietly and politely, and added his reasons. He said that such cessions of German territory were impossible. The German people would oppose giving France the frontier of 1814. King William could not hand over his subjects against their will. Prussia attached no value to Luxemburg, but felt disquieted at Napoleon's attitude, which would diminish Prussia's confidence in him. Prussia had believed that Napoleon was more interested in the rise of a strong and independent Prussia than in territorial acquisitions. If that assumption was mistaken, there would be no longer any reason for limiting Prussia's aims to the control of North Germany, and Germany's unity might be completed by including the South German States as well.

Benedetti remained firm, and appealed to King William, who confirmed the views expressed by Bismarck. He was told that public opinion was opposed to any cession of German territory, however small. The two statesmen met once more and discussed matters during several hours. At last Bismarck summarised the position as follows: 'Why should we act as you wish? You must know that it is impossible for us to cede German territory. That would be a confession of bankruptcy in view of our victories. Perhaps different ways might be found for satisfying France. However, if you should insist upon your demand for German soil, we should use every weapon. We should not only appeal to the entire German race, but should unconditionally make peace with Austria, we should leave to her the whole of South Germany and should bear with the old German Federation, but then

Prussia, Austria, and the other German States would cross the Rhine with 800,000 men and take from you Alsace-Lorraine. All the German armies are ready. The French army is unready, and you can imagine what the consequences would be.'

Benedetti was deeply impressed, and exclaimed: 'Do you think Austria would make peace if France should oppose you?' Bismarck replied: 'I do not express to you a new idea. Immediately before the war we and Austria had discussed this very subject, and I assure you that Austria would make peace to-day. Therefore you should avoid a war which very easily might be fatal to France.' Benedetti answered: 'I should do this willingly, but my conscience compels me to declare to the Emperor Napoleon that his dynasty will be endangered unless he receives territorial compensations.' Bismarck closed the conversation with the words: 'Tell your Emperor that a war springing from such causes might under certain circumstances be fought *à coup de revolutions*; that in case of revolutionary dangers the German dynasties might prove to be erected upon a more solid basis than that of the Emperor Napoleon.'

Napoleon was ill with stone in the bladder, and was racked with pain which sometimes was almost unbearable. He recognised that his policy had been a failure, that he had been instrumental in creating a powerful Prussia to France's danger, that, by the sudden rise of Prussia, France had lost her paramount position in the world. The Empress Eugenie was in despair. The sick Emperor was overwhelmed with reproaches. On July 11 the Prussian Ambassador, Von der Goltz, reported:

I found the Emperor deeply moved, almost broken. . . . He admitted that possibly he had spoken favourably about Prussia's planned reform of the German Federation without having sufficiently weighed the consequences. He admitted that he had made a great mistake, which was doubly awkward through the publicity which his policy had received. If Prussia and Italy continued to oppose him, France would

be deeply humiliated. Something would have to be done to get him out of the impossible position. He inquired what conditions were demanded for an armistice.

The French Emperor's position and his despondency appear clearly from Von der Goltz's report.

On July 13 the Prussian Ambassador, who had meanwhile received Bismarck's important directions as to Prussia's peace aims of July 9, of which an extract has been given in these pages, hastened to see Napoleon. He discussed with him Prussia's peace aims tentatively and in somewhat vague generalities. Napoleon wished still to appear the leading diplomatic figure in Europe. He felt keenly his previous failures. Hence he desired to propose himself those peace conditions which Prussia intended to demand, as long as these were acceptable to France. With this object in view he asked Von der Goltz to submit to him Prussia's peace programme in writing. As we have seen, Napoleon had agreed that Prussia should become supreme in North Germany. On the other hand, the French Emperor had shown that he felt doubtful whether France could consent to vast Prussian annexations. He thought that such a demand should be met by a French demand for an equivalent territorial increment. Von der Goltz was an exceedingly skilful diplomat. He desired that Napoleon should himself propose the settlement which Bismarck had outlined to him. In order to achieve this aim, Von der Goltz resolved to omit the question of annexations. He immediately set to work on a formula, and on the following day, July 14, he saw Napoleon and placed before him peace proposals which were worded as follows:

Austria recognises the dissolution of the old German Federation, and does not oppose a new organisation of Germany in which she will not participate.

Prussia forms a union in North Germany which comprises

all States north of the river Main. She will have the command over the troops of these States.

The German States south of the Main are free to conclude a South German union which will enjoy an independent international position. The bonds between the North German and the South German unions will be arranged by free and mutual agreement.

Schleswig-Holstein will be united with Prussia, with the exception of those districts of North Schleswig, the inhabitants of which desire reunion with Denmark.

Austria and her allies pay Prussia's war expenditure.

It will be noted that in the proposals drafted for Napoleon's use Von der Goltz mentioned only the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, which Prussia had conquered with Austria's help in 1864. Nothing was said about the intended annexation of Hanover, Hesse, &c.!

Napoleon was simple enough to agree to everything. He merely suggested the amendment that Austria should pay only a part of Prussia's war expenditure, and added the phrase, Venetia excepted, Austria's integrity will be preserved.' He then turned to Goltz and told him that the Prussian Ambassador had succeeded in expressing his, the Emperor's, own ideas!

Napoleon had not only shown to Von der Goltz his incapacity and his despondency in the conversation reported by the latter on July 11, but he had allowed himself to become a tool in the hands of one of Bismarck's ablest diplomats. As the question of annexations had not been mentioned, Napoleon possibly imagined that Prussia would be exceedingly moderate in that respect. Goltz did nothing to open Napoleon's eyes. He continued talking moderation, especially as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was opposed to Prussia's aggrandisement. M. Georges Rothan, a very able French diplomat and writer, described in his book, 'La Politique Française en 1866,' the unscrupulous way in which Von der Goltz obtained Napoleon's consent to vast

Prussian annexations, notwithstanding the opposition of the Foreign Minister :

On the 19th of July Von der Goltz entered the room of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. His face was distorted. He abused Bismarck, complained of his demands and his methods, and said that he would resign. He had been given a most disagreeable task, and he thought it wrong. However, having been given orders by the King, he had to carry them out. The Prussian Court was intoxicated by unexpected military successes. Bismarck wished for Prussia's territorial expansion. He hoped that the French Government and Emperor would, in view of the circumstances, satisfy the demands of the army and of public opinion in Prussia, which would be greatly inflamed against those who would try to rob Prussia of the fruit of her victories. After all, it was only a question of some small pieces of territory with 300,000 inhabitants. . . .

Drouyn de Lhuys replied that an annexation of territory with 300,000 inhabitants was not very serious, but that the handing over of the population was a grave step which should be discussed and approved of by the European Powers. Besides, any Prussian annexation on the right bank of the Rhine would inevitably lead to a French annexation on the left bank. The Ambassador replied that King William absolutely refused to cede any German territory. The French Minister rose and answered : ' If that is the case I have nothing further to say. The only thing I have to do is to bring your communication to the notice of the Emperor.'

Von der Goltz did not wish to be forestalled by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He rushed to Saint-Cloud and demanded to see the Emperor. He knew that Napoleon formed decisions without consulting the Foreign Office, and that he shrank from war in view of the unpreparedness of the French army. The next morning he went to the French Foreign Office beaming with smiles and told M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Emperor had not only agreed in principle with Prussia's annexationist demands, but had promised that he would agree to the annexation of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, &c., with about 4,500,000 inhabitants.

Von Sybel, the official historian of Prussia, who read Von der Goltz's reports, has denied Rothan's account and has declared it to be an invention. However, official historians are not always reliable guides. Von Sybel always tries to improve Prussia's case, and he is not averse from stretching the truth in order to serve his country. Besides, he may not have been shown all the dispatches sent by Von der Goltz. At all events, one may say of Rothan's account, ' Se non è vero è ben trovato.' In Paris it was generally believed at the time that Prussia demanded annexations of land with 300,000 inhabitants. Hence the people were amazed when they learned that Napoleon had consented to Prussian annexations which increased the population of the country by almost 4,500,000.

On July 26 a preliminary peace was concluded between Prussia and Austria at Nikolsburg. In forty days the most brilliant military and political campaign had been concluded. On August 16, 1866, the King of Prussia sent a message to the Diet at Berlin in which he asked for their sanction to the annexation of Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, &c., to Prussia. He stated :

We, William, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia, &c., hereby declare and make known :

The Governments of the Kingdom of Hanover, of the Electorate of Hesse, and of the Duchy of Nassau, as well as the Free Town of Frankfort, have, by their participation in the hostile conduct of the former Diet, placed themselves in a state of open war with Prussia. They declined the Neutrality as well as the Alliance repeatedly offered to them by Prussia, even at the last moment, under the promise of a Guarantee of the Integrity of their Territory ; they took an active part in the war of Austria against Prussia, and appealed to the decision of war for themselves and their countries. This decision, according to God's decree, has been against them. Political necessity obliges us not to restore to them the power of government, of which they have been deprived by the victorious advance of our army.

The aforesaid countries could, in case they maintained their independence, cause, from their geographical position, difficulties and obstructions by a hostile or even doubtful attitude of their Governments towards Prussian policy and military action, far surpassing the extent of their actual power and importance. Not from a desire of acquiring Territory, but from a feeling of duty to protect our inherited States from a recurrence of the danger, to give a broader and surer foundation to the national reorganisation of Germany, the necessity arises for us to unite for ever with our monarchy the Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Free Town of Frankfort.

We know very well that only a part of the people of those States share with us the conviction of this necessity. We respect and honour the feelings of loyalty and devotion which bind the Inhabitants of those Countries to their Princely House and to their Independent Political Institutions, but we trust that a lively share in the progressive development of the National Commonweal, together with an indulgent attention to special legal interests, will facilitate the inevitable transition into a new and more extensive community.

We call on the Houses of the Landtag to give their constitutional sanction to the contemplated Union, and for this purpose send them the accompanying draft law.

It will be noticed that Prussia annexed Hanover, Hesse, &c., ' not from a desire of acquiring territory, but from a feeling of duty,' that she did so because she feared the obstruction and the hostility of these small countries. In the Reasons for the Draft Law for the Annexation of Hanover, &c., which were appended to this document, it was stated that the continued existence of the annexed States was ' a permanent danger ' for Prussia, that ' recent events have shown how great the danger of their independence has been ' ! Similarly, Germany talks now of the danger of an independent Belgium.

Two days later, on August 18, an alliance was concluded between Prussia, Saxe-Weimar, Oldenburg,

Brunswick, Lübeck, Bremen, Hamburg, &c., whereby all the North German States were made subject to Prussia, and whereby their troops were placed unconditionally at Prussia's disposal. The effect of the treaty will be seen from the following extracts :

Art. I. The Governments of Prussia, Saxe-Weimar, Oldenburg, &c., &c., enter into an offensive and defensive alliance for the maintenance of their independence and integrity, and of the internal and external security of their States, and they enter at once for the common defence of their possessions, which they guarantee to each other reciprocally by this alliance.

Art. IV. The troops of the Allies are under the Command-in-Chief of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

The contingents to be furnished during a war will be regulated by special agreements.

By these stipulations all the States of North Germany and their armies were placed at the disposal of the King of Prussia.

The South German States promptly shared the fate of the North German States. On August 5, the day after Bismarck had returned to Berlin from the war, the Chancellor invited the South German States to send to Berlin plenipotentiaries for negotiating a peace. The Bavarian representatives suggested that the South German States should negotiate jointly with Prussia, but Bismarck preferred to handle them singly in order to break their resistance all the easier. He began negotiating with Würtemberg. When difficulties arose he suggested that Prussia and Würtemberg should guarantee one another's possessions, and the idea of such a mutual guarantee of territory was expanded into the proposal of concluding a defensive and offensive alliance between the two States by the terms of which the troops of Würtemberg should be placed under the command of the King of Prussia. Würtemberg was terrified by the superior strength of Prussia and by threatened

exactions, and so she signed simultaneously a treaty of peace and of alliance on August 13. By similar means Baden was induced to conclude on the identical basis a treaty of peace and a secret treaty of alliance on August 17, and Bavaria followed suit on August 22. The Prusso-Bavarian treaty stated :

Art. I. A defensive and offensive alliance is hereby concluded between his Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the King of Bavaria.

The High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee to each other the integrity of the territories of their respective countries, and bind themselves, in case of war, to put their whole military force at the disposal of each other for that purpose.

Art. II. His Majesty the King of Bavaria transfers for such a case the command-in-chief of his troops to his Majesty the King of Prussia.

Art. III. The High Contracting Parties bind themselves to keep this Treaty secret for the present.

On October 21 the kingdom of Saxony concluded peace with Prussia, joined the North German Federation, agreed to reorganise her army upon the Prussian model and to place it under command of a Prussian general.

Six weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, when Prussia's attitude clearly indicated that she intended to attack Austria, the far-seeing Thiers told France in a speech delivered before the Corps Legislatif, which created an enormous sensation at the time :

Ce qui est certain, c'est que si la guerre, je le répète, lui est heureuse, elle s'emparera de quelques-uns des Etats allemands du Nord ; et ceux dont elle ne s'emparera pas, elle les placera dans une diète qui sera sous son influence.

Elle aura donc une partie des Allemands sous son autorité directe, et l'autre, sous son autorité indirecte ; et puis on admettra l'Autriche, comme protégée, dans ce nouvel ordre de choses.

His remarkable prophecy has come true in every particular.

Germany's present position curiously resembles that of Prussia in 1866. In 1914, as in 1866, the Hohenzollern State went to war with a number of States. In going to war the German monarch and statesmen knew that they risked the existence of the State and of the dynasty. Still they were once more ready to risk all for all in view of the immensity of the advantages which a victory would bring to them. The victory of 1866 doubled the population under the sway of William the First and more than doubled Prussia's armed strength and wealth. It raised Prussia to the rank of a real Great Power and gave her the predominance in Europe. The war of 1914, if successful, would far more than double the population governed from Berlin, and would give Germany the predominance throughout the world. These were gigantic stakes. It was worth while risking once more all for all.

Austria-Hungary has become Germany's vassal, and Bulgaria and Turkey have become vassals of the Central Empires. These four States have together a population of about 150,000,000, and for all practical purposes they form now a single political unit absolutely controlled from Berlin. By merely preserving the *status quo* before the war, and without allowing for Germany's vastly improved strategical position by her domination of the point where three continents meet, that country would have more than doubled her population and armed strength. It must be obvious to all that if peace were now concluded re-establishing the *status quo ante bellum*, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey would not be able to recover their independence. They would remain Germany's vassals politically, militarily, and economically. It follows that a drawn war would considerably more than double Germany's strength. If, on the other hand, the Central Powers should be victorious and retain their conquests and dictate a peace, Germany

would no doubt keep the lion's share. She would retain part of Eastern France and Belgium, with together perhaps 10,000,000 inhabitants, and her annexations in the East would increase her population still further. If Germany should take the Baltic Provinces of Russia and Poland and attach these to herself, her population would be increased from 67,000,000 to about 100,000,000. As Belgium and Poland are the two most important industrial centres outside Germany on the Continent of Europe, Germany's economic power and wealth would be more than doubled. Poland, Belgium, and Eastern France are exceedingly rich in coal and iron, which furnish weapons of war and munitions of every kind.

Possibly Germany would, as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and other German statesmen have repeatedly declared, re-establish the independence of Belgium and Poland under vaguely mentioned 'guarantees,' which would safeguard Germany from another 'aggression' on the part of her rapacious neighbours. The nature of these 'guarantees' has been made known to the world through numerous indiscretions of leading Germans who have outlined them in detail. The most authorised description of these guarantees is contained in the remarkable disclosures made by Mr. Gerard, the late American Ambassador in Berlin. He has stated in his book:

From the time when Chancellor Hollweg first spoke of peace, I had asked him and others what the peace terms of Germany were. I could never get anyone to state any definite terms of peace. On several occasions when I asked the Chancellor whether Germany were willing to withdraw from Belgium he always said, 'Yes, but with guarantees.' Finally, in January 1917, when he was again talking of peace, I said:

'What are these peace terms to which you refer continually? Will you allow me to ask a few questions as to specific terms of peace? First, are the Germans willing to withdraw from Belgium?'

The Chancellor answered: 'Yes, but with guarantees.'

I said: 'What are these guarantees?'

He replied: 'We must possibly have the forts of Liége and Namur. We must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of communication. The Belgians will not be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to retain a large army in Belgium. We must have commercial control of Belgium.'

I said: 'I don't see that you have left much for the Belgians excepting that King Albert will have the right to reside at Brussels with a guard of honour.'

And the Chancellor answered: 'We cannot allow Belgium to be an outpost (*Vorwerk*) of England.'

'I do not suppose the English, on the other hand, wish it to become an outpost of Germany,' I returned, 'especially as Tirpitz said the coast of Flanders should be retained in order to make war on England and America.'

I then asked: 'How about Northern France?'

'We are willing to leave Northern France,' the Chancellor responded; 'but there must be a rectification of the frontier.'

'How about the Eastern frontier?' I asked him.

'We must have a very substantial rectification of our frontier.'

'How about Roumania?'

'We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with Roumania.'

'How about Serbia?'

'A very small Serbia might be allowed to exist, but that question is for Austria. Austria must be left to do what she wishes to Italy, and we must have indemnities from all the countries, and all our ships and colonies back.'

Of course 'rectification of the frontier' is a polite term for annexation.

The nature of the 'guarantees' demanded by Germany appears clearly from the Chancellor's own words.

Before the war Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants, and the four States of the Central Alliance had together

about 150,000,000 people. By attaching to Germany Belgium, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and certain French territories Germany's population would be increased to about 100,000,000. Austria-Hungary, if victorious, would probably acquire the Ukraine and parts of Roumania and of Serbia, which would increase the population of the Dual Monarchy to about 80,000,000. The population of Turkey and Bulgaria combined would, by the territories they claim, be increased to at least 40,000,000. The population of the four States would then be increased to at least 220,000,000, and these would be absolutely dominated by Germany.

A greatly aggrandised Germany would not merely control her three vassal States, but would likewise endeavour to attach to herself the smaller States around the gigantic new composite State in accordance with the views and desires which have been expressed by many of the most prominent Germans. Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland would be the first to fall under Germany's sway. A victorious war would therefore not merely double the population and wealth at the disposal of Berlin, as did the war of 1866, but would more than treble Germany's subjects and armed strength.

The crude system of increasing the number of one's subjects by the annexation of independent States is completely out of date. One can have the identical result by incorporating States which nominally retain their independence. Bismarck's action in 1866 and the German system of Kartells have furnished valuable precedents. In 1866 the Prussian Government doubled the population under its sway while preserving the nominal independence of the minor German States. After a victory in the present war Germany might respect the nominal independence of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, who now stand in the same relation to Germany in which Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden stand to Prussia, and she might in addition maintain the nominal independence of Belgium and Poland

as well. The latter countries would probably be given even less real independence than is enjoyed by the 'independent' States of Brunswick and Oldenburg. Germany's present rulers share the view which Bismarck expressed in his dispatch of July 9, 1866, previously quoted, that the full control of nominally independent States is as valuable as their absolute possession.

To all who think clearly it must be obvious that a peace which would re-establish the *ante-bellum* frontiers would firmly establish a greater Germany of more than 150,000,000 people, while a peace concluded on the basis of a German victory would create a connected State under Germany's control the population of which would be at least 220,000,000. Germany would dominate the world.

CHAPTER IX

HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR IN PEACE—HER POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1888[1]

GERMANY has consistently followed a twofold policy towards the United States. Always reckoning with the possibility of a collision with England, she has endeavoured to be on good terms with the United States, counting upon their support in case of a great war. At the same time, German statesmen have seen in the Great Republic an economic and political danger, and, while ostensibly maintaining excellent relations with the United States, they have stealthily endeavoured to weaken them by various ways, and especially by creating enmity between them and England. In leading German circles it has been an article of faith that the United States and England are natural enemies; that both countries bitterly remember the War of Independence and the quarrels which succeeded it. It has been an article of faith in Germany that Canada was coveted by all Americans; that the existence of that great English Dominion in North America was an ever-present cause of friction between the two Anglo-Saxon States; that the Americans would take Canada as soon as England was involved in a really serious war.

The twofold policy pursued by official Germany towards the United States may be seen from the pronouncements of Bismarck, the creator of modern Germany. At every opportunity Bismarck showed sympathy to America and flattered American sentiment. However, although he frequently publicly stated that there was no point of difference between the German Empire and the United States, he combated secretly the Americans and their Monroe doctrine. On March 13, 1884, Bismarck stated in the Reichstag:

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, January 1915.

Frederick the Great was the first European monarch who entered upon closer relations with the United States. Since then good relations between Prussia and America have become a Prussian heritage which the German Empire has taken over. Since the time when I began conducting the foreign affairs of Prussia and of Germany, I have unceasingly endeavoured to cultivate our relations with the United States. . . . I think I may say that since the time when I entered into the Cabinet up to the present day nothing has happened which was likely to disturb the cordiality of German-American relations. Hence, I think they are at the present day as friendly and as intimate as they were at the time when I entered the Government.

On July 8, 1890, that great statesman, addressing a deputation of New York citizens, said:

As a Minister of Prussia, and later on of Germany, entrusted with the conduct of national foreign policy, I have always endeavoured to maintain those friendly relations with the North American Republic of which the great King, Frederick II, laid the foundation more than a hundred years ago by being the first ruler who recognised their independence. The friendly relations existing between Germany and the United States are a legacy of Frederick the Great, which has been highly valued ever since. Germany and the United States belong to that category of States which happily have no cause to bear envy to one another.

The views publicly uttered by Bismarck relating to the United States were most satisfactory to all Americans. However, the Iron Chancellor secretly endeavoured to antagonise American policy. In 1913 Herr Hermann

Hofmann, the former editor of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, brought out his reminiscences of Prince Bismarck. They are particularly valuable, because the Prince published, after his dismissal, his political views in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* in numerous articles, and Herr Hofmann acted as an intermediary, standing in constant relation with the aged statesman. Herr Hofmann reprinted in his Memoirs the articles of which Prince Bismarck was the author, and these betray unmistakably their origin by their marked and vigorous style. On February 9, 1896, the Prince caused the following article on the Monroe doctrine to be published in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*:

The Monroe Doctrine

Some German newspapers continue discussing the so-called 'Monroe doctrine,' in consequence of the events which have taken place in South America. We are of opinion that that doctrine, and the way in which it is now advanced by the American Republic, is an incredible impertinence (*eine unglaubliche Unverschämtheit*) towards the rest of the world. The Monroe doctrine is merely an act of violence, based upon great strength, towards all American States and towards those European States which possess interests in America. If we desire to state a European doctrine similar to that overweening American doctrine, we must imagine that some European State, let us say France or Russia, should claim that it would not allow any alteration of the frontiers of Europe to take place, except with its consent, or we must imagine that some preponderant Asiatic Power, such as Russia or England, should advance the pretension that it would not allow a change in Asia's political relations, except with its permission! We are under the impression that the great wealth which the American soil has furnished to its inhabitants has caused part of the American legislators to over-estimate their own rights and to under-estimate at the same time the right to independence possessed by the other American Powers and by the European Powers as well.

In Bismarck's time and after his dismissal, Germany, while maintaining ostensibly the most friendly and intimate relations with the United States, has repeatedly endeavoured to oppose and damage America's interests. More than once has she been successful, and more than once has Germany's anti-American policy led to dangerous friction between the two States.

The first quarrel between Germany and the United States occurred during the time when Bismarck was still in office. It took place in 1888 in connection with the Samoa Islands, upon the possession of which the United States and Germany possessed certain claims. In view of the great strategical importance of these islands, which dominate one of the great American trade routes, the United States had undoubtedly the stronger claim upon their possession. The friction between Germany and the United States about Samoa became so acute that both Powers sent fleets there. At the most critical moment a sudden storm destroyed both fleets, and then matters were patched up by mutual agreement.

Ten years later, in 1898, the Spanish-American War broke out. The United States discovered that all Continental Europe sympathised strongly with Spain. The entire Continental Press, and the entire German Press too, violently attacked America's policy, and an attempt was made to create a pan-European combination for restraining the United States. However, the action of the Continental Powers was foiled by Great Britain supporting America's policy. Although Germany had taken a prominent part in the attempt of bringing about European intervention, German diplomacy endeavoured to explain that England had striven to create a European combination hostile to the United States, and that Germany's loyalty to America had prevented its success.

During the Spanish-American War Germany endeavoured to acquire the Philippines. While other countries

had sent only a few ships to the Philippine Islands, Germany had, without any obvious reason, dispatched there her Pacific Squadron—a force equal to that commanded by Admiral Dewey. The German Admiral Diedrichs endeavoured to foil Admiral Dewey's operations, and the relations between the German and American fleets became so strained that a battle between the two was avoided only by the intervention of the English commander, who backed up his American colleague.

In 1901 Germany induced England and Italy to intervene jointly in Venezuela. Ostensibly, the purpose of the joint naval action was to bring pressure to bear upon that country with a view to obtaining satisfaction regarding certain economic claims advanced by these three Powers which the Venezuelans had disregarded. Ostensibly, the purpose of the joint expedition of these three European Great Powers on the American continent, which created much excitement in the United States and in England, was purely economic. On December 11, 1901, Germany declared that in her proposed measures against Venezuela she had 'no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American continent, or the islands adjacent.' That statement was by no means an acknowledgment of the Monroe doctrine. With regard to it, Mr. Archibald Cary Coolidge, the eminent professor at Harvard University, wrote in his excellent book, 'The United States as a World Power': 'This statement has been regarded as an acknowledgment of the principle (the Monroe doctrine), but it was nothing but a statement of intentions on a particular occasion, and in no way binding for the future.' Commenting on Germany's American policy, Professor Coolidge wrote, not without cause: 'Rightly or wrongly, the Americans were convinced that Germany was "trying it on" to test the Monroe doctrine, and for greater security had persuaded the other two Powers to join her. The loud and almost universal condemnation

by the English people and Press of the action of their Government prevented resentment against England, and since Italy scarcely attracted attention, all the vials of American wrath were poured on Germany. For a while the situation was somewhat critical.'

At the time when English statesmen were considering withdrawing from the Venezuela expedition, upon which they had entered without sufficient consideration, largely owing to the German Emperor's personal persuasion, I had a long conversation with a very eminent German diplomat, who explained to me that England's withdrawal would be a breach of faith towards Germany. If England and Germany settled the Venezuela affair without taking overmuch notice of America's protests, the Monroe doctrine would be dead, and the United States would observe an attitude of becoming modesty towards other countries for at least thirty years.—Germany probably intended to use the Venezuela imbroglio for creating enmity between the two Anglo-Saxon nations. She might have suddenly withdrawn from Venezuela after having deeply committed Great Britain, or might even have gone a step further by siding at the critical moment with America against England.

The fact that the best-informed Germans hopefully reckoned upon setting England against America, or America against England, is borne out by numerous pronouncements and writings of most eminent Germans, and especially by those of General von Bernhardi, who, in his writings, contemplates the twofold possibility of either fighting the United States with the help of Great Britain, or Great Britain with the help of the United States.

Germany's diplomatic policy was supported by her Press policy towards the United States.

The German Government attaches great value to public opinion. Practically the entire German Press stands under Government influence, and the entire non-Socialist Press of Germany may be said to be edited by the German Govern-

ment. Germany has for many years endeavoured to secure some kind of control over public opinion abroad. Even in the United States, which are supposed to have the freest Press, the German Government has exerted a considerable influence over public opinion in curious ways, with which most diplomats who have lived in that country are acquainted.

In 1907, Mr. Emil Witte, a former Press attaché at the German Embassy in Washington, published at Leipzig a book on his experiences at the Washington Embassy. For some reason or other, that book, which contains disclosures most damaging to the German Government, has remained practically unknown. It is so scarce a book that it seems possible that the German Government bought up and destroyed all the copies it could lay hands on.

The following extracts from Mr. Witte's disclosures throw a powerful light upon Germany's diplomatic methods, and upon her American policy. Mr. Witte was, in spring 1898, one of the editors of the *Deutsche Zeitung* of Vienna. At that time the Spanish-American War broke out, and practically the whole of the German and Austrian Press took the part of Spain and violently attacked the United States in accordance with official directions. Mr. Witte was apparently the only editor who, in a leading article, advocated the cause of the United States. His article, which appeared in the *Deutsche Zeitung* on April 23, 1898, was cabled in full to America, and led to a warmly worded letter of gratitude by the American representative in Vienna. As Mr. Witte thought that the German and Austrian Press adopted so violent an anti-American attitude because German editors were insufficiently acquainted with American affairs, he determined to go to America and found there a Press agency for the information of the German and Austrian Press. He was prompted by the wish to serve German interests, and as an old German-American journalist he considered himself well qualified for acting in the way

intended. However, the German Government apparently did not wish the German and Austrian Press to be informed from an independent quarter. The semi-official Wolff Agency made use of his idea, and when Mr. Witte arrived in America he found himself forestalled. Anxious to find employment, he approached the German Ambassador in Washington, and, compelled by necessity, became a confidential employee attached to the Embassy. Mr. Witte described his position as follows:

At that time Busch's Memoirs were published in London. They were the sensation of the day. Wherever people met they discussed the revelations of Bismarck's Press man. I became an attaché for Press affairs to the German Embassy at Washington and received my income from the secret Government Fund in Berlin in respect of services which did not very much differ from those which the late Moritz Busch rendered to the great German Chancellor.

I now give some extracts from Mr Witte's book. It is entitled ' Experiences at a German Embassy: Ten Years of German-American Diplomacy, by Emil Witte, late Councillor of Legation, Leipzig, 1907 ':

. . . The public learns from these pages for the first time the truth, and the whole truth, about German-American relations, the true state of which has been disguised and misrepresented on both sides of the ocean by a powerful and corrupt Press. . . .

' These Americans are, after all, incredibly simple. They swallow any bait greedily as long as it is sufficiently sugared and placed before them with a friendly smile.' I heard this phrase frequently from an intimate friend of Herr von Holleben, the German Ambassador at Washington, at the time when I had the honour to be attached to the German Embassy at Washington in order to attend to Press matters. That phrase is characteristic of the view which prevailed among German diplomats towards the statesmen of the New World. These views have led to very gross errors. After

a number of serious incidents, such as the Dewey-Diedrichs episode in the Bay of Manila, the unfortunate Samoa affair, the Coghlan affair, and the Venezuela imbroglio, the diplomats at Berlin suddenly remembered the old historic friendship which united Prussia and the United States since the time of Frederick the Great, and they assured the Americans that the great Republic possessed no more faithful and sincere friend than the German Emperor. In order to give a practical demonstration of that historical friendship to the world in general and to the United States in particular, the American journey of Prince Henry was announced. . . .

The Prince arrived, and he convinced himself and was able to report to his Imperial brother that he was in a country where one-third of the population was of German birth or of German descent, and was firmly resolved to stand faithfully at Germany's side under all circumstances. He convinced himself of the truth of the statement, which Dr. von Holleben had made to a journalist at a time when German-American relations were in a critical state, that a war between Germany and the United States would assume the character of a *civil war*.

Dr. A. von Mumm admitted to me at Washington that Germany was responsible for the unhappy Dewey-Diedrichs incident at Manila.

The anti-German attitude of the American Press which was noticeable at the time when I entered upon my duties (January 1899) was not unjustified. I was selected, as Press attaché to the German Embassy in America, to make up for the sins which the German Press had committed in its blind desire to please the men at the Wilhelmstrasse.

When I entered upon my duties, I received the general instruction to do everything in my power to silence the journals hostile to Germany, and to convert them from determined enemies of Germany into friends and admirers of the Emperor. Besides, it was my duty to create the belief in American public opinion that the true enemy of the United States was not Germany, but England. . . . Thus I began my work. The German Ambassador was particularly annoyed by the personal attacks which he received nearly every day from three Washington dailies. One of the first tasks which I received from his Excellency was to try my power of persuasion on their editors with a view to silencing them. I succeeded largely, and I owed my success in part to the friendly exertions of Count M. G. Seckendorff, a younger brother of the former Court Marshal of the Empress Frederick, who, during many years, was at the head of the Washington office of the influential *New York Tribune*. Owing to his personality, his connections, and his important position in the American Press, he enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the American authorities at Washington. He was a personal friend of Dr. von Holleben, and had rendered him many a service in the Press before I entered upon my duties, and he assisted me in every way, as I acknowledge with gratitude.

In order to ensure the success of my mission, it was of the greatest importance that the true character of my relations with the German Embassy should remain a strict secret. In consequence of Herr von Sternburg's suggestion, the Ambassador empowered me to assume the part of a Special Correspondent of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and in that character I had intercourse with the American journalists whose acquaintance I sought by the Ambassador's orders. Count Seckendorff, of the *New York Tribune*, knew of the secret, and gave me letters of introduction to the editors of the *Washington Evening Star* and the *Washington Post*, with whom he was personally acquainted. In these letters he introduced me as Special Correspondent of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and pleaded that I should be given opportunity to correct in their journals the frequently erroneous views of the editors regarding Germany's policy. My reception by Mr. Wilkins, the proprietor of the *Washington Post*, was not very encouraging, because of his experiences in Germany. In Berlin, and in other German towns, German officers had demonstratively gone away from his table when they heard that he was an American. I was more successful with Mr. Noyes, of the *Washington Evening Star*.

I had a very friendly reception by Mr. Goldwin West, the editor of the *Washington Times*. That journal, which hitherto had been one of the most determined opponents of the German Ambassador, published on the morning following my visit an article in which the necessity of preserving and cultivating friendly relations between the United States and Germany was advocated with the greatest zeal. I succeeded in arranging a meeting between Mr. West and Herr von Holleben, which was extremely satisfactory to both. Later on, Mr. West confided to me that since that meeting, Herr von Sternburg was a frequent and welcome midnight visitor in the editorial sanctum of the *Washington Times*.

As I am speaking of the local Press of Washington, I might give an amusing anecdote showing how the German Ambassador was taken advantage of by a smart American. The facts given in these pages make it clear how great a weight Herr von Holleben would attach to obtaining so great an influence upon a Washington daily that it would in all circumstances, and for any purpose, be at his absolute disposal. Therefore, he eagerly grasped the opportunity when he was approached by a journalist, Mr. W. R. Vaughan, who came to him with an introduction from a Senator from the West, and who offered to bring out a daily in Washington in which as many columns as he desired would be at the Ambassador's disposal. As he did not possess sufficient capital for starting the enterprise, he confidently hoped that the Ambassador would assist him. On February 22, 1899, there was really published the first number of *Uncle Sam's American Eagle*, adorned with Mr. Vaughan's name as publisher and editor. However, Herr von Holleben was bitterly disappointed when he discovered that that journal was not a daily, as he had been promised, but quite an unimportant weekly, which was filled with cheap, syndicated articles furnished in stereotype plate. At the same time, one must confess that Mr. Vaughan took the greatest trouble to retain the Ambassador's goodwill by his articles. In long periods he announced that *Uncle Sam's American Eagle* was determinedly opposed to America concluding an alliance with any foreign Power, the unnamed foreign Power

being, of course, England, and that it would with energy advocate friendship with Germany. I believe that Herr von Holleben felt soon the attentions shown to him by *Uncle Sam's American Eagle* as a burden, for nearly every week Mr. Vaughan asked his Excellency's permission to print a special edition of his paper for the use of the Embassy. Although Mr. Kinne, the Chancellor of the Embassy, was lavish in distributing gratis copies of that journal, the remaining stock was so great that it sufficed to fulfil all the requirements of the whole Embassy for paper during many years.

The attacks of the *New York Sun* were a constant source of anger for the Ambassador, and one day I received orders to go to New York and see Mr. Laffan. I told Mr. Laffan: 'In my quality of Special Correspondent of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, I have repeatedly been able to discuss the attitude of the *New York Sun* towards Germany with Herr von Holleben, the German Ambassador. As he is one of the most sincere admirers of all the great features which are characteristic of the *Sun*, he deplores most sincerely that your paper is an opponent of Germany's policy, and he is earnestly desirous to convince you of Germany's sincere friendship for the United States. I do not ask anything from you except that your paper should adopt an impartial attitude.' Mr. Laffan listened to me with attention, and assured me that I had not appealed to him in vain, that the attacks of the *Sun* upon the German Ambassador should cease.

The Ambassador was delighted when I returned to Washington and told him of the success of my journey. He told me: 'Now, we must see whether the rascal keeps his word. Sit down and write an article and send it to the *New York Sun*. If it appears, I will believe in the sincerity of Mr. Laffan's assurances.' I wrote the desired article, and it appeared the next morning in a prominent position on the leader page, where it filled a whole column. It was signed with my initials, and the editor had given it a send-off with some friendly words. When the Ambassador saw the *New York Sun*, he said: 'It seems that we have found the right man in Mr. Witte, for he has succeeded in doing what

no one has been able to do before him in converting the *New York Sun*.'

Those who wish to understand the real attitude of German diplomacy in the United States during the time following the Spanish-American War will find the secret key in Germany's hostility towards and envy of England. On February 13 I received the following letter from Mr. A. Kinne, the Chancellor of the Embassy:

'Dear Mr. Witte, I enclose, in accordance with orders received, an article of the *Washington Post* of July 3, 1898. Kindly make the best possible use of it.—I am, yours very truly, A. KINNE.'

The article in question treated 'Germany's Position during the Spanish-American War,' and was written by Mr. Fred F. Schrader, a German-American journalist. Its contents are beyond the capacity of a correspondent of the Western journals, and every line betrays its inspired origin. It is too lengthy to be quoted in full, but the following passages may be of interest:[1]—

'. . . All those who are acquainted with the present position of international affairs are aware that the German Government observes an attitude of absolute neutrality in the Spanish-American War, and that its neutrality is mitigated by its very friendly feelings towards the United States. Hence, hitherto no German ships have been discovered supplying the Spanish squadron with coal, or strengthening America's enemies with artillerists. Nevertheless, the truth has been systematically perverted for diplomatic reasons, which are fully understood at Washington.

'As Secretary Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and other equally prominent men have openly admitted, England is forced to conclude an Alliance with another Power, and she has made to the German Government *surprising offers in order to conclude with Germany an alliance directed against Russia.* We have been told that among the various proposals made to Germany, there was also one according to which Germany was to be given a free hand for enlarging her

[1] The quotation from the *Washington Post* is retranslated from the German, as the translator had no access to the original.

colonial possessions under the shelter of a British guarantee. In fact, Germany was offered colonial concessions, the exact nature of which has hitherto not become known.

'For reasons best known to the German Government, these offers were declined. Great Britain was left in her isolation, while Germany openly strove to bring about more intimate relations with Russia and France. All the attempts which were made with the object of bringing about an estrangement between the United States and the German Imperial Government date from that period.

'The diplomats at Washington are of opinion that systematical endeavours were made at that critical period to make Germany suspected, with the object of bringing about an intolerable position which would induce one side or the other to commit some rash act which would bring about a German-American war. In case of such a war Great Britain would be able either to offer to the United States an alliance against Germany, or to Germany an alliance against the United States. However, to Great Britain an alliance with a strong land Power such as Germany, which is Russia's neighbour and can immediately attack that country, is more important than an alliance with the United States. In all probability, England would therefore address her offer in the first place to the German Emperor, and England's enthusiasm for her blood relations would as quickly be changed in favour of a *rapprochement* with Germany, as her attitude, friendly to Spain, was changed in favour of the United States at the beginning of the Spanish-American War.

'Neither the British Prime Minister, nor the Queen, have spoken in favour of the United States. Only Anglicised newspaper correspondents abroad, such as Austin Dobson and Robert Barr, have advocated the creation of an Anglo-American brotherhood. Secretary Chamberlain has said something about the flags of the two countries supporting one another. However, the matter has not advanced far enough to bind the British Government to a certain course of policy. At a critical moment it can quite decently withdraw and make common cause with the German

Emperor after having brought about a war between Germany and the United States.'

This article was not written by a simple newspaper correspondent such as Mr. Fred F. Schrader, but by the Chief of the German Embassy. He is the authority for the statement that at the beginning of the Spanish-American War, England made to the German Government ' surprising offers in order to conclude with Germany an alliance directed against Russia,' that Great Britain had given Germany a free hand for enlarging her colonial possessions under the shelter of a British guarantee, and had in addition offered further colonial concessions to Germany.

The secret differences between Germany and England found open expression during the Samoa troubles. [In the following pages the author describes the intrigues whereby Germany endeavoured to make mischief between England and the United States during the Samoa negotiations. These intrigues are at present perhaps of little interest.]

At the time of my presence in Washington there was the danger of a Customs war between the United States and Germany. By his reports to the authorities in Berlin, Herr von Holleben endeavoured to create the impression that a German-American Customs war would not last long, and that Germany would be victorious. He endeavoured to create the same impression in the United States, and to impress public opinion in that way with the co-operation of Mr. James Howard Gore, Professor of the Columbia University at Washington. This gentleman published in *The Forum*, an American monthly, a lengthy article on the commercial relations between the United States and Germany, and he endeavoured to prove in it that the United States had every reason to avoid a Customs war with Germany. As the arguments and figures given seemed strangely familiar to me, I made inquiries, which showed that they were the identical arguments and figures which were habitually employed by the German Ambassador and his secretaries. I also discovered that the Professor had crossed with the Ambassador on the same steamer to Europe. Of course, we cannot reproach the editor of *The Forum* for having published Professor Gore's article. He did it undoubtedly in good faith, and in the hope of doing a service to the United States. At the same time this incident shows that even the nominally most independent American monthlies are liable to be secretly influenced by European Governments, and that public opinion in the United States, as elsewhere, is led by the nose.

It is not generally known that Germany owes the possession of the Caroline Islands chiefly to the exertions of Baron Speck von Sternburg, who represented Herr von Holleben during his leave of absence. Owing to his influence with his good friend Roosevelt, he succeeded in obtaining them for Germany. Scarcely had he achieved this difficult task when Herr von Holleben returned from his holiday, and immediately took credit for the acquisition made in his reports to the German Foreign Office. . . . Germany would like, of course, to have acquired the Philippine Islands in addition to the Caroline Islands. She has officially and semi-officially again and again denied that the German Government had had any intention to acquire Manila and the Philippines. However, I myself can be a witness to the fact that a secret connection existed between the Phillippines and the Foreign Office in Berlin. Professor Blumentritt, who lived in the neighbourhood of Prague, and who advocated the freedom of the revolting natives, formed the connecting link. Only a few days before German interests in the Philippine Islands were placed under American protection, I received an official report, written by Professor Blumentritt, on the revolting natives, for the use of Prince, then Count, Bülow, which I was to translate and to utilise in the United States Press. That report contained the most secret details as to the resources and reserves of the Philippines, as to their armament and equipment, as to their store of ammunition and food, as to the character of their leaders, &c. The report concluded with a prophecy that the Americans would never succeed in mastering the Philippinoes, who would gladly place themselves under a German Protectorate. This remark explains in part the attention which the German Admiral von Diedrichs paid to Admiral

Dewey and the American fleet. When I expressed my surprise that at a time when Germany asked the United States to protect her interests in the Philippine Islands an article based on that information should be circulated in the United States, I received the short but significant reply: 'We must not allow the United States to become too strong.'

The German Ambassador played a very delicate and dangerous part in the German-American movement. Mr. John J. Lentz, of Columbus, Ohio, a member of Congress, told me: 'Please tell the Ambassador to keep the German-American movement *progressing with energy*.' The Ambassador replied, when I gave him the message, that 'it was not unexpected.' I had met Mr. Lentz previously in the house of Herr von Sternburg, and I met him frequently at the Embassy. As he was a member of the Committee for Military Affairs, and was therefore acquainted with the most secret information, his intercourse with us was not approved of by American people. Mr. Lentz was an orator and a firebrand, and he became generally known as organiser of the German-American indignation meetings which took place in the large towns in the West and East, and at which American citizens of German birth or German descent were requested to fight at election time every American administration unfriendly to Germany.

Herr von Holleben played a very dangerous game, and in the end it cost him his position.

Formerly official Germany and its representatives in the United States never took any notice of the German-Americans. With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, things suddenly changed. The formerly despised 'renegades' became the object of innumerable attentions on the part of the Emperor and his Ambassador. Everywhere in the United States German Veteran Societies were formed, which, by close interconnection, became an organisation of great power.

The Emperor gave colours to many of these societies, and these were handed over by the Ambassador in person, accompanied by the most imposing ceremonies. Numerous decorations and distinctions were bestowed upon German-

American citizens who had acquired merit in promoting the German-American movement. . . .

The surprising change of policy which Berlin adopted towards the formerly so much despised German-American can easily be explained. When the anti-German current in the United States seemed to bring the possibility of war with Germany in sight, intriguing German-American politicians and University professors drew Herr von Holleben's attention to the fact that he could easiest force President McKinley and his administration to follow a policy friendly to Germany and hostile to England by making use of the millions of German-American voters.

I arrived in Milwaukee, the most strongly German town in the United States, and met there the editor of the *Germania* on the very day when that paper had published a pæan of praise of Herr von Holleben. I told the editor, Herr Emil von Schleinitz, the reasons why I could not agree with his article. The editor admitted the justice of my arguments, and told me verbally: 'Last year, when I was in Berlin, I had conversations with the Imperial Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Money and decorations were offered to me, and I was to be received by the Emperor. However, the audience did not take place, as the Emperor's plans were changed at the last moment.' Herr von Schleinitz then asked me to tell him what I knew about *Germany's readiness for war in America*. I replied: '*Germany is absolutely ready for such an event.* That is, after all, necessary.' Herr von Schleinitz replied: 'I know all this, and I know more. I have spoken with officers in high positions in Berlin, and I have heard surprising things. *Germany reckons very strongly upon the support of Germans living in the Western States.*' Herr von Schleinitz and I looked at one another. WE KNEW!

Professor Schönfield, of the Columbia University at Washington, was a constant visitor at my house, and never tired of advocating the foundation of a *great monthly review published in the English language*, which was to be the organ of all friends of Germany in America, and which was at all times to be a reliable instrument in the hands of the

German Ambassador for influencing public opinion in the United States. I had much sympathy for the project, and at last wrested from Herr von Holleben the promise to recommend it in Berlin. 'However,' the Ambassador added, 'the first number of the projected review must be got ready in manuscript, so that I can enclose it together with my report to the Foreign Office. When I was Ambassador in Japan I acted in the same way, sending the first number of a new Japanese monthly in manuscript to Berlin, and, by doing so, obtained a success.'

Professor Schönfield exclaimed, 'They ought to have given me the post of Professor Münsterberg. He receives $5000 from Harvard and as much from Berlin. I should not demand any more!'

On March 15 the *New York American* published a letter from Mr. H. A. Buck, an engineer who had formerly lived in Berlin, and who had heard from officers in an exalted position moving in the entourage of the Emperor that the German Ambassador, Herr von Holleben, and Professor Münsterberg had created a widely-spread organisation of espionage in the United States. Professor Münsterberg had been sent to America by direct command of the Emperor, in order to mislead the public of the United States with regard to Germany's true policy towards America.

At a time when the *New Yorker Staats Zeitung* displeased the German Ambassador, Professor Hugo Münsterberg, of Harvard University, dealt with it. In several important journals statements based upon information derived 'from the best sources' appeared, according to which the foundation of a new large daily in New York was projected. That journal was to appeal to all Germans in New York who had become dissatisfied with the unending quarrels and intrigues, and with the political faithlessness of the *New Yorker Staats Zeitung*. Besides, the projected journal would prove intellectually and technically superior to the *Staats Zeitung*. Money would be no object. The new journal would dispose of unlimited funds, the Treasury of the German Empire. Mr. Bernhard Ridder is a German-American self-made man, who began life as an office-boy and became the editor

and part proprietor of the *New Yorker Staats Zeitung*. He became frightened! After all, the report might be correct, and if, as was rumoured, Professor Hugo Münsterberg himself should become the editor of the new daily, the *Staats Zeitung* would be ruined. Herr Ridder, therefore, thought it better to give way. A reconciliation dinner took place, and the new German daily did not appear.

The vast majority of the German newspapers appearing in the United States could not conveniently exist if they did not save the wages of journalists and compositors by relying upon the factories which produce stereotyped matter. The producers of the stereotyped matter which is sent out to the German-American papers can make a living only by copying matter which has appeared in the German and Austrian journals and periodicals. They reprint part of their contents, cast plates, and sell these at a very low price to the German-American Press. The *New Yorker Staats Zeitung* asserts that it is the only German newspaper in America which pays its contributors for belletristical contributions, but its payments are more than modest. The very difficult struggle for existence forces the German-American newspapers to play a very humiliating part. At election time they usually sit on the fence with one leg in the Republican and the other in the Democratic camp, waiting for the development of things. In America, politics are, after all, a business. The Anglo-American newspapers may indulge in the luxury of a political conviction. The German-American newspapers cannot afford to do likewise. In view of the venality of the German-American Press, it is only natural that German-Americans are considered by both parties only as voting cattle, and that they play no part in political life.

It cannot be denied that the Germans living in America are politically indifferent, and both American parties endeavour to make use of that indifference. The 'Furor Teutonicus' of the German-American is aroused only if anyone dares to touch his most sacred interest—his beer. Then he becomes savage, and he brings about at the poll the defeat of the candidate in whom he sees an enemy of his personal liberty—of the liberty to drink as much beer as he likes, as

often and as long as he likes, on all days, Sunday included. Interference with the public-houses led to the rejection of Mr. Seth Low.

The German churches throughout the United States, which were well frequented, now stand empty during divine service, and most preachers are forced to preach in English, because the younger generation of German-Americans knows only English. The only thing which could help Germanism in America, which would bring new blood to the country, would be an unfortunate war on Germany's part or a German revolution.

On the German Day, October 6, 1901, Germanism in the United States was organised at Philadelphia and Pennsylvania. On that date the ' Deutsch-Amerikanische Nationalbund der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ' was founded. According to its constitution, it endeavours to awaken among the American population of German descent a feeling of unity, to organise it for the purpose of energetically protecting the common interests of Germanism, &c.

It should be of interest to consider the activity of the German Bund. It agitated energetically with the object of inducing the Government of the United States to intervene in the war between England and the Boers. In support of this agitation it handed to Congress a petition which weighed more than four hundred pounds, and which was more than five miles long.

An organisation, similar in character and scope to that representing all German-Americans, is the ' Centralverband Deutscher Veteranen und Kriegerbunde Nord-Amerikas,' the Central Society of German Veterans and Soldier Societies of North America. The principles and aims of that society are similar to that of the parent society. . . .

Without doubting for a moment the often-asserted loyalty to the United States expressed by the members of the German Soldiers' Societies in the United States, and without dwelling on the reasons why they have been officially distinguished by the German Government by sending them flags, decorations, gracious letters, &c., it must be frankly stated that *the relations between official Germany and the emigrant subjects*

of the Emperor, whether they have become citizens of the Republic or not, may lead to serious complications between Germany and the United States, and to unforeseen incidents which at any moment may involve both Powers in serious difficulty. . . .

In handing over the first colours bestowed on behalf of the Emperor William II to the Military Society of Chicago, the German Ambassador, Dr. von Holleben, said : ' Greetings from the German Emperor ! That is the cry with which I come before you. His Majesty, my most gracious master, has ordered me to hand to you to-day the colour which has been desired by you so strongly and for so long. The colour is a token of his Majesty's graciousness and of the approval with which the German Emperor remembers in love and friendship those who have served in the German Army and Navy, and those who have fought and bled for the Fatherland. This colour is to be the symbol of German faithfulness, German manliness, and German military honour. His Majesty asks you to accept the colour as a token of that unity which should prevail among all German soldiers, to act also abroad in accordance with the sentiments of German loyalty and German sense of duty, and to take for your maxim the word of that great German, Bismarck : " We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world ! " Now let the colour flutter in the wind. In this moment of enthusiasm, let us all sound the cry that is now on the lips of every old German soldier : " His Majesty, German Emperor, William II. Hurrah ! Hurrah ! Hurrah ! "'

The wooing of the formerly despised German renegades in the United States by the German Empire and its official representatives in America, since the Spanish-American War, must seem all the stranger to the spectators, and especially to Anglo-Americans, as that policy is directly opposed to the policy which the German Government pursues in Germany towards men of non-German language. What would happen if the King of Denmark or the President of the French Republic should send to the former citizens of Denmark in Schleswig-Holstein, and of France in Alsace-Lorraine, through their official representatives, colours with inciting inscriptions, or if Danes or Frenchmen dwelling

in Germany, and remembering regretfully the old *régime*, should send across the German frontier telegrams assuring their former rulers of their undying faithfulness and loyalty? What would happen if the Poles living in Berlin should march in procession through the streets carrying national banners and the portraits of their national heroes, singing Polish national songs? In America dwell also Danes, Frenchmen, and Poles, who are good citizens of the Republic, who thirst for vengeance against the German Empire, and who do not fail at every opportunity to point out how strangely Germany's policy in America contrasts with Germany's policy in Germany.

One cannot be surprised if the Government at Washington is becoming somewhat nervous and believes that possibly there is a German league which, in the event of a war between Germany and the United States, would aim at creating an independent federation of the largely German States of the Middle West of America, involving the United States in a civil war. Herr von Holleben has pointed out that possibility by telling a lady interviewer, Mrs. Grace A. Downing, laying stress upon his words, that a war between the United States and Germany would bear the character of a *civil war*.

CHAPTER X

THE INFLUENCE OF MACHIAVELLI UPON GERMAN STATECRAFT [1]

THINKERS and writers are fond of tracing great events to their ultimate source. Some have told us that William II began the present war in the desire to emulate Louis XIV or Napoleon I, and have drawn laborious parallels between the character of these French rulers and the German Emperor. Some have blamed for the war men like Clausewitz, Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardi, and the German professors in general, whose aggressive teachings have undoubtedly greatly inflamed public opinion. The policy of nations and of powerful rulers is influenced partly by precedents, partly by certain doctrines. The precedents were furnished to the German Government and people not by the great rulers of France, but by the most successful Prussian sovereigns, by Frederick William, the Great Elector, and by Frederick the Great. The German philosophers of war have merely provided a scientific cloak for these men, and have extolled their ambition, brutality, faithlessness, and treachery as virtues, and have embodied them in a system. The German professors and writers have been commentators, not originators. If we wish to discover the doctrinal source of German unscrupulousness, ruthlessness, and barbarity, we must go back four centuries to the time of Machiavelli, for the great Florentine is undoubtedly

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, June 1917.

the father of Prusso-German statecraft. Machiavelli's works have been widely read by German rulers and statesmen, and by the German people. They have been commented upon by Bollmann, Buble, Ebeling, Ellinger, Fehr, Fester, Feuerlein, Fichte, Frederick the Great, Gaspary, Gervinus, Hinrichs, Kemmerich, Knies, Leo, Macun, von Mohl, Mundt, Plato, Ranke, Rathmann, Reumont, Treitschke, Thudichum, Twesten, Vorländer, Weizel, Wolff, Zimmermann, and many others, and most of the authors mentioned have praised Machiavelli's doctrines. Ranke, and especially Treitschke, the most influential German historians, were warm admirers of the author of 'The Prince,' while Frederick the Great proved himself an apt disciple of Machiavelli by publishing his celebrated 'Anti-Machiavel' a few weeks before attacking unsuspecting Austria and robbing her of Silesia. The activity of Prusso-Germany's rulers from the time of the Great Elector to the present day in internal and external affairs follows Machiavelli's teachings in every particular, and the resemblance is too great to be merely accidental.

To Machiavelli conquest seemed the natural occupation of the sovereign. He judged rulers by their success or by their failure. He wrote in the third chapter of 'The Prince':

Nothing is so natural or so common as the thirst for conquest, and when men can satisfy it, they deserve rather praise than censure. But when they are not equal to the enterprise they undertake, disgrace is the inevitable consequence.

In chapter xxiv. of the same book we read:

A prince who performs his duties well need never fear the want of defenders. His recent elevation, far from esteeming him in a less degree, will on the contrary double his glory because of the obstacles which he has had to conquer and which his merit alone enabled him to overcome. He will acquire the renown not only of having founded a new principality, but of having established wise laws, a good army, firm alliances, and glorious examples; whereas he who was born a prince, and loses his dominion by imprudent conduct, deserves eternal infamy.

The sentences quoted apply in every word to the Hohenzollerns. If we did not know the author, we might attribute them to Treitschke. The material factor, success, is everything. Morality is nothing.

According to Machiavelli, the principal object of a ruler consists in acquiring glory, in increasing his territories. As failure in achieving this object is infamy, foreign and domestic policy should be subordinated to successful aggression. A ruler cannot hope to conquer his neighbour States unless he can make the fullest use of his subjects, unless his subjects are his tools and obey blindly. They should therefore be subjected to the ruler's will partly by laws, partly by terror. In chapter iv., book i., of his 'Discourses on Livy,' Machiavelli writes:—

I have observed that men never behave well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free to act as they please and are under no restraint, everything falls at once into confusion and disorder.

In chapter xvii. of 'The Prince,' which is superscribed 'Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether it is Better to be Loved or to be Feared,' we read:

It may be truly affirmed of mankind in general that they are ungrateful, fickle, timid, dissembling, and self-interested. So long as you can serve them, they are entirely devoted to you. Their wealth, their blood, their lives, and even their offspring are at your disposal when you have no occasion for them. But in the day of need they turn their back upon you. . . .

Men are generally more inclined to submit to him who makes himself dreaded than to him who merely strives to

be loved. The reason is obvious, for friendship, being a mere moral tie, a kind of duty resulting from a benefit, cannot endure against the claims of calculating interest. On the other hand, fear carries with it a dread of punishment which never loses its influence. A prince, however, ought to make himself feared in such a manner that if he cannot gain the love he may at least avoid the hatred of his subjects.

The policy of the Hohenzollerns towards their subjects has always been one of deliberate terrorism. They wish to be feared by them without being hated at the same time.

Citizens may be held in bonds of fear not merely by the threat of barbarously severe punishment, but also by religious influences. Machiavelli saw in religion chiefly an instrument whereby a ruler could hold the ruled in awe, and strengthen the discipline of his army. In book i., chapters xi. and xii., of his ' Discourses on Livy ' he wrote:

It will be plain to anyone who carefully studies Roman history, how much religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the people, in keeping good men good, and putting bad men to shame. . . . Princes and Commonwealths that would save themselves from growing corrupted should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and ceremonies of religion, and always hold them in reverence; for we can have no surer sign of the decay of a State than to see divine worship held in contempt.

Machiavelli considered religion as a tool which might prove useful for political and military purposes. He saw in it an instrument of discipline, not an inspiration. He frankly despised Christianity, believing that it tended to make men merciful, tender, unwarlike, and effeminate. He stated in book ii., chapter ii., of the ' Discourses on Livy ' :

The present generation of men is less vigorous and daring than were the men of ancient times, owing to the difference of the training of the present day from that of earlier ages.

This difference arises from the different character of the religions then and now prevailing. Our religion teaches us to set little store by worldly glory, whereas non-Christians greatly esteem glory, consider it the highest good, and display the greatest fierceness in action. . . . When the old religions prevailed none could obtain divine honours except those who had received worldly glory, successful leaders of armies and rulers of States; while the Christian religion glorifies men who are of a humble and contemplative mind, but who do not lead a vigorous life. While the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity, vigour, and all those qualities which make men brave, that of Christianity exalts humility, lowliness, and contempt for the things of this world, and if it enjoins us to be brave it calls rather for courage in suffering rather than for courage in action. Therefore the Christian idea seems to have enfeebled the world.

In accordance with Machiavelli's teaching of the usefulness of religion and of the weakening influence of Christian morality, we find that religious ceremonies are strictly enforced in Germany, that religion has been turned into a powerful instrument for disciplining the nation, that the King of Prussia is the *summus episcopus*, that the clergy are obedient State officials. At the same time we find throughout Germany a truly Machiavellian contempt of Christianity because of its weakness and sentimentality. The gentle Christ has become in Germany a fierce god of war—' Our German God '—and the German God is gradually assuming the bloodthirsty character of Odin and of Thor. Intellectual Germans speak with contempt of the Christian idea, and many Germans who consider Christianity played out desire to create a new religion, a German religion in which once more Odin and Thor will rule. Germany actually contains powerful ethical-religious societies for the cult of the old heathen gods.

Machiavelli recommends that sovereigns should endeavour to control the people not only by the fear of

punishment and by the influence of religion, but that they should endeavour at the same time to gain their affection. In chapter ix. of ' The Prince ' we read :

The only resource upon which a prince can rely in adversity is the affection of his people. . . . Let no one quote against me the old proverb, ' He who relies on the people builds on sand.' It may be true that in the case of a single citizen who is opposed by powerful enemies or oppressed by the magistrates, the people are not to be relied upon. But a prince who is a man of courage and is able to command, who knows how to preserve order in his State, need never regret having founded his security on the affection of the people. . . . A wise prince should at all times conduct himself in such a manner that at all times and under all circumstances his subjects may feel the want of his directing hand. Then he may rely on their unshaken fidelity.

In chapter xx. Machiavelli states : ' There is no better fortress for a prince than the affection of the people.'

The writer of ' The Prince ' considers that a ruler should be able to gain the affection of the citizens by simulating all the popular virtues. In chapter xviii. it is stated :

It is not necessary for a prince to *possess* all the good qualities which I have enumerated, but it is indispensable that he should *appear* to have them. I will even venture to affirm that it is sometimes dangerous to possess these virtues. Nevertheless it is always useful to seem to possess them. A prince should earnestly endeavour to gain the reputation of kindness, clemency, piety, justice, and fidelity to his engagements. He ought to possess all these good qualities, but still retain such control over himself as to display their opposites whenever it may be expedient. . . . In a word, it will be useful to him to persevere in the path of rectitude as long as he feels no inconvenience in doing so, as long as he knows how to deviate from the straight path when circumstances make this necessary. He should make it a rule never to utter anything which does not breathe kindness, justice, good faith, and piety ; this last quality it is

most important for him to appear to possess, as men in general judge more from appearances than from reality. All men have eyes, but few have the gift of penetration. Everyone sees your exterior, but few can discern what you have in your heart ; and those few dare not oppose the voice of the multitude, who have the majesty of their prince on their side. Now, in forming a judgment of the minds of men, and more especially of princes, as we cannot recur to any tribunal, we must attend only to results. Let it then be the prince's chief care to maintain his authority ; the means he employs, be what they may, will, for this purpose, always appear honourable and meet applause ; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances, and judge only by the event. And as the world is chiefly composed of such as are called the vulgar, the voice of the few is seldom or never heard or regarded.

In Machiavelli's opinion, rulers ought to make themselves popular by combining strictness bordering upon cruelty with equal justice to all. Moreover, the absence of favourites would strengthen the authority of the prince, who could treat high and low equally as his subjects, as his slaves. In the ' History of Florence ' we read :

That State alone can duly claim the reverence and love of its subjects which equally bestows its favours upon them all, and not that which smiles only upon some few favourites and frowns upon all the rest.

Machiavelli shrewdly recognised the necessity of respecting the property of the citizens. He considered the security of property far more important than security of life. Hence he wrote in ' The Prince ' :

If a prince finds it absolutely necessary to inflict the punishment of death, he should avow the reasons for it, and, above all things, he should abstain from touching the property of the condemned party. It is certain that men sooner forget the death of their relations than the loss of their property.

Nowhere in the world is the security of property greater than it is in Germany, and nowhere in the world is discipline more severe, espionage more widespread, and punishment more cruel.

Machiavelli recommended that rulers should make themselves popular by distributing all favours in person and by leaving the inflicting of punishments to paid magistrates. In chapter xix. of 'The Prince' he taught:

Princes should reserve to themselves the distribution of favours and of employment, and leave to the magistrates the care of inflicting punishments, and, indeed, the general disposal of all things which are likely to arouse discontent.

The foregoing advice is carefully followed in Germany. The King-Emperor makes all appointments in the Civil Service and the Army, bestows honours, &c. For centuries the principal occupation of the Hohenzollern rulers has consisted in personally signing the documents by which officers and officials are appointed or promoted, which, owing to the signature which they bear, are highly treasured by their recipients. Many hours are spent by the German Emperor every day in signing such documents.

Machiavelli further recommended that rulers should make themselves popular by patronising the sciences and arts, commerce and industry. In chapter xxi. of 'The Prince,' which is entitled 'By what means a Prince may become Esteemed,' he wrote:

Princes ought to honour talent and protect the arts, particularly commerce and agriculture. It is peculiarly important that those who follow such pursuits should be secure from all dread of being overcharged with taxes and despoiled of their lands after they have improved them by careful cultivation. Finally, princes should not neglect to entertain the people at certain periods of the year with festivals and shows, and they should honour with their presence the different trading companies and corporations.

On such occasions they should display the greatest affability and facility of access, but they should always remember that they must support their station with becoming dignity. That point must never be lost sight of under any circumstances.

In no country in the world are there to be found more imposing public spectacles, such as military reviews, ceremonial processions, &c., than in Germany. In his personal attempts to make himself popular William II and his predecessors have followed Machiavelli's advice in every particular.

In Machiavelli's opinion, the principal object of every ruler should be to increase his dominions and his wealth by plundering his neighbours. The domestic policy should be directed exclusively with that end in view, so that the sovereign's ambitions should receive the fullest support from the nation. The great Florentine statesman understood that the first condition for success was that a ruler desirous of conquests and glory should be backed by a terrorised, disciplined, and admiring nation. As the army is the instrument with which glory can be obtained and conquests achieved, Machiavelli considered military affairs of the very highest value, and devoted to them a great deal of attention, and he had come to the conclusion that a national army, such as that created by Germany, was bound to be far superior to the armies of hired mercenaries, who were largely foreigners, which prevailed in his time. In chapter xii. of 'The Prince' he stated:

Princes who wish their power to be durable should establish it on a solid foundation. Now the principal foundations of all States, both ancient and modern, are good laws and a proper military force to support them. However, as good laws can never be effective without good troops, and as these two factors of political power cannot be separated, it will be sufficient if I confine my view for the present to one of them.

Troops which serve for the defence of the State are either

national or foreign or mixed. Those of the second class, whether they serve as auxiliaries or as mercenaries, are useless and dangerous, and the prince who relies on such soldiers will never be secure, because they are always ambitious, disunited, unreliable, and undisciplined.

In chapter xx. of the same book Machiavelli wrote: 'It has always been a maxim with those who raise themselves to power to arm their own subjects.'

Machiavelli recommended the formation of national armies in numerous passages in all his works, and he held up as examples the valiant Swiss and the citizens of the German town democracies. At the same time, he recognised that the formation of powerful national armies was inconvenient inasmuch as a ruler might fall under the influence of the army and become its tool. Still such an eventuality seemed to him a comparatively minor disadvantage, because by means of the armed force the ruler and the State could pursue the principal object, the conquest of neighbour States. Machiavelli wrote in chapter xix. of 'The Prince':

A prince is often compelled to do wrong in order to maintain his power. When the strongest party in the land is corrupt, whether it be the people, the nobility, or the army, he must comply with their disposition, and content them, or it will prove his ruin.

It is an open question whether William II brought about the present war or whether it was forced upon him by the army. Possibly the Prussian army was as much responsible for the war of 1914 as for that of 1806.

Every Hohenzollern prince wears the uniform, enters the army as a child, and is taught to consider military matters his principal study and occupation, in accordance with Machiavelli's teaching. We read in chapter xiv. of 'The Prince':

Princes ought to make the art of war their sole study and occupation, for this is the peculiar science of those who

govern. War and everything relating to it should be their only study, and the only profession they should follow. War should be the object always in their view. By war princes can maintain possession of their dominions, and individuals of no position are sometimes raised thereby to supreme authority. On the other hand, we frequently see princes shamefully reduced to insignificance by slothful inactivity. By the neglect of the art of war States are lost, and by its cultivation they are acquired. . . .

A prince who is ignorant of the art of war can never enjoy repose or safety among his armed subjects. He will always be to them an object of contempt, while they will be to him a cause of suspicion. Consequently ruler and ruled cannot act in concert. A prince who does not understand the art of war can never be esteemed by his troops, nor can he confide in them. It is necessary therefore that princes should devote all their attention to the art of war, and to begin with they should take the utmost care that the troops are well disciplined and well exercised. . . .

As part of the military science can be learned by attentive study, a prince ought to read history and to pay particular attention to the achievements of great generals. He should investigate the causes of their victories and of their defeats. Above all, he should follow the example of great men. Alexander the Great immortalised himself by following the example of Achilles, and Cæsar by imitating Alexander.

Since the earliest times up to the present day the Hohenzollern rulers have been the Commanders-in-Chief of their army and have led them in the field, whereas other sovereigns have as a rule left the supreme command to their generals. In this, again, the Hohenzollern rulers have acted in accordance with Machiavelli's recommendations, for he wrote in chapter xxx. of the First Book of the 'Discourses on Livy':

A prince should go himself on his wars, as the Roman Emperors did at first, and as the Turks do now, and as all

valiant princes have done and do. For when it is the prince himself who conquers, the glory and the gain are all his own, but when he is absent the glory is somebody else's.

Machiavelli, like Bernhardi, considered war as good in itself, as a national tonic. He wrote in chapter xx. of 'The Prince':

It is advantageous for a prince to have enemies. They will prevent him from indulging in dangerous repose. Besides, war with them will enable him to win the esteem and admiration both of his loyal and of his rebellious subjects.

If we read Frederick the Great's history of his own time, which was written for the guidance of his successors, his political testaments and essays, which were penned with the same purpose in view, and his memoir regarding the education of his nephew and of the Prussian princes in general, we shall find embodied in them the identical views regarding the army which were put forward by the Florentine statesman. In many instances they seem to be almost copied word by word from Machiavelli's writings.

A military prince at the head of a great national army, and supported by an implicitly obedient nation, should, in Machiavelli's opinion, obtain power and glory by absolutely unscrupulous means. Morality and fairness are ideas which never entered Machiavelli's calculations. He viewed political matters from a purely non-moral standpoint. Every means that was effective was good. Every measure that was ineffective was reprehensible. He created a strictly non-moral system of statecraft, the very system of political realism (*Real-politik*) which is constantly exalted by the Germans. As to him, advantage was the sole criterion whether political action was good or bad—treaties were to Machiavelli mere scraps of paper. In chapter xviii. of 'The Prince,' which is entitled, 'Whether

Princes ought to be faithful to their engagements,' we read:

It is unquestionably very praiseworthy in princes to be faithful to their engagements. However, those of the present day who have been distinguished for great exploits have as a rule not been remarkable for the virtue of fidelity to treaty. They have not hesitated to deceive others who relied on their good faith.

There are two ways of deciding contests. They may be decided either by law or by force. Law is used by men, and force by beasts. Still, when the laws are not sufficiently strong it is necessary to recur to force. A prince ought, therefore, to know how to use either of these two weapons. . . .

A prince may learn dexterity from the fox and the uses of strength from the lion. Those who entirely rely upon the lion's strength will not always meet with success. A prudent prince cannot and ought not to keep his word except when he can do so without harm to himself or when the circumstances under which his engagement was concluded have remained unaltered.

I should hesitate to put forth this teaching if all men were good, but as most men are bad and are ready to break their word, a prince should not be more scrupulous than other men, especially as he can always easily justify a breach of faith. I could give numerous proofs of this and show that engagements and treaties have been violated by the treachery of princes, and that those rulers who played the part of the fox have always succeeded best. At the same time, it is necessary to disguise the appearance of craft. Princes should thoroughly understand the art of feigning and dissembling, for men are as a rule so simple and so weak that dupes can easily be found by those who wish to deceive.

The foregoing arguments of Machiavelli seem to have inspired the reasonings of Frederick the Great, who broke his treaties whenever he found it convenient, and who

defended his unscrupulousness as follows in the preface of his ' Histoire de Mon Temps ' :

Posterity will perhaps see with surprise in these Memoirs accounts of treaties which have been concluded and broken. Although examples of broken treaties are common, the author of these Memoirs would require better reasons than precedent for explaining his conduct in breaking treaties. A sovereign must be guided by the interest of the State. . . . Rulers are slaves of their means. To promote the interest of their State is a law to them, a law which is inviolable. If a ruler must be ready to sacrifice his life for the welfare of his subjects, he must be still more ready to sacrifice, for the benefit of his subjects, solemn engagements which he has undertaken if their observance would be harmful to his people. Cases of broken treaties may be encountered everywhere. It is not our intention to justify all breaches of treaty. Nevertheless, I venture to assert that there are cases when necessity or wisdom, prudence or consideration of the welfare of the people, oblige sovereigns to transgress, because the violation of a treaty is often the only means whereby complete ruin can be avoided.

To me it seems clear and obvious that a private person must scrupulously observe the given word, even if he should have bound himself without sufficient thought. If a private person breaks his contract the damaged person can have recourse to the protection of the law, and, however the decision may go, only an individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a sovereign appeal if another sovereign breaks his treaty? The word of a private person involves in misfortune only a single human being, while that of sovereigns can create calamities for entire nations. The question may therefore be summed up thus: Is it better that a nation should perish, or that a sovereign should break his treaty? Who can be stupid enough to hesitate in answering this question?

In a similar manner Bismarck argued in chapter xxix. of his posthumous Memoirs that treaties need be observed only if observation is advantageous.

In the words of the German Chancellor, ' Necessity knows no law.' Necessity compelled, according to him, the German armies to violate Belgium's neutrality. Necessity, according to the German historians, forced Frederick the Great to invade Silesia and to bring about the partition of Poland. Necessity forced Germany to attack in turn Denmark, Austria, France, and the Powers at present at war with her. The doctrine of the non-moral State, which can embark upon any crime, however hideous, because it is advantageous, because it can be explained as being ' necessary,' was not created by Bismarck and by Frederick the Great, but by Machiavelli. In book iii., chapter xli., of his ' Discourses on Livy, ' he wrote :

When the entire safety of our country is at stake, no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful must intervene. On the contrary, every other consideration must be set aside, and that course alone must be followed which preserves the existence of the country and maintains its liberty.

In book v. of his ' History of Florence, ' we read :

No reasonable man will ever reproach another with defending his country by any means whatsoever.

German statecraft has learned from Machiavelli the principle that the end justifies the means, that success is the only desideratum and the only criterion, that glory and conquest, however achieved, are desirable and praiseworthy, that the State is a criminal association.

Conquered territories must be preserved and be embodied in the victorious State. Germany's principles of treating conquered territories may be found in Machiavelli's writings. We read in chapter v. of ' The Prince ' :

States which are newly conquered, and which have been accustomed to live in liberty under their own laws, may be preserved by three means: by ruining them, by inhabiting

them, by leaving them in the enjoyment of their laws, rendering them tributary and establishing there a small council to form a government. This new government, being created by the prince, is dependent on his favour and power, and will therefore endeavour to support him.

Machiavelli favoured particularly the latter way of incorporating conquered territories. In chapter iii. of 'The Prince' he stated:

In order to preserve a newly acquired State, particular attention should be paid to two points. In the first place, care must be taken to extinguish entirely the family of the ancient sovereign, and in the second place the laws should not be altered nor the taxes be increased. If these precautions be observed the new State will become consolidated with the other dominions of the prince within a short time.

The policy of calculated kindness outlined by Machiavelli was pursued by Prussia after the conquest of Silesia, Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, and Frankfurt-on-the-Main, with the greatest success. The conquered citizens have become most loyal Prussians in accordance with Machiavelli's prediction. While Machiavelli recommended leniency and consideration in the case of conquered territories which would easily yield themselves, he urged the use of the utmost cruelty in the case of territories where the population possessed strength of character and showed some signs of independence. In chapters iii. and viii. of 'The Prince' Machiavelli stated:

We must never lose sight of the maxim: 'Either make a man your friend or put it out of his power to be your enemy.' He may revenge a slight injury, but a great one deprives him of the power to avenge himself. Hence the injury should be of such magnitude that the prince shall have nothing to dread from vengeance. . . .

I conclude that a usurper of a State should commit at once all the cruelties which his safety renders necessary.

Then he may never have cause to repeat them. By not renewing his cruelties he will acquire the loyalty of his new subjects, and by favours given to them he will win their attachment. If, from bad counsel or timidity, he takes another course, he must ever have a dagger in his hand, for he can never rely on subjects whose confidence he has destroyed by repeated attacks. Matters of severity, therefore, should be finished at one blow, for when time is allowed for forgetting resentment the wound is not so deep. Benefits should then be given with circumspection and moderation, and not too often. Then they will be most appreciated.

The world has stood amazed at the nameless barbarities perpetrated by the German troops in all theatres of war, and their systematic plundering. Again German statecraft has acted in accordance with Machiavelli's teachings. In chapters xvi. and xvii. of 'The Prince' we read:

When a prince is at the head of his army and has under his command a multitude of soldiers, he should make little account of being esteemed cruel. Such a character will be useful to him by keeping his troops in obedience and preventing every species of trouble. . . .

A prince ought to be very sparing of his own and his subjects' property. However, he should be equally lavish of that which he takes from the enemy if he desires to be popular with his troops, for that will not diminish his reputation, but rather add to it.

The sum and substance of Machiavelli's foreign policy will be found in a passage of 'The Prince,' and in another one of the 'History of Florence.' In the sixth book of the latter he wrote:

It always has been, and indeed ought to be, the main end and design of those that wage war to enrich themselves and impoverish their enemies. Nor is there any other reasonable motive to contend for victory and conquest but the aggrandisement of one's own nation and the depression of the other.

In chapter iii. of 'The Prince' Machiavelli briefly states:

The prince who contributes to the advancement of another Power ruins his own.

Machiavelli teaches that rulers should not only increase their own territories by every means in their power, but should ruin other States wherever possible. Guided by this maxim, the Hohenzollerns have not only endeavoured to increase their lands, but also to create trouble in all other States. It is notorious that the present Emperor has not only pushed Russia into the war with Japan, and brought about the South African War, but has endeavoured to involve France and England in war, and has made mischief among nations wherever possible.

Machiavelli saw the ideal State in Turkey, which at his time was at the height of its power. He admired both the civil organisation and the army of the Turks, and their cruelty and violence. He wrote in chapter iv. of 'The Prince':

In a country governed by a prince and by the ministers which he has appointed the sovereign enjoys by far the greatest authority. . . . The whole Turkish monarchy is governed by a master to whom all the others are slaves. He has divided his kingdom into different provinces, and these are ruled by governors whom he changes and recalls at pleasure.

Prusso-Germany, with its Ministers who are responsible only to the Sovereign, its sham parliament, and its military organisation, is organised on the model of Turkey, and the people have been animated with a truly Mohammedan conqueror's spirit. Allah and the 'German God' are identical. The difference between ancient Turkey and modern Germany consists in this, that the absolutism of the Hohenzollerns is carefully disguised by parliamentary trappings.

Machiavelli lived at a period of the greatest lawlessness. In every part of Europe violence was in the ascendant. A reign of terrorism and treason seemed to have opened. Crowned criminals of the darkest dye triumphed everywhere. Thirteen years before Machiavelli's birth Mohammed II had conquered Constantinople and destroyed the Byzantine Empire. Serbia, Greece, Egypt, and Hungary were invaded by the irresistible Turks. The Turkish rulers acted with terrible cruelty against all. Sultan Selim I, the Ferocious, who reigned at the time when 'The Prince' was written, dethroned and killed his father, Bayezid, and all his brothers. The atrocities and the successes of the great Turkish rulers, of Louis XI of France, and of Richard III of England, were on all men's lips in Machiavelli's time. Pope Alexander VI (Borgia) and Pope Julius II, perhaps the greatest criminals who have ruled at Rome, were Machiavelli's contemporaries. Spain was ruled by the terrible King Ferdinand, during whose government the Inquisition was introduced, and the Moors and Jews expelled. In Italy the most notorious figure among princes was Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander VI, and the brother of Lucretia Borgia, the great poisoner. By audacity and treason, by poison and dagger, he had acquired glory and power. Seeing everywhere vice triumph over virtue, might over right, and treason over honesty, the melancholy Florentine believed in the triumph and in the necessity of wrong. Hence he held up as ideals for the rulers of States King Ferdinand of Spain and Cesare Borgia, whose name has become a byword. He wrote of King Ferdinand in chapter xxi. of 'The Prince':

Nothing is more likely to make a prince famed than great enterprises and extraordinary actions. Ferdinand, the present King of Spain, may be considered as a new prince, for he has advanced himself from a petty ruler to be the most renowned monarch in Christendom. . . .

Scarcely was this prince seated on the throne when he

attacked the kingdom of Grenada. This war laid the foundation of his greatness. Afterwards, desirous to undertake enterprises still more brilliant, he assumed the mask of religion and cruelly drove the Moors out of his dominions. The means he chose were undoubtedly barbarous. Yet his exploit was extraordinary and almost unexampled. Under the same cloak of religion Ferdinand afterwards attacked Africa, Italy, and France. He had always some great designs which kept his subjects in continual suspense and admiration.

Machiavelli knew Cesare Borgia well, for he had been sent to him on an embassy, and had had numerous opportunities of studying his actions. He admired greatly that criminal. One of the longest chapters in 'The Prince,' chapter vii., is devoted to a glowing eulogy of that monster who, determined upon success, readily made use of every crime without hesitation and without regret. Machiavelli wrote:

The Duke Borgia determined neither to depend on fortune nor on the arms of another prince. He began by weakening the party of the Orsini and the Colonna at Rome, by corrupting all the persons of distinction who adhered to them, either by bribes, or by appointments, or by commands, suited to their respective inclinations, so that in a few months a complete revolution was effected in their attachment, and all came over to the Duke.

Having thus humbled the Colonna, he waited for an opportunity to destroy the Orsini. The Orsini, fearing that the Duke would ruin them, called a council of their friends to concert measures of protection. In consequence of their deliberations Urbino revolted, and troubles arose in the Romagna. Borgia's position being threatened, he resolved to rely on artifice and dissimulation. . . . He reconciled himself with the Orsini through the intervention of Signor Paolo, whom he had gained over by rich presents. Paolo was deceived by Borgia, and the credulity of the Orsini was such that they attended the Duke at an interview at Sinigaglia. There he had all of them put to death. Having

thus exterminated the chiefs and converted their partisans into friends, Cesare Borgia laid the solid foundations of his power. . . .

After the Duke had possessed himself of the Romagna he appointed Ramiro d'Orco as governor, a cruel but active man, to whom he gave the greatest latitude of power. The severities of Ramiro had made the Duke hated. He resolved, therefore, to clear himself from all reproach, and to gain the affection of the people by putting the blame on the governor whom he had appointed. He caused Ramiro to be massacred in the market-place and his body to be exposed upon a gibbet. . . .

Upon a thorough review of Cesare Borgia's conduct and actions, I cannot reproach him with having omitted any precaution, and I feel that he merits serving as a model to all who by fortune of foreign arms succeed in acquiring sovereignty. For as he had a great spirit, and vast designs, he could not have acted otherwise in his circumstances, and if he miscarried in them, it was solely owing to the sudden death of his father and the illness with which he was himself attacked. Whoever, therefore, would secure himself in a new principality against the attempts of enemies, and finds it necessary to gain friends, to surmount obstacles by force or cunning, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, respected and obeyed by the soldiery; to destroy all those who can or may oppose his designs; to promulgate new laws in substitution for old ones; to be severe, indulgent, magnanimous, and liberal; to disband an army on which he cannot rely, and raise another in its stead; to preserve the friendship of kings and princes, so that they may be ever prompt to oblige or fearful to offend; such a one, I say, cannot have a better or more recent model for his imitation than is afforded by the conduct of Cesare Borgia.

Those who are astonished at the policy pursued by the Hohenzollerns, and at the barbarity and treason which have marked Germany's diplomacy and warfare of recent times, should remember that Machiavelli has been the teacher of the rulers and statesmen of Prusso-Germany, that the

learned German advocates of violence and of every form of treachery, from the notorious von Bielfeld to Treitschke and Bernhardi, have been Machiavelli's pupils and admirers. They should remember that Machiavelli's doctrines were inspired by the actions of the most cruel and most faithless tyrants known to history, that the terrible Cesare Borgia was to him the ideal prince, and that he was held up as model to ambitious rulers. William II should therefore not be compared to Louis XIV and to Napoleon I, but to his true master, Cesare Borgia.

CHAPTER XI

THE INFLUENCE OF LUTHER UPON GERMAN NATIONAL CHARACTER

THE Great War has drawn the attention of the whole world to two qualities in the German national character—to the callous brutality of the ruling classes and to the abject submissiveness and docility of the masses.

It is usually assumed that the absolutism of the rulers of Germany and the blind obedience of the people are due to the iron discipline which has been established by the Hohenzollerns, that the German character has been formed by Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick William I, the Prussian drill sergeant, King Frederick the Great, and Prince Bismarck, who have created the Prusso-German tradition of government. The four creators of Prusso-Germany have undoubtedly done a great deal in shaping the national character. However, their action was so powerfully influenced by the character, the actions, and the political teachings of Luther that one must consider the great reformer as one of the principal creators of Prusso-Germany. Heinrich von Treitschke, in his book 'Politics,' placed Luther side by side with Frederick the Great and Bismarck, and very significantly and quite justly he asserted that Luther and Machiavelli had worked hand in hand in creating the modern State of the Prusso-German type. Martin Luther is chiefly known to the English-speaking peoples as a religious reformer. In the following pages

an attempt will be made to show the influence which he has had upon German political organisation, upon German policy, and upon the German national character.

Luther was the son of a poor miner who in course of time acquired a competence. His ancestors were poor peasants and working men. He was a son of the people. Hence he is frequently described as the first German democrat, and the Lutheran revolution has often been called a revolt of German democracy against the absolutism and the tyranny of Rome.

In the beginning of his career Luther was indeed the advocate and the champion of the poor, of the workers, and especially of the peasants. The German working masses in the towns, and especially the peasants in the country, had in the course of time been converted from free men into serfs. Their oppression and exploitation by the rich and the powerful became greater from year to year. At the time of Luther's advent all Germany was not only in a religious ferment, but in a political and social ferment as well. The risings of the persecuted and oppressed peasants were becoming more and more frequent, and peasant revolts broke out in all parts of Germany, particularly in the south and west, which culminated in the terrible Peasants' War of 1525. At the beginning of his career Luther was not merely a religious reformer, but was a revolutionist who, in the interest of the suffering masses, opposed clerical and secular oppression with the utmost energy. The tyranny of the princes and of the nobility over the poor, and their limitless exactions and cruelties, filled him with rage against Germany's rulers. In a widely circulated pamphlet, entitled ' On Secular Authority, and how far it should be obeyed,' which was published in 1523, Luther treated the German princes with the utmost contempt. He wrote:

One should know that from the beginning of the world a clever prince has been a *rara avis*, and that a pious one has been still rarer. Princes are usually either the greatest fools or the greatest scoundrels in the world. Hence little good may be expected of them, particularly in religious matters. . . . Name a prince who is clever, pious, and godly, and what a marvel of God's kindness he appears to the people of the land! . . . It has come to such a pass that there are few princes who are not considered fools or knaves. . . . We may not, we will not, we cannot any longer tolerate their tyranny and wickedness. . . . It is no longer to be borne, as formerly, when they drove the people about like wild beasts. Princes! cease your wickedness; consider what is right, and allow God's Word to have its way, for it will have it despite yourselves.

A prince should not say to himself ' the land and its people are mine, therefore will I do what I wish with them.' He should say ' I will do what is right and useful.' When a prince is a fool or a knave the whole country suffers. . . . If these princes had a city or a castle taken away from them by the Emperor, how quickly they would rise in revolt! Yet they consider it perfectly proper to oppress the poor and to put down rebellion, and then they say that it is by the command of the Emperor. Formerly such men were called rogues. Now they are called God-fearing princes.

Luther's activity with word and pen was prodigious. His influence upon the mind of the German masses was most far-reaching. His teachings influenced them. However, it would be incorrect to assume that the great peasant revolt was caused by Luther's incitements. Still, it may be stated without fear of successful contradiction that by his preaching and teaching Luther excited and inflamed the downtrodden and ill-used masses and contributed vastly to the great outbreak which in the main was due to a sense of unbearable wrong.

When, in 1525, the peasant revolts assumed the character of a war, the peasants embodied their demands in a number of articles which became their charter. In connection with the ' Twelve Articles ' of the revolted peasantry of

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Swabia, Luther published in 1525 a small book entitled 'Admonition to Peace.' At the opening of his pamphlet Luther stated, addressing the German princes and lords:

In the first place, the turmoil and revolt is due to no one on earth as much as to you princes and lords, and to you blind bishops and mad clerics and monks. You in your obduracy do not cease raging and foaming against the holy gospel, although you know that it is right and that you cannot contradict it. Besides in your secular government you do nothing but skin and sweat the people, so that you may live in luxury and pride, until the poor can bear it no longer. The sword is at your throats, yet you believe that you are seated firmly in the saddle, that no one can lift you out of it. Your conceit and your hard-hearted audacity will break your necks. That you will see. I have prophesied this to you many times in the past. Beware of the words in Psalm 104: 'Effundit contemptum super principes, 'He pours contempt over the princes.' You carry on and on, and you want to be knocked on the head, and no warnings and admonitions will help you.

Now as you are the cause of the wrath of God, His judgment will fall on you without doubt unless you better your ways in time. The signs in the sky and the miracles on earth are meant for you, dear gentlemen. They foretell evil, and evil will happen to you. A great deal of the anger of the Lord is already visible. The Lord has sent false prophets among us, so that we may amply deserve hell and eternal damnation by our errors and our blasphemies. And, on the other hand, the peasants are gathering in bands and are rising, and as God does not prevent it and does not heed our repentance Germany is being desolated, devastated, and destroyed by horrible murder and the shedding of blood.

Now, my dear gentlemen, you shall know that God wills it so. One cannot, one will not, one must not endure any longer your raging. You must alter and you must yield before the Word of God. If you do not do it willingly and cheerfully, force and ruin will compel you to give way. If the peasants do not succeed in this, other men will. And

if you defeat them all they will yet be undefeated, for God will arouse others in their place, for the Lord means to strike you down, and will strike you down. Not the peasants have raised their hands against you, but God Himself is your enemy, and He punishes you for your fury. . . .

No words could be stronger than those in which Luther held up the princes and the nobility of Germany to public execration and contempt. He seemed indeed to be the champion of the downtrodden masses. His attitude changed suddenly and completely. After having denounced the princes and the nobility for their tyranny, their oppression, and their extortion for years, he became abruptly the champion of princely tyranny, and urged the rulers of Germany to persecute and ill-treat in every way their unfortunate peasants, whose rising he had largely caused. In the same year, 1525, in which he had published his 'Admonition to Peace' he brought out a small pamphlet, entitled, 'Against the Thieving and Murderous Bands of Peasants,' which for violence and brutality is unmatched in Luther's writings. The little pamphlet is so characteristic and so important that I would render it in full in English. This seems particularly worth while, because, as far as I know, it has not previously been translated into English. Luther wrote:

In my previous booklet I could not condemn the peasants because they desired to instruct themselves. Besides, Christ Himself has told us in Matthew vii. that one should not judge. However, before I had time to look around the peasants continued, put forth their fists, forgot their duties, and robbed and raged like raving dogs. Now one can see what they had in their false hearts, that it was nothing but lies when they talked of their Twelve Articles in the name of the Gospel. In short, the peasants do nothing but the devil's work, and the greatest devil of them all is the one (Thomas Münzer) who reigns at Mülhausen. He does nothing but rob, murder, and spill blood, and Christ has said of him in St. John, chapter viii., that he was a murderer from the beginning.

As the peasants and other wretched people have allowed themselves to be seduced, and as their actions are different from their words, I must write in a different tone. I must in the first instance place their sins before their eyes, as God did in the case of Isaiah and Ezekiel, so that they may recognise the truth, and then I must instruct the temporal authorities how they should act in this matter.

The peasants are guilty of three horrible sins against God and man, for which they have deserved death of body and soul many a time. In the first place, they have sworn to be submissive and obedient to their superiors in accordance with the command of God, who says 'Render unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar's,' and in Romans xiii., 'Let every soul be subject to the higher powers,' &c. Because they have broken their obedience wilfully and criminally, and have set themselves against their masters, they have forfeited both body and soul, as is the case in faithless, oath-breaking, lying, and disobedient knaves and rascals. Hence St. Paul pronounced in Romans xiii. the following verdict against them: 'Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist receive to themselves damnation.' That will be the fate of the peasants. They will receive their punishment soon or late, for God wills that faith and duty should be kept.

As the peasants have revolted, and are criminally robbing and plundering monasteries and castles which do not belong to them, and as they act like common highway robbers and murderers, they deserve for this alone death in body and soul. Hence those act rightly and properly who, as soon as they can do it, throttle these men; for in case of public sedition everyone becomes at the same time judge and executioner. Exactly as in case of a fire he acts best who is first in quenching it, so in case of revolt it is not like common murder, but like a large fire which consumes and devastates the whole country. Sedition fills a country with murder and the shedding of blood. It makes widows and orphans and destroys everything like the greatest calamity. Therefore everyone who can must use weapons, throttle and stab both stealthily and openly, and must remember that nothing is

more poisonous, more noxious, and more devilish than a revolutionary. He must be treated like a mad dog and killed, for if you do not kill him he will kill you, and with you the whole country.

Besides, to cover their horrible and gruesome sin against the gospel these men call themselves Christian brethren, take the oath, and force people to support them in their crimes. They are the greatest of all blasphemers. They disgrace the holy name, and they honour and serve the devil under the cloak of the gospel. Hence they have deserved certainly ten times death both in body and soul. No more horrible sin has ever been known. I believe that the devil feels that the Judgment Day is approaching, and that therefore he has said to himself: 'This is the last, and therefore it shall be the worst. So I will stir up everything from the very bottom.' Thus one can see that the devil is a powerful prince who holds the world in his hands and mixes things up. He can catch, seduce, delude, and cause to rise many thousands of peasants, and in his rage can do with them whatever he wishes to do.

It will not help the peasants if they assert that, in accordance with Genesis i. and ii., all things had been created free, and should be held in common, and that we all are equal owing to our baptism. In the New Testament Moses is of no importance, for there stands our Master Jesus Christ, and He places us with our bodies and our worldly goods under the Emperor and under the law of the world, for He says: 'Render unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar's.' Similarly St. Paul says in Romans xii. to all baptised Christians: 'Let every soul be subject to the higher powers,' and St. Peter says: 'Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man.' It is our duty to live according to Christ's teachings, for the Father in Heaven has ordered it so and has said: 'This is My Beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye Him.' The gospel does not free body and worldly goods, but frees the soul. The gospel does not establish the community of goods except if such a community is established willingly, as did the Apostles and Disciples; see Acts iv. These did not demand the goods of Pilate and Herod, as our mad,

raging peasants would have it, but gave their own goods to the community. But our peasants wish that goods which are not theirs should be held in common, and wish to keep at the same time their own property. They are nice Christians. I believe there is no longer a single devil in hell, for all the devils have entered the bodies of the peasants. Their raging is exceedingly great and is beyond all measure.

As the peasants have offended both God and man, and as they have deserved death many times both in body and soul, as they will neither wait patiently nor act lawfully, but continue raging, I must instruct the temporal authorities how they should act in this matter and preserve a clear conscience. In the first place, I will not condemn the authorities which, according to right and justice, slay and punish the peasants, although this is opposed to the gospel. Right is on their side, the more so as the peasants fight no longer for the gospel, but have become faithless, perjured, disobedient, and seditious murderers, robbers, and blasphemers whom the authorities can punish with justice. In fact it is their duty to punish such rogues. For this object they carry the sword and are servants of God. See Romans xiii.

The Christian authorities who are guided by the gospel should act with the fear of God. In the first place, they should leave the settlement of this matter to God, and should acknowledge that we have deserved our troubles, that God has let loose the devil for the punishment of Germany. Then they should humbly pray for help against the devil, for we fight not only against human blood and flesh, but against the spiritual enemy in the air, who must be attacked with prayer. Now when the heart has been so directed towards God that His divine will shall have sway, one should turn against the mad peasants and offer to act towards them according to justice and equity, although they do not deserve it. If that offer should not serve, the sword should be taken up without delay.

A prince and a lord must remember that he is the representative of God and the servant of God's wrath, and that, according to Romans xiii., he should use the sword against such rascals. Besides, he who does not punish and he who

does not act according to his office sins as much against God as he who commits murder. He who can punish, but does not punish, murder and the shedding of blood is guilty of all the murders and all the wickedness which such rascals perpetrate. He wilfully neglects the divine commands and allows such men to practise their wickedness although he could prevent it, and although his duty calls him to do so. Therefore there must be no delay. There must be no patience and no mercy. This is a time which calls for wrath and the sword, but not for grace and clemency.

Their authorities must act with courage and must strike with a good conscience as long as a muscle can be moved. The advantage is that the peasants have a bad conscience and are in the wrong, and every peasant who is slain is lost in body and soul and is given over to the devil for ever. The authorities, on the other hand, have a good conscience. They have right on their side, and they can say to God in the candour of their heart: 'O Lord, Thou hast made me a prince or a lord. I cannot doubt it. And Thou hast commanded me (Romans xiii.) to wield the sword against the evil doers. This is Thy word. It does not lie. So I must fulfil my office or lose Thy grace. It is clear that the peasants have deserved death many times for Thee and for the world. If Thou wilt that I shall be killed by them, and if Thou wilt take away from me my office and let me perish, Thy will be done. Thus I shall die according to Thy word and divine command, and I shall be obedient to Thy command and to the duties of my office. Therefore I will punish and slay as long as I can move an arm and Thou wilt direct my actions.'

Thus it will happen that those who are slain on the side of the authorities will be true martyrs in the eyes of God, provided their conscience guides them as has been described. For they act according to divine command. On the other hand, those who will fall on the side of the peasants will burn in hell for ever, for they wield the sword against God's word and are actuated by the devil. And if the peasants should be victorious, which God forbid, for to God all things are possible—perhaps on the Day of Judgment, which may

not be far off, He wishes to destroy all order and authority and make a general confusion—the lords will die in any case, and they will perish with a good conscience. They will have fulfilled the office of the sword. They will leave the world to the devil and will gain in exchange eternal blessedness. In these strange times a prince may as easily go to heaven by the shedding of blood as by prayer.

There is another point which should move the authorities. Not satisfied that they have given themselves over to the devil, the peasants have forced many pious men against their will to enter their devilish league. Thus these men are forced into wickedness and damnation, for those who have given way become guilty of all the evil actions in which they participate. They must act against their will because they are weak in faith and do not resist. A pious Christian should rather suffer a hundred deaths than cede to the peasants by a hairbreadth. Many martyrs might now be created by the bloodthirsty peasants and prophets of murder. The authorities should have mercy only upon those prisoners made among the peasants who have been forced to join their bands. If there were no other reason for using the sword mercilessly upon the peasants and to risk lives and goods in the fight, the princes and noblemen should use the sword in order to save the souls of those who have been forced by the peasants to enter into a league with the devil. These have sinned horribly, and will find damnation unless they are saved and helped.

Therefore, dear gentlemen, get ready, save and help. Take mercy upon the poor people. Stab, smite, throttle who can. If you are killed you will be blessed. Never can you find a more blessed death, for you will die obedient to the divine word and to the commands in Romans xiii., and you do a service of love in saving your neighbour from the bonds of hell and of the devil. I pray that all who can should shun the peasants as they would shun the devil himself. I pray that God may enlighten and convert those who do not shun them. May those who refuse to be enlightened find misfortune and non-success, and let every pious Christian say 'Amen.' I know that this prayer is

right and good and that it pleases God. If anybody should think that I am too hard, let him remember that sedition is unbearable.

Many of Luther's supporters who had seen in the great reformer the champion of the ill-used masses against clerical and secular absolutism were horrified at his sudden change of policy towards the people. Some tried to explain and to justify his action, but the great majority of his supporters began to consider him to be a turncoat who tried to curry favour with the princes and the powerful nobility. Even his friends condemned his pamphlet against the peasants and called him '*adulator principum*.' From an advocate of the oppressed, Luther had indeed become an advocate of the oppressors. The common people turned away from him in disgust. The German princes and noblemen, on the other hand, greeted Luther's pronouncement with rapture, and in accordance with his admonition they raged against the unfortunate peasants with the utmost cruelty. Without mercy the defeated peasants were slaughtered and tortured by their masters. According to the best evidence available, more than 120,000 were slain, and apparently the vast majority of these were executed for revenge and in order to terrorise the others. In later years, as may be seen from the fifty-ninth volume of his works, Erlangen edition, Luther boasted that he had been the principal executioner of the German peasantry, for he stated:

The preachers are the greatest destroyers of men, for they admonish the authorities to fill their office and to punish the wicked. I, Martin Luther, have in the peasant revolt slain all the peasants that were killed, for I have caused them to be killed. The blood of all the slain peasants is on my head. But the responsibility for it is with the Lord my God, who has ordered me to speak as I have done.

Even Luther's admirers, both in Germany and abroad, have found it difficult to reconcile his sudden change of

front, his desertion of the poor men for the rich and the powerful in the hour of need. For instance, Professor T. M. Lindsay wrote in his excellent book, ' Luther and the German Reformation ' :

When all is said that can reasonably be said in explanation of his action, we cannot help feeling that the language of this pamphlet is an ineffaceable stain on Luther, which no extenuating circumstances can wipe out. . . . Up to the tragical year 1525, the Lutheran movement absorbed all the various elements of discontent in Germany, and Luther seemed to have the whole land behind him. This year was the parting of the ways. . . . As for Luther himself, the Peasants' War imprinted in him a deep distrust of the ' common man,' which prevented him from believing in a democratic Church, and led him to bind his reformation in the fetters of a secular control, to the extent of regarding the secular government as having a quasi-episcopal function. He did his best within Germany to prevent attempts to construct anything like a democratic Church government.

Up to the time when Luther admonished the princes and the nobility to slay mercilessly the peasants in their thousands, the reformer had been the most popular man in Germany. Suddenly he became the most unpopular man, except with the princes and the nobility, whose absolute power he strengthened by his writings and preachings. His desertion of the masses and the cruelty against the defeated peasants advocated by him were widely condemned in word and in print. Hence Luther took up his prolific pen in his own defence and justification. In a ' Missive regarding the Hard Booklet against the Peasants,' printed in 1525, he endeavoured to justify himself at considerable length. In the course of his pamphlet he stated :

It would be a nice piece of loving-kindness to show mercy and charity to thieves and murderers and allow them to murder, outrage, and rob. There is nothing more outrageous than the mad mob and the peasants when they are

filled with meat and drink and have power. . . . Therefore I repeat, as I stated in my previous book, that no one should take pity on the obstinate, infatuated peasants. Everyone who can do so should strike, stab, strangle, and slay them whenever he can and however he can as if they were mad dogs. They are shamelessly faithless, disobedient, and seditious thieves, robbers, murderers, and blasphemers, and every one of them has deserved death at least tenfold, and should suffer death without mercy. The lords know now the character of the mob. Donkeys must be kept in order with beating, and the mob must be governed with a forceful hand.

In accordance with his violent, passionate, and obstinate character, Luther never disavowed or recanted the brutal views regarding the masses. In a sermon preached in 1528, which will be found in the twenty-second volume of his works, Erlangen edition, he stated :

God would prefer to suffer the government to exist, no matter how evil, rather than allow the rabble to riot, no matter how justified they are in doing so. . . . When *Herr Omnes* seizes the sword under the impression that he is doing right, then evil begins. A prince should remain a prince, no matter how tyrannical he may be. He beheads necessarily only a few, since he must have subjects in order to be a ruler.

The few extracts given make it obvious that Luther completely changed his attitude in 1525, that the champion of the masses became the champion of the rulers, that the man who previously had stood for justice stood henceforth for princely absolutism, however tyrannous and however vicious. Those who are acquainted with Luther's writings are aware that the great reformer, who is widely supposed to be an advocate of democracy because he opposed the absolutism of the Roman Church, simply abolished in Germany Roman Catholic absolutism in order to establish in its place a far more rigid and far more vicious secular absolutism.

His hostility to the masses was by no means solely directed against the peasants owing to their revolt. His hostility against the masses became after 1525 a matter of principle and was general. In the seventh book, fifth chapter, of Janssen's excellent 'History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages' we read:

'Scripture, speaking figuratively,' wrote Luther in the year 1524, 'calls rulers drovers, task-masters, and scourgers. Like the drivers of donkeys, who have to belabour their animals incessantly with rods and whips, or they will not obey, so must the rulers do with the people' (with 'Herr Omnes,' as he calls them); 'they must drive, beat, throttle, hang, burn, behead, and torture, so as to make themselves feared and to keep the people in check. For God is not satisfied with our merely holding up the law before the people; He requires that we should drive them to keep it. For if we only held it up before them, and did not compel them to carry it into practice, it would all come to nothing.'

In one of his sermons on the first book of Moses, which were first published in the year 1527, Luther said 'It was almost desirable that servants should be subjected to a kind of slavery, such as had existed among the Jews. Then Abimelech,' he said, 'took sheep and oxen, and men-servants and maid-servants, and gave them to Abraham, and spake unto Sarah, &c. &c. That was a royal gift. Then he gave them power over the sheep and oxen and men-servants and maid-servants, so that they were all personal property, and the owners might sell them as they liked; and it would verily be almost best that this state of things should exist again, for nobody can control and tame the populace in any other way. And so you see that Abraham and Abimelech held by this custom and let their dependents remain in bondage. Some will say it would have been great kindness and mercifulness if they had set them free; how could love endure that they should be kept as slaves? Just in the same way as love endures that people should be hanged on the gallows or otherwise punished. For there must be firm control by the secular government, in order to curb and

manage the people. The owners would gladly have set them free, if they could, but it would not have answered; they would soon have grown too haughty if too many rights had been granted them.'

The fact that Luther in his advocacy of monarchical absolutism went so far as to recommend the princes to enslave their subjects, to treat them as if they were cattle, and to ill-treat them deliberately in order to keep them terrorised, humble, and submissive, is known to all students of Luther's teachings. It is not denied by the most fervent admirers of Luther, but it is frequently glossed over. Only Prusso-Germans of the ultra-patriotic type, such as Treitschke, highly approve of the ruthless absolutism which Luther recommended to the rulers.

The Reformation, which in the first instance was a democratic revolution, changed its character through Luther's action. While professing to act in the interest of the people Luther merely transferred absolute authority from the comparatively gentle and powerless Church to the princes. These had in the past shared authority over the people with the Roman Catholic Church. The secular and the spiritual authorities had balanced one another. Henceforth all secular and all spiritual authority became united in a single hand. The Protestant ruler became the *summus episcopus* of his country. King and bishop became one. The King claimed the sanctity of the Pope with regard to his secular actions, and he assumed the titles and attributes of the Deity. Thus the German rulers, who in the past had been elected by the popular vote, became the representatives of God on earth and reigned by divine right. On the other hand, the bishops, who formerly had been kept in check by the secular authority, possessed henceforth the entire power of the State. The judges and the army, the whole official apparatus of the country, could be utilised for ecclesiastical purposes on the part of the clerical prince who wore

at the same time the temporal and the spiritual crown. Henceforth theology and policy went hand in hand. The clergy became part of the executive of the bureaucracy, and princely absolutism was defended and advocated in every church.

Luther's influence upon the German character was most far-reaching. He was responsible for the creation of an all-powerful autocratic government which has found its fullest expression in Prusso-Germany. He is therefore largely, and probably chiefly, responsible for the absolutism of the Prusso-German Government on the one hand and for the submissiveness of the people on the other hand. Besides, the great reformer is probably also responsible for the brutality and ruthlessness which the Germans have displayed in their warfare and their treatment of the conquered peoples.

The character of nations is largely shaped by tradition. The character of the citizens is frequently modelled upon that of their national heroes. It is frequently assumed that the brutality of the Prussians is due to the example of Bismarck, Frederick the Great, and especially to that of King Frederick William I, the Prussian drill-sergeant. Very likely these men were not so much originators as imitators. Exactly as the men of modern Germany try to imitate their great hero, Bismarck, in word, thought, and action, even so the men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries probably tried to model themselves upon Luther. Now Luther was not only wonderfully successful in all he had undertaken, he was not only a Bismarck on the religious side, but he was personally almost unbelievably brutal and coarse. These characteristics of the great reformer are usually passed over by his biographers, most of whom were Protestants. They have found adequate analysis and description in the excellent life of Luther by Hartmann Grisar, a Roman Catholic, which was published in three very large volumes in Freiburg in 1911 and 1912.

Of this book a good English translation has been published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd. The sixteenth century was a time of plain speaking; however, among his contemporaries Luther was easily first in his capacity for coarseness and abuse. He called the Germans, according to Grisar's fifteenth chapter, swine and senseless beasts. He wrote, for instance: 'We Germans are and remain Germans, which means swine and hogs without reason; we Germans are such disgraceful swine that we possess neither breeding nor sense; we are a barbarous nation; we abuse the gifts of God worse than swine.'

Luther habitually employed against his opponents not only the coarsest but also the filthiest language, in which the human excreta and certain intimate parts of the human anatomy are constantly mentioned. It is practically impossible to render Luther's language in English. It amazed his contemporaries, who certainly were not squeamish. His attack upon King Henry VIII of England was so full of coarse and filthy expressions that Thomas More replied in words which can fitly be given only in Latin:

> Nihil habet in ore (Lutherus) praeter latrinas, merdas, stercora, quibus foedius et spurcius quam ullus unquam scurra scurratur. . . . Si pergat scurrilitate ludere nec aliud in ore gestare quam sentinas, cloacas, latrinas, merdas, stercora, faciant quod volent alii, nos ex tempore capiemus consilium, velimusne sic bacchantem . . . cum suis merdis et stercoribus cacantem cacatumque relinquere.

German coarseness in sexual matters may also be largely due to the incredible indelicacy and coarseness with which Luther habitually treated these subjects. For instance, in advocating matrimony for the clergy he stated in words which can be rendered only in Latin:

> Major pars puellarum in monasteriis positarum non potest voluntarie statum suum observare . . . Puella non potest esse sine viro, sicut non sine esu, potu et somno.

Ideo Deus dedit homini membra, venas, fluxus et omnia, quae ad generandum inserviunt. Qui his rebus obsistit, quid aliud facit, quam velle ut ignis non urat ? Ubi castitas involuntaria est, natura non desistit ab opere suo ; caro semen concipit sicut creata est a Deo ; venae secundum genus suum operantur. Tunc incipiunt fluxus et peccata clandestina, quae S. Paulus mollitiem vocat (1 Cor. vi. 10). Et, ut crude dicam, propter miseram necessitatem, quod non fluit in carnem, fluit in vestimenta. Id deinde accusare et confiteri verentur. . . . Vide, hoc ipsum voluit diabolus, docens te coercere et domare naturam quae non vult esse coacta.

In his table-talk he frequently discussed the most imtimate matters of sex in the coarsest manner, and did not even spare his wife, Catharine, whether she was present or not. For instance, Cordatus wrote in his diary, mercifully in Latin, on page 8 :

Ridens sapientiam, qua esse volebat sua Catharina, Creator formavit masculum lato pectore et non latis femoribus, ut capax sedes sapientiae esset in viro ; latrinam vero, qua stercora eiciuntur, ei parvam fecit. Porro haec in femina sunt inversa. Ideo multum habent stercorum mulieres, sapientiae autem parum.

Luther habitually indulged in coarse and especially obscene language and in ribald jests which came easily to his tongue. Before men and women he joked without restraint in words which cannot be rendered in English, and the reported coarsenesses and obscenities of Luther are so numerous that they would fill a volume. Often he regretted the obscenity of his language and tried to repress it, but his natural habit always reasserted itself.

The facts given in the foregoing show clearly that Luther was not merely a religious reformer, but that his activity profoundly and permanently affected the body political and the character of the German nation. He coarsened and brutalised the nation by his example, his personal

habits, and his language. Before all he destroyed the popular liberties, and he firmly established the absolutism of the German rulers. Largely through his action, the German people became a people of serfs. It is difficult to read the heart of man. Possibly he abandoned the cause of the people and became the strongest advocate of princely absolutism and tyranny because the outrages committed by the maddened peasants changed his views. This has been asserted by many of Luther's admirers and apologists. Possibly he became the champion of princely power because he remembered the fate of Huss and other democratic reformers and feared for his safety. Possibly, guided by the idea that the end justifies the means, that necessity knows no law, he was so determined to succeed in his struggle with Rome that the cause of the people seemed of little importance to him, that he sacrificed without scruple all else to success. In view of Luther's passionate and ruthless character, the last explanation is very likely the correct one.

If we look upon Luther not from the point of view of the theologian, but from that of the political observer, it is perfectly clear that Luther was the greatest enemy of the people and the greatest benefactor of princely absolutism. He vastly strengthened the power of the German princes by handing over to them the wealth accumulated by the Roman Church and by giving them at the same time absolute power over the people, who henceforth were doubly enslaved. The counterpoise of the Roman Catholic Church was abolished. The Protestant clergy became part of the government apparatus directed by an absolute ruler. Luther delivered to the princes the wealth of the people and the people themselves and made the princes sacrosanct in the eyes of the people.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick William I, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck, have created the governmental tradition of Prusso-Germany, and their activities have had a profound influence upon the character

of the German nation. However, the character and the views of these eminent men were largely formed by Luther and his pupils. Owing to the activities of the great reformer, the Protestant Church became a part of the Prusso-German bureaucracy. If we bear in mind Luther's prestige and the vast influence of his example and teachings through centuries and centuries, it becomes clear to us that the absolutism of the Hohenzollerns on the one hand and the abject submissiveness and docility of the German masses on the other hand are due to Martin Luther, that the ruthlessness and brutality which Germany has practised during the present war were largely caused by the man who established the Reformation, that much of the coarseness of the German people is due to Luther's habits of life, of thought, and of expression. The genesis and character of the Prussian State Church also explains to us the bloodthirsty and inhuman attitude of the Protestant clergy, which otherwise would seem inexplicable. The principle, 'L'État c'est moi,' was not established by Louis XIV, under whom the French people enjoyed a good deal of liberty, but by the Hohenzollerns, who based their action upon the teachings of their politico-religious reformer.

CHAPTER XII

PRUSSIA'S DOWNFALL IN 1806—ITS CAUSES, ITS CONSEQUENCES, ITS LESSONS[1]

THE character of nations, as that of individuals, is shaped by their history and by their experiences. Prusso-Germany has been created by the Hohenzollerns. That family has imprinted its character upon the nation. Men and nations are made what they are not only by their successes, but also by their failures. While the character and achievements of the Great Elector, Frederick William I, Frederick the Great, and William I are generally known, only a few men, both in England and in Germany, are acquainted with the lives and deeds of the two successors of Frederick the Great. Frederick William II and Frederick William III were weak and incompetent rulers. The Prussian historians are somewhat ashamed of them. Hence their lives are little mentioned and their failings are usually glossed over. However, the period of their reign, and especially the twenty years which elapsed between the death of Frederick the Great and Prussia's downfall at Jena and Auerstadt, has been of such immense importance for the development of the national character of Prussia that it seems worth while considering the lives and achievements of these two men.

Brandenburg-Prussia had been created by the Austrian Emperors. Almost exactly five hundred years ago, on April 30, 1415, the Emperor Sigismund signed the cele-

[1] From the *Fortnightly Review*, January 1918.

brated document whereby Count Friedrich of Nuremburg was invested with Brandenburg and the Electoral dignity. The small territory of the Hohenzollerns rapidly grew through the energy and enterprise of its rulers. Chiefly by conquest it increased fifteen-fold to its present size, and it grew particularly at the cost of the Austrian Emperors who had created it. At an early date the Hohenzollerns became the opponents and the competitors of the Habsburgs, their overlords. Austria was the determined champion of Roman Catholicism. Not unnaturally, the Hohenzollerns, who envied them, became equally determined champions of Protestantism. The Reformation and the sanguinary wars which sprang from it were caused after all quite as much by political as by religious motives. Religious differences, envy, and the desire to become independent of Vienna caused Prussia to embark upon a deliberately anti-Austrian policy, and Austria's attempt to restrain the growing power of Prussia and to keep that country in obedience merely embittered the Hohenzollern rulers. Frederick William I created a powerful army for use against his Emperor, and his son, Frederick the Great, attacked Austria soon after his accession under the flimsiest pretext and invaded Silesia. Frederick manifested his hostility to Austria not merely by depriving that country of its fairest provinces, but he prevented Austria finding compensation for her loss by the acquisition of Bavaria. With that object in view he entered in 1778, in his extreme old age, upon the Bavarian War of Succession. Frederick aimed not merely at enlarging Prussia at Austria's cost. He desired to lame the power of the Habsburgs by creating a counterpoise to Austria in the form of a North German union of States dominated by Prussia. On July 23, 1785, he created a union of Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover, which was joined later on by Brunswick, Mecklenburg, Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, Zweibrucken, Ansbach, Baden, Anhalt-Dessau, and Mayence. Thus Frederick the Great laid the foundation of the North German Confederation and

of the German Empire under Prussia's leadership which relegated the Austrian Empire to a secondary position. In his Political Testaments of 1752 and of 1776 Frederick the Great urged his successors to extend Prussia's territories in Germany, especially by conquest, and he recommended particularly the acquisition of Saxony, the possession of which would vastly strengthen Prussia against Austria. The anti-Austrian policy which Frederick the Great had consistently pursued during the forty-six years of his reign, and which had been bequeathed to him by his ancestors, was naturally taken up by his successors.

Frederick the Great had no children. Hence the Prussian crown devolved upon his nephew, Frederick William II, a dissolute and utterly unworthy man possessed of a huge body but a weak brain. Frederick had married his nephew to Princess Elizabeth of Brunswick, but the marriage proved an unhappy one. Frederick described the cause of its dissolution in 1769 as follows in his Memoirs:

L'époux, jeune et sans mœurs, abandonné à une vie crapuleuse dont ses parents ne pouvaient le corriger, faisait journellement des infidélités à sa femme. La princesse, qui était dans la fleur de sa beauté, se trouvait outragée du peu d'égards qu'on avait pour ses charmes; sa vivacité et la bonne opinion qu'elle avait d'elle-même l'excitèrent à se venger des torts qu'on lui faisait. Bientôt elle donna dans les débordements qui ne le cédaient guère à ceux de son époux. Les désordres éclatèrent et furent bientôt publics.

Later on he married the daughter of the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, but he was faithless also to his second wife. Apart from innumerable temporary attachments, he had several permanent ones. He was completely under the influence of Wilhelmina Enke, the daughter of a musician, to the end of his days. He married her to his valet Ritz, and he concluded 'left-handed' marriages with a Miss von Voss who became Countess Ingenheim, and with Countess

Sophie Donhoff. His uncle, Frederick the Great, tried in vain to restrain the dissoluteness and the wastefulness of his successor. The strictness of the old King caused Frederick William to hate him. On November 12, 1774, Lord Malmesbury, the British Ambassador in Berlin, reported to the Earl of Suffolk :

The precipitancy with which his favourite mistress was obliged to fly to Hamburgh, although she is now returned ; the prohibition of masquerades, and the banishment of his merry companions, are events which dwell so deeply on his mind, as to make him wish the demise of his uncle with more eagerness than ever.

The heir-apparent was, owing to his dissolute life, constantly in need of money, and an intermediary sent by him demanded a loan from England through the British representative in Berlin. In a report dated December 15, 1774, Lord Malmesbury has given an account of the conversation. The emissary stated that Frederick William ' n'auroit pas de quoi payer sa blanchisseuse.' In his most interesting letter, which throws a great deal of light upon the inner workings of international politics in the eighteenth century, we read :

As he spoke with a most impetuous vivacity, I have no doubt he was in earnest in what he said, and as I had no sort of reason to be discomposed with his disapprobation of my conduct, I thought it a favourable opportunity of getting some further lights into the Prince of Prussia's real character and connexions ; I therefore, without affecting to justify myself, endeavoured to make him speak more freely, by suggesting different methods of obtaining the succours required, and hinted that Holland, Vienna, and Petersburg were certainly at his disposition. His answer was, ' Que le Prince d'Orange n'avoit pas le sou, que l'Empereur n'avoit pas la Bourse, que l'Impératrice Reine Maria Theresa ne donneroit qu'aux Églises, et que l'Impératrice de Russie le dénoncerait tout de suite à son oncle.' I then mentioned the rich merchants, as well those of his country as strangers.

' Il les a tous épuisés, il doit 300,000 écus (£15,000) ici et autant dans l'étranger.' I ventured to hint that this sum appeared to me incredible, considering the very small ostensible expense of his Royal Highness. ' Il a tout mangé chez les filles, il en a une qui lui coûte 30,000 écus par an, et l'argent qu'il lui faut pour gagner les espions de son oncle monte encore à autant. Vous ne sauriez croire combien de fois j'ai pris la liberté de lui représenter combien peu sa façon de vivre convenoit à un grand Prince, mais son penchant pour le plaisir est trop décidé, il n'en reviendra jamais, cela augmente journellement, et la manière dont son oncle le traite a tant aigri son esprit, que s'il vit encore cinq ans, son caractère changera entièrement. . . .'

I have only to add that I have since heard that the Prince of Prussia has applied through his Princess to the Grand Duchess of Russia, and that he expects to be relieved from that quarter. This accounts for the change of style in our second conference.

The British Ambassador, in his report of July 1, 1775, described Frederick William as follows :

The Prince of Prussia has nothing in his figure which denotes a person of superior talents or genius ; tall and robust, without grace, he has more the air of a stout foot-soldier than that of a great Prince. Constrained and watched to a degree by his uncle, it is difficult to say whether silence and reserve are natural or acquired habits in him. It is certain these strongly characterise him, not only at Court, and before people of high rank, but even when he forgets he is a prince, and frequents lower company, which, through the pains he takes to be constantly in it, appears to amuse him ; yet, even there, he never expresses his satisfaction otherwise than by encouraging his companions to be as loud and clamorous as possible, and to lay aside every respect due to him as their future sovereign.

His favourite mistress, formerly a stage dancer, presides at these revels, and takes the lead in all the scenes of indecent mirth which pass there. She is large in her person, spirited in her looks, loose in her attire, and gives a true idea of a

perfect bacchanalian. He is liberal to her to a degree, and she alone spends the full income he receives from the King. She makes, indeed, the best return in her power to such generosity; for at the same time she assures him that he has the sole possession of her affections, she by no means exacts the same fidelity from him, but endeavours, as far as lies in her power, to satisfy his desires, whenever from fickleness or satiety they fix themselves on some new object; and in this profession she is so dexterous as never to suffer him to become acquainted with any woman who is likely to be her rival in the dominion she has over him. Her choice, and fortunately for her, is generally among those of the lowest kind.

The pursuit of these pleasures, the only ones for which he has any turn, employs the greatest part of his leisure; the rest of his time is spent either at the parade, in attendance on the King, or in dressing—an article in which, whenever he can venture to lay aside his uniform, he is refined and delicate to a degree. He is even at the expense of keeping a favourite *valet de chambre*, by name Espère en Dieu, constantly between Potsdam and Paris, for no other purpose than to give him the earliest information of any alteration in the fashions; and as Espère en Dieu collects his intelligence solely from his brethren (the hairdressers), so those who follow his instructions may very easily be mistaken for one of this class.

Such, my Lord, are the outlines of his amusements, in which one may perceive more levity than vice, and even suppose, had he been fairly dealt with, his debauchery, which is now certainly of the lowest kind, would at least have taken a better turn, and deserved the name of gallantry. Distressed as he is for money, persecuted by his uncle, deprived entirely of the conversation of men of parts and probity, and surrounded by a set of debauched officers, it is not astonishing that he should have fallen into such a low style of libertinism; it would be much more so if, when he shall be called to the throne, he ever gets the better of habits so long contracted, and gives up a way of life from which he appears to receive so great satisfaction.

In the eighteenth century mysticism became fashionable. Its strength may be seen from the prestige enjoyed by men like Swedenborg, Cagliostro, St. Germain, Mesmer, and many others. Numerous secret societies and orders were founded by mystics, and Frederick William fell under the influence of the Rosicrucians. Two men of that order, Wollner and Bischoffswerder, became his intimate friends, and the mystics and the mistresses ruled the Prince between them. Wollner, a former tutor, who possessed considerable eloquence, and who dabbled in alchemy and other mystic arts, became virtually Prime Minister.

Wollner was made not only the principal adviser of the King in civil affairs, but he managed the Treasury and the Building Department, while Bischoffswerder controlled military and foreign affairs as aide-de-camp of the monarch. The King had given himself entirely into the hands of these two men, and especially of Wollner, and complaints and warnings addressed to the monarch did not reach him. Frederick the Great had caused his subjects to address their complaints to him in person. Frederick William II ordered that they should be sent to him only in writing and by the post. Hence Wollner and his friends could prevent petitions and complaints reaching the King. Wollner had in his house a little theatre of mysticism where, among others, the shadow of Cæsar was made to appear. The part of the spirits was played by a man Steinert, a friend of Bischoffswerder, who was a skilled ventriloquist. The King was prevailed upon to attend the seances and to give Steinert a salary of 500 thalers a year. By studying the face of the King, the impression which the spiritualist frauds made upon him, and by bringing about suitable manifestations of the spirits, these men caused Frederick William to fall more and more under their domination. The King became entirely absorbed in mysticism. He was known to the members of the Rosicrucian Order not as the King, but merely as Brother Ormesus. His small library in the marble

palace of Potsdam consisted nearly exclusively of books on mysticism, such as Böhme's ' Theosophia Revelata,' Jugel's ' Physica Mystica,' &c. The prophecies and counsels of the spirits proved more effective than the advice of ministers and generals, and those who wished to advance or to gain influence upon the King were forced to join the Rosicrucians. Ritz, the King's personal valet and the nominal husband of his mistress, spied upon the King in the interest of Wollner and Bischoffswerder, and Ritz's brother acted as Cabinet Secretary to the monarch, and shaped the orders emanating from the King in accordance with the views of his Rosicrucian principals. A bankrupt Rosicrucian merchant of Dresden named Dubosc was called by his friend Bischoffswerder to Berlin and was appointed head of the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.

Frederick William II was sensuous and dissolute, and was simultaneously addicted not only to vice and to mysticism, but to religious intolerance and obscurantism. His religious zeal probably sprang from hatred of Frederick the Great, who was tolerant and a free-thinker. While Frederick the Great had been extremely thrifty, almost parsimonious, his successor wasted the vast funds which had been accumulated. It had been Frederick's principle that the whole business of State was concentrated in the hands of the King. None of his Ministers had complete knowledge of the position of the national finances, and no proper budget was drawn up, so that the King could dispose at will of the enormous surpluses which accumulated, and he could spend vast sums at his discretion to the best advantage of the State. Frederick William II employed the right of unlimited disposal of the State funds for his personal gratification. Frederick the Great had spent for himself only 492,500 thalers per year. Frederick William II spent in the first year of his reign more than three times as much, and shortly afterwards more than four times as much on his amusements. In addition, his mistresses, his Rosicrucian favourites, and

their relatives and friends defrauded the State of colossal sums. They induced the King either to present them with large estates or to sell them estates at absurdly low prices, and resold them immediately at a huge profit. Count Hoym received an estate which was supposed to be worth 40,000 thalers, and sold it immediately to his friend Count Lubinski for 200,000 thalers. Bischoffswerder induced the King to give him an estate officially valued at 18,000 thalers, which was in reality worth 191,000 thalers, and which he sold for 115,000 thalers. Haugwitz made in a similar way a profit of 65,000 thalers, and received in addition lands worth 200,000 thalers. Numerous similar instances occur.

Mirabeau was sent by the French Government to Berlin on a secret mission at the time when Frederick the Great was dying. That great Frenchman was a close observer, and he mingled with the best society of the Prussian capital. In his dispatches, which were reprinted in his anonymously published ' Histoire Secrète de la Cour de Berlin,' we get a wonderful picture of Prussian society and of Frederick William II. In his reports sent between July 16, 1786, and January 13, 1787, Mirabeau wrote:

It seems that the successor possesses all the symptoms of the most incurable weakness, and that those who surround him are most corrupt. The latter increase from day to day their authority over him. . . .

Frederick William looks sometimes angry and sometimes agitated. He can neither control his features nor his movements. He is false, and he does not know how to dissemble. Although he has some sense and talent he has not an idea of his own. He knows only small means, mean passions, and low views. Everything is small in the King's mind, while his body is gigantic. He acts without method. He has the pride of a parvenu, and the vanity of a man of no position. He neither can guide others, nor will he allow others to guide him. What the new King fears most is that it should be believed that he is guided by others. I think

he would willingly leave the Government to other people, supposing that the world should think that he did everything himself. . . .

It is impossible to exaggerate the turpitude of the details of the King's household, of its disorders, and of his waste of time. The men-servants of the King fear his violence, but they are the first to treat his incapacity with derision. Not a single document is kept in order, not a memorandum is attended to, not a letter is personally opened. No human power can induce the King to read forty consecutive lines. In him are combined the passion of violence and the torpor of nullity. . . .

What is the King? It would perhaps be very bold to judge him so early after his advent. Still, one would be tempted to reply that he is nothing. He has no spirit, no strength, no logic, and no industry. He has the tastes and inclinations of the pig of Epicurus. The only heroic quality which he possesses is his pride, or rather his narrow-minded bourgeois vanity. Those are his characteristics, and in what circumstance, at what age, and at what a post! I must discard my reason if I wish to hope. What is really to be feared is that the universal contempt which the King will soon incur will irritate him and rob him even of the little good-nature which he shows at present. The King possesses a mad thirst after pleasures, and his taste is not delicate. He desires to act in secret in a position where nothing can remain secret. . . .

If the present regime will continue for another three months, the King can no longer lose the respect of the Prussian people. All the symptoms of putrefaction appear. Ritz is a greedy thief. He is the vilest and the most corrupt of men, though he manages the royal household and distributes a great part of the aulic favours. He is very susceptible to money, and can be bought, but he is expensive, for he is a greedy spendthrift. He wants to amass a fortune, and he can succeed if ever the Government of France wishes to direct the Cabinet at Berlin. As long as the King is of importance Ritz and Prince Frederick of Brunswick are the two men who should be gained over. . . .

The King's character has three features. He is false, mistaking falseness for cleverness. He possesses a self-love which turns to fury at the smallest occasion. He loves gold, not so much from avarice, but from passionate desire to possess it. The first vice causes him to be suspicious. Men who systematically deceive others always believe themselves to be deceived. The second vice causes him to prefer the company of men of mediocre or of low position. The last induces him to lead an obscure and solitary life. He is violent at home, impenetrable in public, he cares little for glory, and he finds his whole satisfaction in making people believe that he is not guided by others. He rarely occupies himself with foreign politics, deals with army matters, not from interest but from necessity, and leans towards visionaries, not from conviction, but because he believes that he can with their help read the thoughts of men. . . .

The discouragement of the ministers at Berlin increases continually. Since two months the King has not worked with a single minister. Hence their torpor and pusillanimity increases. The art of reigning without doing anything has never been brought to a higher degree of perfection. . . . I had a thorough conversation with Prince Henry, the King's uncle. He is completely discouraged and fears for his country. He has confirmed to me everything that I have reported to you. There is torpor where there should be activity. The Court is depressed. The ministers are amazed. Discontent is universal. Little is planned, and still less executed, and those who complain that nothing is done are gravely told that the King is in love, and that the vigour of the Government depends upon the weakness of Mademoiselle von Voss. The General Directorate, which should be a Council of State, is only a dispatching office for current affairs. If the ministers make some proposal they receive no reply from the King, and if they press for a decision nothing is done, to their disgust. . . .

Public contempt is the worthy reward of unworthy deeds, and it increases from day to day. The stupor which precedes contempt has disappeared. At first the people were surprised to see the King devoting his time to attending

comedies and concerts, to waiting faithfully upon his old mistress and the new one, to spending hours in looking at engravings and at furniture in shops and playing the 'cello, to spending hours over the small talk and the quarrels of the ladies of the palace, while trying to find minutes for listening to the ministers who devote themselves to affairs of State. Now people are surprised if no new folly or vice fills up his days. To-day the new uniforms which the King has designed have made their appearance. That childishness confirms the belief that a sovereign who attaches so much importance to military tailoring has a mind which sees in the cut of a uniform a matter of significance. . . .

The King is a man without will-power, and will remain so to his death. His predecessor was all mind. This one is all body. The proofs of his incapacity are becoming more and more serious, and matters are made worse by the fact that the ministers are plotting against one another. . . .

It may be stated as a fact that with a thousand louis d'or one can in case of need know all the secrets of the Cabinet at Berlin. The papers of State, which are always lying in disorderly masses on tables, can be read and copied out by two secretaries, four valets, six or eight lacqueys, two pages, and the female attendants, who have access to the royal apartments. Hence the Emperor at Vienna received every day faithful accounts of the deeds and intentions of the King. . . .

Never has a kingdom fallen more rapidly into decay. It is being undermined from all sides. The national income has diminished, and the expenses have increased. The principles of Government are thrown to the winds, public opinion is outraged, and the army is weakened. The small number of people worthy of employment are discouraged, deserving men are eliminated, and the King surrounds himself with adventurers in order to make men believe that he rules alone.

Although Frederick William II was the most incompetent, vicious, vain, and idle of monarchs, the courtiers surrounding him flattered him to the utmost, and had the audacity to compare him with Frederick the Great. In 1792, six years after Frederick the Great's death, Count Hertzberg, who under Frederick the Great and during the first few years of the reign of Frederick William II had acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs, published a collection of the State papers he had written, and in the introduction to that work he endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the worthless King by stating:

Those who study the State papers reprinted in the present collection, and who carefully and impartially examine the negotiations and events which have taken place under the Government of Frederick William II since his advent to the throne in 1786, must be convinced that Prussia's political activity during his rule consisted in the unswerving pursuit of the policy which the Prussian Cabinet had formed at the time when the new monarch came to the throne. This policy consisted in carrying on those aims which Frederick the Great had pursued during his life. It consisted in making Prussia the *arbiter of the Balance of Power of Europe* in the south, the north, and east of the European Continent.

Every enlightened and impartial observer must recognise that King Frederick William II had played the part of the *arbiter of the Balance of Power in the south, the north, and the east* on three important occasions, during the Revolution in Holland, during the troubles in Poland, and during the war between the Turks and the Russians and Austrians. . . . All enlightened and impartial readers who carefully go through the volumes of documents will agree that the two Prussian Kings, Frederick the Great and Frederick William II, have, since the treaty of Hubertsburg, which concluded the Seven Years War, played the greatest, the grandest, and the most glorious part of acting as the *pacifiers and arbiters of the Balance of Power* in the different parts of Europe; that they have stepped into the breach when the European equilibrium was threatened; that they have at great risk and at an enormous cost, using only their own strength, saved Bavaria, Holland, Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire from impending danger.

Such flatteries were unfortunately only too frequent, and as they emanated from many of the highest dignitaries, they served to turn the head of the King.

Frederick the Great had concentrated all the power of the State in his own hands. Lombard, the Secretary of the Prussian Cabinet, Mirabeau, and others have described to us the Frederickian organisation. The ministers communicated with the King practically only in writing. Very often they did not see him during many months. Their reports and inquiries and a vast quantity of miscellaneous correspondence were sent to the King every day. Frederick's secretaries, his 'scribblers,' as he contemptuously called them, appended to each document a brief summary of its contents. These summaries were read to the King, and the King immediately gave his decision without consulting anybody. If one of his ministers or one of his secretaries should have ventured to utter an opinion on the matter submitted, the King would have thought him mad. Thus Frederick dispatched in a morning frequently two hundred documents. In the afternoon his replies, which had been elaborated meanwhile by his secretaries from the brief decisions given, were put before the King for his signature, and in order to be sure that he was not deceived by his secretaries, Frederick read entirely a number of the documents which were put before him, selecting them at random. Such being Prussia's organisation, the country could be governed with good results only by an able monarch. Unrestricted one-man government reqnired a monarch of the stamp of Frederick the Great. A vicious decadent surrounded by adventurers and intriguers of the worst kind was certain to ruin the country.

Soon after Frederick William's accession the French Revolution broke out. The European monarchs drew together for mutual defence. The notorious Rosicrucian Bischoffswerder suggested to the King that Prussia should abandon the anti-Austrian policy which she had consistently pursued during many decades and conclude an alliance with the House of Habsburg. On July 25, 1791, a preliminary treaty was concluded between the two Powers at Vienna which stated:

. . . Les deux cours se garantiront réciproquement leurs états respectifs contre toute agression quelconque; la quantité, la qualité et les termes de secours mutuels, ou en tout cas leur équivalent en argent, ainsi que l'entretien des troupes auxiliaires, seront réglés dans le traité d'une réciprocité parfaite.

Les cours s'entendront et s'employeront pour effectuer incessamment le concert auquel S. Maj. l'Empereur vient d'inviter les principales puissances de l'Europe, sur les affaires de France, et elles se porteront de plus à leur requisition respective, secours et assistance réciproque, au cas que la tranquillité interne de l'un et de l'autre état fut menacée de troubles.

On August 27, 1791, the celebrated Declaration of Pilnitz was signed by the Emperor of Austria and King Frederick William. It stated:

. . . Pour mettre le Roi de France en état d'affermir, dans la plus parfaite liberté, les bases d'un gouvernement monarchique également convenable aux droits des souverains et au bien-être de la nation françoise. . . leurs dites Majestés l'Empereur et le Roi de Prusse sont résolus d'agir promptement, d'un mutuel accord, avec les forces nécessaires pour obtenir le but proposé et commun.

On February 7, 1792, a formal treaty was concluded for action against France. It was called 'Une Alliance Intime et Perpétuelle.'

While Frederick William II, guided by the Rosicrucians, wished to reverse Prussia's traditional policy of hostility towards Austria, many influential Prussians opposed that alliance with all their power. A pamphlet, entitled 'L'intérêt de la Monarchie Prussienne,' which was sold very

largely, proclaimed that Austria was Prussia's natural enemy, that an Austro-Prussian alliance was an abortion.

At the end of 1792 Prussian and Austrian troops began the invasion of France. Austrian and Prussian statesmen had embarked upon the war believing that they would rapidly defeat the French rabble, that the campaign would be merely a military promenade. The first encounters were favourable to the Allies. When, however, all France sprang to arms and opposed the invaders successfully, and when the incompetence of Frederick William II and of his generals had decimated the Prussian troops, the invaders began to withdraw. Prussia, which had concluded an alliance with Austria in the hope that the war would result in easily won victories and in great gains of territory, resolved to abandon her ally, notwithstanding the three solemn documents from which extracts have been given and which bound Prussia to Austria. As soon as the war took an unfavourable turn Prussia began negotiating with France for a separate peace behind Austria's back, and after very protracted negotiations Prussia concluded in 1795 at Basle a treaty of peace with France, while Austria was left fighting. Three reasons had caused Prussia's withdrawal from the alliance: the unsatisfactory result of the French expedition; the desire to have her hands free in order to participate in the partition of Poland; the wish to make herself supreme in Germany at Austria's cost. Albert Sorel wrote in his classical history, 'L'Europe et la Révolution Française':

> Polish affairs determined Prussia to withdraw from the Rhine. . . . Hardenberg sought peace with the French Republic in order to rob Austria of her supremacy in Germany and to prepare the renascence of the Empire under Prussia's leadership. At Basle Hardenberg sought to revive the Confederation of Princes (created by Frederick the Great) and to strengthen and to extend it, and thus to bring about a North German Confederation.

By the Peace of Basle of April 7, 1795, Prussia not only withdrew from the war with France, but it ceded to the French the Prussian territory on the left side of the Rhine. That treaty was considered disgraceful at the time, and even now Prussian historians condemn it. In the popular and patriotic 'History of Prussia' by Dr Ludwig Hahn we read:

> The reasons given for Prussia's withdrawal do not suffice to justify that step. The conclusion of peace was advantageous to the French, who secured further successes, and when it was too late Prussia recognised that it had acted not only to the disadvantage of the general interest, but even to its own disadvantage; for Prussia's action strengthened France against Prussia by weakening Prussia's ally against France. Before all, Prussia lost by the Peace of Basle its prestige in Germany.

Frederick William II died for the good of his country in 1797, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Frederick William III. During the eleven years of his father's reign Prussia had sunk very deeply. Incompetence and corruption had sapped the strength of the army and of the nation and had impoverished the country. Frederick the Great had left to his successor a treasure of 50,000,000 thalers in cash, a gigantic sum at the time. During the government of Frederick William II that vast fund, which was equal to the total revenue of the country during three years, had disappeared and had been replaced by a debt of 40,000,000 thalers. Frederick William III was pious, honest, and well-meaning, but he was as dull as his father, and was as jealous in defending his absolute authority. In every attempt of advising him honestly he saw a personal insult, and he allowed himself to be guided by shallow flatterers such as Lombard and the Rosicrucian Haugwitz. He desired to introduce order into Prussia's finances. He dismissed Bischoffswerder and Wollner, while his father's

mistress, Wilhelmine Enke, was imprisoned and had her huge fortune confiscated. As Frederick William III possessed to a very pronounced degree the love of authority which is characteristic of all Hohenzollerns, he created only minor reforms during the first ten years of his long reign. He did not abolish the system of government which Frederick the Great had introduced, and which could be worked with success only by a highly gifted monarch. The Prussian ministers were not allowed to come into frequent personal contact with the monarch. They sent to the King their reports and proposals, and the dull King formed his decisions, which he communicated to the ministers through his secretaries. As Frederick the Great had governed Prussia without advisers, his two incompetent successors thought they ought to do likewise. Napoleon briefly and correctly described the character of Frederick William II as follows to his Irish surgeon O'Meara:

I asked him if the King of Prussia was a man of talent. 'Who?' said he; 'the King of Prussia?' He burst into a fit of laughter. '*He*, a man of talent! The greatest blockhead on earth. *Un ignorantaccio che non da ne talento, ne informazione.* A Don Quixote in appearance. I know him well. He cannot hold a conversation for five minutes. . . .

'When,' continued Napoleon, 'I was at Tilsit, with the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, *I was the most ignorant of the three in military affairs.* These two sovereigns, especially the King of Prussia, were completely *au fait* as to the number of buttons there ought to be in front of a jacket, how many behind, and the manner in which the skirts ought to be cut. Not a tailor in the army knew better than King Frederick how many measures of cloth it took to make a jacket. In fact,' continued he, laughing, 'I was nobody in comparison with them. They continually tormented me with questions about matters belonging to tailors, of which I was entirely ignorant, although, in order not to affront them, I answered just as gravely as if the fate of an army depended upon the cut of a jacket. When I went to see the King of Prussia, instead of a library, I found he had a large room, like an arsenal, furnished with shelves and pegs, in which were placed fifty or sixty jackets of various modes. Every day he changed his fashion, and put on a different one. He was a tall, dry-looking fellow, and would give a good idea of Don Quixote. He attached more importance to the cut of a dragoon or a hussar uniform, than was necessary for the salvation of a kingdom. At Jena his army performed the finest and most showy manœuvres possible, but I soon put a stop to their *coglionerie*, and taught them that to fight and to execute dazzling manœuvres and wear splendid uniforms were very different affairs. If,' added he, 'the French army had been commanded by a tailor, the King of Prussia would certainly have gained the day, from his superior knowledge in that art; but as victories depend more upon the skill of the general commanding the troops than upon that of the tailor who makes their jackets, he consequently failed.'

The dull and incompetent Frederick William III tried to govern Prussia autocratically, like another Frederick the Great, through his personal secretaries, and, like his father, he fell under the influence of small-minded courtiers and intriguers. Frederick William III not only preserved the organisation of the country which Frederick the Great had created, but endeavoured to continue Frederick the Great's foreign policy. He desired to humiliate Austria in order to procure for Prussia the hegemony in Germany. In his eyes, as in the eyes of most of the leading Prussians, Austria's downfall was Prussia's opportunity. The French Revolutionary armies began to overrun Europe. Napoleon won victory after victory. The Austrians were hard pressed. Both they and the French solicited the aid of Prussia. However, while Austria was fighting and bleeding, her ally of Reichenbach, Vienna, Pilnitz, and Berlin continued the policy of Basle. Prussia remained neutral,

hoping for great territorial advantages at the cost of either belligerent. King Frederick William III and his advisers did not care very much whether Prussia secured an increase from Austria or from France. Hence, while pursuing ostensibly a policy of neutrality, Prussian statesmen negotiated continually in Paris and Vienna, trying to find out where they would be likely to secure the better bargain.

In 1805 relations between Austria and France became once more very strained. Another great war between these two countries was in prospect, and once more both France and Austria desired to obtain the assistance of the numerically powerful Prussian army, which still enjoyed the prestige won in the Seven Years' War. The diplomats at Berlin negotiated simultaneously an alliance with Napoleon which was to secure to Prussia the possession of Hanover, and an alliance with Russia and Austria directed against Napoleon which was to procure Prussia vast territorial advantages in other directions. With cunning duplicity Prussia had concluded with Russia an alliance which had been called a Declaration, and when Laforest, the French Ambassador in Berlin, asked Haugwitz whether Prussia had concluded an alliance with Russia, as rumour indicated, that minister replied that that rumour was untrue, that between the Russian and Prussian sovereigns there existed neither a treaty of alliance nor a convention.

While the French army was advancing towards Austria, Prussia continued negotiating leisurely with that country, for she desired to join that side which should be victorious. The Czar Alexander of Russia, who had come to Austria's aid, hoped to act as a mediator between Vienna and Berlin. As Prussia seemed unable to make up her mind unless pressure was brought to bear upon her, the Czar hurried to Berlin in order to secure the aid of Frederick William III. At that time Prince Metternich was the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin. He described the negotiations in his autobiographical memoirs as follows:

> This negotiation was conducted on the one hand by the Emperor Alexander and myself; on the Prussian side by Count Haugwitz for the political part, and by the Duke of Brunswick, to whom the King had given the command of the army, for the military part. . . . From the first moment, the Emperor and I were surprised at the ill-will of the Prussian negotiations. With ill-concealed industry they resorted to every imaginable pretext to protract the negotiations, the completion of which grew more and more urgent in view of the serious aspect of the war on the Danube. . . . At last the King made up his mind. A treaty of alliance between the three Courts was signed at Potsdam on November 5, and the Emperor Alexander went immediately to the Headquarters of the Emperor Francis (of Austria).

Metternich's memoirs were written many years after the event. It is therefore interesting to read the dispatches which he sent to Vienna from Berlin while the negotiations for a combined action against France were going on. On November 4 he reported:

> On arriving here I found that the Russian and Prussian negotiators had been occupied for several days in completing a work which was disputed step by step by the latter. The Emperor began the negotiation by sending through his ministers a project of assent to the coalition pure and simple. The King replied by a counter-project full of words, and showing anything but the active co-operation of Prussia. . . . Prussia is accustomed to act only when it is clearly for her own benefit; that is all she looks to, and Europe might disappear before her eyes if it depended on her efforts to save it.

The treaty of alliance was signed at Potsdam on November 5, 1805. The celebrated battle of Austerlitz, at

which Austria and Russia were decisively defeated, took place on December 2 of that year. A powerful Austro-Russian army faced Napoleon. The French troops were about 82,000 strong, while the Austro-Russian troops numbered 90,000. Napoleon had penetrated deeply into Austria. The Archduke Ferdinand advanced through Bohemia, in Napoleon's rear, with 20,000 men. The Archduke Charles was collecting an army of 80,000 men. Prussia, together with Saxony and Hesse, could have sealed Napoleon's fate with the 240,000 men at their disposal. By advancing towards the Danube Valley they could have cut Napoleon's connection with France. Prussia did not make use of that opportunity, but allowed Austria and Russia to be signally defeated. She looked coolly on, and Austria revenged herself for Prussia's desertion by acting merely as a spectator, when, a year later, Prussia was attacked by Napoleon and defeated at Jena and Auerstadt.

Prussia's policy of selfishness and intrigue found its reward. She was punished for deserting Austria in 1795 and 1805 by a defeat which is unique in military history. On October 12, 1806, Napoleon wrote to the King of Prussia:

Sire, Votre Majesté sera vaincue; elle aura compromis le repos de ses jours, l'existence de ses sujets, sans l'ombre d'un prétexte. Elle est aujourd'hui intacte et peut traiter avec moi d'une manière conforme à son rang; elle traitera, avant un mois, dans une situation différente.

Three days later, on October 15, at three o'clock in the morning, he wrote to the Empress from Jena:

Mon amie, j'ai fait de belles manœuvres contre les Prussiens. J'ai remporté hier une grande victoire. Ils étaient 150,000 hommes; j'ai fait 20,000 prisonniers, pris cent pièces de canon et des drapeaux. J'étais en présence et près du roi de Prusse; j'ai manqué de le prendre ainsi que la reine. Je bivouaque depuis deux jours. Je me porte à merveille.

Adieu, mon amie, porte-toi bien et aime-moi.

Si Hortense est à Mayence, donne-lui un baiser ainsi qu'à Napoléon et au petit.

NAPOLÉON.

The twenty-third bulletin, dated Berlin, October 30, stated:

Le roi de Prusse a quitté l'Oder et a passé la Vistule; il est à Graudenz. Les places de Silésie sont sans garnisons et sans approvisionnements. Il est probable que la place de Stettin ne tardera pas à tomber en notre pouvoir. Le roi de Prusse est sans armée, sans artillerie, sans fusils. C'est beaucoup que d'évaluer à 12 ou 15,000 hommes ce qu'il aura pu reunir sur la Vistule.

The twenty-fourth bulletin, of October 31, proclaimed:

Stettin est en notre pouvoir. . . . De toute cette belle armée de 180,000 hommes, rien n'a passé l'Oder. Tout a été pris, tué ou erre encore entre l'Elbe et l'Oder, et sera pris avant quatre jours. Le nombre des prisonniers montera à près de 100,000 hommes.

The thirty-first bulletin, of November 12, informed the public:

Le nombre des prisonniers qui ont été faits dans la campagne passe 140,000; le nombre des drapeaux pris passe 250; le nombre des pièces de campagne prises devant l'ennemi et sur le champ de bataille passe 800; celui des pièces prises à Berlin et dans les places qui se sont rendues passe 4000.

On November 16 Napoleon wrote to the King of Naples:

J'ai fait dans la campagne 140,000 prisonniers, dont 20,000 de cavallerie. J'ai pris, plus de 800 pièces de canon et 250 drapeaux et étendards. L'armée et la monarchie n'existent plus.

Warfare by strokes of lightning-like rapidity was invented not by Moltke, but by Napoleon. The German campaigns of 1866 and 1870 were based on the campaign of 1806. Prussia, which had successfully resisted Austria, France, and Russia during seven years, was completely overthrown by France alone in a single month.

Indignant at Prussia's duplicity, Napoleon wished to make the country harmless. He systematically endeavoured to impoverish it. The French historian Bignon wrote that never in the past a State had been so cruelly treated as Prussia was ill-treated under the French occupation. According to his account the Paymaster-general had only 24,000 francs with him when the French army crossed the Rhine. According to other accounts he took 80,000 francs with him. During the war Prussia had to feed, lodge, clothe, and supply with horses, &c., 200,000 Frenchmen and their allies, and at the end of the first occupation, in autumn 1808, France had a cash surplus of 474,000,000 francs. According to Daru, the Intendant-general, the cash profit realised, after deducting the pay of the army, came on October 15, 1808, to that huge sum. Napoleon said on March 9, 1809, to Count Roederer, 'I have drawn out of Prussia 1,000,000,000 francs.' That was no exaggeration, but that sum did not comprise the total of Prussia's sacrifices. After the evacuation of Prussia in December 1808, the country had to pay a heavy monetary contribution, to maintain French garrisons in Kustrin, Stettin, and Glogau. It lost huge sums through the continental system, which damaged its trade, and it had to assist Napoleon in 1812 against Russia and to support the French army in its march through the country. The French officers plundered the land on their own account. The Commander of Berlin, St. Hilaire, had demanded 800 thalers table money per week, but increased his demand to a thousand thalers. The Prussian prisoners were not returned, but were employed in France in constructing canals.

According to Duncker, Prussia lost through her defeat the following sums:

Losses during first occupation.

	Francs
Goods supplied and services rendered	813,527,422·50
Contributions in cash	141,270,222·82
Taxes levied by the French	59,064,796·92
Prussian salaries and pensions, not paid by the French	14,321,097·19
Loss through inferior coinage	6,430,870·00
Confiscated timber, minerals, &c., belonging to the State	23,400,083·18
Prussian property confiscated in Warsaw	63,821,088·90
Confiscated trust funds of orphans and minors	7,538,636·89
Total	1,129,374,217·50

Losses from November 5, 1808, to March 1813.

	Francs
Maintenance of French garrisons in Stettin, Kustrin, and Glogau	37,973,951·00
Cash contributions	103,914,318·58
Goods supplied	94,628,574·00
Cost of maintaining French army on the march to and from Russia	309,430,000·00
Total	545,946,843·58
Grand total	1,675,321,061·08

Daru estimated Prussia's net income at 88,000,000 francs per year, while Napoleon stated it more correctly at 73,000,000 francs. Even that figure exceeded Prussia's real income by about 7,000,000 francs. It follows that Napoleon drew out of Prussia in money, goods, and services a sum equivalent to the gross income of about twenty years.

The downfall of 1806 caused Prussia to change her policy in two directions. Her rulers found it necessary to alter completely the national organisation and form of government and to adopt a new policy towards Austria. The vicious Cabinet government through an incompetent King assisted by irresponsible secretaries was abolished. The King and his ministers henceforth worked hand in hand. As the tyrannical institutions of Frederickian

times had estranged the people, a more liberal form of government was introduced, the serfs were converted into landowning peasants, and the army was converted from a professional into a national force. Every citizen was made liable to military service. Having lost the bulk of her territories, Prussia found it necessary to rely upon Austria for support, and with Austria's help Prussia recovered her independence in the wars of 1813–14. However, as soon as the Prussian soil had been liberated the Prussian government resumed its traditional policy of hostility to Austria. Friedrich von Gentz, the secretary of the Vienna Congress, described Prussia's attitude and policy during the Congress as follows in his memoir of February 12, 1815, which will be found in Metternich's papers :

Prussia only brought to the Congress an immoderate desire for extending her possessions at the expense of all other States, and without regard to any principle of justice or even of decency. This passion for conquest had its origin neither in the character of the King nor of his Prime Minister, for the King, although below mediocrity in intellect and judgment, is yet at bottom a good sort of man, and Chancellor Hardenberg is one of the best that ever existed. But the policy of the Prussian Court does not depend after all either on the King or upon Hardenberg. Its policy, founded and pursued during the last century, has found fresh support in the general enthusiasm of the nation, in the energy of the army, and in the irresistible power which a certain number of distinguished military men exercise at present on the Cabinet.

Since the moment of Prussia's resurrection, the principal object of this party has been the total acquisition of Saxony. Being neither able nor willing to antagonise Russia, they have transferred all their designs to Germany. However, the acquisition of Saxony, notwithstanding its vastness, would for them be but the beginning of a grand series of political operations, by which they hope sooner or later to unite to Prussia the largest part of the north of Germany,

to efface the influence of Austria, and to put themselves at the head of the whole German Confederation.

The forecast of the far-seeing Gentz has come true. The war of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with France, are milestones on the road on which Prussia endeavoured to advance towards the complete domination of all Germany, including Austria ; and the war of 1914 was to bring about the consummation of that policy which the Hohenzollerns have steadfastly pursued for centuries. The present war was likely to result in Austria falling completely under Germany's domination whether Germany was victorious or whether she was beaten.

Men and nations rise to greatness by their struggles and by their sufferings. Adversity is a most excellent teacher. The Prussian national character has been immensely strengthened by the terrible sufferings endured between 1806 and 1813. Iron is tried by fire, and nations by their sufferings. The experiences of that period have not only created the determination and the will to victory of Prusso-Germany, but they have aroused that undying hatred of France which was manifested both in 1870 and in the present war. That savage hatred was caused probably not so much by defeat, national humiliation, and loss of territory, which, after all, signify but little to the individual, but by the tyranny with which the French armies ruled Prussia during seven years, and by the enormous and exhaustive extortions which they practised. Germany has, with incredible short-sightedness, applied the regime under which she suffered from 1806 to 1813 not merely to Belgium and France, but to all the countries with which she is at war, and as far as possible to neutral nations as well. She has thereby steeled the character and determination of her enemies and has sown the seed of hatred which will last for many decades, and perhaps for centuries.

Prussia owed her humiliation and sufferings in Napoleon's

time to the incompetence of the two kings who succeeded Frederick the Great, and who vainly strove to act in the manner of that great man. Great men are frequently fatal to nations, not only because they incur great risks, but also because their example invites their incompetent successors to embark upon a policy of adventure. It is dangerous for small men to step into the shoes of a great genius. The war of 1806 was caused by Prussia's duplicity and faithlessness, and its direct cause was a Prussian challenge addressed to Napoleon. Frederick William the Third sent to the French Emperor an unacceptable and offensively worded ultimatum because he, and many of his supporters, believed that Prussia was still as irresistible as she had been under the great Frederick. Queen Louise, the Prussian King's consort, sadly said to Napoleon: 'La mémoire du grand Frédéric nous a fait égarer. Nous nous crûmes pareils à lui, et nous ne le sommes pas.'

One-man government established Prussia's greatness, and one-man government brought about her downfall. Frederick William the Third, unlike his father, was only dull, weak, and vain, but not vicious. The people remained loyal to him and deplored his misfortunes. They considered that Napoleon, not he, was responsible for the war. Had Frederick William the Third possessed the character of his father, or had the war with France been caused by criminal recklessness on his part, they might have risen against him and have driven him out of the country. Prussia of 1806 easily forgave Frederick William the Third for the national disaster which was caused only by weakness and lack of judgment on the part of the King. Will the Germans and the Prussians as easily forgive William the Second if the war should end in Germany's downfall and if the people should find out that it was brought about by the Emperor's recklessness? Prussia's outworn institutions were modernised in consequence of Jena and Auerstadt. Defeat led to the liberalising of the Prussian government and of the

national institutions. A defeat in the present war should have similar consequences. It should democratise Germany and might make it a republic.

Prusso-Germany has waxed great at Austria's expense. For centuries she has persistently pursued a policy hostile to Austria. The present war may result in Austria's disappearance as an independent State. The Dual Monarchy may become a German vassal, unless, indeed, the Habsburgs should make a separate peace with the Allies stipulating that for the Slavonic, Italian, and Roumanian territories which they are bound to lose in accordance with the Allies' declaration of policy made to President Wilson, they should be given Silesia and the South German States as compensation. Silesia was Austrian until 1740, and the South German States followed Austria's lead until 1862. If the war should bring about such a rearrangement Austria might once more become the predominant power in Germany, and the war would have destroyed what Prussia has won during centuries. The Emperor Carl of Austria may revenge himself upon Frederick William I and Frederick the Great. The far-seeing Mirabeau wrote in his book,' De la Monarchie Prussienne,' which was published in 1788:

> Si jamais un prince peu sensé monte sur ce trône, on verra crouler soudainement, sans cause apparente, ce géant formidable; et l'Europe étonnée n'apercevra plus à sa place qu'un pygmée débile.

His prophecy came true in 1806, and it may be confirmed by the result of the present war.

CHAPTER XIII

DEMOCRATIC GERMANY—A GLANCE INTO THE PAST AND INTO THE FUTURE [1]

WHILE the other heads of State at war with Germany accepted the challenge of that Power without drawing a distinction between the German Government and the German people, President Wilson in his address of April 2 discriminated sharply and most emphatically between the German nation and its rulers. He significantly declared that the German Government, not the German people, was at war with the Government *and* people of the United States, that the Americans had not quarrelled with the German people, that they had no hostile feelings towards them, that they fought for the liberation of all peoples, the German peoples included, that they were sincere friends of the German people. The passages in which these discriminations occur are so interesting, so important, and so full of meaning that it seems worth while to give them in full. The President stated:

With a profound sense of the solemn, even the tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that Congress declare the recent course of the *Imperial German Government* to be in fact nothing less than war *against the Government and people of the United States*; that it formally accept the

[1] From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1917,

status of a belligerent which is thus thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps, not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence, but also to exert all its power and to employ its resources to *bring the Government of the German Empire to terms*, and end the war. . . .

We have not quarrelled with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon, as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days, when people were nowhere consulted by their rulers, and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or little groups of ambitious men, who were accustomed to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools. . . .

One of the things that has served to convince us that *Prussian autocracy was not, and could never be, our friend*, is that from the very outset of the present war it filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of Government, with spies, and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of council and our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. . . .

Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them, because *we know that their source lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us*—who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as ourselves—*but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing.* . . .

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that *in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend*, and that in the presence of its organised power, *always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic Governments of the world.*

We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. *We* are glad, now that we see facts with no veil

of false pretence about them, to *fight* thus *for the ultimate peace of the world, for the liberation of its peoples—the German peoples included*—the rights of nations great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon trusted foundations of political liberty. . . .

We are, let me say again, sincere friends of the German people and shall desire nothing so much as an early re-establishment of intimate relations to our mutual advantage. However hard it may be for them for the time being to believe this, it is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present Government through all these bitter months because of that friendship, exercising patience and forbearance which otherwise would have been impossible.

President Wilson's proclamation is addressed not merely to the United States, but to the whole world, and perhaps particularly to the German nation itself. It is a terrible indictment of the German Emperor and the Prusso-German Government. It practically absolves the German people of all guilt in the outbreak of the present war and the calculated atrocity with which it has been conducted. Special conditions prevail in the United States. According to many German writers more than twelve million Americans are German-Americans. In reality only 2,501,181 people born in Germany were domiciled in the United States when the census of 1910 was taken. Still, the number of Germans in the United States is large, and in certain portions of the country it is very large. However, it would be a mistake to believe that President Wilson distinguished between the German Government and the German people and put all the guilt on the former merely in order to conciliate and to carry with him the German-Americans. Although the desire not to wound their feelings may have influenced his action to some extent, I believe that President Wilson acted rather as a statesman than as a politician in making

this discrimination. He considered the German nation the tool of the Emperor and the governing class, and he desired to encourage the former to rise against the latter and to convert Germany into a democracy by a revolution. That this was President Wilson's aim is shown by many weighty sentences contained in his proclamation.

It has been asked whether the German people are fit for democratic rule, whether they are likely to rebel against the men who have misguided them and who are responsible for the present war. Many have answered this question in the negative. They have declared that the Germans are a servile race which has never revolted during the whole course of its history, and that they are therefore not fit for self-government. This argument seems based upon an insufficient knowledge of German history and of the German national character.

By nature, history, and tradition the Germans are democrats. The character of most nations has remained curiously stable through centuries and centuries. Although alien races may have swept over the land or have settled in it, the character of its inhabitants has in many cases remained so strangely similar that one would almost believe that it was formed by permanent local influences, by the prevailing climatic, geographical, and geological factors. For instance, the modern French, as Alfred Fouillée and other psychologists have pointed out, bear the same character that the ancient Gauls had two thousand years ago. Cæsar described them as changeable in council, fond of revolutions, easily carried away by false rumours, rash in action, liable to act on the spur of the moment, easily elated and easily depressed, ready to go to war for an idea, fond of adventure, generous, hospitable, frank, kindly, light-hearted, unstable, vain, attracted by glamour, possessing great acuteness of mind, being fond of jokes, attracted by novelty, full of curiosity, cultivating eloquence and possessing an astonishing facility for talking and for being carried away by words.

Cæsar particularly described the *élan* of the French soldiers. Strabo described the Gauls as nervous, fond of fighting, simple-hearted. He also mentions that they are easily elated when victorious and as easily depressed when defeated. As they act spontaneously, without logic, they often fail in their enterprises. Flavius Vopiscus described the Gauls as the most turbulent nation in the world, ever ready to change their rulers and government, ever in search of perilous adventures.

If we wish to understand the character of the Germans we should not merely study the Germans of to-day and of yesterday, but should study the evolution of the German character since the earliest times. Such study will show that the Germans were originally a democratic nation, and that only in recent times their character was affected and falsified, but was scarcely permanently altered, by the rulers of the House of Hohenzollern. The earliest and the best description of the Germans, a description which is generally considered to be reliable, is furnished by Tacitus in his celebrated book on the Germans. He writes :

In the election of kings they have regard to descent ; in that of generals to valour. Their kings have not an absolute or unlimited power ; and their generals command less through the force of authority, than of example. If they are daring, adventurous, and conspicuous in action, they procure obedience from the admiration they inspire. None, however, but the priests are permitted to judge offenders, to inflict bonds or stripes ; so that chastisement appears not as an act of military discipline, but as punishment by the god whom they suppose present with warriors. . . .

On affairs of smaller moment, the chiefs consult ; on those of greater importance, the whole community ; yet with this circumstance, that what is referred to the decision of the people is first maturely discussed by the chiefs. . . .

An inconvenience produced by their liberty is that they do not all assemble at a stated time, as if it were in obedience

to a command, but two or three days are lost in the delays of convening. When they all think fit, they sit down armed. Silence is proclaimed by the priests, who have on this occasion a coercive power. Then the king, or chief, and such others as are conspicuous for age, birth, military renown, or eloquence, are heard ; and gain attention rather from their ability to persuade, than their authority to command. . . .

The chiefs fight for victory ; the companions for their chief. . . .

They proceed to convivial parties, in which it is no disgrace to pass days and nights, without intermission, in drinking. The frequent quarrels which arise amongst them, when intoxicated, sometimes terminate in abusive language, but more frequently in blood. In their feasts they generally deliberate on the reconcilement of enemies, on family alliances, on the appointment of chiefs, and finally on peace and war ; conceiving that at no time the soul is more opened to sincerity or warmed to heroism. . . .

Their drink is a liquor prepared from barley or wheat, brought by fermentation to a certain resemblance to wine.

German conviviality is exactly now as it was two thousand years ago, but Germany's political organisation no longer resembles that which prevailed in Tacitus's time. Then the Germans possessed free democracies presided over by elected kings. Commenting on the passage, ' On affairs of smaller moment the chiefs consult ; on those of greater importance the whole community,' the celebrated Montesquieu wrote, in the chapter on the English Constitution in his ' Esprit des Lois,' that the British Constitution had obviously been evolved in the forests of Germany :

Si l'on veut lire l'admirable ouvrage de Tacite sur les mœurs des Germains, on verra que c'est d'eux que les Anglais ont tiré l'idée de leur gouvernement politique. Ce beau système a été trouvé dans les bois.

The early German tribes continued to be ruled by elected kings. The tribe of the Franks became supreme among the

German tribes under the guidance of some extremely able rulers, and the greatest of these, Charlemagne, established by conquest a vast Central-European Empire, became the protector of the Pope, and was crowned Roman Emperor in Rome in the year 800. Thus 'the Holy Roman Empire of German nationality' was established. It was considered to be the direct successor of the ancient Roman Empire. The conception arose and the conviction became firmly settled in men's minds that the peace and happiness of the world required one faith and one government, a universal Church and a universal monarchy. The German Emperor, when crowned at Rome, significantly received a double crown *urbis et orbis*. Until 1806 the official title of the German Emperor was *Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus*. Charlemagne was considered the direct successor of the Roman Cæsars, of which he was currently described to be the sixty-eighth. Exactly as the Pope claimed to be the overlord of all the bishops, so the German-Roman Emperor claimed to be the king of kings, the overlord of all kings throughout the world. The old Roman Empire had scarcely known the right of succession by descent. If we study Roman history we find that only three of the Cæsars were followed by their sons. Hence it was only natural that the great spiritual and temporal monarchies which succeeded the Roman Empire became also elective. Exactly as the Pope at Rome was elected by the representatives of the Church, so the King-Emperor of the Roman-German universal monarchy was elected by the representatives of the nation. The old system of choosing rulers by universal election, by acclamation, had to be simplified to avoid delay and quarrels. Owing to the strength of tribal feeling monarchy was not considered to be the right of any one of the German tribes. All laid claim to it. In course of time the idea arose that the four largest tribes, the Franks, the Swabians, the Saxons, and the Bavarians, were particularly entitled to elect the German king through

their representatives. These four leading tribes furnished the four great officers of the imperial household, and in course of time the German Constitution became settled in this way, that the four most powerful and most representative individuals of Germany were given the right of election. They formed the majority of the seven electors of the Holy Roman Empire. The remaining three were the leading princes of the Church in Germany, the bishops of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne.

In course of time the fiefs which had been granted for life for great services rendered became hereditary. A powerful landed nobility arose which strove to increase its power at the cost of the Emperor, their overlord. Hence it became the settled policy of the electors to choose for Emperor not a powerful prince, but a weak one, for a strong monarch would endanger their privileges and their independence. Lord Bryce correctly stated in his excellent book, 'The Holy Roman Empire':

> The chief object of the magnates was to keep the monarch in his present state of helplessness. . . . Rudolf (of Habsburg) was chosen because his private resources were too slender to make him an object of disquiet. Till the expense which the crown entailed had began to prove ruinous to its wearer, the electors preferred to confer it on some petty prince, such as were Rudolf and Adolf of Nassau and Günther of Schwartzburg, seeking when they could to keep it from settling in one family. They bound the newly elected monarch to respect all their present immunities, including those which they had just extorted as the price of their votes; they checked all his attempts to recover lost lands or rights, they ventured at last (in 1399) to depose their anointed head, Wenzel, King of Bohemia, whose dissipated life and neglect of his duties certainly justified their displeasure.

The German Emperors, being weak and finding themselves opposed and hampered by their nominal vassals, endeavoured to find a counterpoise in the wealthy and

flourishing German towns which suffered from the exactions of the landed nobility. The so-called 'free towns' were the strongholds of German wealth, intelligence, and democracy. The democratic character of their government may be seen from numerous contemporary documents, particularly from the most trustworthy reports of the Venetian Ambassadors, who at the time were the ablest diplomats in the world. The Venetian Ambassador Quirini reported on his return from the Court of Maximilian in 1507 as follows:

There are in Germany about a hundred free towns, of which twenty-eight belong to the Swabian League, sixty-two to the great league of Danzig and Lübeck [the Hanseatic League], while the rest lie in the region of the Rhine. . . .

As for the government of the free towns, each one rules itself by its council, to which are admitted citizens, traders who are no citizens, and artisans; yet not all the members of these classes are included in the council, for the number varies with the size of the place, and changes from time to time. These councils appoint the magistrates, who administer justice for the time being, and, moreover, regulate the revenues and public affairs of the town precisely as if it was a free and independent State.

Some of the towns owe their freedom to privileges granted by the Emperor for deeds of valour in the struggle of the Empire against the infidels, who were earlier very troublesome. Others gained their freedom by giving a sum of money to the temporal lord or bishop who held them, and who consented accordingly to cede to the town the territory belonging to it. So many towns have gained their freedom in these two ways during the period that the Germans have enjoyed control of the Empire, that they now number nearly a hundred. In order to maintain their freedom they are accustomed to unite themselves together in leagues for mutual protection and to oppose those princes who would subjugate them. They receive into their leagues those princes of the Empire who wish to join them, whether

ecclesiastical or secular. The leagues are temporary, and are continued or changed from time to time as suits their members.

The great Machiavelli, who, about the same time, travelled in Germany as the representative of the powerful republic of Florence, gave a similar description of the wealth and power of the self-governing German towns and of their proud and independent citizens.

The aboriginal democratic spirit of the Germans which Tacitus had described strongly asserted itself during the development of feudalism. The absolute power which princes and barons exercised in the rural parts was counterbalanced by a democratically chosen Emperor on the one hand and by democratically governed towns on the other. Each town was fortified and was defended by its armed citizens. Most were strong enough to resist single-handed the absolute lords in the neighbourhood, and their combined strength was so great that they could deal successfully not only with the leagues of robber barons and small princes, but even with powerful kings. At first leagues of free towns were formed for securing the highways of Germany. Later on the Hanseatic League was created for defending the rights of the democratically governed towns on the sea as well. The united merchants of Danzig, Lübeck, Hamburg, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Strasburg, &c., created by voluntary contributions fleets which dominated for some considerable time the Baltic and the North Sea, and which defeated the northern kings. The record of the Hanseatic League shows that the Germans were able to practise self-government successfully at a very early period.

If democracy means willing co-operation for general purposes, if it means government by men of equal authority through their elected representatives, Germany was democratic at the top and at the bottom, in respect of the King-Emperor and of the towns. However, absolutism existed

simultaneously with democracy and with self-government. It was exercised by the powerful feudal lords in the country and by the almost equally powerful and equally absolute representatives of the Church. Bishops and other ecclesiastical potentates ruled in their districts often as tyrannously as the temporal lords around them, and oppressed and plundered the poor and helpless. The German Reformation, which began about 1520, was not only a spiritual revolt, but a revolt against temporal tyranny as well. Lord Bryce rightly says in his 'Holy Roman Empire' that it was 'a revolt against the principle of authority in all its forms, erecting a standard of civil as well as of religious liberty.' Princely misgovernment had become as intolerable in Germany as clerical abuse. Martin Luther wrote in 1523:

Since the beginning of the world a wise prince has been a very rare bird, and a pious prince has been still rarer. Princes are, as a rule, the greatest fools and the worst rascals on earth. Therefore one should always expect the worst from them and look forward to little good. They are God's executioners and torturers. They understand nothing except how to flay the poor and to make a game of God's word. Such men were formerly called rascals. Now they wish to be called pious Christian princes. God has struck them with blindness, and He will make an end of them as He will with the spiritual junkers. For the common people are learning to reason, and the plague of princes is becoming hateful to the common people. I fear they cannot be pacified unless the princes behave in a princely manner and commence to govern with good sense and justice. One will not, one cannot, one must not tolerate their tyrannies and their wilfulness any longer. God will not suffer it. The world is no longer a place in which the people can be driven and chased about like cattle.

Two years later, in 1525, the Great Peasant War broke out. The ill-treated German serfs in the South of Germany wished to be free men as were their neighbours in Switzerland

who had freed themselves from Habsburg rule by a successful revolt. At first the peasant armies were successful. They destroyed more than a thousand castles and religious houses. In many cases the townsfolk assisted them against their oppressors. Their grievances were not only economic but political as well. Among the demands made in their proclamations, the demand for justice and freedom was always prominent. For instance, the peasants of south-west Germany claimed: 'None shall any longer be in a state of serfdom; none shall obey any longer any prince or laws but such as pleaseth him, and that shall be the Emperor; justice and right shall be as of old time; should there be one having authority who displeaseth us, we would have the power to set up in his place another who pleaseth us.' Mr. Bax stated correctly in his 'History of the Peasants' War in Germany': 'In the uprising known as the Peasants' War there is more than one strain to be observed, though all turns on the central ideas of equality, economic reform, and political reorganisation.' The Peasants' War and the Reformation occurred simultaneously because the democratic German nation revolted at the same time against the oppression of the aristocracy and of the Church. Unfortunately the revolting peasants were badly led. Owing to their ignorance and dissensions they were defeated by the united feudal lords. The vastness of the peasant revolt may be seen by the fact that, according to the *Berner Chronik*, more than 130,000 peasants died either in fighting or at the hands of the executioners, for the victorious lords took terrible vengeance on the vanquished.

The Thirty Years' War, which lasted from 1618 to 1648, which devastated all Germany and converted the most flourishing part of the country into a desert, dealt a fearful blow to German self-government and democracy. During that gigantic struggle, in the course of which Germany's population was reduced to one-half, if not one-third, the wealth and power of the commercial and industrial towns

was completely destroyed. They could no longer defend their rights and their independence with their armed citizens, especially as the war had led to the rise of powerful professional standing armies, with the assistance of which the princes could easily overcome the opposition of the armed burghers.

The peace of Münster and Osnabrück of 1648 reduced the rights of the Emperor to the utmost. The individual princes, who had been the Emperor's subordinates, were given complete independence, and the result was that they strove to make themselves supreme in the Empire by subjecting its territories to themselves. Among the ablest rulers of the time was Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, who ruled from 1640 to 1688. Recognising the importance of a powerful army for making Brandenburg Prussia an important State, he resolved to create a large standing military force. Democratic self-government prevailed in his dominions. As the self-governing towns and the estates endeavoured to defend their privileges and rights, as they refused to be arbitrarily taxed for the creation of a huge army, a conflict arose between the Elector and the citizens. Frederick William ruthlessly destroyed local self-government, and did not shrink from breaking the legitimate opposition of the burghers by employing his army against them and by delivering protesting burgomasters to the executioner. During his long rule the local Diets were destroyed. The nation became a nation of serfs, and his grandson, King Frederick William the First, the father of Frederick the Great, abolished between 1713 and 1740 the few remaining rights and privileges of the towns and the nobility. Under his rule self-government of the towns, even with regard to trivial local affairs, was abolished. Permission for building operations costing more than six thalers had to be given by the King in person.

The Hohenzollern rulers from the Great Elector onward destroyed the ancient democratic institutions of their country

with the utmost ruthlessness and brutality. Brandenburg-Prussia became the most autocratic State in the world. The great material success of the Prussian State caused many German sovereigns to imitate the Hohenzollern policy of absolutism. But as they acted with greater respect for old-established rights the old democratic spirit of Germany remained active in the non-Prussian States, in South Germany, in Austria, and in the Rhenish province, which became Prussian only in 1815. Herein lies the reason that the south and the west of Germany are far more democratic and far more tolerant than the old-Prussian north.

Ruthless oppression by sovereigns disposing of irresistible power had weakened, but had by no means killed, the ancient democratic spirit of the German people. The Prussians, though proud of Frederick the Great's achievements, sighed under their yoke. They wished for less glory and more liberty, and rejoiced at his death. In the middle of the eighteenth century the spirit of liberty, which had been suppressed by rulers such as the Great Elector, Louis the Fourteenth, and Peter the Great and their successors, was revived, especially in France. Intellectual Germany thoroughly approved of the ideals of the French philosophers and viewed with cordial sympathy the attempts of the French people to break their shackles. The French Revolution of 1789 was greeted with delight by the leading Germans, among them Goethe and Schiller. They had suffered so much under dynastic tyranny that love of liberty had become stronger within them than love of country. They had become admirers of a liberal cosmopolitanism. When the armies of revolutionary France crossed the Rhine into Germany bringing with them the promise of liberty, fraternity, and equality and the maxim 'war to the castle and peace to the cottage,' they were received by the Germans with joy as friends and brothers, as heroes and as deliverers from an intolerable yoke.

Prussia, which had become a nation of obedient, soulless

serfs, was easily defeated by Napoleon in 1806, and the people had so much become accustomed to passive obedience, they had so largely lost the natural instincts of the citizen, that they looked upon the defeat of the Prussian army with comparative indifference. No one had been ordered to oppose the invader, so nobody stirred. The Prussian people became hostile to France only when they began to suffer from the exactions of the French armies. Stein and other Prussian patriots recognised that Prussia could be rejuvenated only by democratising its institutions, by attaching the people to the State by bonds of affection and of interest. The serfs were converted into landowning peasants, the professions, commerce, and industries were freed from their mediaeval restrictions, and the necessary enthusiasm for fighting Napoleon in 1813 was created by the formal promise made to the people that it would receive after the war the representative and democratic institutions for which it had clamoured for a long time. That promise, which was solemnly made by King Frederick William the Third before the war and on September 1, 1815, and which was embodied in Article XIII of the German Federal Act of June 8, 1815, at the Vienna Congress, was not fulfilled. After the overthrow of Napoleon a period of reaction began throughout Germany, but although Germany was exhausted by the Napoleonic War the people refused to abandon their claim for constitutional government. The democratic spirit of the people found eloquent advocates in Germany's leading men, who demanded the introduction of democratic, constitutional rule. The reactionary Government tried to stifle the demand for self-government by brutal persecution. Among the men who were disgraced, imprisoned, hounded out of the country or driven into exile or rebellion were the founders of modern Prussia, men such as Stein, Gneisenau, Arndt, Jahn, W. von Humboldt, Beyme, Boyen ; the most eminent scientists such as the brothers Grimm, Dahlmann, Gervinus, Ewald, Mommsen, Rotteck, Welcker, Virchow, poets and

musicians such as Freiligrath, Heine, Wagner, Kinkel, Herwegh, Laube, Hoffman von Fallersleben, Börne, Dingelstedt, Geibel, Fritz Reuter, and many others.

The protracted wars of the Napoleonic period were as unfavourable to the development of democracy in Germany as the Thirty Years' War had been. Dissatisfaction with governmental absolutism led at last in 1848 to a revolution which broke out simultaneously in Berlin, Vienna, Dresden, Prague, and elsewhere, and it is highly significant and worth noting, that the Germans did not take the initiative in revolting against their leaders, but that they merely followed the example of the French. The Paris Revolution of 1848 was the signal to the democrats in Germany. It showed them the way. History may repeat itself.

The Revolution of 1848 was comparatively a mild one in Germany. The grievances of the people were not very great. Peace and quiet were restored by certain concessions to the popular demands, which, however, were gradually whittled away. The great successes achieved under Prince Bismarck's guidance re-established the prestige of absolute government in Germany, weakened the democratic party, and to some extent discredited it. In Austria, on the other hand, where the people had suffered far more seriously from governmental oppression, where the sense of injustice and of bitterness was far greater, the Revolution of 1848 assumed far larger proportions, and it was overcome only with difficulty and at vast cost in human lives.

The details given in these pages show that the oft-heard assertion that the Germans are an undemocratic and servile race, which has never revolted during the whole course of its history, which is unfit for self-government, is untrue. History teaches us that the German race is as democratic as is the British race. The history of the German towns, as that of Germanic Switzerland and Holland, shows the prevalence of a democratic spirit which could temporarily be suppressed but never be destroyed. The German model

towns, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, are still self-governing republics. It is also wrong to assert that the Germans have never revolted. Luther's Reformation was a political, social, and a religious revolt which in magnitude, success, and world-historical importance stands probably above the English Revolution against Charles the First and the French Revolution of 1789. The Germans did not revolt successfully in modern times, but then they had comparatively little cause to revolt.

If we study the causes of successful revolutions we find that they are two: political dissatisfaction and economic distress. They were found combined in the English Revolution, the French Revolution, the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and the recent Russian Revolution. People will stand oppression patiently and they will stand hunger, but they will not easily stand both combined. If the Germans should in due course suffer simultaneously from hunger and defeat, they may well turn against their rulers and call them to account.

It may be argued that although the Germans possessed a highly developed form of self-government in the past, that although self-government was far more advanced in Germany in the sixteenth century than it was in other countries, the German character has changed in the course of the last few centuries, that the Germans, and especially the North Germans, are so well drilled and disciplined that they have become unfit for democratic rule. In the past, however, the North Germans were the most democratic among the German people. That may be seen from the history of the Hanseatic League. And as to the present, if democratic government means willing co-operation for general purposes, if it means government by men of equal authority through their elected representatives, then the men of modern Germany have shown that they are eminently fit for democracy, for in no country in the world is co-operation more highly developed than it is in Germany.

The German co-operative societies, which had 5,555,803 members in 1912, the German trade unions, which had 4,052,867 members in the same year, the German associations of salary-earners with 623,840 members, the Social Democratic Party, which in 1912 polled 4,250,329 votes, and the gigantic professional associations of agriculturists, peasants, industrialists, &c., are great and significant monuments of German self-discipline and of an ability to co-operate willingly for a general aim without directions from the authorities. The fact that these gigantic, well-organised, highly disciplined, and most efficient associations are particularly strongly represented in North Germany and Prussia shows that the North Germans are at least as fit for democratic rule as are the more easy-going South Germans.

Having made a special study of German affairs and of Anglo-German relations, I had foreseen ever since 1900 that the Emperor's policy was likely to involve Germany in a world-war. Hence I warned this country against a war with Germany for many years in this Review and elsewhere. Moreover, in considering the internal position in Germany and the consequences of Germany's provocative policy, I had come to the conclusion that a war which had been brought about by the Emperor's ambition might lead to a revolution in Germany. I wrote, for instance, in August 1911, at the time of the Agadir crisis, in an article entitled 'German Designs in Africa,' which had the honour of receiving the first place in this Review:

> War has been brought within the limits of vision. It is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course which in a very short time will bring her into a collision not only with France, but with several Great Powers; and as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive alliance relating only to Europe, Germany may find herself deserted by her Allies in the hour of trouble. . . .

Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course which Germany is steering at the present moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason.

Immediately on the outbreak of the present war I wrote an article entitled 'The Ultimate Ruin of Germany,' which appeared in September 1914 in this Review, in which I once more foretold that Germany's defeat might lead to a revolution. I stated:

The question now arises whether the docile Germans will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two-fold shape. Conceivably, the Southern States will, after a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German Emperor. The Empire may be dissolved. . . . On the other hand, it is possible that there will be a general rising of the people against their rulers. The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied with their form of government. A well-educated people does not like to be governed like children. An absolutism thinly disguised by parliamentary forms is tolerable only so long as it is successful and as the people are prosperous. . . . Failure of the Government in the present war will make absolute government impossible in Germany. If Germany should experience a serious defeat, she may either become a strictly limited monarchy on the English model or a republic. However, as both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are equally responsible for the crime of the present war, it may well happen that the German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German republic is certainly within the limit of possibility. In a fatal hour the German Emperor has apparently destroyed not only the entire life-work of Bismarck and Moltke, but part of the work of

Frederick the Great, who acquired Silesia and Poland; and possibly he has destroyed his own dynasty as well. . . .

Many who consider the possibility of a revolution in Germany imagine that it will be brought about by the huge Social Democratic Party. They are wrong. In Germany, where Parliament is powerless, a revolution cannot be made by a single party, however strong. It can be brought about only if the bulk of the nation, regardless of party, is determined to change the existing form of government and if the army is with it. A serious German defeat would give a fatal blow to the privileges of the ruling aristocracy and of the military caste and to the prosperity of the great industrial and commercial middle-class. Therefore it seems likely that in case of defeat the aristocracy, the army, and the liberal middle-class may turn against the Emperor. Moreover, whereas the masses of the people would probably reproach the Emperor for his rashness in involving the nation in the present war, the aristocracy and the army might reproach him for his lack of energy and resolution. They have frequently complained that the German Emperor has, owing to lack of resolution, failed to make Germany supreme in Europe and the world. They have asserted that Germany should have attacked France in 1905, at the time of the first Morocco crisis, when the Russian army had been defeated by Japan, when France was totally unprepared for war and was still divided by the Dreyfus scandal, and when France and England were still somewhat estranged owing to the Fashoda affair. Moreover, they have reproached the Emperor and the Chancellor for losing at the beginning of the present war several precious days in negotiations which enabled Belgium to provide for the defence of Liége, and thus prevented Germany from administering a knock-out blow to France by rushing through Belgium and seizing Paris.

President Wilson has sharply discriminated between the responsibilities of the German Government and of the people. He has placed all the guilt upon the Emperor and his Government, and has absolved the nation of practically all complicity. Whether such discrimination should be made or not is, after all, not so much a question of abstract justice as one of practical utility. If no useful purpose is served, such discrimination is worthless. If it should shorten the war it is extremely valuable.

President Wilson is a student of history and of statesmanship, on which he has written some valuable works. Probably he discriminated between the German Government and the German people, and placed all the responsibility for the outbreak of the war and its atrocious conduct upon the former, remembering the policy which was followed by the Allies in the war against Napoleon a century ago. Napoleon had been the idol of the French people, but in course of time the nation had become tired of the never-ending war and had come to doubt him. All longed for peace. Prince Metternich made skilful use of this situation. He issued in the name of the Allied sovereigns a proclamation that Europe had no quarrel with France, but only with Napoleon, that they were friends of the French people, and that they came to free the land from the incubus. Thousands of copies of this proclamation were distributed in France. Hence the French saw in the invading armies not enemies but their deliverers. Important towns readily surrendered, and the victorious sovereigns were loudly cheered when they entered Paris. By sharply discriminating between the Emperor Napoleon and the French people, and by placing the whole responsibility for the war on the former, the Allies had cut the ground from under Napoleon's feet, as the Emperor himself admitted in his captivity. The nation and many officers and soldiers became hostile to the man in whom they had been taught to see the sole cause of the war. Recruits refused to join the army. Officers disobeyed the

orders given. The necessary taxes could not be collected. Napoleon found himself in a hostile country, the head of an army but no longer the head of a nation. Every French defeat was greeted with joy by the people, and every French victory as a calamity. The public funds on the Paris Stock Exchange fell whenever a success of the French arms was announced and rose rapidly upon the news of a defeat. Perhaps the Germans will before long adopt a similar attitude towards the Emperor and his supporters.

The German people have no doubt begun to recognise the folly and wickedness of the present war. They must see that defeat is inevitable, and that it will bring about not only the weakening of the State, but that it will leave the nation impoverished and disgraced throughout the world. They must recognise that, owing to the criminal conduct of the war, not merely the German State but the German race has become an outlaw throughout the world, that the German people can rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the world only by repudiating the Emperor and their Government and by punishing the guilty.

In forecasting the weather and political developments so many incalculable factors influence events that one can speak only of probabilities. A revolution in Germany consequent upon defeat is not absolutely certain, but is highly probable in view of the historic character of the German nation. The German race is naturally democratic, and the events of the war have undoubtedly strengthened the democratic spirit to a very great extent. That may be seen by the concessions whereby the German Government tries vainly now to appease the people. What the German people require is not the reform of the Prussian franchise, but the direction of the policy of the State by their elected representatives. I think the German nation is too wise to allow again a single man, who may be a degenerate, a madman, a criminal, or merely a fool, to send millions of Germans to their death. Mr. Lloyd George said in his great

speech of April 12 with delightful brevity and irony: 'Prussia is no democracy. The Kaiser promises that she will be a democracy—after the war. I think he is right.' He and President Wilson have probably correctly forecast the future of Germany.

CHAPTER XIV

EXPOSÉ DU GOUVERNEMENT PRUSSIEN DES PRINCIPES SUR LESQUELS IL ROULE, AVEC QUELQUES RÉFLEXIONS POLITIQUES[1]

Pour se faire une idée générale de ce gouvernement il faut examiner en détail toutes les branches du gouvernement, et puis les combiner ensemble.

Je commence par les finances, qui sont comme les nerfs dans le corps humain, qui font mouvoir tous les membres.

Depuis la guerre, les revenus de l'État ont été prodigieusement augmentés, savoir: d'un million deux cent mille écus par l'acquisition de la Pomérellie, un million de tabac, cent mille de la banque, cinquante mille du bois, quatre cent mille des accises et péages, cent trente mille du sel de Schönebeck, cinquante-six mille du loto, au delà de deux cent mille écus par les nouveaux taux des bailliages, cent mille écus des bois; de sorte qu'à présent le total des revenus monte à vingt et un millions sept cent mille écus, dont, outre toutes les autres dépenses de l'État acquittées, cent quatre-vingt-sept mille soldats sont entretenus. Les dépenses décomptées, il reste tous les ans cinq millions sept cent mille écus, dont jusqu'ici deux millions ont été annuellement déposés dans le trésor, et trois millions sept cent mille écus ont été employés, soit aux fortifications, soit aux améliorations du pays, soit pour réparer des malheurs, ainsi qu'en subsides pour les Russes et en bâtiments. Mais

[1] This is the famous political testament of 1776.

la destination de ces cinq millions sept cent mille, en temps de guerre, est pour payer les extraordinaires des campagnes, qui montent chaque année à onze millions, de sorte que, cinq millions sept cent mille decomptés, reste à ajouter annuellement la somme de cinq millions trois cent mille écus. Cette somme doit être prise du trésor, qui est fourni de dix-neuf millions trois cent mille écus, outre quatre millions trois cent mille écus, ce qu'on appelle le petit trésor destiné à rendre l'armée mobile. Nous avons encore, d'ailleurs, quatre millions deux cent mille à Breslau, tout prêts pour acheter et ammasser les fourrages pour une armée de soixante mille hommes, et neuf cent mille dans la banque pour acheter du fourrage pour six semaines à Magdebourg ; en outre, la caisse de guerre doit avoir onze millions pour pouvoir payer en temps de guerre les regiments d'avance ; quatre millions s'y trouvent déjà, les autres y seront dans trois ans. Mais il faut remarquer que si l'on veut puiser tous les extraordinaires de guerre du trésor, on ne pourra durer que quatre campagnes, ce qui fait que de nécessité il faut s'emparer de la Saxe, ménager le plus que l'on peut le trésor, qui ne doit servir proprement qu'à remplir le vide de quelques provinces envahies par l'ennemi. Voilà le fond des choses, qui démontre qu'il faut user de la plus grande économie pour avoir le dernier écu en poche lorsqu'on négocie la paix. Cet argent, ces deux millions qui sortent tous les ans de la circulation en entrant dans le trésor, paraîtront une somme très-considerable ; mais ce qui justifie cette opération, c'est que la balance de commerce est en faveur de l'État de quatre millions quatre cent mille écus, de sorte que la circulation des espèces augmente encore dans le public annuellement de deux millions quatre cent mille écus. Cette balance était contre la Prusse à la mort du feu roi, où la monarchie perdait annuellement cinq cent mille écus par les importations. J'ai trouvé moyen, en établissant beaucoup de manufactures, et surtout à l'aide de la Silésie, de la mettre sur

l'état que je viens d'annoncer. C'est pourquoi il ne faut pas perdre les manufactures de vue ; par leur moyen, cette balance peut encore s'augmenter dans nos possessions actuelles de quelques cent mille écus. Mais ce qui importe surtout, c'est de conserver le bon ordre établi maintenant pour la régie des deniers publics et la surveillance sur toutes les caisses ; sans quoi le peuple paye beaucoup et le souverain est volé.

Des Magasins

Il y a ici un magasin de trente six mille winspels, dont on peut nourrir un an une armée de soixante mille hommes ; il y a un magasin pareil en Silésie pour le même nombre de troupes, et d'ailleurs un fonds de deux millions pour acheter des grains de la Pologne ; ce qui pourra fournir cent vingt mille winspels, par le moyen desquels le pays sera à l'abri de toute famine, et, en cas de guerre, avec le blé qu'il y a déjà, on aura de quoi faire trois campagnes.

De Wartenberg

Wartenberg a tous les ans quatre cent quarante mille écus d'épargne, qui sont employés en partie pour les armes, pour augmenter son dépôt, en partie pour l'artillerie, dont on a construit les canons pour la nouvelle forteresse de Silésie, et une réserve, à laquelle on travaille encore à présent, de quatre cents canons de réserve pour la campagne.

De l'Armée

La situation de cet État nous oblige d'entretenir beaucoup de troupes, car nos voisins sont l'Autriche, la Russie, la France et la Suède. Le pied de guerre est de deux cent vingt mille hommes, y compris les bataillons francs et l'augmentation dans la cavalerie. De ce nombre on pourra

mettre en campagne cent quatre-vingt mille hommes ; mais dès qu'il faut former trois armées, il saute aux yeux que nous n'en avons pas trop en comparaison de nos voisins. Je crois que la discipline doit rester sur le pied où elle se trouve, ainsi que les évolutions introduites, à moins que la guerre ne change, car alors il n'y a de parti qu'à se plier aux circonstances et à changer avec elles ; mais pour égaler les enemies ou les surpasser il faut que ce soit par l'ordre et par la discipline, encourager les officiers et les distinguer, pour qu'une noble émulation les porte à surpasser leurs adversaires qu'il ont à combattre. Si le souverain ne se mêle pas lui-même du militaire, et s'il n'en donne pas l'exemple, tout est fini. Si l'on prefère les fainéants de cour au militaire, on verra que tout le monde préférera cette fainéantise au laborieux métier des armes, et alors, au lieu que nos officiers sont nobles, il faudra avoir recours aux roturiers, ce qui serait le premier pas vers la décadence et la chute de l'armée. Nous n'avons à présent que soixante-dix citoyens par compagnie ; il ne faut point s'écarter de ce principe, pour ménager le pays, qui, par l'augmentation de la population, pourra fournir des ressources ou recrues, si la guerre le rend nécessaire. Les forteresses sont en bon état, à l'exception de Stettin, dont le plan est tout fait. Il faudrait miner toute l'enceinte de Magdebourg. La partie dans laquelle nous sommes le plus faibles est celle du génie. Il nous faudrait encore trente bons officiers ingénieurs ; mais la difficulté est de les trouver. Les mineurs sont bons. Il faudrait également augmenter le nombre des quartiers-maîtres, parce que, supposé trois armées, leur service demande plus d'habiles gens que nous n'en avons. Notre population est de cinq millions deux cent mille âmes, dont quatre-vingt-dix mille à peu près sont soldats. Cette proportion peut aller ; mais il ne faut pas que l'on prenne des cantons plus de huit cent quarante par régiment d'infanterie et quatre cents par régiment de cavalerie.

De la Politique

Un des premiers principes de la politique est de tâcher de s'allier à celui de ses voisins qui peut porter à l'État les coups les plus dangereux. C'est par cette raison que nous sommes en alliance avec la Russie, parce qu'elle nous rend le dos libre de côté de la Prusse, et que, tant que cette liaison dure, nous n'avons pas à craindre que la Suède ose nous attaquer en Poméranie. Les temps peuvent changer, et la bizarrerie des conjonctures peut obliger à prendre d'autres engagements ; mais jamais on ne trouvera avec les autres puissances l'équivalent des avantages que l'on trouve avec la Russie. Les troupes françaises ne valent rien, et les Français sont accoutumés à ne secourir que faiblement leurs alliés ; et les Anglais, faits pour payer des subsides, sacrifient leurs alliés, à la paix, pour favoriser leurs propres intérêts. Je ne parle point de la maison d'Autriche, avec laquelle il paraît presque impossible que des liens solides se forment. S'il s'agit des vues politiques d'acquisition qui conviennent à cette monarchie, les États de la Saxe sont sans contredit ceux qui lui conviendraient le mieux, en l'arrondissant et lui formant une barrière par les montagnes qui séparent la Saxe de la Bohême, et qu'il faudrait fortifier. Il est difficile de prévoir comment cette acquisition pourrait se faire. La manière la plus sûre serait de conquérir la Bohême et la Moravie, et de les troquer avec la Saxe ; soit enfin que cela pût s'opérer par d'autres trocs ou des possessions du Rhin, en y ajoutant Juliers ou Berg, ou de quelque façon que cela se fasse. Cette acquisition est d'une nécessité indispensable pour donner à cet État la consistance dont il manque. Car, dès qu'on est en guerre, l'ennemi peut avancer de plain pied jusqu'à Berlin sans trouver la moindre opposition dans son chemin. Je ne parle pas, d'ailleurs, de nos droits de succession au pays d'Ansbach, Juliers et Berg, et le Mecklenbourg, parce que ce sont des prétentions

connues, et dont il faut attendre l'événement. Comme l'État n'est pas riche, il faut se garder sur toute chose de se mêler dans des guerres où il n'y a rien à gagner, parce qu'on s'épuise à pure perte, et qu'une bonne occasion arrivant ensuite, on n'en saurait pas profiter. Toutes les acquisitions éloignées sont à charge à un État. Un village sur la frontière vaut mieux qu'une principauté à soixante lieues. C'est une attention nécessaire de cacher autant qu'il est possible ses desseins d'ambition, et, si l'on peut, de réveiller l'envie de l'Europe contre d'autres puissances, à la faveur de quoi l'on frappe son coup. Cela peut arriver, et la maison d'Autriche, dont l'ambition va le visage démasqué, s'attirera de reste l'envie et la jalousie des grandes puissances. Le secret est une vertu essentielle pour la politique aussi bien que pour l'art de la guerre.

De la Justice

Les lois sont assez sagement faites dans ce pays. Je ne crois pas qu'on ait besoin d'y retoucher ; mais il faut que tous les trois ans il se fasse une visite des tribunaux des provinces, pour qu'il y ait des surveillants qui s'informent de la conduite des juges et des avocats, que l'on punit quand on les trouve en défaut. Mais comme les parties et les avocats tâchent d'éluder les meilleures lois, il est nécessaire que tous les vingt ans on examine par quel raffinement ils allongent les procès, et qu'on leur mette des barrières, comme on a fait à présent, pour ne pas prolonger les procès, ce qui ruine les parties.

Combination du Total du Gouvernement

Comme le pays est pauvre, et qu'il n'a guère de ressources, c'est une chose nécessaire que le Souverain ait toujours un trésor bien muni, pour soutenir au moins quelques campagnes. Les seules ressources qu'il peut

trouver dans le besoin consistent dans un emprunt de cinq millions de la Landschaft, et à peu près quatre millions qu'il pourra tirer du crédit de la banque ; mais voilà tout. Il a à la vérité en temps de paix cinq millions sept cent mille dont il peut disposer ; mais la plupart de cet argent doit, ou entrer dans le trésor, ou être employé à des usages publics, comme forteresses, améliorations, manufactures, canaux, défrichements, forteresses, bâtisses de villes dont on fait en pierre les maisons qui sont en bois, le tout pour rendre la constitution de l'État plus solide. Ces raisons que je viens d'alléguer exigent que le souverain de ce pays soit économe et homme qui tienne le plus grand ordre dans ses affaires. Une raison aussi valable que la première s'y joint encore ; c'est que s'il donne l'exemple de la profusion, ses sujets, qui sont pauvres, veulent l'imiter et se ruinent. Il faut surtout, pour le soutien des mœurs, que les distinctions soient uniquement pour le mérite et non pas pour les richesses ; ce principe mal observé en France a perdu les mœurs de la nation, qui autrefois ne connaissait que le chemin de l'honneur pour parvenir à la gloire, et qui croit à present qu'il suffit d'être riche pour être honoré. Comme les guerres sont un gouffre où les hommes s'abîment, il faut avoir l'œil à ce que le pays se peuple autant que possible, d'où il résulte encore un autre bien, c'est que les campagnes en sont mieux cultivées et les possesseurs mieux à leur aise. Je ne crois point que dans ce pays on doive jamais se laisser persuader de former une marine militaire. En voici les raisons. Il y a en Europe de grandes marines, savoir : celle d'Angleterre, celle de France, d'Espagne, de Danemark et de la Russie. Jamais nous ne pourrons les égaler ; ainsi, avec quelques vaisseaux, demeurant toujours inférieurs à d'autres nations, la dépense serait inutile. Ajoutez que, pour tenir une flotte, l'argent qu'elle coûterait nous obligerait de réformer des troupes de terre ; que le pays n'est pas assez peuplé pour fournir des recrues à l'armée et des matelots pour les vaisseaux, et enfin que

les batailles de mer sont rarement décisives ; d'où je conclus qu'il vaut mieux avoir la première armée de l'Europe que la plus mauvaise flotte des puissances maritimes.

La politique doit porter ses vues aussi loin qu'elle peut dans l'avenir, et juger des conjonctures de l'Europe, soit pour former des alliances, soit pour contrecarrer les projets de ses ennemis. Il ne faut pas croire qu'elle peut amener les évênements ; mais quand ils se présentent, elle doit les saisir pour en profiter. Voilà pourquoi les finances doivent être en ordre. C'est par cette raison que de l'argent doit être en réserve pour que le gouvernement soit prêt d'agir sitôt que les raisons politiques lui en indiquent le moment. La guerre même doit être conduite sur les principes de la politique, pour porter les coups les plus sanglants à ses ennemis. C'était sur ces principes qu'agissait le prince Eugène qui a rendu son nom immortel par la marche et la bataille de Turin, par celles de Höchstädt et de Belgrad. Les grands projects de campagne ne réussissent pas tous ; mais quand ils sont vastes, il en résulte toujours plus d'avantages que par ces petits projets où l'on se borne à la prise d'une bicoque sur les frontières. Voilà comme le comte de Saxe ne donna la bataille de Rocoux que pour pouvoir exécuter l'hiver d'après son dessein sur Bruxelles, qui lui réussit.

Il est évident, par tout ce que je viens de dire, que la politique, le militaire et les finances sont des branches si étroitement liées ensemble, qu'elles ne sauraient être separées. Il faut les mener de front, et de leur combinaison, assujettie aux règles de la bonne politique, résultent les plus grand avantages pour les États. En France, il y a un roi qui dirige chaque branche à part. C'est le ministre qui préside, soit aux finances, soit à la guerre, soit aux affaires étrangères. Mais le point de ralliement manque et ces branches, n'étant pas réunies, divergent, et les ministres ne sont chacun occupés que des détails de leur département, sans que personne réunisse à un but fixe l'objet de leurs travaux.

Si pareille chose arrivait dans cet État, il serrait perdu, parce que les grandes monarchies vont malgré les abus, et se soutiennent par leur poids et leur force intrinsèque, et que les petits États sont vite écrasés, si tout en eux n'est force, nerf et vigueur.

Voila quelques réfléxions et mes idées sur le gouvernement de ce pays, qui, tant qu'il n'aura pas pris une plus grande consistance et de meilleures frontières, doit être gouverné par des princes qui soient toujours en vedette, les oreilles dressées, pour veiller sur leurs voisins, et prêts à se défendre d'un jour à l'autre contre les projets pernicieux de leurs ennemis.

(Signé) FRÉDÉRIC.

CHAPTER XV

HISTOIRE DE MON TEMPS

Avant-propos. 1775

La plupart des histoires que nous avons sont des compilations de mensonges mêlés de quelques vérités. De ce nombre prodigieux de faits qui nous ont été transmis, on ne peut compter pour avérés que ceux qui ont fait époque soit de l'élévation ou de la chute des empires. Il paraît indubitable que la bataille de Salamine s'est donnée et que les Perses ont été vaincus par les Grecs. Il n'y a aucun doute qu'Alexandre le Grand n'ait subjugué l'empire de Darius, que les Romains n'aient vaincu les Carthaginois, Antiochus et Persée ; cela est d'autant plus évident qu'ils ont possédé tous ces États. L'histoire acquiert plus de foi dans ce qu'elle rapporte des guerres civiles de Marius et de Sylla, de Pompée et de César, d'Auguste et d'Antoine, par l'authenticité des auteurs contemporains qui nous ont décrit ces événements. On n'a point de doute sur le bouleversement de l'empire d'Occident et sur celui d'Orient, car on voit naître et se former des royaumes du démembrement de l'empire romain ; mais lorsque la curiosité nous invite à descendre dans le détail des faits de ces temps reculés, nous nous précipitons dans un labyrinthe plein d'obscurités et de contradictions, et nous n'avons point de fil pour en trouver l'issue. L'amour du merveilleux, le préjugé des historiens, le zèle malentendu pour leur patrie,

leur haine pour les nations qui leur étaient opposées, toutes ces differentes passions qui ont guidé leur plume et les temps de beaucoup postérieurs aux événements où ils ont écrits, ont si fort altéré les faits en les déguisant, qu'avec des yeux de lynx même on ne parviendrait à les dévoiler à present.

Cependant, dans la foule d'auteurs de l'antiquité l'on distingue avec satisfaction la description que Xénophon fait de la retraite des dix mille qu'il avait commandés et ramenés lui-même en Grèce. Thucydide jouit à peu près de mêmes avantages. Nous sommes charmés des trouver dans les fragments qui nous restent de Polybe, l'ami et le compagnon de Scipion l'Africain, les faits qu'il nous raconte, dont lui-même a été le temoin. Les lettres de Cicéron à son ami Atticus portent le même caractère ; c'est un des acteurs de ces grandes scènes qui parle. Je n'oublierai point les Commentaires de César, écrits avec la noble simplicité d'un grand homme ; et, quoi qu'en ait dit Hirtius, les relations des autres historiens sont en tout conformes aux événements décrits dans ces Commentaires ; mais depuis César l'histoire ne contient que des panégyriques ou des satires. La barbarie des temps suivants a fait un chaos de l'histoire du Bas-Empire, et l'on ne trouve d'intéressant que les Mémoires écrits par la fille de l'empereur Alexius Comnène, parce que cette princesse rapporte ce qu'elle a vu. Depuis, les moines, qui seuls avaient quelque connaissance, ont laissé des annales trouvées dans leurs couvents, qui ont servi à l'histoire d'Allemagne ; mais quels matériaux pour l'histoire !

Les Français ont eu un évêque de Tours, un Joinville et le Journal de l'Étoile, faibles ouvrages de compilateurs qui écrivaient ce qu'ils apprenaient auh asard, mais qui difficilement pouvaient être bien instruits. Depuis la renaissance des lettres, la passion d'écrire s'est changée en fureur. Nous n'avons que trop de mémoires, d'anecdotes et de relations, parmi lesquelles il faut s'en tenir au petit nombre d'auteurs

qui ont eu des charges, qui ont été eux-mêmes acteurs, qui ont été attachés à la cour ou qui ont eu la permission des souverains de fouiller dans les archives, tels que le sage président de Thou, Phillippe de Comines, Vargas, fiscal de concile de Trente, mademoiselle d'Orléans, le Cardinal du Retz, etc. Ajoutons-y les Lettres de M. d'Estrades, les Mémoires de M. de Torcy, monuments curieux, surtout ce dernier, qui nous développe la vérité de ce testament de Charles II, roi d'Espagne, sur lequel les sentiments ont été si partagés.

Ces réflexions sur l'incertitude de l'histoire, dont je me suis souvent occupé, m'ont fait naître l'idée de transmettre à la postérité les faits principaux auxquels j'ai eu part ou dont j'ai été témoin, afin que ceux qui à l'avenir gouverneront cet État puissent connaître la vraie situation des choses lorsque je parvins à la régence, les causes qui m'ont fait agir, mes moyens, les trames de nos ennemis, les négociations, les guerres, et surtout les belles actions de nos officiers, par lesquelles ils se sont acquis l'immortalité à juste titre.

Depuis les révolutions qui bouleversèrent premièrement l'empire d'Occident, ensuite celui d'Orient ; depuis les succès immenses de Charlemagne ; depuis l'époque brilliante du règne de Charles-Quint ; après les troubles que la réforme causa en Allemagne et qui durèrent trente années ; enfin après la guerre qui s'alluma à cause de la succession d'Espagne, il n'est aucun événement plus remarquable et plus intéressant que celui que produisit la mort de l'empereur Charles VI, dernier mâle de la maison de Habsbourg.

La cour de Vienne se vit attaquée par un prince auquel elle ne pouvait supposer assez de force pour tenter une entreprise aussi difficile. Bientôt il se forma une conjuration de rois et de souverains, tous résolus à partager cette immense succession. La couronne impériale passa dans la maison de Bavière, et lorsqu'il semblait que les événements concouraient à la ruine de la jeune reine de Hongrie, cette princesse, par sa fermeté et par son habileté,

se tira d'un pas aussi dangereux, et soutint sa monarchie en sacrifiant la Silésie et une petite partie du Milanais ; c'était tout ce qu'on pouvait attendre d'une jeune princesse qui, à peine parvenue au trône, saisit l'esprit du gouvernement et devint l'âme de son conseil.

Cet ouvrage-ci étant destiné pour la postérité me délivre de la gêne de respecter les vivants et d'observer de certains ménagements incompatibles avec la franchise de la verité : il me sera permis de dire sans retenue et tout haut ce que l'on pense tout bas. Je peindrai les princes tels qu'ils sont, sans prévention pour ceux qui ont été mes alliés et sans haine pour ceux qui ont été mes ennemis ; je ne parlerai de moi-même que lorsque la nécessité m'y obligera, et l'on me permettra, à l'exemple de César, de faire mention de ce qui me regarde en personne tierce, pour éviter l'odieux de l'égoïsme. C'est à la postérité à nous juger ; mais si nous sommes sages, nous devons la prévenir en nous jugeant rigoureusement nous-mêmes. Le vrai mérite d'un bon prince est d'avoir un attachement sincère au bien public, d'aimer sa patrie et la gloire ; je dis la gloire, car l'heureux instinct qui anime les hommes du désir d'une bonne réputation est le vrai principe des actions héroïques ; c'est le nerf de l'âme qui la réveille de sa léthargie pour la porter aux entreprises utiles, nécessaire et louables.

Tout ce qu'on avance dans ces mémoires, soit à l'égard des négociations, des lettres de souverains ou de traités signés, a ses preuves conservées dans les archives. On peu répondre des faits militaires comme témoin oculaire ; telle relation de bataille a été differée de deux ou trois jours pour la rendre plus exacte et plus véridique.

La postérité verra peut-être avec surprise dans ces mémoires les récits de traités faits et rompus. Quoique ces exemples soient communs, cela ne justifierait point l'auteur de cet ouvrage, s'il n'avait d'autres raisons meilleures pour excuser sa conduite.

L'intérêt de l'État doit servir de règle aux souverains.

Les cas de rompre les alliances sont ceux : (1) où l'allié manque à remplir ses engagements ; (2) où l'allié médite de vous tromper et où il ne vous reste de ressource que de le prévenir ; (3) une force majeure qui vous opprime et vous force à rompre vos traités ; (4) enfin l'insuffisance des moyens pour continuer la guerre.

Par je ne sais quelle fatalité, ces malheureuses richesses influent sur tout. Les princes sont les esclaves de leurs moyens ; l'intérêt de l'État leur sert de loi, et cette loi est inviolable. Si le prince est dans l'obligation de sacrifier sa personne même au salut de ses sujets, à plus forte raison doit-il leur sacrifier des liaisons dont la continuation leur deviendrait préjudiciable. Les exemples de pareils traités rompus se recontrent communément. Notre intention n'est pas de les justifier tous. J'ose pourtant avancer qu'il en est de tels, que la nécessité ou la sagesse, la prudence ou le bien des peuples obligeaient de transgresser, ne restant aux souverains que ce moyen-là d'éviter leur ruine.

Si François I avait accompli le traité de Madrid, il aurait, en perdant la Bourgogne, établi un ennemi dans le cœur de ses États. C'était réduire la France dans l'état malheureux où elle était du temps de Louis XI et de Louis XII. Si, après la bataille de Muhlberg, gagnée par Charles Quint, la ligue protestante d'Allemagne ne s'était pas fortifiée de l'appui de la France, elle n'aurait pu éviter de porter les chaînes que l'Empereur lui préparait de longue main. Si les Anglais n'avaient pas rompu l'alliance, si contraire à leurs intérêts, par laquelle Charles II s'était uni avec Louis XIV, leur puissance courait risque d'être diminuée, d'autant plus que, dans la balance politique de l'Europe, la France l'aurait emporté de beaucoup sur l'Angleterre.

Les sages, qui prévoient les effets dans les causes, doivent à temps s'opposer à ces causes si diamétralement opposées à leurs intérêts. Qu'on me permette de m'expliquer exactement sur cette matière délicate, que l'on n'a guère

traitée dogmatiquement. Il me paraît clair et évident qu'un particulier doit être attaché scrupuleusement à sa parole, l'eût-il même donné inconsidérément. Si on lui manque, il peut recourir à la protection des lois, et quoi qu'il en arrive, ce n'est qu'un individu qui souffre ; mais à quels tribunaux un souverain prendra-t-il recours, si un autre prince viole envers lui ses engagements ? La parole d'un particulier n'entraîne que le malheur d'un seul homme, celle des souverains des calamités générales pour des nations entières. Ceci se réduit à cette question : vaut-il mieux que le peuple périsse ou que le prince rompe son traité ? Quel serait l'imbécile qui balancerait pour décider cette question ?

Vous voyez par les cas que nous venons d'exposer qu'avant de porter un jugement décisif sur les actions d'un prince, il faut commencer par examiner mûrement les circonstances où il s'est trouvé, la conduite de ses alliés, les ressources qu'il pouvait avoir ou qui lui manquaient pour remplir ses engagements. Car, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, le bon ou le mauvais état des finances sont comme le pouls des États, qui influent plus qu'on ne le croit ni qu'on ne le sait dans les opérations politiques et militaires. Le public, qui ignore ces détails, ne juge que sur les apparences, et se trompe par conséquent dans ses décisions ; la prudence empêche qu'on ne le désabuse, parce que ce serait le comble de la démence d'ébruiter soi-même par vaine gloire la partie faible de l'État : les ennemis, charmés d'une pareille découverte, ne manqueraient pas d'en profiter. La sagesse exige donc qu'on abandonne au public la liberté de ses jugements téméraires, et que ne pouvant se justifier pendant sa vie, sans compromettre l'intérêt de l'État, l'on se contente de se légitimer aux yeux désintéressés de la postérité.

Peut-être ne sera-t-on pas fâché que j'ajoute quelques réflexions générales à ce que je viens de dire sur les événements qui sont arrivés de mon temps. J'ai vu que les

petits États peuvent se soutenir contre les plus grandes monarchies lorsque ces États ont de l'industrie et beaucoup d'ordre dans leurs affaires. Je trouve que les grands empires ne vont que par des abus, qu'ils sont remplis de confusion, et qu'ils ne se soutiennent que par leurs vastes ressources et par la force intrinsèque de leur masse. Les intrigues qui se font dans ces cours perdraient des princes moins puissants : elles nuisent toujours, mais elles n'empêchent pas que de nombreuses armées ne conservent leur poids.

J'observe que toutes les guerres portées loin des frontières de ceux qui les entreprennent n'ont pas les mêmes succès que celles qui se font à portée de la patrie. Ne serait-ce pas par un sentiment naturel dans l'homme qui sent qu'il est plus juste de se défendre que de dépouiller son voisin ? Mais peut-être la raison physique l'emporte-t-elle sur la morale par la difficulté de pourvoir aux vivres dans un trop grand éloignement de la frontière, à fournir à temps les recrues, les remontes, les habillements, les munitions de guerre, etc. Ajoutons encore que, plus les troupes sont aventurées dans des pays lointains, plus elles craignent qu'on ne leur coupe la retraite ou qu'on ne la rende difficile. Je m'aperçois de la supériorité marquée de la flotte anglaise sur celle des Français et des Espagnols réunie, et je m'étonne comment la marine de Philippe II, ayant eu autrefois cet ascendant sur celle des Anglais et des Hollandais, n'a pas conservé d'aussi grands avantages.

Je remarque encore avec surprise que tous ces armements de mer sont plus pour l'ostentation que pour l'effet, et qu'au lieu de protéger le commerce, ils ne l'empêchent pas de se détruire. D'un côté se présente le roi d'Espagne, souverain du Potose, obéré en Europe, créancier à Madrid de ses officiers et de ses domestiques ; de l'autre, le roi d'Angleterre, qui répand à pleines mains ses guinées, que trente ans d'industrie avaient accumulées dans la Grande-Bretagne, pour soutenir la reine de Hongrie et la Pragmatique Sanction, indépendamment de quoi cette reine de Hongrie

est obligée de sacrifier quelques provinces pour sauver le reste.

La capitale du monde chrétien s'ouvre au premier venu, et le pape, n'osant pas accabler d'anathèmes ceux qui le font contribuer, est obligé de les bénir. L'Italie est inondée d'étrangers qui se battent pour la subjuguer. L'exemple des Anglais entraîne comme un torrent les Hollandais dans cette guerre qui leur est étrangère, et ces républicains qui du temps que des héros, les Eugène, les Marlborough, commandaient leurs armées, y envoyaient des députés pour régler les opérations militaires, n'en envoient point lorsqu'un duc de Cumberland se trouve à la tête de leurs troupes. Le Nord s'embrase et produit une guerre funeste à la Suède. Le Danemarck s'anime, s'agite et se calme. La Saxe change deux fois de parti ; elle ne gagne rien ni avec les uns ni avec les autres, sinon qu'elle attire les Prussiens dans ses États et qu'elle se ruine. Un conflit d'événements change les causes de la guerre : cependant les effets continuent, quoique le motif ait cessé. La fortune passe rapidement d'un parti dans l'autre ; mais l'ambition et le désir de la vengeance nourissent et entretiennent le feu de la guerre. Il semble voir une partie de joueurs qui veulent avoir leur revanche et ne quittent le jeu qu'après s'être entièrement ruinés.

Si l'on demandait à un ministre anglais : Quelle rage vous oblige à prolonger la guerre ? C'est que la France ne pourra plus fournir aux frais de la campagne prochaine, répondrait-il. Si l'on faisait la même question à un ministre français, la réponse serait à peu près semblable. Ce qu'il y a de déplorable dans cette politique, c'est qu'elle se joue de la vie des hommes, et que le sang humain, répandu avec profusion, l'est inutilement. Encore si, par la guerre, on pouvait parvenir à fixer solidement les frontières et à maintenir cette balance des pouvoirs si nécessaire entre les souverains de l'Europe, on pourrait regarder ceux qui ont péri comme des victimes sacrifiées à la tranquillité

et à la sûreté publique. Mais qu'on s'envie des provinces en Amérique, ne voilà-t-il pas toute l'Europe entraînée dans des partis differents pour se battre sur mer et sur terre.

Les ambitieux devraient considérer surtout que les armes et la discipline militaire étant à peu près les mêmes en Europe, et les alliances mettant pour l'ordinaire l'égalité des forces entre les parties belligérantes, tout ce que les princes peuvent attendre de leurs plus grands avantages dans les temps où nous vivons, c'est d'acquérir par des succès accumulés ou quelque petite ville sur les frontières, ou une banlieue qui ne rapporte pas les intérêts des dépenses de la guerre, et dont la population n'approche pas de nombre des citoyens péris dans les campagnes.

Quiconque a des entrailles et envisage ces objets de sangfroid doit être ému des maux que les hommes d'État causent aux peuples, faute d'y réfléchir ou bien entraînés par leur passions. La raison nous prescrit une règle sur ce sujet, dont, ce me semble, aucun homme d'État ne doit s'écarter ; c'est de saisir l'occasion et d'entreprendre lorsqu'elle est favourable ; mais de ne point la forcer en abandonnant tout au hasard. Il y a des moments qui demandent qu'on mette toute son activité en jeu pour en profiter, mais il y en a d'autres où la prudence veut qu'on reste dans l'inaction. Cette matière exige la plus profonde réflexion, parce que non-seulement il faut bien examiner l'état des choses, mais qu'il faut encore prévoir toutes les suites d'une entreprise, et peser les moyens que l'on a avec ceux de ses ennemis pour juger lesquels l'emportent dans la balance. Si la raison n'y décide pas seule, et que la passion s'en mêle, il est impossible que d'heureux succès suivent une pareille entreprise. La politique demande de la patience, et le chef-d'œuvre d'un homme habile est de faire chaque chose en son temps et à propos.

L'histoire ne nous fournit que trop d'exemples de guerres légèrement enterprises ; il n'y qu'à se rappeler la vie de François I et lire ce que Brantôme dit être le sujet de

sa malheureuse expédition du Milanais, où ce roi fut fait prisonnier à Pavie ; il n'y a qu'à voir combien peu Charles-Quint profita de l'occasion qui se présentait à lui, après la bataille de Muhlberg, pour subjuguer l'Allemagne ; il n'y a qu'à voir l'histoire de Frédéric V, électeur palatin, pour se convaincre de la précipitation avec laquelle il s'engagea dans une entreprise bien au-dessus de ses forces. Et dans nos derniers temps, qu'on se rappelle la conduite de Maximilien de Bavière, qui dans la guerre de Succession, lorsque son pays était, pour ainsi dire, bloqué par les alliés, se rangea du parti des Français, pour se voir dépouiller de ses États. Et plus recemment Charles XII, roi de Suède, nous fournit un exemple plus frappant encore des suites funestes que l'entêtement et la fausse conduite des souverains attire sur les sujects.

L'histoire est l'école des princes ; c'est à eux de s'instruire des fautes des siècles passés, pour les éviter, et pour apprendre qu'il faut se former un système et le suivre pied à pied, et que celui qui a le mieux calculé sa conduite est le seul que puisse l'emporter sur ceux qui agissent moins conséquemment que lui.

CHAPTER XVI

ESSAI SUR LES FORMES DE GOUVERNEMENT ET SUR LES DEVOIRS DES SOUVERAINS (1777)

Nous trouvons, en remontant à l'antiquité la plus reculée, que les peuples dont la connaissance nous est parvenue menaient une vie pastorale, et ne formaient point de corps de société : ce que la Genèse rapporte de l'histoire des patriarches en est un témoignage suffisant. Avant le petit peuple juif, les Égyptiens devaient être de même éparpillés par familles dans ces contrées que le Nil ne submergeait pas ; et sans doute il s'est écoulé bien des siècles avant que ce fleuve, dompté, permît aux régnicoles de se rassembler par bourgades. Nous apprenons par l'histoire grecque le nom des fondateurs des villes et celui des législateurs qui les premiers les rassamblèrent en corps ; cette nation fut longtemps sauvage, comme le furent tous les habitants de notre globe. Si les annales des Étrusques, des Samnites, des Sabins, &c., nous étaient parvenues, nous apprendrions assurément que ces peuples vivaient isolés par familles avant de s'être rassemblés et réunis. Les Gaulois formaient déjà des associations du temps que Jules César les dompta. Mais il paraît que la Grande-Bretagne n'était pas perfectionnée à ce point lorsque ce conquérant y passa pour la première fois avec les troupes romaines. Du temps de ce grand homme, les Germains ne pouvaient se comparer qu'aux Iroquois, aux Algonquins et pareilles nations sauvages ; ils ne vivaient que de la chasse, de la

pêche, et du lait de leurs troupeaux. Un Germain croyait s'avilir en cultivant la terre ; il employait à ces travaux les esclaves qu'il avait faits à la guerre ; aussi la forêt d'Hercynie couvrait-elle presque entièrement cette vaste étendue de pays qui compose maintenant l'Allemagne. La nation ne pouvait pas être nombreuse, faute de nourriture suffisante ; et c'est là sans doute la véritable cause de ces émigrations prodigieuses des peuples du Septentrion, qui se précipitaient vers le Midi pour chercher des terres toutes défrichées et un climat moins rigoureux.

On est étonné quand on se représente le genre humain vivant si longtemps dans un état d'abrutissement et sans former de société, et l'on recherche avidement quelle raison a pu le porter à se réunir en corps de peuple. Sans doute que les violences et les pillages d'autres hordes voisines ont fait naître à ces peuplades isolées l'idée de se joindre à d'autres familles pour assurer leurs possessions par leur mutuelle défense. De là sont nées les lois qui enseignent aux sociétés à préférer l'intérêt général au bien particulier. Dès lors personne, sans craindre de châtiment, n'osa s'emparer du bien d'autrui, personne n'osa attenter sur la vie de son voisin, il fallut respecter sa femme et ses biens comme des objets sacrés, et si la société entière se trouvait attaquée, chacun devait accourir pour la sauver. Cette grande vérité, qu'il faut agir envers les autres comme nous voudrions qu'ils se comportassent envers nous, devient le principe des lois et du pacte social ; de là naît l'amour de la patrie, envisagée comme l'asile de notre bonheur. Mais comme ces lois ne pouvaient ni se maintenir ni s'exécuter sans un surveillant qui s'en occupât sans cesse, ce fut l'origine des magistrats, que le peuple élut et auxquels il se soumit. Qu'on s'imprime bien que la conservation des lois fut l'unique raison qui engagea les hommes à se donner des supérieurs, puisque c'est la vraie origine de la souveraineté. Ce magistrat était le premier serviteur de l'État. Quand ces sociétés naissantes avaient à craindre

de leurs voisins, le magistrat armait le peuple et volait à la défense des citoyens.

Cet instinct général des hommes qui les anime à se procurer le plus grand bonheur possible donna lieu à la formation des différents genres de gouvernement. Les uns crurent qu'en s'abandonnant à la conduite de quelques sages ils trouveraient ce bonheur ; de là le gouvernement aristocratique. D'autres préférèrent l'oligarchie. Athènes et la plupart des républiques grecques choisirent la démocratie. La Perse et l'Orient ployaient sous le despotisme. Les Romains eurent quelque temps des rois ; mais lassés des violences des Tarquins, il tournèrent la forme de leur gouvernement en aristocratie. Bientôt, fatigué de la dureté des patriciens, qui l'opprimaient par des usures, le peuple s'en sépara, et ne retourna à Rome qu'après que le sénat eut autorisé les tribuns que ce peuple avait élus pour le soutenir contre le violence des grands ; depuis, il devint presque le dépositaire de l'autorité suprême. On appelait tyrans ceux qui s'emparaient avec violence du gouvernement, et qui, ne suivant que leurs passions et leurs caprices pour guides, renversaient les lois et les principes fondamentaux que la société avait établis pour sa conservation.

Mais quelque sages que fussent les législateurs et les premiers qui rassemblèrent le peuple en corps, quelque bonnes que fussent leurs institutions, il ne s'est trouvé aucun de ces gouvernements qui se soit soutenu dans toute son intégrité. Pourquoi ? Parce que les hommes sont imparfaits, et que leurs ouvrages le sont par conséquent ; parce que les citoyens, poussés par des passions, se laissent aveugler par l'intérêt particulier, qui toujours bouleverse l'intérêt général ; enfin parce que rien n'est stable dans ce monde. Dans les aristocraties, l'abus que les premiers membres de l'État font de leur autorité est, pour l'ordinaire, cause des révolutions qui s'ensuivent. La démocratie des Romains fut bouleversée par le peuple même ; la masse

aveuglée de ces plébéiens se laissa corrompre par des citoyens ambitieux qui ensuite les asservirent et les privèrent de leur liberté. C'est le sort auquel l'Angleterre doit s'attendre, si la chambre basse ne préfère pas les véritables intérêts de la nation à cette corruption infâme qui l'avilit. Quant au gouvernement monarchique, on en a vu bien des espèces différentes. L'ancien gouvernement féodal, qui était presque général en Europe il y a quelques siècles, s'était établi par les conquêtes des barbares. Le général qui menait une horde se rendait souverain du pays conquis, et il partageait les provinces entre ses principaux officiers ; ceux-là à la vérité étaient soumis au suzerain, et lui fournissaient des troupes, s'il les demandait ; mais comme quelques-uns de ces vassaux devinrent aussi puissants que leur chef, cela formait des États dans l'État. C'était une pépinière de guerres civiles dont résultait le malheur de la société générale. En Allemagne ces vassaux sont devenus indépendants ; ils ont été opprimés en France, en Angleterre et en Espagne. Le seul modèle qui nous reste de cet abominable gouvernement subsiste encore dans la république de Pologne. En Turquie, le souverain est despotique, il peut commettre impunément les cruautés les plus révoltantes ; mais aussi lui arrive-t-il souvent, par une vicissitude commune chez les nations barbares, ou par une juste rétribution, qu'il est étranglé à son tour. Pour le gouvernement vraiment monarchique, il est le pire ou le meilleur de tous, selon qu'il est administré.

Nous avons remarqué que les citoyens n'ont accordé la prééminence à un de leurs semblables qu'en faveur des services qu'ils attendaient de lui ; ces services consistent à maintenir les lois, à faire exactement observer la justice, à s'opposer de toutes ses forces à la corruption des mœurs, à défendre l'État contre ses ennemis. Le magistrat doit avoir l'œil sur la culture des terres ; il doit procurer l'abondance des vivres à la société, encourager l'industrie et le commerce ; il est comme une sentinelle permanente qui doit veiller

sur les voisins et sur la conduite des ennemis de l'État. On demande que sa prévoyance et sa prudence forment à temps les liaisons, et choississent les alliés les plus convenables aux intérêts de son association. On voit par ce court exposé quel détail de connaissances chacun de ces articles exige en particulier. Il faut joindre à cela une étude approfondie du local du pays que le magistrat doit gouverner, et bien connaître le génie de la nation, parce qu'en péchant par ignorance, le souverain se rend aussi coupable que par les péchés qu'il aurait commis par malice : les uns sont des défauts de paresse, les autres des vices du cœur ; mais le mal qui en résulte est le même pour la société.

Les princes, les souverains, les rois ne sont donc pas revêtus de l'autorité suprême pour se plonger impunément dans la débauche et dans le luxe ; ils ne sont pas éléves sur leurs concitoyens pour leur orgueil, se pavanant dans la représentation, insulte avec mépris à la simplicité des mœurs, à la pauvreté, à la misère ; ils ne sont point à la tête de l'État pour entretenir auprès de leurs personnes un tas de fainéants dont l'oisiveté et l'inutilité engendrent tous les vices. La mauvaise administration du gouvernement monarchique provient de bien des causes différentes, qui ont leur source dans le caractère du souverain. Ainsi un prince adonné aux femmes se laissera gouverner par ses maîtresses et par ses favoris ; ceux-là, abusant du pouvoir qu'ils ont sur l'ésprit du prince, se serviront de cet ascendant pour commettre des injustices, protéger des gens perdus de mœurs, vendre des charges, et autres infamies pareilles. Si le prince, par fainéantise, abandonne le gouvernail de l'État en des mains mercenaires, je veux dire à ses ministres, alors l'un tire à droite, l'autre à gauche, personne ne travaille sur un plan général, chaque ministre renverse ce qu'il a trouvé établi, quelque bonne que soit la chose, pour devenir créateur de nouveautés et pour réaliser ses fantaisies, souvent au détriment du bien public ; d'autres ministres

qui remplacent ceux-là se hâtent de bouleverser à leur tour ces arrangements avec aussi peu de solidité que leurs prédécesseurs, satisfaits de passer pour inventeurs. Ainsi cette suite de changements et de variations ne donne pas à ces projets le temps de pousser racine. De là naissent la confusion, le désordre et tous les vices d'une mauvaise administration. Les prévaricateurs ont une excuse toute prête : ils couvrent leur turpitude de ces changements perpétuels ; et comme ces sortes de ministres se contentent de ce que personne ne recherche leur conduite, ils se gardent bien d'en donner l'exemple en sévissant contre leur subalternes. Les hommes s'attachent à ce qui leur appartient ; l'État n'appartient pas à ces ministres ; ils n'ont donc pas son bien véritablement à cœur, tout s'exécute avec nonchalance et avec une espèce d'indifférence stoique, d'où résulte le dépérissement de la justice, des finances et du militaire. De monarchique qu'il était ce gouvernement dégénère en une véritable aristocratie où les ministres et les généraux dirigent les affaires selon leur fantasie ; alors on ne connaît plus de système général, chacun suit ses idées particulières, et le point central, le point d'unité, est perdu. Comme tous les ressorts d'une montre conspirent au même but, qui est celui de mesurer le temps, les ressorts du gouvernement devraient être montés de même pour que toutes les différentes parties de l'administration concourussent également au plus grand bien de l'État, objet important qu'on ne doit jamais perdre de vue. D'ailleurs, l'intérêt personnel des ministres et des généraux fait pour l'ordinaire qu'ils se contrecarrent en tout et que quelquefois ils empêchent l'exécution des meilleures choses, parce que ce ne sont pas eux qui les ont proposées. Mais le mal arrive à son comble, si des âmes perverses parviennent à persuader au souverain que ses intérêts sont différents de ceux de ses sujets ; alors le souverain devient l'ennemi de ses peuples sans savoir pourquoi ; il devient dur, sévère, inhumain par mésentendu ; car le principe dont il part étant faux,

les conséquences le doivent être nécessairement. Le souverain est attaché par des liens indissolubles au corps de l'État ; par conséquent il ressent par répercussion tous les maux qui affligent ses sujets, et la société souffre également des malheurs qui touchent son souverain. Il n'y a qu'un bien, qui est celui de l'État en général. Si le prince perd des provinces, il n'est plus en état comme par le passé d'assister ses sujets ; si le malheur l'a forcé de contracter des dettes, c'est aux pauvres citoyens à les acquitter ; en revanche, si le peuple est peu nombreux, s'il croupit dans la misère, le souverain est privé de toute ressource. Ce sont des verités si incontestables, qu'il n'est pas besoin d'appuyer davantage là-dessus.

Je le répète donc, le souverain représente l'État ; lui et ses peuples ne forment qu'un corps, qui ne peut être heureux qu'autant que la concorde les unit. Le prince est à la société qu'il gouverne ce que la tête est au corps ; il doit voir, penser et agir pour toute la communauté, afin de lui procurer tous les avantages dont elle est susceptible. Si l'on veut que le gouvernement monarchique l'emporte sur le républicain, l'arrêt du souverain est prononcé : il doit être actif et intègre, et rassembler toutes ses forces pour remplir la carrière qui lui est prescrite. Voici l'idée que je me fais de ses devoirs.

Il doit se procurer une connaissance exacte et détaillée de la force et de la faiblesse de son pays, tant pour les ressources pécuniaires que pour la population, les finances, le commerce, les lois et le génie de la nation qu'il doit gouverner. Les lois, si elles sont bonnes, doivent être exprimées clairement, afin que la chicane ne puisse pas les tourner à son gré pour en éluder l'esprit et décider de la fortune des particuliers arbitrairement et sans règle ; la procédure doit être aussi courte qu'il est possible, afin d'empêcher la ruine des plaideurs, qui consumeraient en faux frais ce qui leur est dû de justice et de bon droit. Cette partie du gouvernement ne saurait être assez surveillée,

pour mettre toutes les barrières possibles à l'avidité des juges et à l'intérêt démesuré des avocats. On retient tout le monde dans son devoir par des visitations qui se font de temps à autre dans les provinces, où quiconque se croit lésé ose porter ses plaintes à la commission, et les prévaricateurs doivent être sévèrement punis. Il est peut-être superflu d'ajouter que les peines ne doivent jamais passer le délit, que la violence ne doit jamais être employée au lieu des lois, et qu'il vaut mieux qu'un souverain soit trop indulgent que trop sévère. Comme tout particulier qui n'agit pas par principes a une conduite inconséquente, d'autant plus importe-t-il qu'un magistrat qui veille au bien des peuples agisse d'après un système arrêté de politique, de guerre, de finance, de commerce et de lois. Par exemple, un peuple doux ne doit point avoir des lois sévères, mais des lois adaptées à son caractère. La base de ces systèmes doit toujours être relative au plus grand bien de la société ; les principes doivent être adaptés à la situation du pays, à ses anciens usages, s'ils sont bons, au génie de la nation. Par exemple, en politique c'est un fait connu que les alliés les plus naturels et par conséquent les meilleurs sont ceux dont les intérêts, concourent avec les nôtres, et qui ne sont pas si proches voisins, qu'on soit engagé en quelque discussion d'intérêt avec eux. Quelquefois des événements bizarres donnent lieu à des combinaisons extraordinaires. Nous avons vu, de nos jours, des nations de tout temps rivales et même ennemies marcher sous les mêmes bannières ; mais ce sont des cas qui arrivent rarement, et qui ne serviront jamais d'exemples. Ces sortes de liaisons ne peuvent être que momentanées, au lieu que le genre des autres, contractées par un intérêt commun, peut seul être durable. Dans la situation où l'Europe est de nos jours, où tous les princes sont armés, parmi lesquels il s'élève des puissances prépondérantes capables d'écraser les faibles, la prudence exige qu'on s'allie avec d'autres puissances, soit pour s'assurer des

secours en cas d'attaque, soit pour réprimer les projets dangereux de ses ennemis, soit pour soutenir, à l'aide de ces alliés, de justes preténtions contre ceux qui voudraient s'y opposer. Mais ceci ne suffit pas ; il faut avoir chez ses voisins, surtout chez ses ennemis, des yeux et des oreilles ouverts, qui rapportent fidèlement ce qu'ils ont vu et entendu. Les hommes sont méchants ; il faut se garder surtout d'être surpris, parce que tout ce qui surprend effraye et décontenance, ce qui n'arrive jamais quand on est préparé, quelque fâcheux que soit l'événement auquel on doit s'attendre. La politique européenne est si fallacieuse, que le plus avisé peut devenir dupe, s'il n'est pas toujours alerte et sur ses gardes.

Le système militaire doit être également assis sur de bons principes qui soient sûrs et reconnus par l'expérience. On doit connaître le génie de la nation, de quoi elle est capable, et jusqu'où l'on ose risquer ses enterprises en la menant à l'ennemi. Dans nos temps, il nous est interdit d'employer à la guerre les usages des Grecs et des Romains. La découverte de la poudre à canon a changé entièrement la façon de faire la guerre. Maintenant c'est la supériorité du feu qui décide de la victoire ; les exercices, les règlements et la tactique ont été refondus pour les conformer à cet usage, et récemment, l'abus énorme des nombreuses artilleries qui appesantissent les armées nous force également d'adopter cette mode, tant pour nous soutenir dans nos postes que pour attaquer l'ennemi dans ceux qu'il occupe, au cas que d'importantes raisons l'exigent. Tant de raffinements nouveaux ont donc si fort changé l'art de la guerre que ce serait de nos jours une témérité impardonnable à un général, en imitant les Turenne, les Condé, les Luxembourg, de risquer une bataille en suivant les dispositions que ces grands généraux ont faites de leur temps. Alors les victoires se remportaient par la valeur et par la force ; maintenant l'artillerie décide de tout ; et l'habileté du général consiste à faire approcher ses troupes de l'ennemi

sans qu'elles soient détruites avant de commencer à l'attaquer. Pour se procurer cet avantage, il faut qu'il fasse taire le feu de l'ennemi par la supériorité de celui qu'il lui oppose. Mais ce qui restera éternellement stable dans l'art militaire, c'est la castramétrie, ou l'art de tirer le plus grand parti possible d'un terrain pour son avantage. Si de nouvelles découvertes se font encore, ce sera une nécessité que les généraux de ces temps-là se prêtent à ces nouveautés, et changent à notre tactique ce qui exige correction.

Il est des États qui, par leur local et par leur constitution, doivent être des puissances maritimes ; tels sont l'Angleterre, la Hollande, la France, l'Espagne, le Danemark : ils sont environnés de la mer, et les colonies eloignées qu'ils possèdent leur prescrivent d'avoir des vaisseaux pour entretenir la communication et le commerce entre la mère patrie et ces membres détachés. Il est d'autres États, comme l'Autriche, la Pologne, la Prusse et même la Russie, dont les uns pourraient se passer de marine, et les autres commettraient une faute impardonnable en politique, s'ils divisaient leurs forces en voulant employer sur mer des troupes dont ils ont un besoin indispensable sur terre. Le nombre des troupes qu'un État entretient doit être en proportion des troupes qu'ont ses ennemis ; il faut qu'il se trouve en même force, ou le plus faible risque de succomber. On objectera peut-être que le prince doit compter sur les secours de ses alliés. Cela serait bon, si les alliés étaient tels qu'ils devaient être ; mais leur zèle n'est que tiédeur, et l'on se trompe à coup sûr, si l'on compte sur d'autres que sur soi-même. Si la situation des frontières est susceptible d'être défendue par des forteresses, il ne faut rien négliger pour en construire, et ne rien épargner pour les perfectionner. La France en a donné l'exemple, et elle en a senti l'avantage en différentes occasions.

Mais ni la politique ni le militaire ne peuvent prospérer, si les finances ne sont pas entretenues dans le plus grand ordre, et si le prince lui-même n'est économe et prudent.

L'argent est comme la baguette des enchanteurs, par le moyen de laquelle ils opéraient des miracles. Les grandes vues politiques, l'entretien du militaire, les meilleures intentions pour le soulagement des peuples, tout cela demeure engourdi, si l'argent ne le vivifie. L'économie du souverain est d'autant plus utile pour le bien public, que s'il ne se trouve pas avoir des fonds suffisants en réserve soit pour fournir aux frais de la guerre sans charger ses peuples d'impôts extraordinaires, soit pour secourir les citoyens dans des calamités publiques, toutes ces charges tombent sur les sujets, qui se trouvent sans ressource dans des temps malheureux où ils ont si grand besoin d'assistance. Aucun gouvernement ne peut se passer d'impôts ; soit républicain soit monarchique il en a un égal besoin. Il faut bien que le magistrat chargé de toute la besogne publique ait de quoi vivre que les juges soient payés, pour les empêcher de prévariquer, que le soldat soit entretenu, afin qu'il ne commette point de violences faute d'avoir de quoi subsister ; il faut de même que les personnes préposées au maniement des finances soient assez bien payées pour que le besoin ne les oblige pas d'administrer infidèlement les deniers publics. Ces différentes dépenses demandent des sommes considérables ; ajoutez-y encore quelque argent mis annuellement de côté pour les cas extraordinaires : voilà cependant ce qui doit être nécessairement pris sur le peuple. Le grand art consiste à lever ces fonds sans fouler les citoyens. Pour que les taxes soient égales et non arbitraires, l'on fait des cadastres, qui, s'ils sont classifiés avec exactitude, proportionnent les charges selon les moyens des individus ; cela est si nécessaire, qu'une faute impardonnable en finance serait si les impôts, maladroitement répartis, dégoûtaient l'agriculteur de ses travaux ; il doit, ayant acquitté ses droits, pouvoir encore vivre avec une certaine aisance, lui et sa famille. Bien loin d'opprimer les pères nourriciers de l'État, il faut les encourager à bien cultiver leurs terres ; c'est en quoi consiste la véritable

richesse du pays. La terre fournit les comestibles les plus nécessaires, et ceux qui la travaillent sont, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, les vrais pères nourriciers de la société.

On m'opposera peut-être que la Hollande subsiste sans que ses champs lui rapportent la centième partie de ce qu'elle consume. Je réponds à cette objection que c'est un petit État, chez lequel le commerce supplée à l'agriculture ; mais plus un gouvernement est vaste, plus l'économie rurale a besoin d'être encouragée.

Une autre espèce d'impôts qu'on lève sur les villes, ce sont les accises. Elles veulent être maniées avec des mains adroites, pour ne point charger les comestibles les plus nécessaires à la vie, comme le pain, la petite bière, la viande, &c., ce qui retomberait sur les soldats, sur les ouvriers et sur les artisans ; d'où il s'ensuivrait, pour le malheur du peuple, que la main-d'œuvre rehausserait de prix ; par conséquent les marchandises deviendraient si chères, qu'on en perdrait le débit étranger. C'est ce qui arrive maintenant en Hollande et en Angleterre. Ces deux nations, ayant contracté des dettes immenses dans les dernières guerres, ont créé de nouveaux impôts pour en payer le dividende, mais comme leur maladresse en a chargé la main-d'œuvre, ils ont presque écrasé leurs manufactures. De là, la cherté en Hollande étant augmentée, ces républicains font fabriquer leurs draps à Verviers et à Liège, et l'Angleterre a perdu un débit considérable de ces laines en Allemagne. Pour obvier à ces abus, le souverain doit souvent se souvenir de l'état du pauvre peuple, se mettre à la place d'un paysan et d'un manufacturier, et se dire alors : Si j'étais né dans la classe de ces citoyens dont les bras sont le capital, que désirerais-je du souverain ? Ce que le bon sens alors lui indiquera, son devoir est de le mettre en pratique. Il se trouve des provinces, dans la plupart des États de l'Europe, où les paysans, attachés à la glèbe, sont serfs de leurs gentilshommes ; c'est de toutes les conditions la plus malheureuse et celle qui révolte

le plus l'humanité. Assurément aucun homme n'est né pour être l'esclave de son semblable ; on déteste avec raison un pareil abus, et l'on croit qu'il ne faudrait que vouloir pour abolir cette coutume barbare ; mais il n'en est pas ainsi, elle tient à d'anciens contrats faits entre les possesseurs des terres et les colons. L'agriculture est arrangée en conséquence des services des paysans ; en voulant abolir tout d'un coup cette abominable gestion, on bouleverserait entièrement l'économie des terres, et il faudrait en partie indemniser la noblesse des pertes qu'elle souffrirait en ses revenus.

Ensuite s'offre l'article des manufactures et du commerce, non moins important. Pour qu'un pays se conserve dans une situation florissante, il est de toute nécessité que la balance du commerce lui soit avantageuse ; s'il paye plus pour les importations qu'il ne gagne par les exportations, il faut nécessairement qu'il s'appauvrisse d'année en année. Qu'on se figure un bourse où il y a cent ducats : tirez-en journellement un, et n'y remettez rien, vous conviendrez qu'au bout de cent jours la bourse sera vide. Voici les moyens d'obvier à cette perte : faire manufacturer toutes les premières matières qu'on possède, faire travailler les matières étrangères pour y gagner la main-d'œuvre et travailler à bon marché pour se procurer de débit étranger. Quant au commerce, il roule sur trois points : sur le superflu de vos denrées, que vous exportez ; sur celles de vos voisins, qui vous enrichissent en les vendant ; et sur les marchandises étrangères que vos besoins exigent et que vous importez. C'est sur ces productions que nous venons d'indiquer que doit se régler le commerce d'un État ; voilà de quoi il est susceptible par la nature des choses. L'Angleterre, la Hollande, la France, l'Espagne, le Portugal, ont des possessions aux deux Indes et des ressources plus étendues pour leur marine marchande que les autres royaumes ; profiter des avantages qu'on a, et ne rien entreprendre au delà de ses forces, c'est le conseil de la sagesse.

Il nous reste à parler des moyens les plus propres pou

maintenir invariablement l'abondance des vivres, dont la société a un besoin indispensable pour demeurer florissante. La première chose est d'avoir soin de la bonne culture des terres, de défricher tous les terrains qui sont capables de rapport, d'augmenter les troupeaux pour gagner d'autant plus de lait, de beurre, de fromage et d'engrais ; d'avoir ensuite un relevé exact de la quantité de boisseaux des différentes espèces de grains gagnés dans de bonnes, dans de médiocres et dans de mauvaises années ; d'en décompter la consommation, et, par ce résultat, de s'instruire de ce qu'il y a de superflu, dont l'exportation doit être permise, ou de ce qui manque à la consommation, et que le besoin demande qu'on se procure. Tout souverain attaché au bien public est obligé de se pourvoir de magasins abondamment fournis, pour suppléer à la mauvaise récolte et pour prévenir la famine. Nous avons vu en Allemagne dans les mauvaises années de 1771 et de 1772, les malheurs que la Saxe et les provinces de l'Empire ont soufferts, parce que cette précaution si utile avait été négligée. Le peuple broyait l'écorce des chênes, qui lui servait d'aliment. Cette misérable nourriture accéléra sa mort ; nombre de familles ont péri sans secours ; c'était une désolation universelle. D'autres, pâles, blêmes et décharnés, se sont expatriés pour chercher des secours ailleurs ; leur vue excitait la compassion, un cœur d'airain y aurait été sensible. Quel reproches leurs magistrats ne devaient-ils pas se faire d'être les spectateurs de ces calamités sans y pouvoir porter de remède !

Nous passons maintenant à un autre article, aussi intéressant peut-être. Il est peu de pays où les citoyens aient des opinions pareilles sur la religion ; elles diffèrent souvent entièrement ; il en est d'autres qu'on appelle des sectes. La question s'élève alors : Faut-il que tous les citoyens pensent de même, ou peut-on permettre à chacun de penser à sa guise ? Voilà d'abord de sombres politiques qui vous disent : Tout le monde doit être de la même opinion, pour que rien ne divise les citoyens. Le théologien y

ajoute : Quiconque ne pense pas comme moi est damné, et il ne convient pas que mon souverain soit roi des damnés ; il faut donc les rôtir dans ce monde, pour qu'ils prospèrent d'autant mieux dans l'autre. On répond à cela que jamais une société ne pensera de même ; que chez les nations chrétiennes la plupart sont anthropomorphites ; que chez les catholiques le grand nombre est idolâtre, parce qu'on ne me persuadera jamais qu'un manant sache distinguer le culte de latrie et d'hyperdulie ; il adore de bonne foi l'image qu'il invoque. Voilà donc nombre d'hérétiques dans toutes les sectes chrétiennes ; de plus, chacun croit ce qui lui paraît vraisemblable. On peu contraindre par violence un pauvre misérable à prononcer un certain formulaire, auquel il dénie son consentement intérieur ; ainsi le persécuteur n'a rien gagné. Mais si l'on remonte à l'origine de la société, il est de toute évidence que le souverain n'a aucun droit sur la façon de penser des citoyens. Ne faudrait-il pas être en démence pour se figurer que des hommes ont dit à un homme leur semblable : Nous vous élevons au-dessus de nous, parce que nous aimons à être esclaves, et nous vous donnons la puissance de diriger nos pensées à votre volonté ? Ils ont dit au contraire : Nous avons besoin de vous pour maintenir les lois auxquelles nous voulons obéir, pour nous gouverner sagement, pour nous défendre ; du reste, nous exigeons de vous que vous respectiez notre liberté. Voilà la sentence prononcée, elle est sans appel, et même cette tolérance est si avantageuse aux sociétés où elle est établie qu'elle fait le bonheur de l'État. Dès que tout culte est libre, tout le monde est tranquille ; au lieu que la persécution a donné lieu aux guerres civiles les plus sanglantes, les plus longues et les plus destructives. Le moindre mal qu'attire la persécution est de faire émigrer les persécutés ; la France a eu des provinces dont la population a souffert, et qui se ressentent encore de la révocation de l'édit de Nantes.

Ce sont là, en général, les devoirs qu'un prince doit

remplir. Afin qu'il ne s'en écarte jamais, il doit se rappeler souvent qu'il est homme comme le moindre de ses sujets ; s'il est le premier juge, le premier général, le premier financier, le premier ministre de la société, ce n'est pas pour qu'il représente, mais afin qu'il en remplisse les devoirs. Il n'est que le premier serviteur de l'État, obligé d'agir avec probité, avec sagesse et avec un entier désintéressement, comme si à chaque moment il devait rendre compte de son administration à ses citoyens. Ainsi il est coupable s'il prodigue l'argent du peuple, le produit des impôts, en luxe, en faste, en débauches, lui qui doit veiller aux bonnes mœurs qui sont les gardiennes des lois, qui doit perfectionner l'éducation nationale, et non la pervertir par de mauvais exemples. C'est un objet des plus importants que la conservation des bonnes mœurs dans leur intégrité ; le souverain peut y contribuer beaucoup en distinguant et récompensant les citoyens qui ont fait des actions vertueuses, en témoignant du mépris pour ceux dont la dépravation ne rougit plus de ses dérèglements. Le prince doit désapprouver hautement toute action déshonnête, et refuser des distinctions à ceux qui sont incorrigibles. Il est encore un objet intéressant qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue et qui, s'il était négligé, porterait un préjudice irréparable aux bonnes mœurs ; c'est quand le prince distingue trop des personnes qui, sans mérite, possèdent de grandes richesses. Ces honneurs prodigués mal à propos confirment le public dans le préjugé vulgaire qu'il suffit d'avoir du bien pour être considéré. Dès lors l'intérêt et la cupidité secouent le frein qui les retenait ; chacun veut accumuler des richesses ; on emploie les voies les plus iniques pour les acquérir ; la corruption gagne, elle s'enracine, elle devient générale ; les hommes à talents, les hommes vertueux sont méprisés, et le public n'honore que ces bâtards de Midas dont la grande dépense et le faste l'éblouissent. Pour empêcher que les mœurs nationales ne se pervertissent jusqu'à cet horrible excès, le prince doit être sans cesse

attentif à ne distinguer que le mérite personnel et à ne témoigner que du mépris pour l'opulence sans mœurs et sans vertus. Au reste, comme le souverain est proprement le chef d'une famille de citoyens, le père de ses peuples, dans toutes les occasions il doit servir de dernier refuge aux malheureux, tenir lieu de père aux orphelins, secourir les veuves, avoir des entrailles pour le dernier misérable comme pour le premier courtisan, et répandre des libéralités sur ceux qui, privés de tout secours, ne peuvent trouver d'assistance que par ses bienfaits.

Voilà, selon les principes que nous avons établis au commencement de cet essai, l'idée exacte qu'on doit se former des devoirs d'un souverain et de la seule manière qui peut rendre bon et avantageux le gouvernement monarchique. Si bien des princes ont une conduite différente, il faut l'attribuer au peu de réflexion qu'ils ont fait sur leur institution et sur les devoirs qui en dérivent. Ils ont porté une charge dont ils ont méconnu le poids et l'importance, ils se sont fourvoyés faute de connaissances, car dans nos temps l'ignorance fait commettre plus de fautes que la méchanceté. Cette esquisse de souverain paraîtra peut-être aux censeurs l'archétype des stoiciens, l'idée de sage qu'ils avaient imaginé, qui n'exista jamais, et dont le seul Marc-Aurèle approcha le plus près. Nous souhaitons que ce faible essai soit capable de former des Marc-Aurèles ; ce serait la plus belle récompense à laquelle nous puissions nous attendre, et qui ferait en même temps le bien de l'humanité. Nous devons cependant ajouter à ceci qu'un prince qui fournirait la carrière laborieuse que nous avons tracée ne parviendrait pas à une perfection entière, parce qu'avec toute la bonne volonté possible, il pourrait se tromper dans le choix de ceux qu'il emploierait à l'administration des affaires ; parce qu'on pourrait lui représenter les choses sous un faux jour ; que ses ordres ne seraient pas exécutés ponctuellement ; qu'on voilerait des iniquités de façon qu'elles ne parviendraient pas à sa connaissance ;

que des employés durs et entiers mettraient trop de rigueur et de hauteur dans leur gestion ; enfin, parce que, dans un pays étendu, le prince ne saurait être partout. Tel est donc et sera le destin des choses d'ici-bas, que jamais on n'atteindra au degré de perfection qu'exige le bonheur des peuples, et qu'en fait de gouvernement, comme pour toute autre chose, il faudra se contenter de ce qui est le moins défectueux.

CHAPTER XVII

INSTRUCTION AU MAJOR BORCKE (1751)

Je vous confie l'éducation de mon neveu, l'héritier présomptif de la couronne ; et comme il est très-différent de bien élever un particulier, ou celui qui est destiné à gouverner des États, je vous donne ici une instruction sur toutes les choses que vous devez observer.

I°. Touchant les maîtres :

Il faut que mon neveu parcoure l'histoire ancienne, qu'il sache les différentes monarchies qui se sont succédé, de l'histoire grecque surtout ce qui se passa dans la guerre d'Artaxerce, de Philippe et d'Alexandre, dans l'histoire romaine, le temps des guerres puniques et de César. Il ne faut point lui fatiguer la mémoire par les noms des princes qui se sont succédé, pourvu qu'il sache ceux des hommes illustres qui ont joué un grand rôle dans leur patrie.

Il ne suffit pas de lui apprendre l'histoire comme à un perroquet ; le grand usage des faits anciens est de les comparer aux modernes, de développer les causes qui ont produit des révolutions, de montrer comme pour l'ordinaire le vice est puni et la vertu récompensée. Il faut, de plus, lui faire remarquer que les historiens anciens ne sont pas toujours véridiques, et qu'il faut examiner et juger avant de croire. La partie de l'histoire la plus essentielle et la plus indispensable, c'est celle qui prend à Charlemagne et qui finit à nos jours ; j'entends par histoire celle de

l'Europe. Il la lui faut faire étudier avec soin, ne s'attacher qu'aux faits principaux, et n'entrer dans un plus grand détail qu'à la guerre de trente ans. Qu'il apprenne l'histoire de sa maison, cela va sans dire.

En apprenant la géographie, il est nécessaire de lui donner une idée des états et de leur gouvernement ; et comme cette étude va très bien avec celle de l'histoire, on peut, en lui enseignant l'une, lui apprendre l'autre en même temps.

Dans quelque temps on pourra lui faire un petit cours de logique dépouillé de toute pédanterie, et autant qu'il en faut pour qu'il discerne de lui-même le point faux d'un raisonnement et en quoi une proposition n'est pas juste. Ensuite on pourra lui faire lire les orateurs, Cicéron, Démosthène, quelques tragédies de Racine, &c.

Quand il aura quelques années de plus, on pourra lui donner un abrégé des opinions des philosophes et des différentes religions, sans lui inspirer de haine pour aucune, en lui faisant voir qu'elles adorent toutes Dieu, mais par des moyens différents. Il ne faut pas qu'il ait trop de considération pour le prêtre qui l'instruit, et il faut qu'il ne croie les choses qu'après les avoir examinées.

J'en reviens à la religion catholique. Elle est assez étendue en Silésie, dans les duchés de Clèves et ailleurs. Si cet enfant devenait calviniste fanatique, tout serait perdu. Il est très-nécessaire d'empêcher même le prêtre de dire dévotement des injures aux papistes ; mais le gouverneur doit adroitement faire sentir à son élève que rien n'est plus dangereux que lorsque les catholiques ont le dessus dans un pays, par rapport aux persécutions, à l'ambition des papes, et qu'un prince protestant est bien plus le maître chez lui qu'un prince catholique.

Il s'entend de soi-même que mon neveu apprenne à lire, à écrire, à compter ; ainsi je passe ces articles sous silence. Il est trop jeune pour apprendre les fortifications, il en sera temps quand il aura dix ou onze ans.

Les exercices comme danser, faire les armes et monter à cheval peuvent s'apprendre l'après-midi, dans le temps de la digestion. Si l'enfant avait envie d'apprendre le latin, le polonais ou l'italien, il ne dépendra que de lui ; mais s'il n'y marque pas d'inclination, il ne faut pas le presser là-dessus, de même que la musique.

Voici pour ses études et ses exercices. Votre grand art sera de lui faire le tout avec plaisir, de bannir la pédanterie de ces études et de lui en faire venir le goût ; c'est pourquoi, au commencement surtout, il ne faut pas charger la dose.

Nous en venons à présent à la plus grande et essentielle partie de l'éducation, qui est celle des mœurs. Ni vous ni toutes les puissances de l'univers ne sauraient changer le caractère d'un enfant ; tout ce que peut l'éducation, c'est de modérer la violence des passions. Traitez mon neveu comme un particulier qui doit faire sa fortune ; dites-lui que s'il a des défauts, ou s'il n'apprend rien, il sera méprisé de tout le monde. Citez lui l'exemple du M. de Schwedt et de Henri. Il ne faut point lui mettre du vent en tête, et l'élever tout simplement. Qu'il soit obligeant envers tout le monde, et que s'il fait une grossièreté à quelqu'un, que celui-là la lui rende sur-le-champ. Qu'il apprenne que tous les hommes sont égaux, et que la naissance n'est qu'une chimère, si elle n'est pas soutenue par le mérite. Laissez-le parler tout seul avec tout le monde, pour qu'il devienne hardi. Qu'importe qu'il parle de tort et travers ? On sait que c'est un enfant, et, dans toute son éducation, faites, autant qu'il sera en vous, qu'il agisse par lui-même, et qu'il ne s'accoutume point à se laisser mener ; que ses sottises soient à lui, de même que les bonnes choses qu'il fera.

Il est d'une très-grande importance de lui inspirer du goût pour le militaire ; pour cette raison il faut dans toutes les occasions lui dire tant vous-même que de lui faire dire par d'autres que tout homme de naissance qui n'est pas soldat n'est qu'un misérable. Il faut le mener tant qu'il

veut voir des troupes. On peut lui montrer les cadets et en faire venir avec le temps cinq ou six chez lui faire l'exercice ; que cela soit un amusement et non pas un devoir, car le grand art est de lui donner du goût pour ce métier, et ce serait tout perdre que de l'ennuyer ou de le rebuter. Qu'il parle à tout le monde, à un cadet, à un soldat, à un bourgeois, à un officier, pour qu'il devienne hardi.

Qu'on lui inspire surtout de l'attachement pour ce pays, et que personne ne lui tienne des discours que de bon patriote ; et sur toute sorte de sujets et de discours on peut y glisser quelques réflexions de morale, qui tendent à lui prêcher l'humanité, la bonté et les sentiments qu'il convient à un homme d'honneur et surtout à un prince d'avoir.

Je veux que, quand il sera plus âgé, il commence à faire le service de lieutenant, pour qu'il passe tout les grades ; ainsi il ne faut point lui mettre du vent dans la tête. Que les officiers qui dînent avec lui l'attaquent et l'agacent pour le rendre hardi et gai, et qu'il voie le plus de monde que se pourra. Dans ses heures de récréation, s'il a envie de voir des enfants de son âge, cela ne fera pas de mal ; il est un peu taciturne, et il est très-nécessaire de l'éveiller ; c'est pourquoi vous vous appliquerez à le rendre le plus gai que possible. Dans toutes les occasions vous aurez grande attention à lui inculquer le respect et l'amour qu'il doit à son père, à sa mère, et la déférence envers ses parents. Quand vous le connaîtrez davantage il faudra voir quelle sera sa passion. Dieu nous garde de la détruire ! mais travaillons à la modérer. Quand il est dans son particulier, qu'il ne fasse jamais des choses sans en rendre raison, à moins que ce ne soit dans ses heures de récréation. S'il est souple, soyez doux, s'il est rétif, donnez-vous toute l'autorité qu'il vous convient, punissez-le en lui ôtant l'épée, en le mettant aux arrêts, et, tant qu'il se peut, en le piquant d'honneur ; jusqu'à présent il paraît fort doux, mais avec l'âge il se développera davantage.

Vous rendrez toutes les semaines compte de sa conduite au père, et à moi tous les mois. S'il y a quelque cas extraordinaire, vous pourrez toujours recourrir à moi. Ne le rendez pas timide par de trop grands ménagements pour sa santé, ou par crainte que malheur n'arrive. Il faut avoir un grand soin de lui, mais il ne faut pas qu'il s'en aperçoive, cela le rendrait douillet, timide et pusillanime. Mon frère pourra régler ses heures comme il le jugera à propos, et vous pourrez prendre vos mesures là-dessus.

Cette instruction n'est bonne que jusqu'à l'âge de dix à douze ans, où il vous en faudra une autre proportionnée aux progrès de mon neveu, à son âge et aux circonstances.

Fait à Potsdam, ce 24 Septembre 1751.

(*Signé*) FRÉDÉRIC.

CHAPTER XVIII

AU MINISTRE D'ÉTAT, COMTE DE FINCKENSTEIN, A BERLIN

INSTRUCTION SECRÈTE POUR LE COMTE DE FINCK

BERLIN, 10 *Janvier* 1757.

DANS la situation critique où se trouvent nos affaires, je dois vous donner mes ordres, pour que, dans tous les cas malheureux qui sont dans la possibilité des évènements, vous soyez autorisé aux partis qu'il faut prendre.

S'il arrivait—de quoi le Ciel préserve!—qu'une de mes armées en Saxe fût totalement battue, ou bien que les Français chassassent les Hanoveriens de leur pays et s'y établissent et nous menaçassent d'une invasion dans la Vieille-Marche, ou que les Russes pénétrassent par la Nouvelle-Marche, il faut sauver la famille royale, les principaux dicastères, les ministres et le directoire. Si nous sommes battus en Saxe du côté de Leipzig, le lieu le plus propre pour le transport de la famille et du trésor est à Cüstrin; il faut, en ce cas, que la famille royale et tous ci-dessus nommés aillent, escortés de toute la garnison, à Cüstrin. Si les Russes entraient par la Nouvelle-Marche, ou qu'il nous arrivât un malheur en Lusace, il faudrait que tout se transportât à Magdebourg. Enfin, le dernier refuge est à Stettin; mais il ne faut y aller qu'à la dernière extrémité. La garnison, la famille royale et le trésor sont inséparables et vont toujours ensemble; il faut y ajouter les diamants de la couronne et l'argenterie des grands apartements, qui en

pareil cas, ainsi que la vaisselle d'or, doit être incontinent monnayée.

S'il arrivait que je fusse tué, il faut que les affaires continuent leur train sans la moindre altération et sans qu'on s'aperçoive qu'elles sont en d'autres mains ; et en ce cas il faut hâter serments et hommages, tant ici qu'en Prusse, et surtout en Silésie.

Si j'avais la fatalité d'être pris prisonnier par l'ennemi, je défends qu'on ait le moindre égard pour ma personne, ni qu'on fasse la moindre réflexion sur ce que je pourrais écrire de ma détention. Si pareil malheur m'arrivait, je veux me sacrifier pour l'État, et il faut qu'on obéisse à mon frère, lequel, ainsi que tous mes ministres et généraux, me répondront de leur tête qu'on n'offrira ni province ni rançon pour moi, et que l'on continuera la guerre, en poussant ses avantages tout comme si je n'avais jamais existé dans le monde.

J'espère et je dois croire que vous, comte Finck, n'aurez pas besoin de faire usage de cette instruction ; mais, en cas de malheur, je vous autorise à l'employer, et, marque que c'est, après une mûre et saine délibération, ma ferme et constante volonté, je la signe de ma main, et la munis de mon cachet.

FRÉDÉRIC, R.

CHAPTER XIX

THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS MEN [1]

Petition signed by the League of Agriculturists, the German Peasants League, the Westphalian Peasants Society, the Central Association of German Industrialists, the League of Industrialists, and the German Middle-class Association.

'Your Excellency,—Together with the whole German people, the German men of business engaged in agriculture, the manufacturing industries, commerce, and trade, are firmly determined to persevere in the struggle for life or death which has been forced upon our country. They will persevere to the last, and at whatever cost, so that Germany may issue from the struggle externally stronger, and that it may possess the guarantee of a lasting peace and the guarantee of an assured national economic and cultural development.

'In view of this aim and the readiness of the whole nation to make the necessary sacrifices, it is only natural that the people have been alarmed by rumours regarding peace negotiations, and particularly regarding the conclusion of a separate peace with England, which was to be based upon certain English wishes and demands.

'In these circumstances the declaration of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* that nobody endowed with common sense could think of giving up the advantages arising from the favourable military position by a premature peace with any one of our enemies has been received everywhere with satisfaction.

[1] Reprinted from Grumbach, *Germany's Annexationist Aims* (John Murray, 1917).

'That determination should not be affected by a less favourable or a less secure position of the war. Otherwise, the external and internal aims which have been indicated by his Majesty the Emperor would be lost sight of. These aims can be obtained only by the military enforcement of a peace which gives us a greater security for our frontiers in the West and the East, which broadens the basis of Germany's naval power, and which gives us the possibility of a powerful and unhampered development of our economic forces. Briefly, peace must bring us such an increase of our political, military, maritime, and economic power that it establishes our greater strength against the nations without.

'A peace which does not yield these results makes inevitable the renewal of the struggle at an early date under materially less favourable conditions for Germany. Therefore, no premature peace must be concluded. From such a premature peace no adequate fruits of victory can be derived.

'But there should also be no half-hearted peace, no peace which, through the defects indicated, does not lead to the full political exploitation of the final military success for which we hope!

'It must not be overlooked that the full exploitation of the favourable military position is necessary not only for securing Germany's future externally and for safeguarding its future, but that the full exploitation of victory is equally necessary during the ensuing years of peace for reasons of internal policy. Only then the people will willingly make the necessary sacrifices. The German nation does, of course, not expect the impossible. Notwithstanding its patriotism, it would consider reasonably the existence of insuperable military difficulties which would make impossible the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. However, the consequences upon the internal position of Germany would be most disastrous if, at the conclusion of peace, Germany should make concessions which are not made necessary by the military situation, if the country should prematurely end the struggle. The result would be that the returning German warriors would believe that the sole result of their bravery was an unbearable load of taxation. That would be fatal for our internal peace. Germany's gains derived from its victories must correspond to the sanguinary sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands!

'The detailed demands which must be fulfilled in the opinion of the signatories, should they be militarily obtainable, and which are necessary to strengthen Germany politically, militarily, and economically to such a degree that the country can with confidence look forward into the future, have been given in the petition adjoined which has been placed before your Excellency on March 10th of this year by the League of Agriculturists, by the German Peasant League, by the Central Association of German Industrialists, by the League of Industrialists, and by the German Middle-class Association. Since then the Christian German Peasant Associations have joined the associations named. The Petition before mentioned was worded as follows:

'"The undersigned associations have considered the question how to carry out the demand which has so frequently been made during the last few months, that the present war should be followed by an honourable peace, by a peace which corresponds with the sacrifices made, and which will be secure and lasting.

'"If we wish to answer this question we must never forget that our enemies unceasingly proclaim that Germany must be annihilated and must disappear from among the Great Powers. As these are their aims, Germany cannot find security in treaties which would be trodden under-foot as soon as convenient. On the contrary, we can find security only by weakening our enemies economically and militarily to such a degree that peace will remain secure for an indefinite time.

'"We demand the possession of a Colonial Empire which corresponds with the many-sided economic interests of Germany. We demand security for Germany's colonial policy and for her customs policy in the future. We demand a sufficient war indemnity in a suitable form. We believe that our principal aim should be to secure and improve the European basis of the German Empire, in

view of the war which has been forced upon us. Germany's position in Europe should be improved as follows:

'"BELGIUM must be placed under German law in order to secure Germany's naval, military, and economic power in the future, especially as towards England. Besides, we must remember the close connection which exists between the economically so important Belgian territory and the principal industrial districts of Germany. For these reasons Belgium must be placed under the German Empire with regard to military affairs, Customs matters, the Mint, Bank, and Postal arrangements. The Belgian railways and waterways must become part of the German transport system. In the Government and the administration of Belgium the Walloon and Flemish districts must be kept apart. At the same time, the industrial undertakings and landed properties which are so important for dominating the country must be transferred from Belgian to German hands, and arrangements must be made which ensure that the inhabitants of the country will obtain no political influence upon the German Empire.

'"As regards FRANCE. For the reasons given above, with regard to Germany's relations to England, the possession of the French shore and coast districts up to the Somme must be considered as a question of life or death for Germany's future position on the sea, for we must have access to the Atlantic. The Hinterland, which would have to be acquired at the same time, must secure the fullest economic and strategical exploitation of the newly acquired Channel ports. All further acquisitions of French territory must be exclusively based upon military and strategical considerations. The acquisition of the mining district of Briey will, however, form an exception to the principle indicated. In view of the experiences of the present war, it may be considered a matter of course that we can never again expose our frontiers to hostile invasion. We can therefore, in particular, not allow our opponents to retain Verdun and Belfort and the western slopes of the Vosges which lie between these two points. By acquiring the line of the Meuse and the French coast of the Channel, Germany would obtain

not only the ore deposits of Briey, which have already been mentioned, but also the coal districts of the Department du Nord and of the Department Pas-de-Calais.

'"In view of the experiences made in Alsace-Lorraine, it may be considered a matter of course that the population of the annexed French territory will not be allowed to obtain political influence in Germany, and that here also the important economic factors, including large and medium-sized properties, will be placed into German hands, while France should undertake to receive and to indemnify the original owners.

'"As regards THE EAST. In the first place, we should be guided by the principle that the vast increase of industrial power which we may expect to receive in the West must be balanced by equivalent acquisitions of agricultural territory in the East. The present economic structure of Germany has proved so fortunate in the course of the war that the necessity of preserving its happy balance for all time may be described as indispensable according to the general conviction of the German people.

'"In view of the necessity of strengthening not only the industrial, but also the agricultural basis of Germany, a comprehensive policy of colonisation with German agricultural colonists is indicated. The German peasants living abroad, and particularly those domiciled outside Germany, and especially in Russia, who have been deprived of their rights in consequence of the war, must be enabled to return to Germany. Their return will greatly increase the population and the military strength of the country. In view of the requirements mentioned, a considerable expansion of German territory is needed towards the East. At least part of the Baltic Provinces and of the territories to the south of them must be annexed. The aim to make the eastern frontier of Germany more easily defendable must constantly be kept in mind.

'"Recreated Eastern Prussia requires more secure frontiers. The provinces of Western Prussia, Posen, and Silesia also must no longer be allowed to remain in their present exposed position. The necessary protection can best be created by acquiring large territories farther east.

'"With regard to the granting of political rights to the inhabitants of the annexed territories, and with regard to securing within these new districts Germany's economic supremacy, the principles laid down with regard to France should apply. The war indemnity to be demanded from Russia should largely consist of land.

'"Of course these demands depend on the assumption that military results will enable us to carry them out. However, in view of the successes obtained so far, we are full of confidence that our armies and their leaders will obtain a victory which guarantees the fulfilment of these our wishes. The aims indicated must be striven for, not from love of conquest, but because a lasting peace can be secured only by achieving them. In view of the sacrifices made by them, the German people expect such a peace. Besides, the voluntary surrender of enemy lands which have been drenched with so much German blood, and which contain innumerable graves of the best Germans, would not correspond with the sentiments of the people, and with their ideas of what constitutes an honourable peace.

'"Lack of harbours on the Channel would strangle Germany's oversea development, as it has done in the past. An independent Belgium would continue to be an English *tête de pont*, a hostile base. It would mean a constant threat on the part of our enemies if the natural line of fortresses of France should be allowed to remain in the hands of the French. Russia, on the other hand, would under-estimate Germany's strength for action and power should she experience no loss of territory. Besides, if we should not acquire agricultural territory on our eastern frontier, we should diminish the possibility of strengthening Germany's military power by an adequate increase of the national population in case of a war with Russia.

'"We have the honour of acquainting your Excellency with these our views, which are held by vast numbers of Germans who do not belong to the undersigned Associations, although there may be differences of opinion with regard to certain details. At the same time, we would respectfully point out that we have sent copies of the present document

to the Ministries of the individual States of the German Empire."

'It is necessary to supplement the petition given in the foregoing. It should expressly be pointed out that the political, military, and economic aims which the German nation has in view in order to safeguard its future are closely interconnected, and cannot be treated separately. In the first place, it is clear that success in obtaining our great political aims depends on the efficacy and success of the German armies. However, the experience of the present war teaches us that in the last resort Germany's military successes and the exploitation of our victories to the fullest extent depend on the economic strength and efficiency of the German nation. Had Germany's agriculture not been able to feed the people, despite all the efforts of our enemies to starve us, had not the German manufacturing industries, German inventiveness, and German technical skill been able to maintain our independence from foreign countries, we should at last be defeated, notwithstanding the glorious successes of our victorious troops, and possibly we would by now have been vanquished.

'It follows that our demands which, at first sight, seem to be dictated by purely economic motives, must be considered from a larger point of view. They spring from the necessity of increasing Germany's national and military power to the utmost. Our demands must therefore be considered from the military point of view. This is particularly the case with regard to the acquisition of agricultural territory upon which stress has been laid in the petition, and with regard to the seizure of the ore-bearing territories of the Meurthe and Moselle, and of the French coal districts of the Departments du Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and the Belgian coal districts.

'The acquisition of adequate lands suitable for agricultural colonisation is indispensable not only with a view to broadening the basis of Germany's national economy. It is necessary not only in order to maintain the happy balance of Germany's national economy, the importance of which the present war has plainly disclosed, but also in

order to secure the powerful stream of national strength and of man-power which is provided by a mighty agriculture. This is particularly necessary if we wish to increase the number of the people and thereby Germany's military strength.

'Acquisitions in the ore and iron districts mentioned are required not only by our economic interests, but also by military necessity. That will appear clearly from the following details:

'Since August 1914, Germany's production of raw iron has increased again to nearly 1,000,000 tons per month, or has approximately doubled, and Germany's steel production has increased to more than 1,000,000 tons per month. Nevertheless, iron and steel are not abundant, but are scarce in Germany, and are still more scarce in neutral countries. The German shell works require quantities of iron and steel which formerly would have been considered incredible. For cast grey shells alone, which are an inferior substitute for drawn shells and steel shells, at least 4000 tons of raw iron have been used every day during the last few months. At the moment, the exact figures cannot be given. However, it is certain that the continuation of the war would have been impossible had the German iron and steel production not been doubled since August 1914.

'The basis of the German iron and steel production is minette ore, the preponderant importance of which is constantly increasing. This ore alone can be obtained in rapidly increasing quantities within Germany's frontiers. The production of the other German iron districts is very limited, and the importation of iron ore from overseas, even from Sweden, has become so difficult that at many works, even those outside the Luxemburg-Lorraine district, minette ore furnishes from 60 to 80 per cent. of the iron and steel produced. It follows that the war would be as good as lost should the production of minette ore be interfered with.

'How does the production of minette ore stand in the present war, and how would it stand in a future war?

'If the fortress of Longwy and the numerous French furnaces in the neighbourhood should be given back to the French, France would be able in a new war to destroy from

Longwy the following iron works in Germany and Luxemburg in a few hours by means of long-distance gun-fire:

	Kilometres distance from Longwy.
Rodingen	7
Differdingen	10
Esch	16 to 17
Oettingen	21
Rümelingen	21
Düdelingen	25

Thus, approximately 20 per cent. of the German raw iron and steel production could be eliminated by France acting from Longwy.

'A glance at the map shows further that Jarny, the minette mine of the Phœnix Company, is situated at a distance of from 13 to 15 kilometres from Verdun, and that the western ore concessions near Landres and Conflans are no farther than 26 kilometres from Verdun. To-day we bombard Dunkirk from a distance of 38 kilometres. Can anyone believe that the French would in the next war abstain from putting long-distance guns into Longwy and Verdun, in order not to disturb Germany's ore production and iron industry?

'In passing, it should be said that only the vast production of steel from minette ore enables Germany to provide agriculture with the necessary phosphoric acid since the importation of phosphates has come to an end.

'Germany's security in a future war urges us compellingly to acquire the whole of the minette territories, including the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, for without their possession the district described cannot be held.

'The possession of vast supplies of coal, and particularly of coal rich in bitumen, such as that which is found in Northern France, is at least as decisive for the issue of the war as is the possession of iron ore. Belgium and Northern France together produce more than 40,000,000 tons of coal per annum. Besides, coal is nowadays one of the determining political factors. That may be seen by the English

coal export prohibition of May 15. The industrial neutral nations must act in accordance with the will of that combatant Power which can guarantee to them the necessary supply of coal. Germany can at present not provide the coal required. Hence we are compelled to make use of Belgium's coal production, for otherwise our neutral neighbours would fall entirely under England's control. It is very probable that the deliberate expansion of the Belgian coal production has been of the greatest importance, that it has induced several of Germany's neighbour States to maintain their neutrality.

'It is generally known that our most important explosives are derived from coal, their constituents being obtained during the coking process, and that coal is important also for the production of ammonia. Coal can provide us with benzol, the only product with which we can replace the benzine which we lack. Lastly, coal furnishes us with tar, which can be converted into oil fuel, which is indispensable for naval purposes, and into lubricants. It should be pointed out that the large expansion of our torpedo-boat flotilla and of our submarine arm is impossible unless we have a vast supply of liquid fuel. The course of the present war has demonstrated the superiority of oil fuel over coal in the case of torpedo-boats, and its advantages are so striking that it would be criminal levity to disregard the lesson in the future. If our enemies secure for themselves oil-wells abroad, Germany must take care to obtain the necessary gas coal at home. In time of peace she must provide an inexhaustible supply of oil, benzol, toluol, ammonia, and naphthaline, not only in order to increase the national prosperity, but also because their possession is an indispensable part of Germany's war armament.

'In summing up, we would say that the war aims indicated will secure permanently Germany's national economy, and at the same time guarantee her military strength and her political independence and power. In addition, they will expand Germany's economic opportunities. They will provide work for the workers, and will therefore be of advantage to labour as a whole.'

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